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Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) continues to be a prominent tool for advancing or changing the 
strategic agendas of companies of all sizes around the world. Despite its popularity with corporate 
executives, deals continue to struggle to live up to expectations in terms of long-term value created. 
The Introduction  (Faelten, Driessen and Moeller; 2016; Why deals fail: And how to rescue them; 
The Economist) chapter of this chapter deals with this point, addressing the questions of why deals 
fail and how to rescue a deal which is showing early signs of failing. The chapter covers a number 
of well-known (completed and non-completed) deals, including HP’s acquisition of Autonomy, the 
Microsoft and Yahoo tie-up that never materialised and the Glazer family’s successful pursuit of 
Manchester United, over the course of the last decade which are used as case studies to illustrate 
points dealmakers often get wrong during the deal process. The conclusions made in this chapter 
shows that there are three main areas which dealmakers get wrong most often and which are seen 
to be potentially most value destroying for deals, being a lack of focus on planning, people and 
communication. 
A significant driver of M&A activity over the last decade has been global companies investing in 
emerging or developing countries by acquiring existing local businesses. This strategy has obvious 
benefits in acquiring an existing team, customers, distribution channels, etc., but also knowledge 
about ways of doing business in the local market and knowledge about culture and potential differ-
ences with the acquiring business. It is often seen as a quicker and more efficient entry strategy 
compare to a greenfield investment. However challenges are also several and includes unknowns 
and uncertainty around the legal, political, economic, financial and structural environment. Chapter 
1 and 2 explore these challenges and possible factors which can mitigate these risks. Chapter 1 
(Appadu, Faelten, Moeller and Vitkova; 2016; 'Assessing market attractiveness for mergers and ac-
quisitions: the M&A Attractiveness Index Score', European Journal of Finance) builds on work by 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) and presents a new scoring methodology designed to measure a country’s 
capability to attract and sustain business investment activity in the forms of cross-border inflow and 
domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The index and its components serve as the determi-
nant(s) of M&A activity and it is shown that the type and significance of various aspects of a country’s 
environment differs significantly at different stages of country maturity. 
Another important element of M&A activity and the success of the same is corporate governance. 
Building on the scoring methodology and the index presented in the previous chapter, Chapter 2 
(Faelten, Gietzmann and Vitkova; 2013; ‘Naked M&A transactions: How the lack of local expertise 
in cross-border deals can negatively affect acquirer performance – and how informed institutional 
investors can mitigate this effect’; Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting) explores how the 
composition and experience of a company’s board can help acquirers succeed with acquisitions in 
foreign markets. The chapter builds on theoretical and empirical work around financial geography 
including Dye and Sridhar (2002) and Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2009) and tests the hypothesis 
that deals in which long-term investors have a high level of expertise in the target firm’s region are 
more likely to perform better than if the deal is ‘naked’, i.e. when such regional expertise amongst 
the investors is low. The evidence presented confirms the hypothesis and also demonstrates that is 
strongest when the maturity for corporate transactions (see Chapter 1) of the target country is low. 
The subsequent two chapters, Chapter 3 and 4, contributes to the literature by researching the link 
between a company’s decisions to access capital markets and subsequent M&A activity. Since the 
early 1990s, when Ritter (1991) first documented the aftermarket underperformance of IPOs, there 
has been a significant number of papers published confirming his results across markets and geog-
raphies. Chapter 3 (Appadu, Faelten and Levis; 2013; ‘Acquisitions, SEOs, Divestitures and IPO 
Performance’; Chapter 17 in ‘The Handbook of Research on IPOs’) contributes to the literature by 
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empirically testing the link between the IPOs and subsequent corporate event activity. Importantly, 
the empirical results also show that such characteristics of corporate events have a defining effect 
on the aftermarket performance of IPO companies. 
The final chapter 4 (Appadu, Faelten and Levis; ‘Reverse Takeovers: Are they a Viable Alternative 
to IPOs?’) examines a unique dataset of Reverse Takeovers (RTOs) – a corporate event which 
includes a privately listed entity acquiring a publically listed entity and the merged entity lists as a 
result of the transaction - in the UK from 1995 and 2012 and compare them with a matched sample 
of IPOs. RTOs, particularly the US listings, have seen a significant amount of documented issues 
highlighted, both around poor quality of foreign listings but also due to widespread underperformance 
of the listed entities in the years following completion and the entities’ low survival rates (Gleason et 
al., 2005 and Adjei et al., 2008). The chapter concludes that due to the similar regulatory framework 
between IPOs and RTOs in the UK, there is no significant difference in follow-on event activity and 
aftermarket performance between the two types of IPOs and RTOs, leading to the elevation of RTOs 
as a viable alternative to IPOs. 
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0. Why Deals Fail: And how to rescue them 
 
Anna Faelten, Michel Driessen and Scott Moeller 
 
A note on terminology: 
There are numerous words describing deal-making, such as transaction,  acquisition, takeover, 
investment, deal and merger. The most important distinction is arguably between a merger and an 
acquisition. The technical definition of the difference –as it happens a non-standardised and debated 
one - is a topic outside of the scope of this book. That said, in general, a merger is a combination of 
two similarly-sized, often larger, leading companies in the same industry that creates a new, larger 
company, whereas an acquisition is typically a bigger company buying out the shareholders of a 
smaller one, to then integrating it within its own structure. Many practitioners use these terms 
interchangeably, but we have tried to be careful in making the above distinctions between mergers 
and acquisitions. 
0.1. Introduction 
The Three Big Mistakes of Deal-Making  
When Silicon Valley heavyweight Hewlett Packard [HP] sealed a takeover of Britain's Autonomy in 
2011, no one predicted the corporate car crash that would follow.  
There had been very few significant deals since the 2008 global financial collapse and economic 
slowdown, which helped HP’s CEO Leo Apotheker to secure a reasonably upbeat reception when 
he made his bold statement to transform the sleepy IT company into "a leader in the evolving infor-
mation economy.” 
But just 12 months later, HP had lost its reputation and its chief executive and was facing write-
downs of $8.8 billion, nearly 80 per cent of the $11 billion it paid for Autonomy. Worse, in 2012, HP 
alleged that it had been the victim of fraud by Autonomy's management and its auditors, blaming the 
losses on "serious accounting improprieties, disclosure failures, and outright misrepresentations."  
Autonomy and its founders have, as you would expect, publicly and categorically rejected such 
claims. HP, on the other hand, has agreed to pay one of its shareholders, PGGM Vermogensbeheer, 
a Dutch pension fund, $100 million in damages, without admitting any liability. 
The company was and is facing years of legal battles. Irrespective of their outcome, the takeover will 
go down in history as a spectacular failure.  
High Expectations 
Founded in a garage in Palo Alto in 1939, HP was one of the original core Silicon Valley start-ups 
and later it was the world's largest manufacturer of computers.  
But as the industry developed, the company found itself stuck in the low-end margin business of 
computer hardware production and despite its hefty $95 billion market capitalization, HP's share 
price was suffering as a result. 
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Figure 0.1-A: HP’s share price – February 2009 to December 2013 
 
Under pressure from investors to improve its strategic positioning, the company brought in Leo 
Apotheker as its CEO in November 2010, with the strong expectation of immediate acquisitions.  
Apotheker was an experienced executive in the computer industry, having spent over 20 years with 
the multinational German software company SAP, and just prior to his appointment, at HP, as SAP’s 
co-CEO.   
A tie-up with Autonomy, a British entrepreneurial success story, looked like the solution to a faster 
and more innovative future growth. The company, a Cambridge University spin-off, was founded in 
1996. By the time of HP's bid, Autonomy was in the FTSE 100.  On August 18, 2011, HP announced 
a formal offer of £25.50 ($42.11) per share, a 64 per cent premium on the previous day's closing 
price.    
Headed by Dr. Mike Lynch, a Cambridge University engineer who started out building the technology 
behind music synthesizers, Autonomy was one of the fastest-growing and dynamic software busi-
nesses in the world. Its main product, the IDOL (Intelligent Data Operating Layer) platform, was 
ground-breaking and is still marketed by HP as a highly intelligent tool for indexing unstructured 
data.  
In the year of the deal, Autonomy posted record quarterly revenues of $256 million. However, some 
analysts questioned not only the value of Autonomy’s technology but also its accounting methods.  
Richard Windsor, formerly at Nomura Securities, commented on HP’s challenges to Autonomy’s ac-
counting practices: "Autonomy's detractors have been writing about this for years and there has 
been the occasional obvious sign that things were not quite right. The most common red flag was 
that cash flow in some quarters often did not match profit. This is quite unusual in a software com-
pany.” 
“It is certainly noteworthy that HP acquired Autonomy at a record price tag, only to write down most 
of the price paid less than two years later, blaming the huge write off on the very accounting practices 
which industry experts and analysts had been questioning for years." 
Whatever the legitimacy of these accounting practices, any such issues should have been dealt 
with at the all-important due diligence stages – both pre-announcement and pre-completion. 





























HP's CEO, Leo 
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in favour of Meg 
Whitman
20/11/2012
HP announce a 
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the acquisition of 
Autonomy
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On the day of the announcement Apotheker proudly told investors: "HP is taking bold, transformative 
steps to position the company as a leader in the evolving information economy. Today's announced 
plan will allow HP to drive creation of long-term shareholder value.”  
The decision to buy your way onto a new strategic path is common practice, but there are certainly 
a number of alternatives to outright M&A which perhaps would have been better and less risky for 
HP. Deciding on the right target company to acquire to reach your strategic aim is also a tricky task. 
Later in this book we highlight the need to have a ‘live’ target list where you track your most desired 
assets closely. Sealing a deal means finding both the company that is the right strategic fit but which 
is also potentially ‘in play’, that is, where a deal with the existing shareholders is even possible. It is 
certainly possible that HP suffered from a fixation on its target, Autonomy, a common error for buy-
ers, which means they had already lost a significant amount of bargaining power when negotiating 
the final price paid.  
Although HP's share price rose by 15 per cent in the wake of the announcement, reflecting an initial 
positive reaction by the investment community, it closed the day as the US market’s worst performer. 
The new strategy, as laid out by management, was apparently not credible to HP’s shareholders 
when they analysed it.  
Analysts and investors challenged the ability of HP to integrate the combined business - perhaps 
remembering HP’s challenges with its 2001 merger with Compaq - and the company faced an uphill 
battle to convince its various stakeholders that this large bet was a good one.  As we will demon-
strate, effective communication on the day of the deal’s announcement is crucial, as it is manage-
ment’s chance to position the strategy and value behind the deal and to align the views of internal 
(who have known about the deal perhaps for as long as several months) and external stakeholders 
(who only find out about the deal with the public announcement).  
Things quickly went from bad to worse for HP. Just weeks later, Apotheker was fired and replaced 
with Meg Whitman, previously CEO of eBay. Then, in May 2012 after a mere eight months with HP, 
Lynch - who was a crucial part of the Autonomy takeover - left, taking much of Autonomy’s remaining 
management team with him.  
Many cited a clear culture clash between the corporate bureaucracy of HP and the more entrepre-
neurial, flat-structured Autonomy. As we will discuss throughout this book, a failure to recognize 
cultural differences between the buyer and target - effectively choosing to ignore the human compo-
nent of any deal - is one of the most oft-cited reason for M&A failure.   
These days – but also at the time of the HP / Autonomy deal -- the due diligence process done rightly 
includes a comprehensive segment on culture. We will highlight later in the book the importance of 
that cultural fit, demonstrating that cultural compatibility or potential differences must be raised early 
in the deal conception phase, ideally well before any public announcements and especially if people 
are a key component of profitability, as was the case with Autonomy.  
The departure of Lynch and his team was only the opening sequence of a very long blame game 
leading, as mentioned earlier, to the now infamous $8.8 billion write-down announcement in Novem-
ber 2012.  
Responding to allegations of fraud, Lynch replied in an open letter: "As we have said before, we 
believe the problem with the Autonomy acquisition by HP lies in the mismanagement of that business 
by HP under its ownership, making it impossible for Autonomy to deliver on HP’s expectations. Au-
tonomy’s accounts were fully audited by Deloitte throughout the period in question and Deloitte has 
confirmed that it conducted its audit work in full compliance with regulation and professional stand-
ards. We refuse to be a scapegoat for HP’s own failings.” 
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Sadly, the HP and Autonomy story is far from unique. RBS’s acquisition together with Fortis and 
Banco Santander of ABN AMRO also crosses the line between the merely misguided and downright 
disastrous.  
In this book, we will use these and many other examples of both famous global companies and 
smaller, less well-known firms to demonstrate how much value has been destroyed by ill-considered 
or poorly executed M&A deals - and how that could have been avoided. As we will show, there are 
a number of errors which deal-makers appear to get wrong on a consistent basis, a common and 
recurring set of mistakes if you will. As presented throughout this book, we have summarised these 
in a list of tips and guidelines, intended to help buyers and sellers to avoid the usual pitfalls and 
therefore preserve value throughout the deal process.  
Our assessment of these deals is, by necessity, an analysis of their impact only in the broad period 
following the deals. For example, following the UK Government’s inevitable re-flotation of RBS, the 
bank it bailed out during the 2008 financial crisis, it is conceivable - if unlikely - that events as yet 
unknown could propel RBS to the top of global banking’s profitability league in, say, fifteen to twenty 
years’ time after the deal with ABN Amro. But should that happen, none of the credit will belong to 
the men and women who executed the deal in 2007. 
 
Introducing The Big Three 
There were several manifest failures in the HP-Autonomy deal, exhibited as well in many of the deals 
we discuss in this book. But we have distilled them to three overarching issues - failure of planning, 
failure of communication and failure to properly consider the impact of people - which we believe are 
the Three Big Mistakes of Deal-Making. 
1) Planning 
This supposedly transformational acquisition of Autonomy was by its nature inherently risky, 
even for HP, a company valued at nearly $100 billion. The cost of Autonomy was sizeable at 
$11 billion. Its importance for HP was magnified because the company was pinning its future 
on the transaction to deliver strategic wins in terms of culture change in the core business as 
well as cross-selling and its own market position.   
If you don’t have a clear, detailed, well-thought out and articulated deal strategy, no planning 
for its integration will be sufficient: the two are inherently linked. Planning also entails being 
prepared for any pushback from the regulators, an increasingly important issue for corporate 
deal-makers due, among other factors, to the rise in cross-border acquisitions globally. 
While large transformational deals are not automatically destined for failure, perhaps a more 
gradual shift towards high-end software products, buying smaller, more easily digestible tar-
gets, would have worked better for HP. Hubris is one of the most common M&A pitfalls for 
business leaders who are prone either to over-estimate their own ability or under-estimate 
the scale of the task.  
2) Communication 
HP’s failure to communicate convincingly the benefits of the deal to its shareholders, as 
demonstrated by the significant fall in share price on the day of the announcement, was the 
start of the downfall for the transaction.  
Effective communication is often the reflection of a well prepared and well aligned combined 
management team; the case for synergies should be clearly articulated in the due diligence 
phase and the 100 days integration plan written by the time the deal is announced.  
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Knowing that in any deal there are significant risks, it was certainly appropriate for investors 
and analysts, for example, to ask questions about the price HP paid for Autonomy.  
The deal did, as stated, represent a significant premium on Autonomy’s share price, implying 
that HP expected to generate synergies from the deal worth, as suggested by several ana-
lysts at the time, a minimum of $2.9 billion on a net present value basis. Add to that the fact 
that HP was paying 24 times the trailing Earnings before Interest, Tax and Depreciation 
[EBITDA], and most analysts would say that the price was a stretch. And this figure does not 
include costs associated with transaction such as advisor fees and integration costs, which 
were likely another 15-20 per cent of the deal’s price at a minimum. 
HP saw the transaction as the facilitator of a significant strategic shift towards high-end soft-
ware and indeed as a tool to change the culture of its traditional core business. But when a 
buyer is attracted to a target because of its culture, an understanding of the specific compo-
nents that make this culture so unique is pivotal to making the deal work. HP might have 
admired Autonomy’s culture, but it did not truly understand it nor how or even whether it could 
be adopted by HP’s other divisions.  
3) People 
Poor communication and a lack of understanding of the culture of Autonomy led to the third 
failure to appreciate, evaluate and consider the value of people. Autonomy’s culture was 
what HP said it wanted, yet it failed to lock in and learn from its expensively acquired new 
management team and its different, more entrepreneurial culture.   
In summary, HP failed in all three areas, even though a failure in just one of the Big Three could 
have been sufficient to make the deal fail overall.  Generally speaking it is necessary to be successful 
in all three but certain deals may require a focus in one area more than another.  
We will discuss the significant difference between valuation and pricing in M&A in later, but the high 
price paid in this case implied that HP knowingly paid a premium over Autonomy’s pre-deal market 
valuation. HP must have seen real strategic businessvalue in Autonomy as well as its culture and 
management team, aspects that are difficult to assign a financial value to. They would have also 
assumed significant post deal synergies, helping to justify the price paid. In hindsight, it is quite clear 
that those synergies were overstated or the estimated risk of delivering the same was understated. 
As the management team of Autonomy pointed out following HP’s court filing disclosures in Sep-
tember 2014, HP’s own estimated revenue synergies of $7.4bn as a result of the two businesses 
operating as a combined was certainly a hefty target and, they claimed, the real reason behind the 
significant write-down. In their own court filings, HP, on the other hand, pushed the argument of 
misstated underlying revenues which had led them to believe Autonomy had more potential – and 
value to them – than was actually the case. The correct valuation is the result of sound and achiev-
able financial forecasts based on accurate and well-researched due diligence data, none of which 
appeared to have been present in this particular deal.  
Readers may be surprised that although we reference price and value here, we do not categorise it 
as one of our Three Big Mistakes.  
Whilst we do consider pricing to be a significant potential concern, we do not believe mis-pricing is 
terminal. Firstly, there is no such thing as the ‘one right price’ in an M&A context. What the buyer 
ultimate pays for the target is based on its own views regarding the financial future value of the target 
including the potential synergies as a result of the two businesses combining and any changes that 
the buyer may make post-deal. Clearly, the inputs into a financial model to determine the value will 
be different from bidder to bidder and those are ultimately different from the sellers’ view who see 
their company on a stand-alone basis. The difference here is what creates the opportunity to transact 
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a deal. So the price paid will be incorrect for anyone but the buyer that closes the deal. The highest 
bidder will usually – but not always – prevail and even though a full price was paid, it can be deemed 
a success if the underlying predictions are correct. 
Secondly, determination of the price paid as ‘right’ can only be done with the benefit of hindsight. 
There are a plethora of other factors which can destroy value for the acquirer. We have seen many 
deals where the pricing was certainly considered as full and the buyer was able to achieve its aims 
despite this; in fact mis-pricing in this context - where a price was paid well above market expecta-
tions - is the one major error companies can actually recover from. That said, appropriate pricing, 
meaning NOT overpaying, does make success easier to achieve. 
Few M&A transactions collapse as dramatically as HP’s takeover of Autonomy, but a far greater 
proportion do fall far short of their promise to deliver on the expected value creation.  
Numerous studies from the 1980s and 1990s show a failure rate as high as 70-80 per cent. But it is 
getting better.  The best-case scenario in more recent studies is a success rate of just under 50 per 
cent, as noted earlier. Given the opportunities for value destruction of such a significant corporate 
event, a 50/50 hit rate is hardly satisfactory. 
The broader implications are highly significant. Mergers and acquisitions are part of the fabric of 
economic life. They help drive a significant proportion of corporate growth, whether in large, mature 
companies or recent start-ups. In fact, globally somewhere between 25,000 and 35,000 M&A deals 
are completed annually. They are not a rare phenomenon.   
According to one study, the chance of a Fortune 1000 company being involved in a merger or ac-
quisition in any given year is close to 30 per cent. Of all the companies that have been listed on the 
UK stock exchange since 1995, our own research indicated 25 per cent announced an acquisition 
within 12 months of listing. By their second year that rises to 41 per cent and by the third year, more 
than 50 per cent.  M&A deals are here to stay. 
M&A is, we believe, one of the most fascinating activities in the business world. However, corporates 
more often than not get them wrong.  We have purposefully avoided a bias towards coverage of only 
private or only public deals as we believe the mistakes that are often made are the same for either 
type of deal.  
For obvious reasons of data availability and familiarity, the case studies used in this book are often 
of larger deals including household names. But there is no reason to believe that the lessons learnt 
from those transactions are not applicable to smaller deals between mid-sized or small businesses. 
In deals between smaller companies and private deals, albeit often less process driven as you are 
likely to have less headache in dealing with regulators and a large and diverse shareholder base, 
you are quite often dealing with founder-owned businesses who, rightly, are very emotionally at-
tached to the businesses they have built. Navigating the politics and dynamics between negotiations 
(when the parties are very much on opposite sides) at the same time as you are devising a combined 
business plan and organization structure (when the same parties have to start working together) is 
the key element in making sure the deal gets over the line. Deal-makers often say: "A small deal is 
as complicated and painful as large one." Simple deals just don’t exist.   
As well, the whole M&A process can be very scary, even for experience dealmakers.  As Sebastian 
James, head of technology retailer Dixon Carphone said to Management Today after the merger of 
Carphone Warehouse and Dixons in 2014, ‘My terror was that when we combined the two, we’d get 
that 80s nightmare where they bred African killer bees with European docile honeybees.  You hoped 
for loads of honey with a nice temperament but you could have wound up with a load of angry bees 
and not much [of the runny stuff] to show for it.’ 
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And although almost all the examples in this book are corporate case studies, there are also obvious 
lessons that can be learned for those doing deals in the public sector, such as the merging of gov-
ernmental agencies, or the Third Sector, including the consolidation trend for many charities and 
hospital trusts. 
These are lessons to be learned that will be useful for both seasoned deal-makers and newer par-
ticipants. The statistics speaks for themselves: there is no guarantee you will get this deal right even 
if you succeeded with earlier ones. For new practitioners, this book will take you through the full deal 
process, from strategic groundwork to doing the right deal, all the way to how to avoid a corporate 
divorce, and what to do if one is inevitable. In fact, one part of this book is dedicated entirely to the 
topic of divestitures. For those more experienced deal makers, a reminder of the do’s and don’ts 
should always come in handy. 
Finally, as the three authors are located in Europe we have a natural bias to use case studies where 
at least one party is European, but that doesn’t mean that we don’t also use deals from North Amer-
ica and elsewhere. We all have first-hand experience in deal-making worldwide and can testify that 
the mistakes made are applicable on a global scale. It is probably one of the few areas where culture 
doesn’t differentiate behaviour.  
0.2. Think Before You Buy 
Getting to the top of the corporate ladder puts a bulls-eye on your back …. not just for as long as 
you can keep that job but even afterwards, as CEOs and other senior managers of some failed M&A 
deals have found out to their chagrin and both their reputation and financial loss. In many jurisdic-
tions, shareholders can file lawsuits against companies and individuals many years after the deals 
have closed. 
CEOs who make the wrong strategic gamble, as HP’s Leo Apotheker did, are summarily shot. There 
is rightly huge pressure on corporate leaders, commensurate with their often huge remuneration 
packages, to be seen to deliver quick solutions for their companies. But rushed deals can also lead 
to reputations being destroyed forever, as we will show in our discussion of Royal Bank of Scotland’s 
former chief executive Fred Goodwin.  
The key phrase above is “to be seen to”. We will set out the strategic options open to new CEOs 
when they take office. But some of these options grab far more attention than the others. CEOs don’t 
tend be selected as the cover story of Forbes or Fortune magaines for achieving years of steady 
incremental organic growth. But many have appeared on the cover after initiating a transformational 
merger.  
In addition to the high expectations of shareholders, employees, lenders and the press, CEOs who 
like to do dynamic things are self-selecting. And few corporate decisions are as ‘dynamic’ as an M&A 
deal. 
In the case of HP, Apotheker was hired not because he was content to do small things, but because 
he had already been the CEO of SAP, where he had risen up the food chain, in part, because of his 
big, differentiated vision for the company and indeed its role in defining the entire information tech-
nology [IT] sector. 
Properly directed, such dynamism can unlock great value for companies and their shareholders 
through M&A. Unchecked, such dynamic ambition can tip over into the sort of hubris that drove 
Goodwin toward the decisions that practically destroyed his company when he bought ABN AMRO. 
What’s Your Facebook Relationship Status? 
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One of the most successful companies of the last decade and one that, as we will see, has shown it 
knows when to do M&A - and when not to - is Facebook, the social media network co-founded by 
Harvard student Mark Zuckerberg. Started in his college dormitory, the company grew phenomenally 
with revenues of $12.5 billion at its 10 year anniversary. Nicely, Facebook’s online guide to social 
status easily translates into our guide to corporate deal-making.  
Facebook allow users to select their relationship status for all their friends to see.  The options are: 
 Single 
 It’s complicated 




 In a relationship 
 Engaged 
 Married 
 In a Domestic Partnership 
 Civil Union 
To adapt these options to the corporate world, we need to trim the number down to five options, all 
of which have a business corollary that any company can consider in its strategic review.    
So: 
 ‘Single’, becomes: Do nothing, remain independent and focus on organic growth 
 ‘It’s complicated’:  Buying minority stakes in other companies or preparing for one of the other 
four options 
 ‘Open relationship’: Strategic alliances/ joint ventures [JVs] 
 ‘Divorced’: demergers/ divestments of assets/ liquidation of an unprofitable division or one 
that is no longer strategically necessary, or in the process of trying to sell a division (‘sepa-
rated’)  
 ‘In a relationship’ is the start of the process that the that leads to formal announcement  of 
an acquisition or merger (‘engaged’) or having done so (‘married’, ‘in a domestic partnership’, 
‘civil union’) 
We consider each of these strategic options in turn, but before we begin it is important stress how 
little time incoming CEOs may have to make an impact. Bob Kelly, former CEO and Chairman of 
Bank of New York Mellon, was abruptly pushed out by his board following a near five-year tenure 
during which he implemented, then pretty much seamlessly integrated, a widely-applauded transfor-
mational merger between Bank of New York and Mellon Financial.  
The 2011 press release announcing his departure did not provide much detail about his removal, 
stating simply that it was “due to differences in approach to managing the company” between Kelly 
and the board of directors.  
Inevitably there were underlying causes: some observed that there were cultural differences be-
tween Kelly and some of his executives and there was also the release of information related to 
Kelly’s decision to pursue publicly a bigger job at Bank of America.  
But strip aside any ‘blame’ and there is a factor Kelly had in common with many departing executives 
which is that he had been in the post for around five years when he left.  
The average tenure of a Fortune 100 CEO is approximately 4.6 years. In fact, Kelly used this statistic 
to answer a question posed to him at a Cass Business School conference about why he chose to 
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make the huge decision to merge with Bank of New York in 2007 after just nine months in post as 
CEO and Chairman of Mellon Financial. 
The reality is that public company boards and institutional shareholders do not have the same gen-
eration-long horizons as, say, some investors such as Warren Buffett, and even shorter than the 5-
year standard private equity investment timeframe. 
For founder or privately-owned high-growth businesses, there usually comes a time when the size 
of the underlying business means year-on-year growth slows and M&A becomes an important tool 
to stay ahead of competition. It is often a strategy used before the company itself is sold and thereby 
demonstrates as well that management can execute deals, a feature which is attractive for later 
potential buyers and especially for a private equity buyer who wants to have a quick and simple deal. 
 
CEO companies must decide on their strategy as quickly as possible to have the best hope of reap-
ing the benefits of transaction integration within their corporate life-time. But what about the alterna-
tives to M&A? There are a number of different options, often less risky but equally effective, which 
are available to CEOs, as discussed below.  
Staying Single 
The first option a CEO should consider is doing nothing, at least not externally do a big M&A deal, 
and instead just focus on organic growth. In wider society a ‘single’ Facebook status can carry the 
taint of social pariah, particularly, one suspects, for the social network’s fickle teenage audience. 
In the corporate world, however, there are three types of singleton: 1) the desperate one who is 
either a seller but finding it hard to attract a suitor or a buyer who simply can’t find a target at an 
affordable price, 2) the catch at the top of the business hierarchy who can afford to take their time to 
pick and choose between many admirers and targets, and 3) the fundamentally single committed 
corporate bachelors, as many of the new ‘unicorn’ (valuation over $1 billion) private companies in 
the Fintech world and many smaller, often family-owned businesses, who prefer the independence 
of being ‘single’. Over a company’s lifetime, it might fall into more than one of these categories at 
different times. 
For a company that only came into being in 2004, Facebook has spent most of its life in the corporate 
marriage business. Over its relatively short lifetime, Facebook has surprisingly made more than 50 
minor add-on acquisitions in its first dozen years, as well as some major ones.  These were designed 
to keep things fresh for their crucial teenage audience, and included deals with new social media 
platforms Instagram and WhatsApp.  
But so far as being a target goes, Facebook has been adamant in retaining its ‘single’ status, even 
when surrounded by large admirers.  
Status: Company growth: Market position: Market dynamics: Action:
Single Strong Niche, Protected Medium to Strong Focus on organic growth
It’s complicated Low to Strong Focused Low to Medium Buying minority stakes in other companies
Open relationship Low to Strong Focused Medium to Strong Strategic alliances/ joint ventures 
Divorced Low to Medium Diversified Low to Medium Demerge / Divest assets / Liquidate unprofitable division
In a relationship Low to Strong Expanding Medium to Strong Focus on M&A
Figure 0.2-A: Corporate status overview 
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After News Corp bought the MySpace social networking site in 2005, Facebook became the Prom 
Queen of a tech sector mesmerised by the corporate marriage business. The company was caught 
up in a bidding war with several major players, including News Corp, approaching it about a takeover. 
In 2006, Facebook began formal talks with Yahoo, whose own strategy was in disarray and who was 
a deeply eager groom. Yahoo offered $1.4 billion for Facebook, a fortune for its founder Mark Zuck-
erberg who had co-created the social networking platform as part of a “Would You Rather?” college 
jape just a few years previously.  
So exponential has Facebook’s growth been since then, it’s easy to forget that at that time the reach 
of its platform was limited to just university campuses and then high schools in English-speaking 
countries, principally the US.   
Even so, Zuckerberg was not to be diverted from his vision by Yahoo. Talks broke down and within 
a year Facebook would receive a $240 million cash injection from Microsoft that allowed him to keep 
control of the business (and which made the Microsoft / Facebook relationship status ‘it’s compli-
cated’). The Facebook co-founder hit pay-dirt in 2012 when the company’s flotation catapulted his 
personal net worth to $28 billion, all thanks to his determination to stay corporately single at a crucial 
time.  
In holding out for his vision, Zuckerberg was following in the footsteps of another tech sector great: 
Steve Jobs, according to American website Business Insider.  
In the late 1990s, Apple was on the verge of bankruptcy. The company had been losing money for 
12 years, so it was no great surprise that in 1997, Chief Executive Gil Amelio was shown the door 
as the company welcomed back its co-founder, Steve Jobs, who commenced a turnaround which 
arguably could be the greatest corporate comeback of all-time. 
The company Jobs had co-created had lost focus and was spending money it didn’t have on projects 
that were unlikely to bear fruition.  
Once a competitor to Microsoft and IBM, Apple had lost the personal computer war. But while Apple 
still viewed Microsoft and IBM as the enemy, co-founder Jobs saw things differently. Instead of sell-
ing the company for what would probably have been the equivalent of a corporate pittance, he helped 
to engineer an emergency $150 million cash injection from Microsoft, who ironically did not want to 
lose Apple because it believed the US Government would come down harder on its own dominant 
position in software if it were to lose yet another competitor.  
Once that lifeline was secured, Jobs began a root and branch reform of Apple. At an early meeting 
he reportedly told the board: “You know what’s wrong with this company? The products SUCK. 
There’s no sex in them!” 
Soon the iMac, the first “non-beige box” computer, was born. Apple sold nearly 800,000 units within 
five months of launch and by 1998 the company was back in the black. A marketing revolution fol-
lowed as the iPod, iTunes and finally the iPhone, products with which the old enemy Microsoft had 
no hope of competing, changed the personal computing market forever.  
We can see from these examples that timing is everything when it comes to making a decision about 
whether to stay single.  
When considering whether to merge or buy, sectoral trends can be crucial, whether rivals are con-
solidating rapidly or whether they are breaking down and de-merging. But there may also be over-
riding company-specific issues, as there were with Facebook. In that case, Zuckerberg was one of 
the few people in the world who could see his company had a prime-mover advantage in a truly new 
industry, so rightly held out as a singleton.  
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Just because everyone is involved in M&A, doesn’t mean your company should be. ‘Single’ status 
doesn’t have to be bad, as we’ve shown above, and it is certainly preferred to being ‘married’ to the 
wrong partner.   
RBS’s 2007 bid for Dutch bank ABN Amro made sense in terms of rapid sector consolidation and as 
a defensive move against a rival bid by RBS’s competitor Barclays Bank. But it did not make sense 
for RBS, which was already over-leveraged, to chase ABN Amro just as the global economy began 
to unwind, particularly after ABN Amro completed the lock-up sale of its US arm LaSalle Bank, sup-
posedly the big prize coveted by the UK bank. 
Equally the converse might be true. The previous wave of UK banking sector consolidation in the 
1990s saw the creation of a very successful Lloyds TSB from the merger of the two high street 
banks. The spate of deals also provided Fred Goodwin, RBS’ CEO at the time, with his greatest 
triumph in the swift acquisition and integration of rival NatWest. That corporate marriage made 
sense;  the next one didn’t. 
Outside of these consolidation trends, there are a small band of businesses for whom it is always 
appropriate to stay away from the large, transformational deals. There aren’t many of them and it is 
hard to define these committed bachelors and maidens, since they are not limited to any particular 
industry or part of the world. In fact the essence of their corporate personality is that very ability to 
stay independent in a rapidly globalising world.  
A few examples can be found in industries that have already consolidated so deeply that govern-
ments and regulators will protect the status quo to ensure they do not become any more concen-
trated. An example of this is accountancy where, after the collapse of Arthur Andersen made the Big 
Five a Big Four, regulators have made clear they would save any of the remaining four in the public 
interest should they hit an Enron-type scandal and that mergers among the Big Four will be blocked. 
Even though this is the case all four accountancy Firms have been active in making smaller, bolt-on 
or complementary/ adjacent acquisitions (eg. PwC buying consultant Booz & Co or Deloitte similarly 
buying Monitor). Other examples can be found in heavily regulated industries such as mobile and 
land-line telephone companies and in electric and gas utilities companies.  As noted earlier, family-
owned business often fall into this category, too. 
But most of our “committed bachelors” are able to stay independent because they have a strategy 
of providing very niche premium products with a global reach such as the strategy consultancies like 
McKinsey, Bain and BCG and certain corporate law firms, as discussed below. Often, they provide 
premium services particularly in professional services, an over-represented business among this 
group.  
In the future, increased globalisation, new technology, political revolutions or just the passage of 
time might force these businesses to adapt. But for the moment, they are single because they can 
be. And they glory in it.  
One such firm is New York-based Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. For a business whose work is 
advising on mergers it represents an anomaly: as resolute a bachelor as exists. So are the firm’s 
leaders ignoring the industry they serve, or is something else going on?  
By any metric, Wachtell is successful as a standalone law firm. Founded on a handshake by the four 
principals and Jerry Kern in 1965, its name has been associated with M&A deals for decades. 
Watchtell even invented the much-copied poison pill, a hostile defense technique that as we discuss 
later in this book. 
Wachtell’s strategy appears to work as it has been one of America's most profitable corporate law 
firms since lawyers started keeping a public record on performance, with . Pprofits per partner of  
$5million  according to the American Lawyer published in 2014, making it the US’ most profitable 
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law firm by some margin. In the same year the firm was the third most active M&A advisor globally, 
working on 70 deals worth $308 billion, including Halliburton’s acquisition of Baker Hughes for $36.4 
billion and the merger of Tim Hortons and Burger King Worldwide, a deal worth $11.4 billion. It is 
easy to see why it would you wouldn’t want or need to merge with anyone.  
Other exceptional law firms have also managed to occupy the same high ground.  
In London, Slaughter and May is known as the firm who refused to globalize, or to accept branding 
developments at a time when its rivals rushed towards globalization, stealing ideas from other, less 
traditional, professional service industries along the way.  
For any other law firm, this refusal to move with the times would have sounded its death knell or it 
would simply have been absorbed into a larger consolidator. 
The secret to Slaughter and May’s success is that advises more of the UK’s FTSE 100 and 250 than 
any of its rivals, giving it an in-built advantage over the competition.  
As other firms rushed to find international partners, lawyers at the firm saw the cultures of their rivals 
being diluted and decided that, as long they didn’t have to, they didn’t need to merge. 
As result of this vote for independence - or if you look at it another way, in spite of it - the firm has 
consistently been the most profitable among major European law firms. It has managed to keep its 
top-notch client base and perhaps most importantly for those who control the business, its culture. 
These two corporate law firms are not the only ones who have stayed independent. There are many 
other professional services firms and family-owned businesses - small, medium and large - who 
have stayed independent and have been highly successful, mainly because they hold a strong niche 
position in their industry or just within their own geography. Timpson, the UK-wide shoe repair com-
pany, is an excellent example of just such a family-owned business. 
Committed bachelors and maidens may be admirable high achievers, but singledom is not a rea-
sonable ambition for most companies. The forces of globalization have been driving business to-
wards a ‘bigger is better’ model for decades, and will continue to do so.  
So, the more likely scenario is that CEOs will at some point look externally to find growth, innovation 
or industry consolidation synergies. However, there are three alternative Facebook status options 
that could result in the same outcome – all outlined below - and which should always be considered 
first as they are arguably less risky than full ‘marriage’. 
It’s Complicated 
In the corporate world, we believe that “it’s complicated” is analogous to the taking of minority stakes 
in other companies. As in the world of personal social relationships, this sort of arrangement is in-
creasingly widespread, but slightly murky in that the longer-term purpose of stake-building is often 
not readily apparent.  
In some industries, such as biotechnology and software development, taking minority stakes is an 
established corporate practice, and in others, such as the convergence of banking and technology, 
it is an emerging, but popular and maybe even necessary, trend. In this sense the corporate world 
has entered the sphere of venture capitalists en-masse, creating seed funds to bankroll start-ups 
and stakes in emerging players. As with strategic investments in technology start-ups, this is often 
a form of outsourced R&D for the larger firms. 
In the life sciences industry GlaxoSmithKline spun out a group of scientists and patents involved in 
experimental drugs for analgesics in 2010. GSK kept 18 per cent of the new business, called Con-
22 
vergence Pharmaceuticals. In this case the deal was seemingly designed to cut overheads in re-
search and development for GSK, boost productivity at the new company and still leave GSK with 
“skin in the game.”  
The spin-off was part of wider trend: Big Pharma is facing patent expiry on valuable products and 
many in the industry have responded to investors’ concerns by outsourcing clinical service and re-
search to smaller, more agile and entrepreneurial firms. Similarly Baxalta spun out Baxter, its hae-
mophilia treatment division, in 2014; so successful was the spin-off, that Baxalta became the target 
of a successful $32 billion takeover by Shire Plc just 12 months later.  
In 2014, business publisher Euromoney teamed up with Carlyle, the private equity house, to buy out 
data provider Dealogic for $700 million; Euromoney took a 15.5 per cent stake. Here the motivation 
was less clear. There are some synergies between Dealogic and Euromoney and the publisher 
could, in the longer term, be planning to buy out Dealogic and move it completely into its stable of 
titles. On the other hand, it could be a purely financial investment. Because ‘it’s complicated,’ nobody 
really knows. 
However, in other instances, the taking of minority stakes has been followed by a full-blown takeover. 
It can be a useful tactic for buyers, because minority holdings give their owners important rights and, 
potentially, crucial influence over and insights into a company. The downside for sellers is that po-
tential buyers can use this strategy to put together a lot of information about your company.  
When a bidder knows your company really well, they also know its weaknesses, something that 
could be very helpful at the due diligence phase and ultimately help them in the negotiation phase. 
A buyer in the know will have a strategic advantage over other bidders, able to better and quicker 
determine the correct value but also being aware of the various issued to be ironed out in the due 
diligence process.  
As we will discuss later, momentum is a key determining factor in getting a deal across the line, and 
an informed buyer will simply have a better understanding of the buttons that need to be pressed to 
get there. Being able to track the asset for a considerable amount of time as a minority investor can 
prove invaluable when a larger transaction process kicks off and it can also deter other potential 
bidders as they will be unwilling to invest time in a process that they know they are unlikely to win.   
The Glazer family’s private takeover of Manchester United football club in 2005 is a great example 
of such tactical investment. The family ultimately, and controversially, loaded a previously debt-free 
business with more than £500 million of debt, some of it in the form of very high interest loan notes 
issued by hedge funds. In the context of boom-time leveraged buyouts, the financing structure used 
by the Glazers to acquire the company with its own money was aggressive, but not unusually so. 
But because the takeover was of a football club, which was completed in the teeth of opposition from 
the fans, it has generated more column inches about debt than many other deals in the decade since 
it completed. 
In the midst of this furore, one of the more technically interesting aspects of the deal, specifically 
Malcolm Glazer’s acquisition of an ever-increasing minority stake in the club, is often overlooked. 
He began to build his stake in Manchester United in March 2003. A year later, despite the steady 
increase in his holding, Glazer announced that he had “no current intention of making a bid and may 
reduce his stake.” That statement was forced by the UK’s Takeover Panel in response to articles in 
the Financial Times and elsewhere that he had hired Commerzbank to advise on the possible struc-
ture of a takeover. 
It is unclear in the context of this statement why Glazer would gradually continue to increase his 
stake until, in October 2004, his holding approached but didn’t reach the 30 per cent level at which 
UK law mandates a full takeover offer.  
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The Glazer family discussed a bid for the club with Manchester United’s CEO in October 2004. They 
subsequently relied on the rights and leverage their stake gave them to exert influence over the 
company, including the removal of three board directors in November of that year (replacing them 
with their own family members), as they fought a year-long battle to secure full control of the busi-
ness. Think also about the information advantage gained by having the three board seats in terms 
of determining whether to proceed with a highly-leveraged offer.  
That Glazer initially said he had no plans for a takeover did not stop widespread speculation that this 
was his intention all along and that the acquisition of an increasing minority stake was always a tactic 
to help win the club. In certain circumstances, this would mean that Glazer would have been skating 
very close to breaching UK laws on takeovers, which probably explains his extensive use of expert 
advisors. 
In an open relationship  
In the world of personal relationships, an open relationship seems to offer a dazzling chance to have 
your cake and eat it too. In reality though, such arrangements can turn pretty sour, pretty quickly. 
The corporate version of open relationships - strategic alliances or, more formally, joint ventures - 
can also be challenging. But, done right, they give companies access to industries or markets oth-
erwise out of reach because they lack the necessary local or industry expertise, or the appropriate 
funding and scale. 
The essence of all alliances is the same: two or more corporations agree to operate jointly for a 
common purpose that they each feel they are unable to achieve alone. There are many casual types 
of alliance, which are hard to research accurately, but we concentrate on the most formal, measur-
able type, a joint venture, where two or more partners invest together in a new vehicle. 
There are three main reasons for investing in a joint venture: 
1. JVs allow partners to pool resources. This is particularly useful from a financial perspective when 
credit is scarce, as in the period immediately following the economic crisis of 2007/8.  But it need 
not be driven by finance:  for example, another common driver to JVs is when companies need 
access to technologies and skills that cannot be bought. Because of these advantages, compa-
nies that are even competitors can team up (as we saw earlier with Microsoft and Apple), alt-
hough obviously careful consideration is needed as it is difficult to set boundaries regarding what 
information you share with your partner.  
2. JVs give partners access to new markets, either geographically or to new products.  
3. JVs are sometimes used as a precursor to M&A, allowing cultural and other due diligence over 
an extended period.  
Figure 0.2-B: Joint venture rationale 
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Unfortunately, as with human open relationships, the corporate version sounds great, but can be 
fraught with difficulties and many companies regret entering into them.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
JVs – How to make them work 
Comprehensive research by Cass Business School and Allen & Overy LLP, the law firm, of 500 
global joint ventures – both large and small - between 1995 and 2014 demonstrates the potential 
pitfalls of such arrangements. The study found: 
 JVs are not forever:  In 60 per cent of cases one or more of the original partners had exited 
the JV or the JV had been dissolved 
 Half of the exited JVs were successful:  Some 50 per cent ended for a “positive” reason, but 
still 46 percent finished for a “negative” one such as a dispute (9 percent) or poor perfor-
mance (14 percent) 
 JVs are generally a medium term strategy:  A majority (51 percent) of the exited JVs came 
to an end within five years of their start date. One year later, 61 per cent were over. Eleven 
per cent had reached their natural or planned end at the time, but in 53 per cent of cases one 
partner ultimately took control, and in 17 per cent the entire JV was sold to an external party 
Following the study, Allen & Overy made the following recommendations for setting up a JV for 
success.  
 Test your business proposition thoroughly  
 Ensure the strategies of the partners are aligned from the outset; the success of the venture 
will depend largely on the “fit” of the partners.  
 Devise workable decision-making processes 






























One company that fell foul of the open relationship quagmire is French food group Danone, which 
has made a number of unfortunate joint venture investments in China, a country where it is notori-
ously difficult to exit such arrangements.  
Danone announced in September 2009 that it was exiting its partnership with China’s Wahaha. Two 
years previously the French company had filed lawsuits accusing Wahaha and its founder Zong 
Qinghou of running a parallel copycat production line. Further, Danone had alleged Mr Zong, one of 
China’s richest entrepreneurs, had defrauded it with the help of relatives and a fabricated facade of 
offshore companies.  
To put that in context, Danone and Wahaha had been co-operating since 1996 and their joint venture 
was once used as a case study for success by business schools.  
But serious cracks emerged when Danone tried to buy Wahaha out in 2006 and, according to The 
New York Times, the Chinese company appeared to be holding out for more money.   
The two sides suspended legal hostilities in late 2007. In 2009, following extensive negotiations, 
Wahaha bought out Danone’s 51 per cent stake in the joint venture. According to analyst estimates, 
Danone received around $500 million for a business valued at $2 billion.  
Another example of the difficulty of exiting an international joint venture comes from the oil and gas 
industry. In 2003, BP put its Russian assets into TNK-BP, a joint venture with the energy oligarchs 
behind Alfa Group, Access Industries and Renova (AAR). By 2008 AAR was flexing its muscles in a 
bid to gain greater control of the company; TNK-BP chief executive Robert Dudley fled Russia, fol-
lowing what he claimed were politically motivated criminal charges linked to a government-backed 
campaign of harassment in support of AAR.  
In January 2009, BP ceded control over the joint venture to AAR, whose board had previously been 
shared 50-50. Two years later the AAR board flexed its muscles again to prevent BP and Russia’s 
former state energy company, Rosneft, from signing a plan to jointly explore for oil and gas in the 
Russian Artic.  
Only in 2012 was BP able to extract itself from the impasse. AAR agreed to a plan to sell TNK-BP 
to Rosneft for $55 billion. The deal, which was personally cleared by Russian President Vladimir 
Putin, gave BP $16.7 billion cash and an additional 12.5 per cent stake in Rosneft.  
Divorced 
Divestment of under-performing assets, de-mergers and the liquidation of unprofitable divisions are 
largely outside the scope of this section, except insofar as they raise funds that enable refocused 
companies to go on the acquisition trail, or provide targets for buyers; however, we will return to 
these issues later when our book will come full circle to discuss corporate divorce.  
A good example of a demerger is UK-listed Cadbury’s decision to separate out its US drinks business 
Schweppes in 2008. The sale was designed to raise cash for an acquisition spree, but instead turned 
Cadbury from predator to prey and ultimately led to its acquisition by Kraft.  Sir Dominic Cadbury - 
although no longer formally part of the company when it was bought - in a talk at Cass Business 
School following that takeover said that the demerger of Schweppes led to the ability of a larger food 
company to do a ‘pure-play acquisition’ to buy the confectioner founded by his great grandfather. 
In May 2003, Todd Stitzer took over as CEO at Cadbury-Schweppes, then a drifting food and drinks 
company comprised of two ill-fitting halves: a global confectionary business and a US and European 
drinks business whose main brands were Dr Pepper, Snapple and Oasis. Although the acquisition 
of Adams in 2002 had made Cadbury Schweppes the world’s biggest confectionary group, its global 
market share of the wider sector was only ten per cent, hardly a commanding position. 
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The company had long dreamed of dominating the confectionary business through a merger with 
Hershey and in 2002 had tried, but failed after the American business’ controlling charitable trust 
stepped up at the last minute in to stop the deal. Cadbury Schweppes lacked the war chest for a 
proper spending spree so sold its European drinks brands, Orangina and Oasis, to Lion Capital in a 
first step to raise cash.  
Nelson Peltz, the US activist investor, began taking an interest in the sector, buying stakes in Cad-
bury and unbeknown to the UK-listed company, also in its rival Kraft. Peltz’s plans for Cadbury, to 
use it in industry consolidation, seemed to chime with those of Stitzer and the Cadbury board, so the 
UK company began slowly to discuss how to sell off its US drinks businesses, while privately re-
opening talks with Hershey in the hopes of getting the trust onside with a proposed merger of equals. 
But Cadbury’s US shareholders were pushing for an immediate split. Having failed to find a private 
equity buyer for the drinks business, the board was pushed into a US listing far sooner than it would 
have liked. In 2008, the Dr Pepper Snapple Group was listed in the US, bringing in cash that left 
Cadbury especially vulnerable to a takeover bid. Today the “unwanted” drinks arm remains an inde-
pendent business, while the “jewel in the crown”, the Cadbury confectionary arm was bought by 
Peltz’s other target, Kraft, in 2009.  
In a relationship  
Once all other relationship options have been carefully considered, it is time for ambitious companies 
who still see a merger or takeover as the best option, to get engaged – that is, make an offer - and 
progress to marriage.  That will be the subject of most of the rest of this book: to describe what can 
go wrong in a corporate marriage but also what can be done to avoid the main pitfalls and ultimately 
make it work.  This can include the time when the companies are just talking to each other, seriously 
considering joining together (‘in a relationship’), formally agreeing to merge (‘engaged”) or finally 
‘married’. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
First Mover Advantage 
A study into European CEO succession and M&A strategy by the M&A Research Centre at Cass 
Business School suggests that an early, focused, acquisition is the optimal action for many compa-
nies 
Analysing CEOs in four European countries (the UK, France, Germany and Spain), the study found 
that those CEOs who were hired with a clear mandate for change were unsurprisingly the most likely 
to act quickly, within a year, to do their first M&A deal. 
Those who embarked on deal-making in that first year bought assets more frequently than they sold 
them. An analysis of company share price found that CEOs hired by poorly performing companies 
(defined by weaker share price performance against their peers) tended to be those who sold, rather 
than bought assets.  
While CEOs who sold assets benefited from a short-term bump as cash flooded into the company, 
often this was simply a “quick fix” which did not assist growth over the medium or longer term. In the 
longer run, the most successful strategy is buying in that first year. 
But while the optimal strategy is to buy early, CEOs should be careful not to over-extend themselves. 
The study also found that CEOs who bought more than one company in their maiden 12 months 
saw a decrease in corporate returns over the long run.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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As we will show throughout this book, CEOs with a clear strategy who act quickly and decisively to 
merge, and implement their decision using best practice, are well-placed to add value for their com-
panies. After all, ambitious businesses, just as much as teenagers, often want and need to be “in a 
relationship.” 
Think Before You Buy: THE Dos AND Don’ts 
 Do first consider the alternatives to M&A – several options are available and they can 
be less risky than a takeover 
 Don’t enter into a joint venture or alliance before being comfortable – in principle and 
legally – that your and your partner’s intentions are aligned 
 Do consider divestments as a strategic option, as it can be more efficient to divest a 
division that is non-core than to buy additional capabilities to make it grow 
 Do be prepared for M&A – it is very rare to stay single throughout your corporate life
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0.3. Avoid Tunnel Vision 
So, you’ve run through the options and you believe that M&A is an answer to your company’s stra-
tegic needs. At this point, you have to get the two fundamental foundations of successful M&A right. 
This means first formulating the best possible deal strategy and then putting in place an optimal 
target selection procedure.  
The former is a precursor to long-term success, while the latter determines how companies imple-
ment that strategy day in, day out, long before they move on to the detail of due diligence we discuss 
later. Of our Three Big Mistakes of Deal-making, this chapr is all about planning.  
At this stage you are trying to lay the foundations for your company's success in M&A and good 
planning is the key to this. “Unless you have a coherent business strategy, it’s very hard to have a 
coherent M&A strategy. If that strategic intent is bought into by the board and employees, the M&A 
stuff follows easily,” advises Paul Walsh, former Chief Executive, Diageo.  
Generally, because the worst examples illustrate our points the most dramatically, many case stud-
ies in this book are object lessons in how not to approach M&A. But this does not present a fair 
picture of the real world. Outside of these pages, M&A is a key driver of corporate and economic 
growth; it is something that companies frequently do get right. Yet finding a poster child for successful 
M&A still remains much harder than finding a cautionary tale. And any “success” can only be meas-
ured in a medium-term window after the transaction has been bedded in, but before unforeseeable 
factors - unrelated and unable to be anticipated at the time of the deal, such as fundamentally new 
developments in technology or global geopolitics - create a different yardstick.  
Looking at the period since 2008, Diageo, the global drinks producer, is one company who did get it 
right. At the conceptual stage it formulated the right strategy for the company and then it implemented 
that strategy well, getting the fine detail right. The company hit every “Do” in this chapter’s M&A 
checklist. It was determined, yet flexible, in implementing its M&A policy, chasing down targets for 
years after first identifying them and then preparing in detail for tough negotiations.   
Deal Strategy 
M&A is in Diageo’s DNA. At the heart of the company are its two forebears: Guinness PLC and 
Grand Metropolitan PLC, two London-listed food and drinks conglomerates who merged in 1997. 
Diageo's grandparents Arthur Bell & Sons, the Bell’s whisky-maker, and International Distillers & 
Vintners are still recognisable in parts of the business.  
Consider Diageo today and Johnnie Walker, Smirnoff, Ypioca (if you are Brazilian) or (if you are 
Turkish) Yeni Raki all come to mind: all top beverage alcohol brands with global or strong regional 
reach that Diageo has brought under its roof as part of a coherent M&A strategy.  
The conglomerate’s former chief executive Paul Walsh, who led the company from 2000 to 2013, 
had a key role in designing that strategy supported by a very capable senior management team. 
One of his first actions was to conduct a strategic review that put his clearly defined acquisition policy 
at the heart of the company. 
From 2000, the company had clearly defined ambitions and was quickly mapping out the M&A path-
ways by which to reach them. During Walsh’s tenure, Diageo’s share price nearly quadrupled with 
much of that rise recorded in later years as corporate strategy was executed through deal-making. 
As we highlighted earlier, new CEOs often do major deals in their first year because they are brought 
in with a mandate for change. For Walsh, thinking about M&A came even earlier. Asked to consider 
the top job a year ahead, he replied that he would happily take it, but believed the company as 
currently configured was not a global winner.  
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At this juncture before embarking on a program of acquisitions, a board should consider the full 
range of strategic options from disposals to a joint venture.  
In an interview for this book, Walsh said, “Diageo had not long been created when I took over,” said 
Walsh. “We had four un-amalgamated divisions: fast food (the Burger King outlets), Pillsbury con-
venience food, spirits and Guinness.  In my opinion every one of them was sub-scale. I thought we 
had done a good job on food improving the scale and margins, but there was no way I could see us 
getting into the Premier League of food players.”  
The central tenet of the strategic review was fundamentally to reposition Diageo through a concerted 
acquisition spree. The company saw that for a modern, amalgamated “house of brands”, production 
and distribution was no longer its central purpose; marketing, tapping into the lifestyle aspirations of 
consumers, and cross-distribution were key. For that, Diageo needed to focus solely on alcohol, 
target recognisable luxury brands and, later on, to attract the growing middle classes of the southern 
hemisphere.  
Diaego’s emerging markets acquisition strategy would reach its pinnacle between 2008 and 2013, 
as the company shifted investment geographically south. But it was Walsh’s early work that laid the 
foundations for the later focused acquisitions.  In 2000, Diageo manifestly needed to divest to raise 
cash and concentrate on its core drinks assets. By the end of the year, Diageo had sold its food 
division Pillsbury – which included breakfast cereals such as Cheerios - to rival General Mills for 
$10.5 billion.  
Two years later Diageo sold Burger King to the US private equity giant TPG for $1.5 billion. The 
latter deal, which took two and half years to complete - during which time both Burger King’s perfor-
mance and the prospects for the fast food industry had deteriorated - was criticised by some as a 
bargain basement price. But, freed from its unwanted food interests, Diageo was now in a position 
to make the acquisitions necessary in its new core. Walsh noted this when he said, “There are times 
in life it is better to be quick than good. We were very fortunate.” 
When the Seagram’s spirits and wine portfolio was put up for auction by Vivendi Universal in 2001, 
it represented a rare opportunity to participate in industry consolidation that few of Diageo’s rivals 
were ready for. Diageo, however, was. 
Partnering with Pernod gave Diageo the cash to get a deal for the whole of Seagrams done quickly. 
The two companies tabled a winning $8.15 billion bid and shared the spoils, with Diageo taking the 
Captain Morgan rum brand it coveted. These early deals on which Walsh staked his career gave 
him a strong power-base that allowed Diageo later to build its emerging markets business – a geog-
raphy they felt was underrepresented in their corporate portfolio of brands.  He noted that “Buying 
Seagram and selling Pillsbury were the ‘bet the ranch’ deals. My position wasn’t at stake in the same 
way during subsequent deals, even though there were some very large ones.” 
The first step to formulating an optimum strategy is selecting the right chief executive. For Diageo, 
Walsh was the right person at the right time, as shown above. A Diageo lifer, he began his career at 
Grand Metropolitan and knew the business and its people intimately. This experience helped him to 
make good decisions on merger strategy and gave him the strength to persuade the board to opt for 
his divestiture programme when just a few years earlier the company - and Walsh himself - had been 
building up its food divisions.  
To see what happens when an executive attempts a transformational deal at a time of huge uncer-
tainty, we need look no further than Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) chief executive Fred Goodwin 
who pushed through the co-acquisition of ABN AMRO that his bank jointly purchased together with 
financial services company Fortis (of Belgium and the Netherlands) and Banco Santander (of Spain).  
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“The world’s biggest ever cross-border acquisition”, “the banking sector’s largest ever deal”, “the 
deal that nearly ‘bankrupted’ Britain”: RBS’s acquisition of ABN AMRO was a deal for which no 
superlative seems enough. “[The ABN AMRO acquisition] is a serious indictment of both the senior 
management and leadership,” according to the UK government in the Treasury Select Committee 
analysis of the Financial Services Authority [FSA] Report on the failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
The takeover Goodwin drove through was a massive failure in one of the industries most likely to 
damage the wider public good, just at a time when the financial system was creaking.  Two of the 
three co-acquirors - RBS and Fortis - had to be bailed out by their governments in the wake of the 
hostile deal, so on that metric alone it may be the worst takeover in history. 
The UK regulator that has since been disbanded in part because of its own failure to properly regu-
late RBS had this to say on the takeover: 
“The acquisition of ABN AMRO by a consortium led by RBS greatly increased RBS’s vulner-
ability. The decision to fund the acquisition primarily with debt, the majority of which was 
short-term, rather than equity eroded RBS’s capital adequacy… In the circumstances of the 
crisis, its role as the leader of the consortium affected market confidence in RBS.” 
Goodwin, former RBS chairman Sir Tom McKillop and the bank’s former chairman Sir George 
Mathewson have been held jointly responsible for the failure, but it was Goodwin - who was stripped 
of his knighthood because of the fall out from the failed acquisition - who was Public Enemy Number 
One in the wake of the deal.  
Could it have been foreseen or is it just a case of 20/20 hindsight?   
A few industry mavens had been warning about Goodwin’s style for years.  One example from sev-
eral years earlier in 2005 was James Eden, an outspoken but highly rated banking analyst with 
Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, who took his turn questioning the bank’s chairman Sir George 
Mathewson at an analyst meeting in the wake of the acquisition of Charter One in the US.  
“Some of our investors think Sir Fred is a megalomaniac who cares more about size than share-
holder value,” The Telegraph reported Eden telling Sir George as investors rebelled over another 
RBS acquisition, the arguably over-priced Charter One deal. 
Ironically Goodwin’s fall from grace was almost certainly built on his initial success. In banking circles 
he was considered a Scottish upstart in the City. Goodwin started out as an accountant at Touche 
Ross before taking over as deputy chief executive of Clydesdale, a small Scottish bank owned by 
National Australia Bank (NAB). 
When Sir George poached him to be the deputy chief executive of RBS in 1998, he was already 
known as “The Shred” thanks to his abrasive cost-cutting style. Goodwin’s role in RBS’s takeover of 
NatWest - still considered one of the best deals in the UK banking industry - set him up in an elevated 
position. 
In September 1999, NatWest had been due to merge with the insurer Legal & General. But investors 
hated the deal and forced out the bank’s chief executive Sir Derek Wanless, leaving the bank rud-
derless. RBS pursued friendly talks with the Bank of Scotland, but Sir George and Goodwin were 
plotting a rival offer for NatWest.  
The FSA backed this view. “RBS’s track record of successful acquisitions and integration, particularly 
of National Westminster Bank (NatWest), may have led the RBS executive management to be con-
fident in its ability to integrate the ABN AMRO business. It is clear that RBS underestimated the 
operational and integration risks that arose from the acquisition,” said the regulator. 
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One of the prime architects of the ABN AMRO deal, RBS’s former global head of investment banking 
Johnny Cameron, echoed these sentiments when he later spoke to FSA officials as part of the in-
quiry.  “After we bought NatWest, we had lots of surprises, but almost all of them were pleasant. And 
I think that lulled us into a sense of complacency around that.”  
Goodwin went on to deliver not only the takeover, but also £3 billion of post-integration synergies. 
Once Sir George was elevated from chief executive to chairman - a move that goes against the 
standards of UK corporate governance norms - his protégé cemented his position further.  
There is no question that the corporate governance practises at RBS were partly to blame for the 
failure in ABN Amro. Having a non-biased, accountable board with relevant experience and expertise 
that can challenge management is key ingredient in getting a deal right, especially as it will help 
executives getting too emotionally attached to the deal or a particular target and in so avoid tunnel 
vision. 
For small and medium sized businesses there are useful lessons as well from this case.  For smaller, 
often non-public companies, having board members with experience in deal making is equally im-
portant, however for slightly different reasons. Top executives in these businesses are often more 
operationally involved and therefore have less time to meet with and get to know potential target 
companies.  
Having experienced board members (often the Chairman) to navigate the more difficult discussions 
with counterparties, both with target companies and potential investors, can be very helpful in order 
to keep ongoing relationships intact. In this light, growing companies often seek out board members 
with such experience, often as non-executives or independent board members or, in the case of 
family-owned businesses, an advisory board.  
Target Selection 
Target selection is where companies put into practice their well-thought out, coherent deal strategies. 
As we will see, it is work that goes on not just immediately ahead of a deal, but day in, day out, for 
years. It is in this sphere that Diageo truly excelled.  
Diageo built on its early M&A success. The company’s transformational deal with Seagram had 
helped it to position itself, particularly in the US, but by 2009 it had become clear that Diageo was 
too dependent for revenue on developed markets, particularly in Europe. Around two-thirds of its 
revenues were from North America and Western Europe at a time when growth was stagnating in 
both regions in the wake of the credit crisis.   
At the same time, emerging markets were booming. As Goldman Sachs Chief Economist Jim O’Neill 
coined the acronym BRIC [Brazil, Russia, India and China], so Diageo began to focus beyond its 
established markets for growth, kicking off a strategic project to help it identify the best regions for 
fresh investment.  
The company decided to target the emerging middle class in Latin America, Asia, Africa and Rus-
sia/Eastern Europe. Such consumers were identified as households with an annual income of be-
tween $5,000 and $35,000, entering an income bracket at which they could afford to think beyond 
meeting their basic needs and becoming aspirational in their way of living. 
Explaining his thinking at the time, Walsh said, “We had been looking at emerging markets before 
then, but in 2008-2009, it was clear the world was going to change. It was my belief and the board 
supported it that Europe was going to be lacklustre for a period of time.” 
He added, “The way to offset that was to harness the economic power in these new markets. As I 
stand here today when we have seen some of the bloom come off that rose, I still believe that one 
32 
of the few things you should not bet against in economic theory are demographic trends. When you 
combine those with even modest per capita gap growth and you get a very exciting story”.  
In 2009, Diageo set out to reach a 50-50 split in terms of revenue generated from developed and 
emerging markets and since then has focused most of its acquisitions there. The right target com-
panies would provide access to the targeted consumers and would help to build Diageo’s distribution 
network in areas of the world where it was not possible to build that position as quickly organically, 
boosting overall corporate integration. 
Perhaps best of all, there were several potential targets in most key markets, all medium-sized bolt 
on acquisitions, so it made target selection process much easier. If Diageo selected the right acqui-
sitions and remembered not to get fixated on just one, it need not overpay.  
Having spent the previous nine years heavily involved in M&A, in 2009 Walsh was now well-placed 
for the next round of acquisitions having the confidence of the board, investors, staff and advisors. 
The company had also designed its own comprehensive system to run a deal project. 
Figure 0.3-A: Diageo’s deal process 
 
Diageo says “Saúde” to Ypióca 
On May 12 2012, Diageo issued a press release announcing a deal with Brazil's Ypióca Agroindus-
trial Limitada to acquire its leading drinks brand for £300 million. A textbook Diageo acquisition from 
its emerging markets period, it is a prime example of the company’s tenacity in M&A and is equally 
useful as a case study to show how a medium-sized company can ‘sell’ itself or divisions to a larger 
company.  
In the decade leading up to 2008, the economy of Brazil had been transformed and was now 
amongst the ten biggest in the world. With a very young population - 50 per cent of Brazilians were 
under the age of 29 at the time - the country's demographics promised an economic boom that would 
create exactly the growing aspirational middle class with disposable income that Diageo sought.  
It was estimated that 57 per cent of the population - or 113 million Brazilians - would be middle class 
by 2014, the year Brazil was due to host the World Cup, with more joining their ranks by 2016, when 
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Brazil would host the Olympic Games. Those two sporting events were in themselves expected to 
combine to increase the country's consumption of beverage alcohol significantly. 
Diageo focused on cachaça, the Latin American spirit used in caipirinha cocktails, as the best pro-
spective investment. Cachaça, Brazil’s “national drink”, is a spirit distilled from fermented sugar cane 
juice that has dominated the local market for about 500 years.  
Consumption was almost exclusively domestic, but sales of the premium segment were growing and 
Diageo believed it could adapt its vast knowledge of other global brands, as well as other national 
drinks such as Mey Icki Raki in Turkey and Zacapa rum in Guatemala.  
Brazil has over 4,000 different brands of cachaça and Diageo’s preferred choice was the high qual-
ityYpióca. The target was an attractive brand with the obvious additional appeal of a distribution 
network in the north-eastern region of Brazil that Diageo could leverage to drive sales not only for 
Johnnie Walker whisky and Smirnoff vodka, but for its other emerging middle class-targeted brands.  
When Diageo first approached the owners to explore a deal, the analysis, valuation and due dili-
gence were longer and more complex than initially expected because the assets had to be ‘carved-
out’ from Ypióca Agroindustrial Limitada. Diageo therefore continued to keep its options open 
throughout in case the deal did not proceed.  
ABN: “It’s hard to see what’s in it” 
Then there’s the wrong way to do it. In its bid for ABN Amro, RBS got fixated on a single target, 
made a takeover decision seemingly based on emotion and hubris, and turned up to a sale late. Not 
a good combination. 
In January 2007, as RBS’s investment banking advisor Merrill Lynch briefed it on a plan to lead a 
break-up bid for ABN Amro, Goodwin’s power was unchallenged, as we discussed above.  
Analysts had long suspected ABN Amro was the sector’s next takeover target, a likelihood that was 
confirmed as London-based hedge funds, including Toscafund, by then run by the now-retired former 
RBS chairman Sir George Mathewson, began to take stakes in the bank. 
Unfortunately for Goodwin and unbeknownst to him, ABN Amro had already met just days earlier 
with his UK rival, John Varley, chief executive of Barclays Bank, to discuss a consensual takeover. 
Being late to a takeover party is often fatal and, in this instance, ABN Amro’s chief executive Rijkman 
Groenink told him that ABN Amro was not for sale, even as he discussed terms with Varley. 
On March 18, Barclays gave Varley approval to pursue a takeover and the story broke in the UK 
press shortly thereafter.  
RBS, knowing an outright bid for ABN Amro would be blocked on anti-trust grounds, began to as-
semble a raiding party that ultimately was made up of Fortis and Santander. The latter was a long-
term investor in RBS, with a seat on its board seat.  
Despite the fact they had had no access to confidential ABN Amro information - particularly important 
in financial sector deals but critical for proper due diligence and pricing in any deal - and that Barclays 
did have such access as they were well into their due diligence process, the consortium launched a 
hostile bid on April 15 at a higher price than their rivals. 
The decision to proceed without due diligence is ultimately what cost RBS its solvency because ABN 
Amro’s investment banking division contained some of the most toxic subprime debt around. While 
we consider due diligence later, here it is indicative of a more fundamental problem - CEO hubris. 
RBS’s decision surprised the market. This issue regarding due diligence – or rather the lack of it - 
was singled out by the FSA retrospectively as one of the biggest problems with the deal.  
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“In proceeding on that basis, however, RBS’s Board does not appear to have been sufficiently 
sensitive to the wholly exceptional and unique importance of customer and counter-party 
confidence in a bank. As a result, in the [FSA] Review Team’s view, the Board’s decision-
making was defective at the time.”  
One important element to the deal for RBS was ABN Amro’s US arm, LaSalle Bank, a better busi-
ness than RBS’ own Citizens Financial Group (itself an RBS acquisition from 1988). Realising this, 
ABN adopted a lock-up sale defence, whereby it sold what the unwanted bidder most wanted, strik-
ing an agreement to sell LaSalle to Bank of America and thereby making it impossible for RBS, if it 
successfully bought ABN Amro, to merge LaSalle with Citizens.  
Yet RBS continued to pursue ABN Amro, re-justifying its strategy on the strength of synergies be-
tween ABN’s investment banking operations and RBS’s own similar Global Banking and Markets 
(GBM) business.  
As spring moved into summer, RBS’ may - or may not - have tried to get out of the takeover, but the 
bid stood. 
Commentators in the UK press thought RBS and Goodwin were out of control, and said so. “For 
RBS, the task is to convince its own shareholders the bid is still worth the candle now that LaSalle 
is lost … Someone will lose,” said James Harding, then Business Editor of The Times, in July 2007.  
“And if it's hard to see why [Barclay's boss] Varley is staking his reputation on ABN, it's now even 
harder to see what's in it for Sir Fred – other than winning.” 
Barclays, perhaps because of what it had seen was inside ABN Amro, never hiked its opening offer. 
In September 2007 RBS’s bid for ABN Amro closed and the bank was finally able to see what they 
had bought. As the financial crisis continued, RBS found that they had bought a bank full of danger-
ous liabilities.  
Before the deal had closed, the governments of The Netherlands and Belgium had to partly nation-
alise RBS’s partner Fortis.  RBS, which was thinly capitalised and had financed the acquisition 
through the failing wholesale credit markets, was well on its way to the same fate. 
In the rest of this book, we will tell you how to recover from deals that are going wrong. Here there 
was almost certainly only one way to recover - to walk away.  
By not counter-bidding, Barclays did walk away and it helped the bank to avoid compulsory nation-
alisation when its biggest rival had to be bailed out.   Sometimes the best deals are those not done. 
Patience is the Watchword as Diageo says Şerefe to Mey Īçki 
If you really want an asset, your corporate ambition needn’t put you at a disadvantage. One of Dia-
geo’s first emerging markets acquisitions, Mey Īçki in Turkey, demonstrates that if you really want 
something, you must play a dispassionate long game.  
As part of the process to move Diageo further into emerging markets, Diageo had identified Turkey 
as one of the target countries. Turkey was, in many ways, was even more attractive than Brazil as it 
already had a fast growing middle class with consumer spending forecast to grow at six per cent per 
annum - twice the rate of GDP - by 2010. Turkey was also seen to be a good place to do business - 
it was ranked 61st in the global business practice index, higher than all of the BRIC countries and 
even EU countries such as Greece and Italy.  
So when the Turkish government privatised Mey Īçki in 2004 as part of its sale of TEKEL, the com-
pany came onto Diageo’s radar as a possible investment. Ultimately Mey Īçki, which was in need of 
a more modern management, was sold to US private equity group TPG. But Diageo had not forgotten 
about it.  
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When it came time to exit the business in 2010, TPG - who had bought Burger King from Walsh 
eight years ago - remembered Diageo’s interest in Mey Īçki. 
By this point TPG had thoroughly transformed the company, creating what they considered to be a 
world class distribution system that was ready to use for Diageo’s international brands.  However, 
with the Turkish company already in the preliminary stages of an initial public offer [IPO] process, it 
wanted a full price for the asset.  
At the same time, the deal was one of the largest Diageo had executed in an emerging country for 
many years, and it needed for its strategy an asset it could be completely certain about; this meant 
price was more flexible than usual.  
Keeping an open mind, Diageo considered the potential scale of the local raki spirit market including 
the local political and economic conditions, especially critical for an alcohol beverage company buy-
ing a manufacturer and distributor of alcohol in a country where the majority of the population was 
Muslim. 
Diageo was able to negotiate price with TPG but knowing the strategic worth of Mey Īçki to its emerg-
ing market focus, it had to take a balanced approach  making sure that the price was not too far 
below TPG’s expected IPO valuation.  
Eventually, a deal was struck between principals and announced in February 2011. The final price 
represented 9.9 times the 2010 EBITDA of TL333 million (approximately $208 million or £133 mil-
lion), a full price, but at a level where Diageo was still a keen buyer.   
Has the “bloom gone” at Diageo? 
As previously stated, for the purposes of M&A strategy, we assess Diageo’s success only within a 
particular timeframe, in this case 2000-2013. 
But, although Diageo had nearly reached its target of earning 50 per cent of its global revenues from 
emerging markets by the end of 2014, profit growth from outside of Europe and US had begun to 
fluctuate.  
Some of the challenges have been created by factors outside of Diageo’s control including weaken-
ing currencies in South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela, as well as the anti-extravagance crackdown 
in China that reduced demand in that country for its premium spirits.  
But that does not negate the company’s success. Walsh, who has followed his time at Diageo with 
a position as the non-executive chairman at Compass, commented in 2015 that “Diageo is in a phase 
whereby there is not just economic uncertainly, but political and security uncertainty. So we are 
inevitably going to see volatility, but you still can’t bet against those long-term demographics.”.   
What is clear is that overall emerging markets acquisitions helped to transform Diageo from a North 
Atlantic company to a truly global leader. Perhaps most importantly, the company decided what was 
the best thing to do based on the information it had at the time and implemented that decision with 
unusual rigour. 
In this regard, it’s useful to recognise the differences between emerging markets and the more de-
veloped markets. Allan Taylor, M&A partner at the global law firm White & Case pointed out the 
following:  "In emerging markets, generally speaking the deals are more likely to fail due to the seller 
and buyer taking a very different view of the market growth potential of the target. When combined 
with different risk appetites for due diligence issues, execution certainty and market risks, this can 
create a real potential for serious disagreement regarding pricing and willingness to commit fully.”  
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However, he went on to say, “In developed markets we see tend to see deals failing due to a loss of 
momentum caused by lack of internal support and lack of certainty about being able to achieve 
strategic premiums. That comes down to planning and leadership of the key people.  In public mar-
kets with share for share deals, there is also the issue of properly communicating synergies to the 
market and the ability for target shareholders to see upside in the combined entity; bidders must 
ensure that they effectively sell the benefits of the acquisition to the target board and sharehold-
ers and other key stakeholders."  This communication is absolutely critical and one of the Big Three 
mistakes that need to be avoided. 
Small, family-owned businesses can do this well, even when staying local.  Timpson traces its origins 
back to 1865 when William Timpson opened a shoe shop in Manchester. It remains in the family yet 
now has expanded throughout the UK through acquisition, into key cutting, watch repairs, engraving, 
dry cleaning and photo processing.  Although these may not seem to be linked, the selection of 
acquisition targets follows a formula.  The preferred targets? Businesses in distress. 
As John Timpson, great great grandson of the founder explained, ‘We try not to buy anything that’s 
doing very well.  You’ve got to pay a lot of money and then you’ve got to do it better than someone 
who was doing quite well before.  It’s much easier to do a great deal when buying a crap business;  
we want to be the last man standing in an industry that no one else likes.’   
As an example, in late 2008, Timpson bought 187 of the Max Spielmann’s photo-processing stores 
out of administration for £1.3 million, substantially expanding its own coverage in England and Scot-
land, together with the transfer of 545 employees to Timpson.  But 127 stores were not purchased, 
as the company had a rigourous process in deciding what was of interest.  Notably, within eight 
months, the purchase price had been recovered from the profits generated by those 187 stores. 
Frequent buyers who get their deal strategy right will know and appreciate the value of maintaining 
a ‘live’ list of possible targets. The number of potential targets you need to review to reach a com-
pleted deal will obviously differ from time to time but as a rough estimate, a 100 to 1 ratio is a good 
benchmark.  
Figure 0.3-B: Target selection process – The 100-2-1 ratio 
 
As we have seen with the RBS and ABN Amro case, getting fixated on a particular target or situation 
can be dangerous, so maintaining such a list of possible alternatives is crucial. A well-defined and 
mapped target universe will also help identify the priority companies where it is worth investing more 
time to ensure that you are – as a bidder – well placed when a deal situation does arise.  
Avoid Tunnel Vision: Dos and Don’ts 
100 possible targets
25 companies reviewed by external analysis 
only
10 approached with minimal contact
4 targets approached via direct contact
2 progress to deal discussions
1 deal accepted and agreed
• Drawing up the long list of possible targets of interest
• Research and due diligence done without contacting the company
• Approach target indirectly via an advisor to determine availability; 
limited due diligence through advisors, if possible, or from public 
sources
• Extensive due diligence performed; limited initial feelers regarding 
price and terms
• Discussions had about price and purchase terms to reach a deal
• But there are still risks to the deal, as the target still needs to accept 
the offer; a last minute out-bidding by a competitor also possible
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Setting the M&A strategy: 
 DO have a clearly defined M&A strategy on which the Board and the CEO are aligned.  
 DO be explicit about what each and every potential target will contribute to your overall 
corporate strategy and have options.  DO have good corporate governance structures 
in place including strong and experienced non-executive directors: a CEO who simply 
hears confirmation of his own ideas will make bad decisions. 
Implementing your strategy: 
 DO stay flexible - more than one takeover target can often deliver the same strategic 
aim. 
 DON’T get fixated on a single target - this means looking at up to 100 targets for every 
one you buy. 
 DO be committed to delivering on your M&A strategy  
 DON’T make a takeover decision based on emotion or hubris 
 DO be prepared to chase a target for many years once you have identified it.  
 DON’T be late to a takeover battle - if you are late to the process, you will very rarely 
win even if you do acquire the target  
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0.4. Knowledge is Power 
When the UK’s financial regulator began the first of many reviews of RBS’ catastrophic takeover of 
ABN Amro, it described the British bank’s due diligence on ABN Amro as “minimal.” That any buyer 
- let alone one of the world’s biggest banks - could be satisfied to proceed with a takeover after only 
a “minimal” assessment of the hugely complex financial instruments held by another bank, is mind-
boggling. It is safe to say that RBS’ due diligence on ABN Amro was a complete failure - as quickly 
became clear when RBS took control and discovered ABN was riddled with toxic debt.  
Legions of buyers have begun on a much stronger footing than RBS - many with a reasonably solid 
M&A vision - but ultimately their acquisitions have failed to bear financial fruit because of mistakes 
at the due diligence stage.  This is true whether the target is large or small, as we should not assume 
that because the acquisition is much smaller that it is easier. 
Of the case study failures we consider in this book, mistakes during the due diligence phase were 
often either the underlying cause of the failure of their takeovers, or at the least the nail in the coffin. 
Whilst due diligence might be seen as the dull sibling of other more newsworthy areas of M&A such 
as regulatory battles or hostile bid tactics, things often go wrong for the buyer in the data room.  
For the purposes of our Three Big Mistakes of Deal-Making, here all eyes should be on planning 
and people. Getting the right level of due diligence done should be part of the company’s broader 
M&A plan and - if it is done properly - the information gleaned at this stage will continue to be useful 
through the integration phase and beyond. Within this, it is important that due diligence also covers 
the target company’s people and culture: after all, the ‘assets’ that walk out of the door and go home 
every night are often the company’s most valuable ones. The cultural implications of a corporate 
marriage are the single most important determinant of deal success, yet the issue is most often 
overlooked in the due diligence process.  
When a bid is hostile - as in the case of RBS’ bid for ABN Amro - a lack of due diligence is a risk that 
is knowingly undertaken and should be fully understood as making the takeover more risky and 
prone to mistakes. But even when the target provides full access, there should be full due diligence 
conducted.   Often, friendly ‘full access’ will lull a buyer into a process where they put off the due 
diligence until late in the process.  This can be particularly true with deals between two smaller 
companies who know each other well from the market and who are entering a friendly deal to merge 
together. But even in larger deals when an approach is friendly - so proper time and access to due 
diligence is available - there is little excuse for these types of errors. Yet they still happen, as in the 
Volkswagen / Rolls-Royce deal we will discuss.  
Sometimes particular circumstances dictate that a transaction must be hurried - as we discuss later 
with our case study on Britvic - but here the expectation is that the buyer has enough pre-existing 
research or industry expertise in its locker to be able to pull the deal off.  And should do so with eyes 
wide open.   
We will provide an overview of the pre-announcement due diligence process, and touch on what is 
different in cross-border M&A. In terms of our Three Big Mistakes of Deal-making, bad due diligence 
tends center around with two potential problems in particular - poor planning and poor people man-
agement.  
Due diligence is absolutely intertwined with fixing the correct value on the target, a function that can 
only properly be finalised at the end of the due diligence process. A thorough approach will give a 
bidder the appropriate foundation in fixing the correct walkaway price. For this reason this section of 
the book and the following one on valuation should be read together.  
Where is Diligence Most Due? 
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Performing thorough due diligence is absolutely critical to ensure deal success. It tends to focus on 
the buyer reviewing documentation and interviewing stakeholders about the target but a good due 
diligence process also involves the target firm assessing the style and intention of the bidder.   
Figure 0.4-A: Areas of Due Diligence 
 
Traditionally due diligence has been confined to tangible disciplines - primarily financial, legal, IT, 
operations and commercial. Conducting a takeover only through that narrow prism, however, can be 
very damaging;  “softer” issues such as people and governance, culture and ethics are equally im-
portant. Poor due diligence and a lack of understanding of the correct valuation of “softer” assets 
such as management and key employee retention created huge losses for shareholders in cases 
such as HP’s takeover of Autonomy that we discussed in the Introduction or the well-known case of 
and Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia Handsets.  
New systems for measuring IP and intangibles have been created to deal with just such failures as 
the corporate world has moved on. Other risk factors, such as cyber security, have already found a 
place on the due diligence check list, following a number of high profile cases such as adultery 
website Ashley Madison’s potential planned IPO in 2015 prior to a very public hacking. This area of 
cyber security has been critical as well in M&A deals ranging from the retail industry to financial 
services, in both public deals and private. 
Another example of emerging due diligence is a company’s social media policies and footprint, where 
a target’s social media presence on Twitter, Facebook and other platforms should come under as 
much scrutiny as other areas of due diligence.  This is especially critical as often these new media 
areas within a company are run by younger, less experienced staff in teams who may even work on-
line remotely and thus not be located within the corporate headquarters, and therefore would not 
normally have been included in the due diligence process. This on-line presence for many compa-
nies is their virtual shopfront for many and, in some cases most, customers. 
Yet it is important to remember that there are still many pitfalls even in “traditional” due diligence.   
If you buy a Rolls-Royce car today, it will have been manufactured in Goodwood in West Sussex, 
England. But you will actually be buying it from BMW - the German giant took control of the Rolls-
Royce business in 2003. Had M&A history gone to plan, you'd be buying the car from BMW's bitter 
German rival, Volkswagen. Instead the Rolls Royce v Volkswagen deal presents what many would 
call one of the worst intellectual property mistake in history. 
In 1998, Vickers, the British manufacturing firm that had owned Rolls-Royce and its sister car brand 









car manufacturers had sold out to their continental European and US rivals decades earlier and 
there was much national gnashing of teeth as Vickers moved to sell off one of the final bits of Britain's 
proud automotive history. 
Production of expensive Rolls and Bentleys had fallen to just 17,000 in 1997, and the majority of 
those were Bentleys. Other than a factory in Crewe with 2,500 employees and a reputation for fan-
tastic automotive hand-finishing, the business up for sale had few real assets except its brands.  
Rolls Royce's destination was always likely to be Germany. BMW, which already supplied engines 
and parts for the cars, looked like the obvious destination. But the car manufacturer's final offer of 
£340 million, was easily beaten by a bid from Volkswagen for £430 million.  
But there was a legal wrinkle in the deal structure. The Rolls Royce business got control of the brand 
name and the famous "RR" trademark when Rolls aircraft engine and car businesses were split as 
part of a government nationalisation in 1971. Under that agreement, Rolls Royce was not allowed to 
sell the Rolls name as part of any deal that sold off the car manufacturing business.  
Unfortunately VW's lawyers did not realise this. The German car manufacturer got all the IP rights 
to the cars themselves - the design rights of the luxury interior, the body and even the famous Spirit 
of Ecstasy hood ornaments. Effectively, they could build the cars, but not advertise or sell them as 
Rolls Royce.  
History does not record the private reaction of VW's ambitious chairman Ferdinand Piech when he 
uncovered the mistake. But there might have been a few expletives exchanged. Matters got worse 
because BMW leveraged its close ties with Rolls-Royce to licence the brand name from under VW's 
nose for just £40 million.  
However, the downward spiral doesn’t stop there. BMW's contract to supply vital engines and com-
ponents to Rolls-Royce - which were effectively just hand finished in the UK - could be cancelled at 
12 months’ notice. VW did not have time to re-engineer the Rolls-Royce engine itself without taking 
production offline so when BMW threatened to stop supply, it forced the clash between these close 
rivals to a head. The matter looked like it was heading for court, but the German government inter-
vened to push the two sides to arbitration.  
Under the deal BMW would continue to supply engines for the cars and would let VW use the brand 
name from 1998 until 1 January 2003. But from that date, only BMW would be able build cars bearing 
the Rolls Royce name, while VW would be left building cars known as Bentleys. Effectively BMW 
had bought Rolls-Royce for a tenth of the price paid by VW for Bentley, because they had done their 
legal homework.  
Due Diligence in Cross-Border M&A 
The long-term trajectory of M&A activity is remorselessly upwards, despite temporary blips in the 
economic cycle. So is the trend for cross border deals with international M&A activity growing even 
more quickly than domestic deals?  
The background to this increased international activity is the growth of a global middle class, hungry 
for new products and services, as witnessed by Diageo’s strategy for buying into the growing drinks 
market in Brazil and Turkey that we showed in an earlier section. 
And cross-border M&A growth is set to continue over the long term. It is estimated that the global 
middle class will more than double in size from 2 billion today to 4.9 billion in 2030, according to the 
OECD. Driven by growth in China, India, Indonesia and Thailand, Asia is expected to host almost 
two-thirds of the global middle class by 2030 and account for 40 per cent of global middle class 
consumption, according to Reuters. 
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In countries in South America and - to a lesser extent Africa - M&A interest is shifting from natural 
resources and raw commodities to services such as healthcare and financial services, as well as 
luxury and near-luxury products. New commercial networks are emerging to serve M&A and expan-
sion in fast-growing parts of the world, in particular a new "Silk Road" whereby South-South trade 
between Asian and South American countries bypass Western commercial centres. Again, this can 
only bolster M&A growth. 
Whilst cross-border M&A, as with many topics in this book, could be the subject of a whole book, it 
is worth considering a few of the basic principles for good practice here: 
1) Know your market   
If you really understand your market, then it can't be "Europe" or "South America." Bolivia and Ar-
gentina share a border, but they are as different ethnically, culturally, geographically and linguistically 
as any two countries on the South American continent. Deal processes and legal systems are also 
not the same. Transpose that rule to Europe and the same could be said of Italy and Sweden or 
France and the UK. Local knowledge needs to be really local, certainly to a national level and some-
times even down to region within a country. 
2) Politicians are fickle – and they can derail a deal   
Any nation has the potential to become interventionist under the right circumstances. After a long 
history of welcoming foreign investors, the US government blocked Dubai Ports World's rights to US 
seaports that came under the company's control when it bought UK-listed P&O. At the time, in 2006, 
the UAE was one of America's strongest Gulf allies but public concerns about security in the wake 
of 9/11 overrode all logical business and international relations arguments.  
3) Be prepared for longer, deeper due diligence 
Be prepared to spend twice as much time and maybe money to get the same result as on a domestic 
deal.  
4) Choose the right cross-border partner 
Diligent partner selection could be one of the most important factors in the success or failure of an 
international joint venture or strategic alliance. If you are going to do that to "get into a relationship", 
you'll certainly want to redouble your efforts if you are making the next step to propose a corporate 
marriage.  
5) Truly understand the people culture 
As with M&A generally, it is easy to overlook the human component of any deal. Cultural nuances 
are critical, both in completing the deal during the planning and negotiation process, but also later 
down the road when the deal needs to be implemented by the local team. 
How Long Should Due Diligence Take? 
The answer to that question, if you are the buyers seeking the right information about the target and 
its market, is that it should be as long as it takes to get the answers. Even if you are doing a friendly 
deal where you have full access to the target and the deal hasn’t yet been announced or been leaked 
to the public, you will need to find out where the right information resides and what it really means.  
You will, however, want to do this as quickly as possible because you are under significant time 
pressures to avoid competing bidders and the possibility that employees, clients and suppliers will 
leave the target. 
As a general rule of thumb, very large or financially complex target companies and all publicly listed 
companies will require the most due diligence, although listed sellers will want to limit what they 
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make available because what is given to a friendly bidder must be shared with any rival bidders if 
they appear on the scene.  
But crucially, research demonstrates that not only does longer due diligence result in a higher likeli-




When no one knows: pre-announcement M&A activity and its effect on M&A outcomes 
There is a link a between longer due diligence period and the success of a deal as well as the 
payment of a lower premium, as found by research by Cass Business School's Mergers and Acqui-
sitions Research Centre for Intralinks conducted in 2013.  
The study was based on research on a sample of 519 publicly announced M&A transactions which 
used an Intralinks virtual data room (VDR) for due diligence between 2008 and 2012.  
Although the link was a generally held truism, this was the first time its existence had been actually 
proven. The study found shareholder returns for acquirers to be significantly higher where due dili-
gence was longer with acquirers outperformaning by 18.8 per cent when they had a due diligence 
period longer than the average compared to 6.7 per cent below the index for acquirers involved in 
deals with shorted due diligence period. 
There are sound reasons why this should be the case. Longer due diligence allows buyers to dig 
deeper and find information about the target that it can use to negotiate harder on the price. However, 
the study provided anecdotal evidence from interviews with practitioners that indicates that there 
may be a ceiling on this advantage: even a friendly seller - particularly one that has other options - 
could become bored or insulted by too much due diligence and call time on a deal.  
Sellers often try to limit the due diligence period for this very reason, although their ability to do so 
will depend on their power in the market and - particularly - the existence of rival bidders.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Irn Bru and Britivic Indian Tonic Water taste very different, don’t they? 
Although a longer due diligence period tends to benefit the buyer as it gives them more time to 
unearth information which they can use to negotiate down the price for the target, there are times 
when an opportunistic buyer wants to prioritise a quick deal, either because a target is so distressed 
it needs to be rescued, or because there is a one-off opportunity where the target, particularly a rival, 
is temporarily on the back foot. 
Because the need for speed reduces the opportunity for long due diligence, outright “rescue” takeo-
vers of insolvent or distressed companies tend to be low cost and are the preserve of specialists. 
But the opportunity to buy a troubled rival or, from the perspective of a struggling business, the 
chance to attract a helpful industry partner, can be too attractive for even the most cautious of cor-
porates to pass up.  The problem is that in the heat of the pursuit, there is too great a temptation to 
bypass the due diligence basics we outline in an earlier section even for the traditional areas of legal 
and financial information that almost all firms insist be done before a deal closes.  And in that rush 
to do complete a deal, it is even easier for mistakes to be made in the “People” category of our Three 
Big Mistakes of Deal-Making by making ill-thought out decisions about the proposed partners’ exec-
utive teams and their corporate culture. 
Another balancing argument against a longer due diligence process is the important issue of main-
taining the deal momentum. As we will see in the case of the proposed merger between Britvic and 
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AG Barr, two UK-based beverage companies, maintaining momentum and having all parties aligned 
is crucial if you want to reach a deal. As time moves on, even for just a few months, so do the industry 
dynamics and the need or want to sell or buy. In short, the deal may stall, but the rest of the world 
doesn’t. 
The answer is of course to have a very clear and detailed check-list and process in place before 
commencing due diligence. In deal situations you often hear about the 80/20 rule, that is, that there 
are the very important aspects of due diligence, the 80 per cent, which you need to fully understand 
and sign off on before a deal can be signed. The remaining 20 per cent - often the smaller issues 
which can take as long as the first 80 per cent to get to the bottom of - are issues which are not deal-
breakers and ones which the buyer can take a punt on in the pursuit to close the deal quickly. Caution 
is clearly needed but with the right planning, and significant pre-diligence completed, this can be an 
effective deal strategy. 
When trouble-hit UK drinks business Britvic announced it was in £1.4 billion merger talks with Scot-
land’s AG Barr, analysts cheered plans to create what was described in the deal announcement as 
“one of the leading soft drinks companies in Europe.” 
For Britvic’s shareholders - who had also suffered a recent profit warning in 2011 - its smaller listed 
rival looked like a cost-cutting knight in shining armour. Britvic’s medium-term troubles had just been 
significantly compounded by a forced safety recall of its child-focused Fruit Shoot drinks, which 
knocked 35 per cent per cent off its share price; combining with a well-run AG Barr seemed like the 
answer to their financial woes and what the Financial Times in September 2012 described as its 
“highly leveraged” balance sheet.   
Shareholders of AG Barr meanwhile had recently seen their company shake off its sleepy image 
with fast-growing youth-focused drinks such Rockstar and Irn Bru. What looked like a reverse take-
over of a struggling larger rival, according to The Telegraph seemed an excellent and timely bit of 
business. 
“The combination has compelling commercial and industrial logic,” the parties said in their joint state-
ment.  
In addition, they promised that a merged Britvic-AG Barr would deliver synergy savings of £40 million 
a year by 2016 as well extending Britvic’s strong relationships with Britain’s biggest supermarket 
chains and with its international partner and major shareholder, Pepsi, to the rest of the business. 
Few investors grumbled initially, but as the market digested the merger, a few began to question its 
logic.  In November 2013, an activist investor and Britvic’s eighth largest shareholder, publicly criti-
cised the deal as “poorly negotiated.” The “no-deal” camp got more bad news when it emerged AG 
Barr was to get half the seats on the combined board, in addition to the all-important chief executive 
role that was to go to its highly respected chief executive Roger White. Yet despite these challenges, 
only six per cent of Britvic’s shareholders ultimately voted against the deal. 
The tie-up was made contingent on approval by the UK’s entry level competition authority, the Office 
of Fair Trading [OFT] (whose functions have since been reorganised into the Competition & Markets 
Authority [CMA]), which clears a vast majority of mergers every year.  As the deal lumbered through 
the UK’s regulatory processes, no commentator predicted that the competition authorities would be 
a serious bar to a tie-up. After all, a combination of Britvic’s orange-coloured Tango drink and AG 
Barr’s Orangina was probably not uppermost in the minds of the government when they drew up 
competition policy.  Nevertheless, the competition authorities are a critical stakeholder for almost 
any deal – large or small – and neglecting to recognize this is dangerous.   
So when the OFT referred it in February 2013 for a lengthy examination by the Competition Com-
mission (now also superseded by the CMA), there was much gnashing of teeth as Britvic and AG 
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Barr complained that the market’s dominant player, Coca-Cola, already had double their combined 
market share. 
Britvic’s chairman Gerald Corbett was widely quoted as stating: “If this is [UK] industrial policy, I am 
a Frenchman. This is about two British companies getting together to take on Coca-Cola. The win-
ners today are cracking open bottles of champagne at Coca-Cola in Atlanta, Georgia.” 
Strip away the populist comments and the due diligence comes into question. Was a referral of the 
tie-up so completely unlikely that the companies - and their lawyers - should have made the deal 
contingent on quick approval by the OFT? For Britvic, which was dealing with the impact of the Fruit 
Shoot recall, you can see why such a contingency was particularly palatable because only a quick 
tie-up would get it out of its immediate troubles. But from the perspective of AG Barr, which had been 
presented with the opportunity of a lifetime, it is hard to see why the company would choose to put 
a backstop on a merger unless its hand was forced.  
The two sides promised to revisit the possibility of a merger following an investigation by the Com-
petition Commission. Britvic’s chief executive Paul Moody, who had agreed to step down as part of 
the merger, was replaced later in February 2013 by an executive who cut his teeth in the excellent 
Diageo team. 
The new chief executive, Simon Litherland, had been hired as Moody’s successor before the A.G. 
Barr deal, so was now in an unenviable position. But, instead of sloping off into the sunset, Litherland 
kicked off a strategic review to assess how he could improve Britvic’s strategy regardless of any 
merger. What he found were £30 million a year of cost cuts that Britvic could implement itself, cuts 
that had been overlooked when AG Barr’s chief Roger White promised to find £40 million synergies 
at a merged business. In announcing Britivic’s own rationalisation programme he wiped out much of 
the financial rationale for a deal. Having recovered from the Fruit Shoot recall, Britvic’s shares were 
now trading at nearly 500p and the company could renegotiate merger terms. 
Once the Competition Commission cleared the deal in July 2013, Britvic tried to renegotiate its share 
of the merged company up from 63 per cent to 70 per cent and - crucially - it asked for control of the 
board of the new business, reputedly with Litherland replacing White as chief executive, according 
to reports in The Telegraph.  
The positions could not be reconciled and the two sides walked away with AG Barr professing itself 
“disappointed” and Britvic lauding its former merger partners as “good people” but seeing a bright 
standalone future. 
Several years on it looks like somebody at the OFT inadvertently did Britvic and its shareholders a 
favour when stalling the deal and allowing it time to rethink the proposition.  AG Barr’s share price 
remained broadly undisturbed, while Britivic’s shares hit a high in 2015 of 775p per share, almost 
three times higher than its low when the process started. 
Successful due diligence has solid foundations 
The building blocks of successful due diligence are solid corporate strategy and dedicated imple-
mentation of that strategy through continuous target selection. For example, US private equity house 
Vista paid more than its rivals to acquire failing software business Misys, but had done enough 
homework to know that the target had more value than their competitors realised. We will consider 
this case study in our next section on valuation.  
Financial sponsors, such as private equity firms who each do upwards of 10-20 deals annually, are 
businesses who must – and do - excel at due diligence. One such company is JAB Holding Com-
pany, the private wealth vehicle of the Reimann family, whose wealth dates back to the German 
Benckiser industrial chemicals business founded in the 1820s. They saw an undervalued gem in 
Douwe Egberts coffee business in 2013 and, because JAB could see the opportunity it brought, it 
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bought the coffee maker ahead of rival bidders and by 2014 had co-investors including global food 
giant Mondelez.  For $13.9 billion, JAB also purchased at the end of 2015 the US coffee company, 
Keurig Green Mountain. 
And it's not just financial sponsors who are known for their excellent due diligence. Liberty Global, 
the entertainment firm stalking ITV in 2015, is known for its background research and speed, having 
completed the acquisitions of Virgin Media ($23.3 billion) and Ziggo (€10.0 billion) in record speed 
in the prior two years in terms of starting the conversation/dialogue and completing the deal.  
Getting it right the Cheung Kong Way 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure (CKI) Holdings has been one of the most successful acquirers of the 
last decade. With an investment portfolio that spans Europe, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 
the company’s Chairman is Victor Li, the eldest son of global entrepreneur, and Hong Kong's wealth-
iest citizen, Sir Li Ka-shing. 
Like Diageo, CKI has a reputation for excellent target selection built on a bedrock of high quality 
industry expertise. Putting in the homework early helps the company through the due diligence pro-
cesses that are a key part of infrastructure asset auctions.  
One of CKI's biggest European acquisitions was UK Power Networks - the non-core electricity dis-
tribution arm of EDF, a French power company who had bought into the UK market with the purchase 
of several English electric companies including London Electricity Plc in 2002. The French power 
giant decided in 2010 that it wanted to be part of the UK's new nuclear power programme, but needed 
to divest assets in order to pay for that investment. In addition, returns in the electricity industry had 
been dampened by the 2009 recession and the industry was also facing regulatory issues. 
CKI, who had missed out on the earlier sale of a regional electricity distribution business, brought in 
Basil Scarsella, a long-term senior executive of the group to run the bid, in conjunction with CKI’s 
M&A executives, for the assets that would become UK Power Networks.  
Scarsella believed that CKI's unique approach gives it an early advantage over other financial bid-
ders, claiming that “CKI considers itself to be an operator of regulated assets not just an investor... 
CKI has owned and successfully operated regulated utilities assets in Hong Kong, Australia, United 
Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand for a long time.  When undertaking due diligence on possible 
acquisitions, CKI generally have a very good idea of areas in the business where they can add 
value.”  This demonstrates another key point about due diligence done well:  the need to know your 
own company’s strengths and weaknesses in order to assess properly what complementary skills 
and resources are needed through a merger or acquisition. 
The Hong Kong-based business does have a stand-out reputation for bringing in good managers, 
applying best in class governance and then leaving them to run the business. In that sense it is 
sometimes viewed as an excellent hybrid - tying the interests of the company's backers to manage-
ment's, but also having a corporate level of industry expertise.  
Scarsella says that CKI's status as a long-term investor is also seen as a cornerstone of its success. 
"The proof is there for everyone to see that CKI is a long-term investor. Reputation is very important 
so CKI manages the businesses from a long-term perspective”.  
CKI has so far largely focused on developed markets where the state has already sold off most 
infrastructure assets. Given the size of the pool of potential investments, maintaining this reputation 
is a necessity, not a luxury.  
From CKI in Asia to Rolls Royce and Britvic in the UK, careful, holistic due diligence that takes into 
account issues such as cultural differences is vital. Adequate time must also be planned for this 
work:  it cannot and should not be rushed.   
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Excellent due diligence will now become our building block not just for the next section on pricing, 
but, if the deal does go through, for the post-deal period where excellent due diligence provides the 
foundation for excellent integration.  
Knowledge is Power: THE DOs AND DON’Ts 
 Do your homework; knowledge is power 
 Do take your time – it might even help reduce the price… 
 … but don’t be afraid to move quickly if you need to as long as you have done your 
homework  
 Don’t forget to carefully consider non-traditional risk factors like culture, ethics and 
cyber security in your due diligence process 
 Don’t be afraid to walk away from a bad deal 
 Do remember to spend time on managing all the important stakeholders as you’ll have 
to work together once the deal is done 
 Don’t ever assume that you know everything about a target company, even if you think 
that you know the industry and even that company well. 
 Do conduct due diligence on your own company’s capabilities to do the deal, includ-




0.5. Why the Price Isn’t Always Right 
Cast your mind back to the end of last century when the Millennium Bug was the world’s biggest 
cyber threat and the world was preparing to party like it was 1999. The late 1990s and the millennial 
dotcom boom saw a slew of mega-deals that still dominate the M&A league tables. In 1999, the UK’s 
Vodafone AirTouch launched an offer for its German rival Mannesmann, in what remains the biggest 
ever hostile cross-border bid. The deal was a totem of a telecoms boom that easily dwarfs the tech-
nology market mania of the Facebook-WhatsApp age.  
At the time, a captivated global business audience followed every twist and turn of a rare Anglo-
American raid on Germany company, until Mannesmann rolled over and Vodafone ultimately paid a 
massive $183 billion for a friendly merger. Approaching 20 years later, it remains the third-largest 
M&A deal ever.  
Five years after the merger, Vodafone was forced to tell investors it was taking a £28 billion “goodwill” 
charge, one of the biggest post-acquisitions write-downs on record. The write-off was primarily due 
to the Mannesmann acquisition. Such a significant write-down of goodwill, defined as the difference 
between the net assets of an acquired business and the purchase price, indicated that Vodafone 
had mispriced its bid for Mannesmann.  
Yet when the deal is considered – both at the time of the transaction and in the aftermath - pricing 
is very low down the agenda of criticisms. This may sound surprising, but it is not. Pricing is not an 
issue we consider to be one of the fundamental Three Big Mistakes of Deal-making; it is possible to 
pay a high price and still make the deal a success., And valuation and pricing, in contrast to our Big 
Three of planning, communication and people, are together the one area of deal-making where par-
ticipants tend to invest appropriate time and resources to get right.  Not that firms don’t get it wrong 
(as with Vodafone above), but at least it typically is something that gets appropriate attention. 
We will walk you through the mechanism for determining the correct valuation as determined by the 
buyer - that is, its walkaway price - taking in consideration methods used by the wide variety of 
bidders from financial sponsors such as hedge funds, private equity firms and even sovereign wealth 
funds to the strategic corporate acquirers, both privately-held and publicly listed.  
Many of the most obvious failures of valuation occur not because there is a mistake in the valuation 
methodology or process, but because a buyer’s view on either or both the future forecasts and risk 
– and therefore inputs to their financial models - is inherently flawed.  
A good example is the acquisition by Saudi Arabian investors of Continental Farmers Group Plc, the 
owner of huge tracts of valuable fertile farmland in the Ukraine. The Saudis bought the UK-listed 
agricultural business through an investment vehicle - the United Farmers’ Holding Company - as 
part of Saudi Arabia’s strategic push for food security. The Gulf country, which had plenty of petro-
dollars but very little of its own arable land, had in recent years encouraged its state-backed compa-
nies to buy up farmland in Africa and near Asia.  
Unfortunately, when Russia sent troops into separatist, ethnically Russian parts of Eastern Ukraine 
in 2014, food production slowed and it became almost impossible to get food harvested and out of 
the country. Saudi Arabia’s willingness to invest in unstable geopolitical regions - or certainly to do 
so for the £58 million it paid for the UK-listed company - was not primarily a valuation error or due 
diligence mistake. Instead, it was a strategic gamble on a bad risk, or a mis-pricing on risk if you will. 
Pricing and valuation must be part of a company’s wider M&A strategy.  
Valuation versus Pricing 
M&A valuation centers around striking the balance between the buyer’s views of the value of the 
target and the ‘market’ or the seller’s expectations on price to be paid. In order to avoid overpayment, 
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the bidder should always have established their walk-away price prior to embarking on potential 
target pursuit. 




In summary, there are five steps to establishing a buyer’s walk-away price  
1) Stand-alone valuation to the equity shareholders  
There are several different methods of doing this, including the target’s financial performance in 
relation to the performance of comparable listed companies; assessing net asset value or using 
management buy-out / leveraged buy-out models determined by the company’s financial forecast 
and the cost and availability of debt.   
Many, if not all, valuation methodologies will be influenced by market or transaction multiples, that 
is, what other investors are prepared to pay for one unit (dollar, euro, pound, etc) of revenue, EBITDA 
or earnings of a company or its competitors. Public target bidders also need to consider the 52 week-
high pre-bid target share price, as it has been shown to have an impact on the minimum bid level at 
which the shareholders’ are likely to tender. In other words, each shareholder will have a view on 
the value of control, that is, the value of future benefits from the stock, and the memory of near-term 
historic valuations, which the premium paid has to exceed.   
Interestingly, the average premium paid of 20-40 percent over the undisturbed share price in acqui-
sitions of public targets has been remarkably consistent over time and across sectors, which is likely 
a reflection of the benchmark ‘value’ of giving up control and future benefits for investors.  These 
premiums do vary by industry, country and point of time in the economic and M&A cycle. 
2) Add: Target’s net debt  
Enterprise value must consider the target’s debt holders as well as shareholders. There will usually 
be a change-of-control clause in the debt holders’ contract with the target company which means 
the acquirer will need to pay down or renegotiate that debt after the deal completes.  
Valuation
1. Target valuation assessment
2. Synergies
3. Costs and ‘business impact factor’
Pricing
1. Background – why sell?
2. Context – valuation of peers and 
comparable transactions
3. Competition – quality of asset / interest
4. Negotiation tactics
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Clearly, any outstanding cash belonging to the target can be used to net off the effect of the debt. 
This is why cash-rich companies make for likely acquisition targets. 
3) Add: What is control of that business worth to my business? 
This ‘control’ allows the acquirer to achieve synergies. A synergy in this context is the notion that the 
two businesses are worth more together than as two separate entities. Synergies can be revenue- 
or cost focused, with usually only the latter making it into models and deal communication as it is 
relatively easier to control, to measure and to track. In some ways, synergies are also the inverse of 
the acquisition premium and should, at least in theory, ensure that the bidder with the greatest syn-
ergy potential prevails in an auction. However, due to several reasons already discussed in this book 
– hubris, strategic mistakes, poor planning, external pressures, etc. – this is easier promised than 
achieved. The value of acquisition synergies is also a key sweetener for investors in any share-
based deal. 
4) Do: Valuation analysis 
There is never a single, exact answer in M&A valuation.  Scenario analyses and  valuation ranges 
based on different possible outcomes are essential. With so many subjective and moving inputs, 
there simply is no such thing as the right M&A value, and all the values should be considered. This 














If a deal is indeed agreed, the agreed price will likely end up being somewhere between the low or 
the high end of the range, with the exact point being determined by non-financial factors such as the 
relative negotiation strength of the two parties.  
5)  Add: Costs, including: 
 Advisory costs - investment bankers, accountants, lawyers, public relations firms, stock 
agents, debt advisory fees, etc. (these can be up to five per cent of the negotiated deal value) 
 Opportunity costs – what the company would be doing with the time and resources spent in 
the pre-completion phase if a deal was not being done (this is a difficult figure to estimate, 
but should not be ignored for that reason as it could be the highest individual deal cost item) 
 Dis-synergies – when the company is constrained to achieve certain cost synergies due to 
its size and scale in the market; this is particularly important if the buyer  expects to have to 
divest assets as part of the deal, either to finance it or because of competition concerns. 
Current share price 
($) 
Figure 0.5-B: The valuation football field 
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 Integration costs (these can be up to 15 per cent of the deal value, although spread out over 
several years) 
Funding costs (interest payments), if bridge loans are required or if debt is being raised to purchase 
the target. 
Clearly, there is an entire industry and many tomes devoted to a whole variety of valuation methods. 
But despite their very technical and apparently precise nature, the output should always be chal-
lenged on the basis of reasonability and logic.  The use of valuation methods is an art, not a science, 
as will hopefully be clear later in this section.  Just because a complex valuation method spits out a 
result for the target’s value doesn’t mean that is the correct figure at the time of calculation, in that 
specific deal and for that buyer. 
Having a formal process to determine the walk-away price, which, as with everything in M&A valua-
tion, will be a range as opposed to a precise number, should help acquirers recognise and evaluate 
warning signs in the process when the negotiation is running hard. It should help executives to have 
a more objective justification to the buying company’s board as to why it should make a decision to 
walk away. Finally, if an indication of price expectation has been given in an auction, it should help 
potential bidders determine early in the process if it is one in which they should participate. 
Of course, the walk-away price only considers the buyer’s situation. Equally important is the selling 
shareholders’ view on value, which will be of critical importance in the pricing.    
In summary again, the five questions that will influence a ‘market’ or the seller’s view on pricing are:  
1)  Rationale: Why do I want or have to sell? 
2) Context: What have competitors sold for? 
3) Control: What premium will I or my shareholders accept for change of control? 
4) Competition: Can I get a higher bid from someone else? 
5)  Finance: What can the bidder afford and can they borrow to pay more? 
The most efficient buyers will run valuation models alongside their live deal list and do tend to be 
stricter in their approach to valuation, that is, they should have a view when it is time to walk away, 
or at least be more selective in the deal process they decide to participate in. The bid by the RBS-
led consortium for ABN Amro - a hurried deal with apparently little valuation planning and due dili-
gence - is the counterpoint to that approach. CEOs who have not put in their early groundwork will 
find it much harder to pull out later on because at that point they and their team (including the board 
of directors) will be influenced by other factors.  These include emotional ties to the deal: there is 
often a  tendency to assume the target will be won and to attribute significance to the sunk costs of 
both time and money already invested in the deal process. 
Because of this overconfidence, managers who are responsible for their company's M&A process, 
and have a successful track record on past deals, are more likely to embark on a "riskier” strategy. 
This could include cross-border transactions, which may require regulatory approval in multiple ju-
risdictions, or hostile takeovers.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Masters of the Deal 
Despite our claim that a high price doesn’t necessarily mean a disastrous deal, there is evidence 
that successful acquirers are price-savvy and tend to be better at ‘timing the market’. Indeed, they 
are more likely to strike when others are encumbered, when a target can be bought for a much lower 
price. 
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According to global research conducted in 2015 by Intralinks and Cass Business School, Masters of 
the Deal – Part 2, more successful M&A corporates – measured by share price value generated 
after the acquisition(s) or divestiture(s) – significantly increase their deal value ratio of divestments 
to acquisitions in times when markets are ‘hot’ and crucially valuations are high. Similarly, they shift 
their ratio towards more acquisitions than divestments when markets are less inflated. 
Figure 0.5-C: Buy and Sell patterns of successful acquirers 
 
 
From our experience, key advantages for successful buyers also include a strong corporate culture 
and good preparation, both through solid long-term implementation of deal strategy and effective 
due diligence. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Overpaying is not the End of the World 
If there is one company that reminds us there corporate second chances do exist, it’s Misys, the 
software provider that went from an unloved public company to a takeover target in an over-priced 
private equity transaction. The company’s owner, Vista, won a bidding war to get Misys, but paying 
over the odds has not held it back.  
In 2012, Misys was listed on the London Stock Exchange. The company was over-leveraged, under-
marketed and its shareholders were mutinying. The company’s client base then, as now, was com-
prised principally of large international banks and financial institutions who were struggling through 
a Eurozone crisis that considerably weakened their willingness to invest in software.  
It looked like things were getting worse as Misys reported a 12 per cent fall in revenues for the third 
quarter to £89 million. The company’s shareholders - pension funds as well as hedge funds and 
other activists - were unwilling to wait years for things to get better so they supported the sale of the 
company, basically to anyone who would have it and who would be willing pay a reasonable price. 
They weren’t greedy. 
With each of their shares worth just 260p, investors were particularly annoyed that a deal to sell 
Misys to a US buyer for 450p a share had fallen through in 2011. It looked like they would now have 
to accept an all-share bid from a Swiss trade rival Temenos without a premium to the share price - 
a very unusual situation as most offers for public targets include the aforementioned 20-40 per cent 
control premium. However, Misys and its investment bankers managed to get a bidding war going.   
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CVC, the private equity house, and Value Act, Misys’ biggest investor holding 21.5 per cent of the 
company, looked like carrying the day with a higher bid. But another private equity firm, Vista, got 
Misys’ non-executive directors on side and made a surprising 350p a share bid at a six per cent 
premium to the company’s share price, which had already been bumped up by CVC’s bid.  
US based-Vista - a technology specialist - ending up valuing the company at more than £1.2 billion, 
despite the fact that Mysis’ revenues were falling.  Analysts described Vista’s price as “full” and many 
commentators thought the private equity house had paid a big premium that was artificially pushed 
up by a bidding war.  
But Vista has made a huge success of Misys thus far. The US private equity house combined it with 
one of one of its portfolio companies, Turaz, the former Thomson Reuters business that provides 
software for managing treasury and capital markets transactions. Then it bolted on IND, a mobile 
banking software provider, and Custom Credit Solutions, which makes software for managing the 
loan origination process.  
Vista brought in Nadeem Syad, an Oracle veteran with whom it had worked before who - thanks in 
part to an improvement in European financial markets - turned Misys around. At the end of 2014 
Vista appointed investment banking advisors to prepare the company for a dual process sale or IPO 
and, according to Sky News, then had talks with a number of parties in including Temasek, Singa-
pore’s sovereign wealth fund.  
What is most likely is that Vista knew and understood the potential for Misys better than anyone else 
so could afford to pay more than others (overpaying, in the eyes of those competitors) because it 
could extract more value from the business. They had done their due diligence which was then 
reflected in their deal valuation and thus were willing to pay a higher price. 
It is not surprising that a study by Forbes magazine of 500 CFOs who had been involved in a merger 
puts overpayment very low down the list of why deals fail. Overpayment comes in at 7th, below 
incompatible cultures, an inability to manage the target and a clash of management styles - all fail-
ures that belong in the “failure to properly consider people” Big Mistake. Also rated as a bigger 
problem than overpayment was a failure to anticipate foreseeable events as happened with the 
Saudi Arabian investors in the Ukraine and with the entire global mining sector around 2007, even 
though in both of those industries there was evidence at the time of the possibility of a change in 
market circumstances.  
Pricing in Risk 
Failure to anticipate foreseeable events falls between being pricing risk failure and a failure of as-
sessing underlying strategy. With the Ukrainian farmland deal, priced at a 48 per cent premium to 
the undisturbed share price despite falling earnings for the target company, it certainly seemed that 
the Saudi Arabian investors had a fundamentally different view – and in hindsight too low - on the 
appropriate risk discount than the rest of the market. Given that the Caucasus region has a long-
standing history of Russian support for separatist ethnically Russian people in former Soviet coun-
tries, that risk should have been better anticipated in their valuation calculations. 
Sometimes events that could have a huge impact on takeovers are not foreseeable at all (so-called 
‘black swan’ events), but rarely do they come completely out of left field. There are well-developed 
processes in risk management of identifying possible (but not necessarily probable) scenarios, and 
the pricing and valuation calculations for an M&A deal should be stress tested through these sce-
narios. 
Deals hit by potentially foreseeable changes in technology include the disastrous AOL-Time Warner 
merger which failed to anticipate the massive shift fast internet would create in the entertainment 
market, even though there were definite signs that this was the way things were moving at the time 
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of the merger. A number of well-known contemporary analysts were saying at the time that they 
couldn’t understand the deal.  Tom Wolzien, a stock analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein, was reported 
by The New York Times  shortly after the deal was announced  as saying that ''there's a real difficult 
time with the Street by and large coming to grips with the combination'' and that neither AOL nor 
Time Warner were easy to understand because AOL got its revenue from subscriptions, advertising 
and Internet commerce, whereas Time Warner had five major divisions, each with its own different 
business cycle. 
The effects of regulatory reform should also be anticipated.  For example, financial regulation that 
bans payment protection insurance or a medical regulator banning a pharmaceutical company from 
making a particular medicine are risks which are foreseeable. However, few blind spots have been 
as obvious as the one that developed amongst executives in the mining industry in 2007.  
With the world on a rapid upwards economic trajectory, the years that led up to the 2008 financial 
collapse were good ones for most commodities. Not only were the US and Europe booming, but the 
fast-growing BRICs were joining the party. China and India were building new cities at a pace the 
miners could not match and commodity prices soared as they fought with Latin American buyers 
over aluminium and iron ore.  
The emerging markets boom convinced Big Mining - including Rio Tinto chief executive Tom Al-
banese - that the industry had entered a new “super-cycle” where there would be no slowdown. 
Ever.  
This cloak of invincibility gave Albanese and Rio’s biggest rivals - BHP Billiton, Glencore and Xstrata 
- the confidence to go on spending sprees. The term ‘super-cycle’ was still being used in 2009 as 
the Western European and American banks begged for taxpayer bailouts, but Albanese didn’t 
acknowledge the new reality - the need for less aluminium and iron as car production, heavy ma-
chinery and building works slowed down - until 2013, when he was pushed out in the wake of a $38 
billion write-down. 
Albanese had joined Rio in 2007 at the top of the cyclical commodities peak when aluminium prices 
were at a 20 year high. At the same time the world’s biggest aluminium producer, Alcan, wanted 
protection from an unwanted bidder, just as Albanese’s company was being pursued by its own 
unfriendly bidder, BHP Billiton, for a mining mega-merger. Sealing the deal for $38.1 billion - a 65 
per cent premium on Alcan’s undisturbed share price – was, the Rio chief claimed, “a case of being 
in the right place at the right time.” 
Former Alcan chief executive Dick Evans describes it rather differently. Evans, talking with the Wall 
Street Journal in 2013 with the benefit of hindsight, called it “one of the worst decisions ever, the 
largest metals and mining transaction in the history of the world at the high point of the commodity 
cycle.”   
Buying Alcan did help Rio Tinto to fend off an unfriendly approach from BHP Billiton, although by the 
time its rival formally abandoned the chase, it was November 2008, and two months after the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers would have made it very hard to borrow money for the deal. Regulators 
had also threatened to tie that deal up in months of red tape.   
The Alcan deal, meanwhile, left Rio highly over-leveraged just as the world was heading into the 
financial crisis; overnight, the miner’s net debt increased to $46.3 billion, or 94.5 per cent of turnover, 
from $2.4 billion, or 9.4 per cent of turnover.  
Rio Tinto was not the only miner to gorge on spare cash generated by the commodities boom. Bra-
zil’s Vale bought Inco for $18 billion in 2006 and Australia’s Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc 
bought Phelps Dodge for $23 billion.  
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In fact the world's largest mining groups have written off about 90 per cent of the value of their M&A 
deals completed since 2007, according to a report by Citibank in 2015.  The bank calculates that, 
overall, miners have built up impaired assets worth $85 billion over those last seven years, and this 
represented 18 per cent of their average asset base. Most affected were Rio Tinto, which had 34 
per cent of its asset base impaired and Anglo American, with 23 per cent impairment. 
Rio did the biggest deal at the worst possible time. One of the large credit rating agencies, Fitch, 
said it was concerned that it might need to lower the miner’s credit rating. Rio was forced to go cap 
in hand to shareholders for a rescue rights issue. The company was then left trying to sell assets to 
streamline itself at a time when there were few buyers for anything, and even fewer who could afford 
it.  
As the economy improved slowly, Rio hung on, hoping that aluminium prices would pick up. But it 
had misread China, underestimating that country’s own growing aluminium output and overestimat-
ing demand for the metal, which was constrained by fall in sales of new cars.  
The company delayed write-downs, taking only $1 billion in 2009 against the Alcan purchase, but 
when the hoped-for bounce failed to come, it was forced to write down a further $14 billion more 
against both that deal and a $3.9 billion Mozambican coal acquisition personally spearheaded by 
Albanese in 2011.  
At this point Albanese’s position was no longer tenable. “While I leave the business in good shape 
in many respects, I fully recognise that accountability for all aspects of the business rests with the 
CEO,” he said in his farewell statement in January 2013.  
Valuing Intangibles 
In addition to strategic errors in judgment that lead buyers to mis-price risk, there is also a category 
of “true” pricing errors where a buyer has attached a value to a target’s asset, but has under or 
overvalued it, or - even more worryingly - not recognised it as an asset.  
It is hard to imagine that despite the value in most businesses these days being derived from intan-
gible sources, these are neither identified nor audited in financial statements. It is only in M&A trans-
actions that they even appear on “the books” and even in a transaction situation, the allocation of 
purchase price will ascribe value to those easy to identify intangibles such as registered IP rights but 
then gather most of the value together in one word, ‘goodwill’. For reasons that should become 
apparent, we are predicting the death of goodwill, at least in accounting terms. 
In a world increasingly driven and dominated by disruptive technologies, the issue of careful assess-
ment of truly valuable but more or less identifiable assets and intangible intellectual property [IP] is 
an increasingly important issue in M&A. Badly managed in a transaction, IP can be a quagmire that 
can adversely effect any M&A deal, as we saw in the last section when VW acquired Rolls Royce 
only to discover it had not bought the rights to use the luxury carmaker’s name.  VW’s error is not a 
one-off: equally famously eBay bought Skype for $3.2 billion and seemed not to recognize that the 
core Skype technology relied on a license from an entity outside of the transaction perimeter which 
then expired after the purchase. 
In the past, IP evaluation has been limited to black letter registered IP rights, that is, patents (partic-
ularly important in the life sciences industry), trademarks, design rights, domain names and copy-
rights.  
Because of this, IP due diligence has traditionally been carried out by law firms. During the due 
diligence phase law firms will focus on the IP that can be easily seen and therefore assessed and 
will typically: 
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 Ensure the target owns or has the right to use the registered IP that comprises part of the 
sale (in an assets sale) or is owned the target (in a share sale) and verify, quantitatively, that 
this registered IP exists 
 Check the impact of  change of control on the registered IP 
 Establish whether there are any pending legal challenges to the target’s registered IP or 
infringements of 3rd party registered IP rights by the target and aim to establish the risk in 
both cases 
 Negotiate warranties from the seller to confirm the above; sometimes this will be done instead 
of due diligence rather than in addition to it. 
 The buyer and its advisers will seek to value the assets acquired  and allocate value between 
the tangible and intangible assets acquired.  
Valuation of IP is normally carried out post sale using one of the three main methods: 
 Cost:  what would it cost to replace the IP asset based on benchmark figures? The challenge 
here is that benchmarks are not always available and, even where a buyer or advisor sug-
gests that they are, upon further due diligence, the IP assets are often found to be unique in 
ways that make benchmarks difficult to use as accurate comparables 
 Market: how much would it cost to buy a similar asset? Similar to the issue of benchmarking 
availability, the uniqueness of both IP assets and individual M&A deals can make it difficult 
to identify a similar asset and determine its value 
 Income: how much revenue will the asset provide once it is owned? This calculation can be 
based on the alternative cost of licensing the IP  from a third party or based on an estimate 
of the additional profits generated by the target business versus the profits of that business 
without the IP. This income estimate can then be projected for, say, the next five to ten years 
and, using net present value [NPV] calculation techniques, modelled to determine a current 
value for the revenue stream 
In recent years, however, there has been an acceptance that there is significant value in other “in-
tangibles” that extend beyond the scope of legal IP due diligence.  
Andrew Watson, Head of IP Strategy at Ernst & Young says:  “The main challenges with intangibles 
and IP are that there is no consistent lens used to assess which intangibles are the most important 
sources of value and no common language in which to talk about them. It is typical to find that after 
the value of tangible assets of the target are deducted from the purchase price, as much as 95 per 
cent of the value will be intangible. Take off the value of the registered IP rights using a method such 
as relief from royalty and there is still a large amount of value that will typically be allocated to “good-
will”. If a buyer does not have an appreciation of all of the assets being acquired and legal diligence 
does not, in fact could not, identify and assess them, there has to be a serious risk of impairment to 
goodwill.” 
Within this goodwill element are many assets of different shapes and sizes. A company’s people - 
executives and staff - are the main repositories of that intangible value. The most valuable asset of 
most companies will be its knowledge of what to do and indeed what not to do (a right known as 
negative know-how); expertise on how to build or take a product to market on the one hand and 
supplier relationships on the other are other intangible assets examples of this. Such knowledge is 
rarely able to be underpinned by formal legal IP rights such as by patent or trademark protection. In 
fact, a well thought through IP strategy would deliberately decide not to apply for registered protec-
tion of these assets. 
The main exception to the rule that most value is in the unregistered IP rights is in the life sciences 
sector. In pharmaceuticals the majority of intangible value will be in the patents which give a right to 
exclude a competitor from using the same invention for 20 years. In this industry, the patent cliff will 
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apply at the end of the patent life, at which point 80 per cent of the revenues will typically disappear 
within two weeks and never come back. , However even in this sector, other intangibles such as 
expertise in compliance with regulatory approvals or R&D collaborations will exist and be of high 
value.In terms of our Three Big mistakes of Deal-making, valuation mistakes are often fundamentally 
people mistakes. If staff and executives hold the keys to intangible value that is not underpinned by 
formal IP rights, then a buyer should find ways within the transaction structure both to unlock and to 
transfer that value and incentivise the holders to stay. Buyers must be careful to ensure that where 
they think they see no value in an incumbent management team, the intangible value of the company 
is held elsewhere in that company, for instance by lower level executives or  a group of staff such 
as an R&D or Marketing team. The key, first, is to identify and evaluate the asset base. The solution 
as to how to deal with this in the transaction context then depends on the nature of the specific asset. 
Even when a buyer does put value on the senior management team, it may often not do enough to 
persuade them to stay with the business post-deal completion. A case in point is HP’s acquisition of 
Autonomy, the 2011 deal we discussed in the Preface to this book. At $11 billion, or 24 times 
EBITDA, HP’s valuation of Autonomy was a stretch by any definition. At the time of the purchase it 
was widely believed that HP wanted Autonomy not just for its software, but also for its dynamic 
management team, led by serial technology entrepreneur and founder Mike Lynch. The desire to 
keep management on board was believed to be a key reason for HP’s willingness to pay such a full 
price.  
This made sense because Lynch and the Autonomy senior management team were repositories of 
much of the intangible and therefore total value of the company. It was objectively clear and would 
make IP strategic sense for Autonomy’s IDOL engine search technology to be protected not by pa-
tents but by trade secrets (why would one patent and therefore make publicly available a search 
technology when it could not ever discover infringement by a third party?). It is likely the case that 
when HP conducted its IP diligence, it analysed Autonomy’s patents and other registered rights. But 
- as with a growing number of newer technology businesses – Autonomy’s IP value was not just in 
its patents but in its trade secrets. Apparently around 600 of them. And who has access to trade 
secrets in a company - the senior management team of course 
IP Due Diligence Advice Trends 
A specialist team at Ernst & Young and in other advisory firms have been identifying these trends 
and beginning to fill this gap. Rather than replacing the traditional law firm due diligence, these ad-
visors will work alongside the lawyers performing qualitative due diligence on IP and intangible as-
sets to back up the legal diligence.  
Andrew Watson of EY’s IP Strategy team, who has also previously worked as an M&A lawyer, has 
created what he calls a “universal taxonomy of intangibles”. This is used to help buyers identify all 
intangibles and then, using an associated methodology, establish which are the most important in-
tangible in driving value. This analysis feeds into the valuation exercise required. “We place a lens 
over a business to work out what is really at the source of value. Outside of life sciences most 
companies could lose most of their patents and it would make little difference to its success. We 
need to look outside of the registered rights using a new lens to find that value. Often it may be a 
team of highly regarded men in white coats (literally) who are able to design products to meet the 
requirements of the future product roadmap”.  
The system was created with data from over 300 projects where the commercial value of IP was 
assessed. Watson and his team built this into a benchmarking system for intangibles, whose core 
data is constantly added to. As Watson says “this is a brave new world”.  
Another example is Microsoft, the company that changed the computing world with its Windows 
software.  It has not had a happy time in the M&A market.  
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One of its biggest deals - and the largest in terms of people and plant - was its acquisition of the 
handset division of Finland-based Nokia, another once great tech giant on the slide.  
In 2013, Steve Ballmer, the same Microsoft CEO who dallied with Yahoo, decided the IT giant had 
to get into the mobile phone business that was fast becoming the principal technology that people 
were using to access the internet. A deal to buy Nokia’s handset business for $7.9 billion closed in 
April 2014, but just 15 months later Ballmer’s successor, Satya Nadella, announced a $7.6 billion 
write-down of Nokia’s assets and axed 7,800 staff from the company. That’s $7.3 billion written off 
in just over a year. 
In the years leading up the deal, Microsoft and Nokia were both victims - to a greater or lesser degree 
– of all-conquering tech giants Google and Apple. Nokia had been hit much harder. With its business 
squeezed between Apple’s iPhones and rivals who ran Google’s Android on their handsets, the 
Finnish business was losing money as it stuck by a deal with Microsoft to use its once dominant 
Windows operating system on its mobile devices.  
Microsoft’s performance had held up much better than Nokia’s thanks to its Windows computer soft-
ware, which,  although it had lost ground to Apple products in home computing, had held up in the 
business market. But in the long-term, Microsoft saw its future threatened by the increasing demands 
of customers for synchronised information on all their devices. The company knew that people 
wanted to be able to start an email on their laptop and finish it on their phone, Microsoft would only 
be in the game if people bought Windows-based handsets.  
In the wake of rumors that Nokia was about to ditch Windows in favour of the more widely used 
Google-developed Android operating system, Ballmer announced the acquisition of Nokia. The prob-
lem was, by the time he made his decision, the ship had well and truly sailed. Very few consumers 
were convinced by a Windows-based phone; just three per cent of mobiles globally used the oper-
ating system. Microsoft had completely misunderstood the value of the Nokia handset business to 
its overall empire and bought something that was nearly worthless.  
The acquisition was bad news for both sides. Microsoft said that it would concentrate on its core 
business customers, leading many analysts to ask why it didn’t buy Blackberry, the businessman’s 
favourite mobile phone at the time, instead of Nokia. The company has also concentrated on devel-
oping holo-eyewear and other devices it hoped would make handheld phones redundant in a gen-
eration. Embattled Nokia meanwhile did get some cash for its shareholders, but many of the job cuts 
fell on Nokia’s Finnish plants, causing an outcry in the Nordic nation where the mobile phone pioneer 
was once a national champion and according to The Economist, contributed a quarter of Finnish 
growth from 1998 to 2007. 
Deals Leak 
As we discussed in the last section, research shows that the longer due diligence goes on, the lower 
an offer price is likely to be. A seller's best option to limit due diligence is to orchestrate a competitive 
bid process from the outset. Another pricing tactic – albeit not as openly discussed – is to leak news 
of the deal.  
‘When No One Knows’, a November 2013 study on pre-announcement M&A activity by Cass Busi-
ness School and Intralinks, found evidence to suggest that many, if not most, deal leaks are delib-
erate. The research data suggested that there is no corollary between a specific event, such as the 
opening of a deal-room or the hiring of advisors, and the timing of leaks. Instead they tend to appear 
towards the end of the process and are likely to be motivated by one party being unhappy with how 
negotiations are progressing. Information is therefore leaked to push the deal in the direction they 
prefer. In our experience, even if the leak itself is not deliberate, then the target deal team’s decision 
whether to confirm the deal talks "off the record" can be.  
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In a related annual study of leaks, Intralinks and Cass found a slight drop in the number of deals 
showing suspicious trading activity prior to deal announcement from approximately forteen per cent 
of all public deals in 2008 to six per cent in 2014. Notably, through most of that period, they are also 
more common in Europe and the Middle East than the US, perhaps due to greater enforcement of 
rules prohibiting leaks in the US through much of that period.  
A leak has advantageous consequences for valuation because it may start the clock on formal take-
over rules, if any, thereby putting pressure on buyers. It also flushes out potential counter-bidders. 
Even the whisper of a counter-bid might be enough to encourage a confirmed buyer to move more 
quickly, perhaps short-cutting the due diligence process that could uncover additional information 
about the target.  
It is not difficult to see why leaks are part of the deal tactic toolbox. Our research found that leaked 
deals deliver on average a significant increase in takeover premium of 18 per cent.  
How to Pay 
Most buyers will have a broad idea of how they plan to finance a takeover by the time they get to the 
valuation phase. But it is only after a buyer has ascribed a final price to pay that the fine details can 
be filled in. 
In the private sphere and for smaller- and medium-sized companies, especially family-own firms, 
most takeovers are paid for with cash, funded by existing funds, debt or a combination of these. In 
the listed world of large global corporations, it possible to make an “all-paper” offer where the buyer 
pays solely with its own shares, although in practice most takeovers are funded with at least an 
element of cash.  
A company’s individual circumstances, the logistics of the deal and its appetite for risk will influence 
the proportional mix of funding. Specifically management and its advisors will consider: 
 The detail of the transaction including its financial and dilution impacts on its existing equity 
shareholders, earnings and share price. 
 The deal’s impact on the company’s financial stability and security. The company will want 
to assess the long-term impact of financing on its income statement, cash flow and balance 
sheet, including the ability to refinance the debt. 
 How important it is to get the deal done quickly and confidentially, as cash deals can usually 
be faster than share or complex hybrid deals. 
Of course, all are strongly influenced by the negotiation process in terms of what the buyer will accept 
or believes the shareholders will accept. 
When a company wants to include an element of cash in the acquisition price, and it is not using 
existing funds available on the balance sheet, it has broadly the following options: 
 A listed entity can issue new equity to existing shareholders or place equity with new share-
holders. If a company is private, it might even go public to raise cash for acquisitions. Face-
book, for example, bought WhatsApp in 2014 for $19 billion shortly after going public itself, 
paying a significant portion in cash.  
 Sell corporate bonds or take on new debt from a bank or other lender.  
 Sell a piece of the existing business to help fund the acquisition. We saw this with Diageo, 
who disposed of its non-core food assets, such as Burger King, in order to fund an acquisition 
spree. But the disposal doesn’t have to take place before the purchase of the new company, 
as buyers can use bridging finance for the initial acquisition with the plan (or even the formal 
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agreement already in place) to sell off non-core assets after the deal. For example, commod-
ities and trading giant Glencore sold off Dakota Growers Pasta, a pasta-making business, 
soon after its takeover of Xstrata.  
 Sometimes payment can be also staggered, deferred or linked to performance criteria. This 
a common consideration technique for smaller and medium sized businesses which is grow-
ing quickly. The acquirer will look to de-risk the purchase price by linking future growth to the 
payment terms. The price paid can also include a ‘lock in’ element for key management and 
staff that encourages them to stay by prohibiting them from working for a competitor for a 
period of time, typically two years. One issue with linked payments is that true integration is 
then somewhat limited. That’s why it is used more widely in strategic bolt-on acquisitions or 
private equity backed transactions, as we will see with the case of Mergermarket Group. 
In some instances, a seller can also provide its own financing for a purchaser. This is especially 
common in financial services where banks selling off their divisions in the wake of the financial col-
lapse provided so-called “stapled” finance to prospective buyers whereby the financing and sale 
were part of the same deal – ‘stapled together’.  
Tax, economic climates and changing investment practices have also had a huge influence in M&A 
deal financing. In the 1980s ‘cash was king’, while the 1990s saw mega-deals such as when the 
large UK-based oil company BP purchased Illinois-based oil company Amoco with shares. Then, in 
the run-up to the global economic collapse, the easy availability of cheap debt meant share deals 
were rare; when the money supply dramatically tightened after 2008, all-paper (equity only) deals 
were suddenly back in vogue. 
All-paper offers can allow a bidder more flexibility in a hostile situation because - as long as the 
share exchange ratio is skewed to the buyer’s advantage - such approaches are relatively low risk.  
Acquisitions that are funded principally by shares are more likely to be ‘timed’, that is, announced at 
a time when the bidder’s shares are considered to be highly or ‘fairly’ valued. A belief certainly per-
sists amongst some experts that takeover bids using equity destroy value for shareholders which is 
confirmed in numerous studies from the 1990s and early 2000s. Warren Buffett, an investor in Kraft, 
publicly advised the food group’s CEO Irene Rose Rosenfeld that she was using too much of what 
he considered to be Kraft’s undervalued stock in its 2009 bid for Cadbury.  
However, a recent study is challenging that conventional wisdom regarding the impact of funding in 
acquisition success. Crucially, this study found that not only are share-financed acquisitions not 
value destructive, but that the type of funding used for a takeover generally makes no difference to 
its financial success or failure. ‘Do Stock-Financed Acquisitions Destroy Value? New Methods and 
Evidence’ by three academics (Andrey Golubov, Dimitris Petmezas and Nickolaos Travlos) in 2015 
found no evidence for the over-valued equity hypothesis. “Stock-financed acquisitions are not value 
destructive and the method of payment generally has no further explanatory power in the cross 
section of acquirer returns,” the authors said.  
No doubt the topic of valuation in M&A will continue be an area of focus for professionals, and rightly 
so. With changing industry dynamics and the upward trends in deal-making, both in terms of number 
of deals and aggregate value, we will continue to see new tools for valuation developing as well as 
new and innovative ideas for deal financing. Valuation and pricing in this context will continue to be 
debated and this is precisely the dynamic that enables deals to happen. In other words, the valuation 
gap between the buyer and the seller is what creates the market, and although they use the same 
or similar methods and models to get there, inputs, forecasts and expectations will differ, hence our 
belief that there is no such thing as the ‘right price’.  
Valuation gaps can be bridged by other levers, such as speed to completion, deal terms and financ-
ing. It is certainly not unheard of that the highest bidder doesn’t always win the target. Money, it 
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appears, isn’t always everything. And while risks can equal rewards, the analyses supporting those 
calculations must be backed up by exhaustive due diligence, examining both the target company 
and external factors such as disruptive technologies, market trends, likely competitive responses 
and, where necessary, socioeconomic factors.  
With all these moving and subjective parts, we contend that paying a price well above market ex-
pectations does not need to be fatal for the outcome of a deal, as long as the Big Three are carefully 
considered, although the job is certainly made easier by not overpaying. 
Why the price isn’t always right: THE DOs AND DON’Ts 
 Do carefully consider your walk-away price, and be willing and prepared to walk! 
 Do link your due diligence with your valuation, including for the difficult-to-value in-
tangibles 
 Don’t let the other side be better prepared 
 Don’t pay out all your synergies by offering too high a premium  
 Don’t forget to consider all your costs associated with the deal 
 Do plan for the financing of the deal early and spend time striking acceptable terms 
for both the buyer and seller  
 Do remember that overpaying is not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle, but can 
make the ultimate success of the deal more difficult 
 Don’t forget that M&A valuation is an art not a science:  values and pricing differ in 
each deal
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0.6. Negotiating Tactics 
If you were watching the 1987 film Wall Street - or any other Hollywood movie about a corporate 
takeover, actual or imaginary - the deal negotiation phase would come very near the start. For a 
non-business audience, this section is where this book would begin.  
In the real world, we’ve had to have four sections of strategy, planning, due diligence and valuation 
to get to this point in the deal. It is in this section that the groundwork put in on long-term strategy 
and target selection combine with the heavy lifting on due diligence and valuation finally start to pay 
off. Of our Three Big Mistakes of Deal-Making, it is the people and planning categories that must be 
tackled in this section.  
The single factor that distinguishes the best buyers from the rest is their willingness to invest large 
amounts of leadership time, money and organisational focus into a deal. What that buys is 
knowledge and expertise. And the old adage that knowledge is power has never been more true 
than in M&A. This is also true for the management team and shareholders on the ‘sell side’ of the 
deal:  for selling shareholders and management teams, the single best indicator of how serious the 
buyer is the involvement of senior management on the bidder side.  
We will consider one deal - Malcolm Glazer’s acquisition of Manchester United Football Club in 2005 
- that showcases this principle perfectly. But we will also see, in Microsoft’s failed bid for Yahoo in 
2008, that even the most intimate industry knowledge will not deliver if the negotiation tactics are 
wrong.   
We will also see that every deal is unique. Even the best negotiating tactics are non-transferable: 
the blitzkrieg shareholder offensive used successfully by Shire in its all-share pursuit of Baxalta, 
would not, for instance, have worked for Glazer’s all-cash leveraged buyout of Manchester United. 
Indeed, Glazer’s strategy to buy Manchester United was very different from the way he negotiated 
and purchased the Tampa Bay Buccaneers US football team years earlier. 
Given the specificity of every deal, there is little point in having a fully worked “M&A Playbook”. Basic 
principles that can be applied to each individual deal are much better, but awareness of the options 
available remains critical and will be covered here.  
Friend or Foe? 
The starting point for any negotiating strategy is to determine whether a deal is friendly. Because 
unfriendly approaches of public companies dominate the headlines, it is easy to forget that 97 per 
cent of M&A deals start by mutual consent. Assuming you are operating in that overwhelmingly 
friendly majority, the skeleton approach should be to:  
 Clarify where the two parties stand 
 Identify resistance points 
 Find zones of agreement  
 Determine the best possible solution for both parties, creating a win-win 
Auctions: does the highest bidder always win? 
Many sellers, particularly since the arrival in force of financial sponsors such as hedge funds and 
private equity firms, conduct their disposals by auctions.  Therefore, it is worth making a few general 
points here about the auction process and bidders’ reputations.  
Whilst an auction may seem like a cut and dried financial mechanism, it should be kept in mind that 
the following can also guide a seller’s choice:  
 How successful have the buyer’s previous deals been? 
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 What is the buyer’s history in dealing with target managements? 
 Are there a large number of issues where the buyer is likely to take a position different than 
the seller? 
 Has the buyer backed out of previous deals, either entirely or to renegotiate significant 
points? 
 How involved and visible are senior and key decision-makers? 
Does the buyer have access to sufficient financing? 
As this checklist shows, sellers evaluate bidders’ approaches and abilities in deal-making.  There-
fore, acquirers need to be very mindful of their reputation, especially private equity buyers who reg-
ularly participate in auctions. As we will see with the sale of Mergermarket Group, an auction that 
attracted 50 interested parties in the first round, gaining a competitive advantage through more than 
your formal, written submitted bid can prove crucial.  
Although a longer due diligence process is positive for the buyer as it could give them more ammu-
nition to negotiate down the purchase price, this is a less-than-ideal scenario for everyone. The 
better option is for bidders to have done significant research and to be given access to enough 
information pre-bid to provide a bid that they can stick closely to throughout the negotiation process.  
For the seller, if their business is in order, the financials stack up, and there are no skeletons in the 
closet, there should be no reason to give away any discount in pricing or terms. This way, the final 
price should and possibly will match the initial expectations, pleasing the seller and making their 
acceptance of the offer more likely.  Similarly, the bidder will win the prize without getting a reputation 
for a negotiation strategy that appears to outsiders as one that is continually ‘chipping away on the 
price’. 
In the small percentage of situations that are not friendly – that is, the three per cent that start off 
unsolicited (although less than one per cent of deals end up without a recommendation to sell from 
the target’s board) - the negotiating strategy will be determined by a range of issues including:  
 What you want to do with the company? 
 How much - and how - you are paying for it? 
 The stance of the target’s board and its investors (and these two may differ) 
 Whether the company has any other alternatives, as a desperate seller is very different from 
a reluctant one. 
 Whether the company has any defensive anti-takeover protections to defer bidders or make 
a hostile purchase unreasonably expensive (some of these are called ‘poison pills’ when 
particularly offensive to any bidder) 
For instance, should the buyer need to persuade the target’s board to recommend the bid, the buyer 
will take a different approach than if it plans to go hostile by ignoring the board resistance, go around 
them directly to the shareholders to get their approval and then ultimately sack the board once the 
deal is done.  
It’s not just about shareholder approval, however, as the buyer will need to consider how to pay for 
the target. The main reason truly hostile bids – that is, those made via a formal offer to shareholders 
in the face of stated board opposition - are so rare, is that lenders will not often not back them. A 
listed company making a share-based offer has much more freedom in this regard than a financial 
sponsor or private company who only has cash to offer.  
It isn’t uncommon for a private companies to offer themselves for sale but at the same time prepare 
for a public listing. This is known as a ‘dual track’ process and the two different outcomes compete 
with each other. 
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In this context, most so-called “hostile” bids are actually “Bear Hugs” - a mechanism by which bidders 
bypass the board initially and target investors directly with attractive offers (the ‘hug’), usually with 
an offer premium that is above the industry average. No serious bidder will take this route unless 
they have funds - and the will - to bring shareholders around though a combination of charm, logic 
and cash, plus a threat and ultimately a willingness to go hostile as a last resort. 
Hard or Soft? 
The style of the negotiations as opposed to the substance of the approach will often be determined 
by the advisors - lawyers, accountants, public relations (PR) firms and investment bankers - who will 
usually take the lead. 
Good quality advice is crucial. An independent series of studies between 2013 and 2015 by aca-
demics at the University of Surrey and New York University’s Stern Business School found that 
companies represented by the world’s largest multi-national  investment banks and the large ac-
countancy firms were more successful with their acquisitions than those who either had no advisors 
or advisors not in those groups. 
Some CEOs insist on the involvement at those advisors of particular individuals they like or trust. 
For example, when Cadbury was being stalked by Kraft, the company insisted on using certain sen-
ior managing directors and partners at the banks and law firms advising them; another example is 
Invensys, the engineering firm, who preferred to rely on the same advisor for each of its deals. 
There are also market-leading “stars” at some investment banks, with larger than life personalities. 
Such bankers are something of a dying breed, but those still practising tend to make their way onto 
the biggest deals, as was the case with the Kraft / Cadbury deal where, for example, the partner 
advising confectionary giant Cadbury in 2010 from law firm Slaughter & May was selected to be the 
firm’s overall managing partner six years later in early 2016. Another example from that deal was 
Bruce Wasserstein. 
 “Bid ‘Em Up” Bruce 
Bruce Wasserstein, of Franco-Anglo-American investment bank Lazard, epitomised flamboyant in-
vestment banking, using every lever - however aggressive - to secure a deal for his clients. There is 
no doubt that “Bid ‘Em Up” Bruce, as he was known to many of the industry, who died in 2009 whilst 
in the middle of advising Kraft on its takeover of Cadbury, was a Wall Street legend who shook up 
deal-making in the 1980s.  
Perhaps more than anyone, he symbolised private equity’s determination to get its target, advising 
KKR on its ground-breaking take-private of the fool and tobacco company RJR Nabisco, a deal that 
heralded the rise of financial sponsors and that was infamously detailed in the book “Barbarians at 
the Gate” by Brian Burrough and John Helyar and later a movie by the same name starring James 
Garner as the CEO and president of RJR Nabisco. 
Wasserstein’s personal financial success in deal making also helped to seal his reputation - he sold 
his boutique advisory business Wasserstein Perella to Dresdner Bank at the height of the dot-com 
boom for nearly $600 million.  
According to Forbes magazine, which put him on its cover, Wasserstein “did more than anyone else 
to modernise investment banking by bringing aggressive tactics to a world previously known more 
for its clubbiness than its sharp elbows.” He also fell out with lots of people, including his own part-
ners. His public rows with Michel David-Weill, a descendant of the founders of Lazard - with whom 
he disagreed over his plans to take Lazard public - provided as much newspaper copy at the time 
as his takeovers.  
64 
Unsurprisingly, Wasserstein hated his own ‘bid ‘em up’ soubriquet. Aside from the RJR Nabisco 
takeover - which was a financial success, but loaded the target with debt - a few of the $250 billion 
of takeovers he advised on turned out to be disasters, including the Time-Warner AOL deal dis-
cussed earlier in this book.   
Wasserstein’s passing was much mourned. His former partner, Joseph Perella, called him “a rare 
talent”. He certainly transformed Wall Street, pushing the envelope with creative legal interventions, 
direct approaches to shareholders and the active use of public relations.  
Not everybody liked his style. With the global credit crunch came an expectation of corporate aus-
terity together with disapproval from the press and public of sky-high investment banking salaries; a 
much quieter style of banker seems now to be in demand, certainly in Europe.   
A Football Master-Class 
Malcolm Glazer’s acquisition of London Stock Exchange-listed Manchester United is a master-class 
in how to pick off an unwilling target.  
In 2003, Manchester United was one of the most successful football teams in Europe with a history 
that gave the club a uniquely popular global fan-base. Entertainment giant BSkyB had seen the 
potential for a combination two years earlier only to see regulators stamp on its bid and the fans 
taking credit for launching a public campaign to stop Rupert Murdoch, the owner of BskyB, from 
successfully buying the club.  
It was a time when a number of outside investors saw the UK football market as an attractive invest-
ment either for prestige or money.  According to The Glazer GateKeeper written by Teshin Neyani, 
others such as Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich (who purchased Chelsea Football Club) had 
already dismissed Manchester United as too difficult to buy and too costly.  But Malcolm Glazer, the 
owner of the Tampa Buccaneers - an American football team - relied on his sports industry 
knowledge to identify extra value in Manchester United.  
As we saw with Vista Equity Partners’ acquisition of Misys, the Glazers believed they knew better 
the industry than their rivals. The family felt that the global marketing potential of Manchester United 
- and, more broadly that of the UK’s Premier League - was vastly undervalued.  
Manchester United supporters publicly and vociferously hated the acquisition. In the run-up to the 
global financial crisis it became a cautionary tale against the growing use of debt in buyouts: the 
Glazers paid £812 million, including transaction fees, to buy United, yet put in just £240 million of 
their own cash. Whether by luck or by good judgment, the club at the end of 2015 was valued at 
almost £2 billion and Malcolm Glazer’s children were taking £15 million every year in dividends from 
the investment. Not a bad return. 
So, how did they negotiate their way to such a great investment? Good industry knowledge and 
target selection took them part of the way, but their negotiating tactics really made the difference. 
The family and their advisors knew that they were dealing with an unfriendly scenario with a target 
that had no desire to be purchased. After all, why would the board of Manchester United want to 
facilitate the sale of a successful business, losing their own jobs in the process? Since the terms of 
the Glazer’s financing would not allow him to make a formal hostile bid for the company, he put the 
company into a “Bear Hug”.  
In such a situation, sweeping up the market for available shares and building up a small initial (so-
called “toe-hold”) shareholding are frequently used tactics combined throughout with the Glazers’ 
effective use of UK company law. They began to purchase shares in the company in March 2003 
with small incremental stakes. Only six months later, in September 2003 when the Glazer family hit 
a regulatory threshold, did they declare their holding to the public, as required.  
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By the end of the year, they had amassed over 14 per cent of the shares from market sweeps and 
smaller shareholders, but only in February 2004 - when they were fully prepared - did Glazer an-
nounce that he was considering a bid for the company.  
By November of that year the Glazer family had 28 per cent of the shares and then demanded – and 
received – three board seats. At this point, however, Glazer was nowhere near being able to force 
through a deal. And the rest of United’s board was still firmly against it.  
But Glazer had a trump card in his negotiating strategy. United’s second biggest shareholder with 
29 per cent was Cubic Expression, the investment vehicle of two Irish financiers and horse-racing 
buffs J.P. McManus and John Magnier. They also had a board seat.  Combining his stake with 
Cubic’s would give him more than 50 per cent of the club – certainly enough for control and also 
sizeable enough to try to force out small investors.  
As luck would have it, the two Irishmen had fallen out with Manchester United’s longstanding man-
ager and the company’s most important member of staff, Sir Alex Ferguson. The Irish financiers had 
gifted Sir Alex part-ownership of Rock of Gibraltar, a champion race-horse, but when the football 
man also claimed the stud rights to the animal, a huge falling-out ensued with Sir Alex suing and the 
Irishmen asking questions publicly about the financial probity of his transfer dealings for the club. 
Between October 2004 and May 2005, the Glazers shifted into gear, making a series of incrementally 
rising indicative offers for Manchester United. But, in addition to receiving threats from fans (who 
themselves were trying to arrange a shareholding position to stop Glazer), they had still not secured 
the board recommendation they needed to take control.  
In May 2005, they finally secured Cubic’s stake, giving them a majority of the company’s shares. 
Even then, while the Manchester United board advised shareholders to accept the offer on value 
grounds, it refused to recommend the bid, arguing that  Glazer’s highly leveraged takeover would be 
detrimental to United’s wider group of stakeholders including staff and fans.  
Only at this point though - confident that they could “squeeze out” the remaining shareholders as 
would be possible under UK takeover regulations - did the Glazer family launch a formal bid for 
Manchester United. Given the profit they have made from the club, the wait was worth it.   
Figure 0.6-A: Glazer’s Manchester United takeover timeline 
 
 
Microsoft’s Search Engine bid 
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If there is anything the media enjoys more than a football takeover, it’s a Silicon Valley merger. Like 
the Glazers’ bid for Manchester United, Microsoft’s 2008 offer for Yahoo was played out in the full 
media spotlight. But although Glazer’s clearly paid a top price for Manchester United, Microsoft’s bid 
was about really big money in what the market calls a ‘mega-deal’:  valued at up to $50 billion, it was 
merger games on a massive financial scale. 
Just as the Glazers ultimately did, Microsoft opted to put Yahoo into a Bear Hug. But in this instance 
- despite offering to pay 61 percent more than Yahoo’s undisturbed market value – Microsoft failed 
to come away with its prize.  
It is worth saying from the outset that Microsoft ultimately got lucky. Yahoo signed a much less 
lucrative search and co-operation deal with Microsoft just one year later.  Almost a decade later, its 
share price was still largely unchanged from the Microsoft bid price. 
Not only that, but Microsoft has not had a happy time integrating some of the companies it has been 
able to buy and Yahoo would likely have been particularly difficult in that regard and might have 
destroyed any value there was. For example, before it bought Skype in 2013, its biggest deal was 
the acquisition of aQuantive for $6.3 billion. Microsoft has since written off all but $100 million of the 
value of that purchase.   
These failures go to Microsoft’s broader corporate and M&A strategy.  In terms of negotiating tactics, 
Microsoft missed the opportunity to attempt what it had calculated as a deal worth paying for. Per-
haps, like the Glazers, Microsoft saw something in Yahoo that few others could.  
Carl Icahn, the activist shareholder who tried to push the Microsoft deal through, was the forerunner 
of a host of activist investors at Yahoo; indeed Yahoo has continued to be the subject of takeover 
speculation as well as a target for other arbitrage hedge funds ever since. 
Icahn’s actions were central to the Microsoft deal and whilst not sufficient to push it through, are 
representative of the rise of the activist investors.  From the perspective of Yahoo’s shareholders - 
who saw their company go through years of turmoil after the deal collapsed and who have seen its 
strategy drift ever since - the failure of the deal was a disaster. But let’s assume for our focus here 
on negotiation that the merger could have been good for both companies and consider what went 
wrong during that crucial negotiation phase.   
Keep Your Friends Close and Your Enemies Closer 
The technology industry may seem international, but can really be very local.  
The Silicon Valley hub that produced Yahoo, Microsoft, Google and Apple is actually a relatively tiny 
close-knit community - chief executives have often worked together, almost always know each other 
personally and certainly regularly meet at industry events.  In early 2008, Microsoft CEO Steve 
Ballmer was still working in the shadow of the company’s larger-than-life founder Bill Gates who did 
not depart the firm as an employee until after the Yahoo saga.  Ballmer was facing a changed world 
dominated by Google, which was the run-away leader in internet-based computing. To tackle 
Google’s dominance, he needed to make quick in-roads into immediate revenue growth in paid for 
search and display advertising. In the medium term, Microsoft also needed to protect itself against 
possible future threats by Google to its core Windows product.  
Yahoo meanwhile was on a downward trajectory, but was still a reasonably sought after partner. A 
tie-up seemed like an obvious solution for both companies. Not only that, but Yahoo’s shareholders 
- corralled by Carl Icahn, who had a small stake in the search engine’s business - were keen to arrest 
their company’s slide. 
67 
Given the closeness of the industry, you would expect Ballmer to have known his target and its 
executive personalities well enough to pitch a deal right. If he was unsure, he might reasonably have 
been expected to put out some board-level feelers before making a public approach.  
Instead, on February 1st 2008, Ballmer made an unsolicited $44.6 billion approach for Yahoo. Press 
reports claimed background talks had been going on between the two sides for more than a year 
and - with the initial bid going in at a fairly full price - everyone expected the deal to happen. Instead, 
after ten days deliberation, Yahoo’s board rejected the deal.   
Yahoo’s response ten days later to that initial indicative offer was the standard one that it ‘substan-
tially undervalued’ the company, although it is notable here that the market did not agree; the bid 
was well above Yahoo’s share price and, when Microsoft walked away, the company’s share price 
fell by a third. Media reports said this was simply an opening gambit and that Microsoft was prepared 
to bid as high as $50 billion. But Microsoft never did make a second, higher offer. 
Yahoo claimed as well that the bid was a ‘significant distraction’ yet within a a few days began looking 
for a ‘white knight’ by publicly cosying up to Microsoft’s arch-rival Google as well as Rupert Mur-
doch’s News Corporation. Trying to get rival bidders involved is a standard tactic for targets to get a 
higher price or to flush out more bidders, but in this case, in a bell-jar industry, it caused some 
seriously ruffled egos at Microsoft. Anyway, within a month, on March 11th, News Corp walked away,  
Had it been a bit more determined, the IT giant could have hunkered down and waited out the storm 
in pursuit of its long-term strategy. They certainly had the resources, including cash, to do so.  In-
stead, despite the fact that analysts backed the tie-up, Microsoft’s quick departure looked distinctly 
like a childish sulk. This happened, according to the Financial Times, just days after Yahoo founders 
Jerry Yang and David Filo supposedly flew to Seattle for a last-ditch negotiating session with Ballmer 
and Kevin Johnson, who oversaw the computer giant’s internet operations.  
The situation was complicated by a poison pill provision in Yahoo’s corporate regulations. In May 
2001, the company had adopted a “stockholder rights planwhich stipulated that unless a deal was 
recommended by the board, shareholders would have the right to buy extra shares so that it could 
effectively block a hostile bid.  
In order to be successful with a hostile bid, Microsoft would have to first persuade shareholders to 
get rid of Yahoo’s board and replace it with pro-takeover executives who would either rescind the 
poison pill or recommend the bid. Microsoft referred to this provision in its walk-away statement of 
May 5th 2008 when Ballmer said to investors in a letter that he had decided against this approach 
because it “would necessarily involve a protracted proxy contest” either for the shareholder vote or 
for changing the board. 
However, Ballmer and his advisory team would have (or, as we’ve seen in the section on due dili-
gence, should have) been well aware of this provision when they approached Microsoft in the first 
place. Which begs the question: Why make a friendly bid unless you know it will be well received? 
And why make an unfriendly approach if you aren’t prepared either to go hostile or to play the long-
game and get investors onside? Regardless of history’s judgment on Yahoo, at the time Ballmer 
looked like a weak executive who had taken just one punch and then run away from a fight.  
For Microsoft, that was the end of Yahoo merger saga but it left the target in a very difficult position. 
Several pension fund shareholders launched lawsuits against Yahoo’s management.  Carl Icahn, 
who continued to buy up shares, eventually helped to force out the CEO. Yahoo ultimately signed 
up to a much less remunerative partnership deal on internet search and advertising with Microsoft 
over a year later in July 2009, leaving shareholders out of pocket and the company the proverbial 
tech industry “might-have-been”.  
Opening Gambits 
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Your place or mine?  
First meetings between board-level executives of a bidder and target are often key to the success 
or failure of deal, whether they are used to initiate takeover talks or to draw them to a conclusion. 
Unfortunately for romantics, organised meetings between executives often take place in very dull 
buildings. The days of high-powered chief executive-level breakfasts or lunches in classic spots such 
as the River Room at the Savoy Hotel in London or the Rainbow Room at the top of New York’s 
Rockefeller Center are, unfortunately, largely gone. Lawyers’ offices are a particular favourite now: 
the uninviting grey exteriors of London’s so-called Magic Circle of top law firms – or their equivalent 
in Frankfurt, Tokyo, New York and Shanghai - have provided cover for executives to meet and dis-
cuss the biggest deals of the last decade.  
Quite why a tradition arose that legal advisors are considered to have more neutral venues than 
investment banking advisors - or accountancy firms - is unclear. Downtown meeting rooms in hotels 
are also commonly used, as the anonymity of hotels is a definite plus as it may be less likely for a 
curious journalist to note that two senior executives have met together in a private conference room 
there.  Another equally used - and equally mundane - location for these jet-setting chief executive 
level meetings are private corporate rooms at international airports such as New York’s JFK or Lon-
don’s Heathrow, as often the CEOs are not based in the same city so someone needs to fly to the 
face-to-face meeting.  
When it comes to floating the possibility of a merger with a rival - or discussing relations with a key 
investor - trade conferences can offer a more imaginative and informal opportunity.  Indeed the ser-
endipity of meeting an executive at such a conference can sometimes lead to a discussion where 
the idea of an acquisition or merger is hatched, for later follow-up in the lawyer’s or accountant’s 
offices a few days or weeks after the conference.  These trade forums may be even more important 
to buyers and sellers of small companies who may not be invited to the truly global conferences such 
as Davos. 
Trade Relations 
Every January, The World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland is the king of international busi-
ness conferences. Attended by politicians, bankers, financiers and the chief executives and chair-
men of global corporations, this jamboree collects a higher density of billionaires and decision-mak-
ers than anywhere on the planet.  
Although a limited number of accredited press are invited to the conference, most attendees behave 
as if nobody is watching them. The public rooms provide a great opportunity for people spotting; in 
2010 for instance, any attendee could observe Irene Rosenfeld, then head of Kraft, deep in conver-
sation with activist investor Chris Hohn. Having just completed the acquisition of Cadbury at a higher 
price than her key shareholder Warren Buffett would have liked, observers were left wondering 
whether she might be expecting the rebel shareholder to register his concerns. 
Further away from prying eyes at champagne-fuelled private parties sponsored by the likes of 
Google, Standard Chartered and McKinsey, a chief executive could float a merger in relative peace. 
The mountains behind the conference centre and those in nearby ski resort Klosters contain dozens 
of upmarket chalets where truly private business functions can be held; the failed merger between 
News Corporation and UK-listed BSkyB was indeed mooted in one.  
Davos might be the king of conferences and is actually as much a collection of politicians and country 
finance heads as of business men and women.  But there are other, more focused, industry events 
where deals can be casually raised.   The annual tech industry conference run by Allen & Co in Sun 
Valley has generated some important technology sector developments. 
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That conference, which has been going since 1983, offers whitewater rafting, tennis, hiking and yoga 
sessions. But, as at Davos, much of the work is done in private rooms or at the bar. Some examples: 
 In 2008, key players in the Microsoft-Yahoo merger including Yahoo’s President Sue Decker, 
Google founder Sergey Brin, Yahoo’s former chief Terry Semel and some of Yahoo’s major 
shareholders were gathered for a chat in Sun Valley.  
 The Idaho conference gained a reputation as a deal-making centre in 1996 when Disney’s 
former chief executive Michael Eisner hatched a plan to buy the ABC television network.  
 In 2014, it gave birth to the merger between AOL and Verizon. Although the deal was not 
announced until 2015, executives from both companies met up a year earlier at the confer-
ence to explore possible commercial opportunities.  
Fast or Slow? 
Some executives, including those in the Microsoft-Yahoo merger, do not make it into a room together 
until a deal is about to collapse. In this case - where there was interest on both sides in doing a 
merger - this was a terrible mistake and contributed to Microsoft walking away.  
In other cases, it is a deliberate and successful strategy to keep the chief executives apart until right 
at the end. Kraft made some bad mistakes in its 2010 takeover of Cadbury, but the US company’s 
decision to keep Cadbury’s chief executive Todd Stitzer and chairman Roger Carr at arm’s length 
until right at the very end of the deal was probably not one of them. 
Kraft Chairman and CEO Irene Rosenfeld knew that she did not want to keep Cadbury’s board nor, 
particularly, the company’s senior executives; she wanted the company’s brands and its emerging 
markets business. On the other hand, she had challenges with her own share price as the offer was 
part-cash, part-shares and there were other issues simmering with the financing and investors. 
There was little need to speak to the target’s board until she was in a position to make a proper offer. 
The Baxalta Bear Hug 
On the other hand early and focused engagement with the target’s board and investors can be help-
ful in a “Bear Hug”, as we can see from pharmaceutical company Shire’s acquisition of Illinois-based 
Baxalta. 
Companies who do their homework properly can complete the formalities behind a takeover very 
quickly. Speed and surprise can also be advantageous tactics when mounting unsolicited takeover 
bids. One example is Shire’s pursuit of smaller US-listed pharmaceutical industry rival Baxalta in the 
second half of 2015. Anglo-Irish Shire surprised the markets by going public with an all-share $30 
billion takeover offer for Baxalta in July 2015 at a premium of more than 35 per cent to Baxalta’s 
undisturbed share price.   
The pursuit came less than a year after Shire was left at the altar by its larger rival, US-based AbbVie, 
following political opposition in Washington that derailed the agreed deal. One of the major attrac-
tions of Shire for US buyers was the potential to access tax savings thanks to the company’s tax-
domicile in Ireland where corporate tax rates are much lower than in the US. Once the AbbVie deal 
collapsed, Shire was free to pursue its chosen partner from the pool of pharmaceutical companies 
operating under the comparatively high US tax regime; as such, Shire had a lot to offer as a merger 
partner and acted quickly to take advantage of that.  
Shire’s pitch to Baxalta was that they could together create a world leader in the medical treatment 
of rare diseases, an increasingly lucrative field. The Anglo-Irish bidder not surprisingly - and with the 
backing of some analysts - argued that the acquisition would be to the benefit of both sets of share-
holders, not least because of Shire’s more advantageous tax regime.  
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Baxalta had been formally spun off by its parent company Baxter Industries for just one month when 
Shire announced its approach; the Anglo-Irish business reportedly informally approached its target 
just nine days after Baxalata gained its separate corporate identity. Given the timing, it is very likely 
Shire - as with other good acquirers - had been monitoring its target for some time.  
The offer was batted off by Baxalta’s chief executive Ludwig Hantson who called it “puzzling.” Shire’s 
next move was to put Baxalta in a ‘Bear Hug.  Like Yahoo, Baxalta’s corporate charter included a 
poison pill clause designed to fend off hostile takeovers. This clause stipulated that should a bidder 
begin trying to buy its shares on the open market, Baxalta could issue additional shares to incumbent 
investors once that bidder reached a stake of 10 percent.  
The only way to get around the poison pill was to secure a board recommendation or to remove the 
board, which in Baxalta’s case was made more difficult by a subsidiary defensive tools that meant 
board terms were staggered, so it would take longer to eject a majority of the board members as 
only a certain number could be replaced at any one time.  Recognising these defences that Baxalta 
had in place, Shire focussed its efforts on persuading shareholders to push for a board recommen-
dation - something Microsoft could have done more effectively than it did in its bid for Yahoo.  Be-
cause Shire needed that recommendation, it also structured the deal financially to appeal Baxalta’s 
sitting board, entitling them to multi-million dollar pay-offs.  
Shire’s chief executive and chairman spent the next few months personally criss-crossing the Atlan-
tic to press their case for the proposed deal with Baxalta’s US-based investors.   
Shire’s bold approach ultimately paid off when Baxalta’s board accepted a sweetened part-share 
part cash offer valuing the company at $32 billion. Investors had made clear they wanted a cash 
element in return for their support as Shire changed its bid to 40 per cent cash, 60 per cent shares. 
By this point,  Baxalta’s investors were pressing strongly for a recommendation and the target’s 
board responded by agreeing to one.  
Announcing the deal in 2016, Flemming Ornskov, Shire’s Chief Executive, said revenue synergies 
from the merger could push combined revenues to $20 billion by 2020, compared with $12 billion in 
2014. It is too early to assess Ornskov’s promises, or whether Baxalta was the right target for Shire’s 
shareholders. But what Shire and its board did do was carefully select its preferred target then make 
its move swiftly and with tenacity. In terms of negotiating tactics, we can already say this one was a 
blockbuster.  
Still Leaking?  
When we discussed leaks in an earlier section, we said that they can be used by sellers as a nego-
tiating tactic to increase leverage over buyers, for instance by bringing counter-bidders out of the 
woodwork.  The myth of the accidental leak – the deal folder inadvertently left by an analyst in the 
back of the taxi - is just that, a myth. Most leaks look deliberate. And there are many, as the figures 
shown from the study demonstrate. 
Figure 0.6-B: Percentage of deals which leak across regions 
71 
 
Of the M&A advisors surveyed for that Intralinks study about leaks, half thought that leaks could be 
good for deals, although nine out of ten conceded they can backfire. And it must be mentioned that 
regulators truly frown on firms and deals where there have been leaks, as they bring into question 
the integrity of the markets.  Leaks done wrongly can get an advisor or a firm in trouble with those 
regulators. 
Leaking is not restricted to the due diligence phase - it has much wider applications and deliberate 
‘leaks’ are used during negotiations. Not only is there evidence that sellers use it to bring in rival 
bidders, but buyers use it to scupper a deal they are cooling on.  
Although leaks are a tactic in the arsenal of unfriendly bidders, they are most damaging in a friendly 
context. Friendly deals are often announced with great fanfare, with deal completion plans, post deal 
senior management teams and even integration plans ready to be announced well advanced.  
However, if a deal has to be prematurely announced because of a leak, these plans may not yet be 
fully developed and the pre-approvals of key stakeholders and regulators may not have been com-
pleted, nor the planning for the integration of the two companies post-closing. As we will see in the 
next section with Prudential’s failed $30 billion bid for AIA, an early leak can mean the difference 
between success and failure.  
Negotiating Tactics: THE DOs AND DON’Ts 
 Do be aware that the first approach is usually the key one  
 Don’t launch an approach until you are fairly sure how the target will react 
 Do your homework on any poison pill and other defences the target may have 
 Don’t expect to be able to delegate the negotiations:  the CEO and Chairman WILL 
need to be involved in big deals 
 Don’t be afraid to use a deliberate ‘leak’ to move things along…but do be aware that 





0.7. The Engagement 
Of our Three Big Mistakes, this section concentrates wholly on the second.  
Communication is not just about the time when a deal is announced or - if you are unlucky - the 
moment it leaks. From the moment when a CEO starts thinking about an acquisition strategy, through 
the announcement of the deal to post-merger integration, a top drawer communications plan that 
takes in shareholders, employees and all the critical external stakeholders is not just a “nice to have” 
add-on. It is crucial for successful deal-making and deal completion. 
Whilst listed companies nearly always have internal and external PR (public relations) advisors, for 
smaller or private businesses, good communications need not necessarily involve hiring an expen-
sive public relations agency; the important thing is that somebody at your company does it.  
Most deals get done without the knowledge of a majority of the employees of both firms – with the 
obvious exception of start-up businesses – as the knowledge that a deal might be on the cards could 
cause concern amongst employees due to it often involving job losses. Even if this is not the case, 
deals are often a catalyst of organizational change and the notion of such a change on the horizon 
is likely to cause unwelcome distraction. The day of the announcement is therefore likely to be the 
first time when employees of both firms will find out their work environment will change significantly. 
Most people don’t like change, of course, and surprises even less. So crafting a story about the 
reason for the deal, why it is a ‘win-win’ situation and what it will mean for employees on both sides 
is paramount not to cause additional confusion, fear and ultimately lose key people. It is also a 
chance for the combined management to showcase a joint frontline, especially important for the 
employees in the target company, who are likely to feel the least excited about having been taken 
over.  
In this section we will consider the reasons why you need a PR strategy and a plan to implement 
that PR strategy, whether or not you use an outside PR firm. We also look at communications with 
shareholders - both institutional and activist - that will often be handled by either management or 
their investment banking advisors. Finally, using the example of Prudential’s 2010 bid for AIA, the 
Asian arm of AIG, we will show you a communications disaster where poor planning and communi-
cations scuppered what could have been a transformational merger for the venerable UK insurer.  
Spinning Tales 
In the old days, PR advice on an M&A deal was an optional extra. Those days are long gone. In the 
past two decades, public relations professionals – sometimes called corporate communications or 
financial communications professionals - have become one of the first numbers on a CEO’s speed-
dial list.  
Research by the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School shows why 
there is a sound financial reason for this. In Selling the Story, Cass found it pays to pay for PR. The 
research, which examined 198 large public-to-public UK M&A deals from 1997 to 2010 found that 
deals with PR firms on board had a significantly higher chance of completion than those without. 
When PR firms advised both the bidder or target, over 90 per cent of the deals completed success-
fully, whereas those without any PR advisors did so just over two-thirds of the time.  
Given that PR advisory costs tend to be a tiny proportion of total deal-related expenses, hiring a 
professional communications team in a larger deal is both sensible and cost effective.  For smaller 
companies, it may even be a necessity as they don’t have other deals to fall back on. 
These PR advisors can, in the words of Anthony Cardew of PR firm Cardew Group, whose clients 
include Smiths, Thorntons and Lonmin, ‘play a very important role, especially in long-running M&A 
sagas, as long as they are sufficiently well connected to management to do their job properly; if a 
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PR agency doesn’t have the proper links with the management team it can’t work in the same way. 
It’s certainly not just about talking to journalists on the day of a deal. You need to be spending time 
helping the company to communicate its long-term strategy to a range of stakeholders - whether you 
call that public relations or something else.’ 
Another leading London-based PR expert, Chris Salt, Partner, Headland Consultancy which advises 
clients including Danone, the AA, Legal & General and Johnson Matthey, added that ‘many PR 
advisers will be in place long before a deal is on the horizon. Therefore, one of the key tasks would 
have been to work with the company to tell the corporate story in such a way that any bid or M&A 
activity makes sense in the wider context of a long-term strategy. And secondly, where some advis-
ers might be just there for the deal, how one communicates during the deal process may have a 
strong bearing in the post-deal world for a company.’ 
Figure 0.7-A: PR effect on deal success 
 
The timing of public company deal announcements was also important. Deals announced before the 
start of trading were far more likely to be completed than those announced after the market opened. 
Deals announced between 7:15am and 9:00am had the highest completion rate at 87 per cent; this 
fell to 64 per cent after 9:00am. Again, this points to good planning and a tight deal team with an 
ordered confidentiality process.  Why?  Because an announcement after the market is open is more 
likely to be one that is made in response to a leak or rumour, and therefore not one that was sched-
uled or planned in advance. 
The content of the initial press release is critical, as it will set the tone for any subsequent media 
coverage. As in all things in life, first impressions are important, even to the hopefully dispassionate 
shareholders who will ultimately decide whether to approve the deal.  
Even after the first public statements about the deal, the merging companies need to keep control – 
to the best they can – of the external and internal communications.  Sir Roger Carr, the chairman of 
Cadbury during its takeover by Kraft, described a meeting that took place each Friday to determine 
the PR strategy for the weekend in order to control the news reported in the Sunday press.  The tone 
of those stories, he said, often determined how the press would react during the entire follow week.  
This is especially important as there may be leaks. 
Cardew spoke about this in saying that ‘often reports of deals after leaks are only partially accurate 
so if you are trying to justify an investment case it is really hard to row the story back to your territory 
because of the aggregate nature of the news media. There is a perceived wisdom it takes weeks to 
overturn.’ He went on to say that ‘once a leak happens, you have to deal with the reality of it.’ 
Salt added that ‘leaks can be bloody annoying when you are on the receiving end. They often distort 
the position you and your client wants to take and that can mean you lose time regaining the agenda. 
Having said that, there isn’t a deal that exists where a strategy to counter a leak hasn’t been consid-
ered and planned for. As to fatality? Rarely.’ 
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Of course, most companies won’t be front page news as was the above Kraft / Cadbury deal and 
most deals therefore aren’t subject to leaks.  For those, control of the internal news grapevine is 
most critical.  This internal communications strategy should be planned from the very early stages 
in the deal.  As Cardew said, ‘A deal that is understood is going to be well received. What you’ve got 
to do is to tell a compelling story.’ 
One element that appears in almost every deal announcement is the discussion of potential syner-
gies.  This is not only because it can fully or partially justify the premium that the buyer is paying, but 
it also signals to the market what the buyer intends to do with the target.  In PR advisor Salt’s words, 
‘Whatever may be your side’s contention regarding anything involving a deal – not least synergies – 
you must be clear. Crystal clear. Or you risk losing your investment argument.’   
These synergy questions will include: 
 Will the target be fully integrated, leading to larger synergies?  Or will it be kept principally as 
a separate division by the new owner? 
 What will be the timeline for achieving those synergies, and thus will the changes to the two 
companies – but especially the target – be implemented quickly? 
 How will the business model change? 
 What will be the cost to achieve those synergies, and when? 
Synergies are often an area where management, at least with the public figures provided, choose to 
‘under promise and over deliver’.  However, when there is resistance to the deal after announcement, 
it might be necessary to revise the synergy targets upwards and spending forecasts downwards.   
Institutional Investors: A CEO’s Best Allies? 
For publicly-listed companies, institutional investors can make or break an M&A deal. Communica-
tions with institutional shareholders - and where there is a large retail shareholder base, with retail 
shareholders - should begin in the strategic phase if at all possible.. Any major move such as an 
acquisition or disposal should be signalled to investors well in advance and be part of both a coherent 
corporate strategy and a wider communications plan that also takes in the media and other stake-
holders, particularly employees.  
Early signalling - which is only possible when a company has its own strategy in good order - is 
crucial to the success of an M&A deal. Prudential’s 2010 failed bid for AIA, the Asian arm of US 
insurance giant AIA demonstrates what happens when a CEO suddenly and without warning takes 
his company in a very different strategic direction. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Further research, entitled Learning from your Investors: Shareholder support in M&A transactions 
from 2011 by Cass Business School’s Research Centre, suggests that corporates can actually learn 
and benefit from expert investors. The study looks specifically at investors in a listed company who 
are likely to be either institutional investors (such as pension funds or insurance companies) who 
have particular geographical expertise or sovereign wealth funds with good local access.  These can 
all be harnessed by savvy management teams during the M&A deal process. The principle also 
applies to privately-held companies where, for instance, private equity firms who own a stake in their 
portfolio companies will also put one of their partners on the board of those companies, not just to 
keep an eye on the business, but also to offer fresh expertise and advice.  
Companies who had such ‘monitoring’ investors (those who manage their stakes actively) with su-
perior regional expertise could expect to have more long-term success in cross-border M&A deals 
within that region.  
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Looking at a sample of investment into the UK, the study found that acquirers whose deals were 
supported by institutional investors with local knowledge in the target region clearly out-performed 
those who were not. Those acquirers with such support outperformed the market by 55.7 percentage 
points compared to those without it, who beat the index by only 6.3 percentage points.  
One of the key aspects of the research is when the polar opposites of cross-border M&A strategies 
are compared: 
 “Blizkrieg” where there is a rapid entry into a new foreign market through acquisitions, largely 
planned and conducted secretly, versus 
 “Playing the Long Game” where the company gradually works over time to build a dialogue 
between management and key expert institutional investors in target foreign markets before 
entering.   
The latter strategy may result in superior corporate performance and underscores the point that 
information should not just flow from management to the market but that information needs to flow 
in the opposite direction as well.  The company needs a clear plan to get information from the market 
– here, for cross border deals according to that study, to necessarily include those knowledge-inten-
sive institutional investors. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Communication between management and public market participants such as institutional investors 
must be managed carefully as those conversations may contain market sensitive information. Ex-
change of sensitive and specific target information between the two sides could lead to the imposition 
of restrictions in many countries on an investor’s ability to trade shares, as it exposes them to inside 
information not available to other investors.  
This is an area where regulators keep a close eye on any market manipulation or insider trading. 
The solution to this dilemma is to get in early. If institutional investors are fully briefed in the months 
and years leading up to takeover bid about the company’s overall strategy and general M&A plans 
(but not any specific deals or specific target companies), they will not need to have conversations 
later about market-sensitive information that would cause them to be “brought inside” with a conse-
quent trading ban. 
Rise of the Activists  
As well as introducing the general public to the inside workings of a hostile takeover, the 1987 film 
Wall Street immortalised activist investing in the person of its anti-hero, Gordon Gekko. In the days 
when ‘greed was good’ and ‘lunch was for wimps’, Gekko and his ilk went by a less sanitised name: 
corporate raiders. The stereotype said these men (and yes, in those days there weren’t any female 
corporate raiders) were the jackals of capitalism, hunting down and dismembering weak companies 
for profit without a care for the thousands of job losses that then ensued. Consequently in the 1980s, 
such men were also known as asset strippers. 
But in the intervening years, the practice of activist investing has morphed into something perfectly 
respectable, a mainstay first of Wall Street and now in other financial capitals. Some of the original 
corporate raiders - most notably Nelson Peltz, through his hedge fund Trian, and Carl Icahn, now a 
very active octogenarian - are still around. These days they are part of the establishment but never-
theless still feared by corporate boards.  
In the first decade of the new millennium they were joined by a host of arrivistes determined to shake 
up the companies in which they invest and who use a range of tactics from the fairly hostile to the 
relatively friendly – all designed to persuade management to do what they feel is best. 
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According to research 2015 from the investment bank JP Morgan entitled ‘The Activist revolution’,, 
funds under management by activist funds had ballooned from $12 billion in 2003 to $112 billion in 
2015, with most of that increase taking place after 2009. In addition, multi-strategy funds (funds that 
use a number of investment methods in parallel) have refocused significant amounts on activist 
strategies. Their report stated:  “Adding to the dynamism of this asset class, new funds are entering 
the shareholder activism arena at a rapid pace (typically lieutenants of established or non-activist 
fund managers pursuing activism as a new strategy) and traditional institutional investors increas-
ingly support - directly or indirectly - shareholder activist campaigns”.  
Activists can tackle a range of issues from under-performance to poor governance, but often they 
seek to persuade management to drop a takeover that they feel undervalues the company, be ac-
quired when the value of the company exceeds its current market capitalisation or sell off non-core 
assets that the market undervalues. In some instances they may attempt to engage a board in private 
dialogue, while in others they will go public with their case in the hope of mobilising a company’s 
broader investment base. Or they start with the former but hold out the threat of the latter if the 
private dialogue doesn’t lead where they want to go. 
Activist investor Elliott Management, for example, applauded computer company Dell’s 2015 acqui-
sition of EMC, because they expected Dell then to sell off a number of divisions.  Prior to the deal, 
Elliott had been pressuring EMC. Thus one company’s acquisition became the foundation for poten-
tial future M&A deals through divestments. 
In the past, companies have batted activist investors away or attempted to ignore them, but today it 
is widely accepted that the best option is to engage with them as part of a broader cohesive public 
relations strategy that includes investors, stakeholders and the media. Corporate advisors, princi-
pally investment banking and public relations advisors, have a key role to play here.  
“Today’s activist campaigns are sophisticated public relations contests, fighting for the support of the 
company’s shareholder base. Companies must approach their preparation and responses while 
keeping this new reality in mind,” says the JP Morgan report. 
And whilst it was previously common to ignore activist shareholders who had a stake of less than 
five per cent, smart boards have also recognised that a strong activist’s ability to galvanise the 
broader shareholder base means that they ignore such investors at their peril.  
Indeed, companies are changing their corporate by-laws to allow these minority investors to exercise 
more control.  In December 2015, Apple changed its by-laws to allow a group of up to 20 sharehold-
ers to nominate up to 20 per cent of Apple’s board.  They joined other large American companies 
such as Microsoft, Coca-Cola and Philip Morris International to have introduced similar changes in 
the same year. 
Whilst activism was born in the US, activists are increasingly influential in Europe and Asia.  JP 
Morgan reported that, in mid-2014, that forty per cent of activist hedge funds globally have either a 
European or a global investment focus. Despite the seedy reputation of their early days, shareholder 
activists have so far managed not to draw the eyes of regulators, but this may be about to change.  
Mary Jo White, the chairwoman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, said that activists 
must be very careful what they say when calling for corporate change.  “I do think it’s time to step 
away from gamesmanship and inflammatory rhetoric that can harm companies and shareholders 
alike,” she said, as reported by Fortune in early 2014. Her comments came in the wake of stake-
building by US hedge fund activist Bill Ackman in Valeant, the drug company, with whom he was 
making a joint bid for its rival Allergen.  
Because Ackman knew about the bid ahead of time, a US judge examining the case said there were 
serious questions as to whether his fund had broken insider trading rules. The very nature of what 
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activists do in taking stakes in businesses and engaging management on strategy may make them 
vulnerable to market manipulation investigations.  
Yet at the moment they are riding high. Over the years, Microsoft, Cadbury, Pepsi, Mondelez (for-
merly part of Kraft Foods), Time Warner, GDF Suez, Britvic, Lloyds Banking Group, Amec, Barclays 
Bank and even stock exchanges themselves such as The Deutsche Börse and the London Stock 
Exchange, have all seen their takeovers - actual or planned - influenced by activist shareholders. No 
corporate is too big for them to target. They are here to stay.  
Prudential’s Imprudence 
In Europe the insurance sector emerged from the financial crisis in much better shape than the 
banks, having escaped its own liquidity crisis more than a decade previously. In February 2010, one 
of the most powerful and ambitious insurers was London-listed Prudential, a global insurance giant 
with booming emerging markets interests.  
Led by the charismatic Tidjane Thiam, the Pru was plotting a bold $35.5 billion (£24billion) move to 
buy AIA, the Asian arm of cash-strapped US insurance company AIG, a business considered by 
many to be the jewel in its crown.  The problem was that not only were the markets against Thiam; 
governments, regulators and investors alike were still reeling from the impact of the UK bank bailouts 
and the eurozone looked to be on the brink of collapse. He and his team also made a slew of mis-
takes in communicating the benefits of the deal to shareholders. 
Robbin Geffen, a fund manager at London-based Neptune who corralled the “No” campaign against 
AIA later described the deal thus:  “From the beginning it has been an absurdly ambitious attempt 
by the Pru to buy a very large Asian company, at a very high price, with a very unclear strategy.”  
Pru’s first communication mistake was that for its shareholders, the deal came out of the blue;  as 
Cardew put it, ‘anything that surprises people is not good; the stock market does not like surprises.’  
Other shareholers must have agreed from the start, as Pru’s share price dropped 8 per cent within 
days of the announcement over concerns that also include worries about the size of the money that 
Pru would need to raise to pay for the deal. 
Given that the acquisition would have doubled the Pru’s market capitalisation and dramatically 
shifted its centre of gravity from its home markets in Europe to fast-growing Asia, management 
should have known the deal was always going to be controversial. Although much of the money 
raised by the £14.5 billion rights issue was expected to come from Asian sovereign wealth funds and 
the deal itself was in Asia, management appeared to forget that it still needed the votes of its 
longstanding UK institutional investor base in order to get it through.  
According to The Telegraph, “As one expert observer said: Tidjane wanted to fire his current inves-
tors and get some new ones. He just forgot about the vote.” 
In this case the deal leaked before the Pru was ready to announce, which goes some way to ex-
plaining the ensuing panic by the insurer’s board and advisors. But  it is anyway generally safer to 
warm up shareholders over a period of years, not months, weeks or days, when planning such a 
major initiative.  
Thiam’s troubles did not end here. He then faced a media storm about his appointment to a seem-
ingly innocuous non-executive directorship at Société Générale, a French bank with its own signifi-
cant challenges. The appointment was portrayed in the media as a diversion and, under pressure, 
Thiam turned it down.  
But perhaps most seriously of all, as it was legally bound to do, the Pru had failed to inform the UK’s 
financial regulator, the Financial Services Authority [FSA] that it was planning to buy AIA. This meant 
that not only did the insurer have to delay its rights issue prospectus, but, in the regulator’s eyes, the 
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acquisition of AIA would leave it under-capitalised. Since this was a time when banks across Europe 
had recently collapsed and many were still considered as requiring possible government bail-outs, 
the FSA’s ruling was extremely damaging. Although AIG was later able to negotiate a solution, the 
public relations damage was already done. 
Furthermore, the insurer was fined £30 million - one of the FSA’s biggest ever fines at that time - in 
2010 for failing to keep the FSA in the loop. Thiam was personally rebuked for his part in that failure. 
“The failure to inform the FSA was significant because it resulted in the FSA having to consider 
highly complex issues within a compressed timescale before making a decision as to whether to 
suspend Prudential’s shares,” said the regulator. “It narrowed the FSA’s options in scrutinising the 
transaction, risked delaying the publication of Prudential’s subsequent rights issue prospectus and 
hampered the FSA’s ability to assist overseas regulators with their enquiries in relation to the trans-
action.”  
Thiam did manage to bring his core investors back onside. Three of the biggest - Legal & General, 
Janus Capital Management and Capital Group - backed his bid following a personal charm offensive 
by the chief executive and his chairman. However, the Pru was now presented with another problem: 
it had agreed on a final price with AIA, but in the wake of that agreement, financial markets around 
the world had tumbled further, particularly in the Euro area.  
The Pru tried to renegotiate on price, but ultimately AIG - which by now was understandably con-
cerned about the Pru’s ability to get a deal done at all - turned the new offer down. Because the 
Pru’s reputation had taken such a battering, it did not even try to revive its own deal. AIA was sub-
sequently floated and its share price more than doubled in its first five years of being publicly owned.  
So would Prudential’s shareholders have been better off backing the deal? Thiam certainly thinks 
so. In 2014 he told investors that the company had missed a “once in a lifetime opportunity.”  He 
added, “I’m still animated about it. I apologise for not succeeding”.   
The Pru deal is a great example of the “Blitzkreig” method we compare with the safer and more 
gradual ‘Playing the Long Game’ M&A strategy.  While there is a strong argument that the AIA ac-
quisition would have delivered great returns, it is not clear that this was exposure that shareholders 
in the Prudential, a conservative company founded in 1848, actually wanted. And for those that did, 
they could anyway buy AIA shares when the company was floated anyway.  
What do the PR advisors suggest as best practice in this area? Cardew said that ‘it’s certainly not 
just about talking to journalists on the day of a deal. You need to be spending time helping the 
company to communicate its long-term strategy to a range of stakeholders - whether you call that 
public relations or something else.’  He went on to suggest that ‘a deal that is understood is going to 
be well received. What you’ve got to do is to tell a compelling story. It is absolutely crucial to lay 
down the context in which you might be announcing anything - what is your overarching narrative - 
a long time ahead.’ 
In short, there are a number of ptifalls for dealmakers, but we would argue that “selling the story” is 
one of the most important. Here we mean that buyers and seller management need to address the 
question “What is our deal Story?” early and devising a communication strategy as soon as possible 
in the deal process.  For all kinds of stakeholders both internal and external, we also argue that this 
is equally important for large or small, public or private deals. Poor communication could scupper a 
public deal, as with Prudential case, but poor communication could have even more devastating 
effects for private transaction: the deal may go through, but because of poor communication the 
buyer loses most of the value as it fails to keep key people in the target and even in its own organi-
zation. 
The Engagement: THE DOs AND DON’Ts 
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 Do treat your shareholders with respect – they have the power to derail the deal 
 Don’t spring surprises on shareholders; they should be fully aware of your strategic objectives 
 Do make sure you have a communications team in place, whether internal or external 
 DO communicate, communicate, and then when you finish communicating, communi-
cate some more 
 Don’t forget that the internal employees are just as important a target group for the 
communications strategy as the external press and shareholders 
 Do engage with activist investors, it will be easier in the long run 
 Do make sure all the details are in place before the announcement is made 
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0.8. Beware of the Regulator 
A growing issue for every ambitious company, particularly those targeting cross-border acquisitions, 
is the proliferation of regulators and governments who can and are willing to block the most coveted 
takeovers.  
As the markets become ever more active globally, so too do the number of merger control regimes 
across the world which are growing as countries bolster their national competition policies. This is 
not just true in the world’s two major trading blocs, North America and the European Union, but the 
Chinese government is also now much more active in their use of rules against anti-competitive 
activity.  
There are also a growing number of specialist national regulators that make merger controls in par-
ticular key industries such as the OfCom, the media regulator in the UK, or the Food and Drug 
Administration, for the pharmaceutical and health care industries in the US.   
In the US, merger control is policed by the Federal Trade Commission and the anti-trust division of 
the Department of Justice and ultimately the Supreme Court. In Europe, the European Commis-
sioner for Competition, a member of the European Commission (the EU’s top political body) has 
responsibility for merger control. Possibly since its decision to block the trans-Atlantic merger be-
tween General Electric and Honeywell put the European Commission on the global map in 2001, it 
is many of Europe’s decisions that have been the most controversial. 
The trend has continued in recent years.  The regulator’s move in early 2012 to stop a tie-up between 
two huge stock exchanges, NYSE Euronext and Deutsche Börse, even after the US had provided 
conditional approval just over one month earlier, shows how crucial EU approval remains. Early 
assumptions that decisions were based on political contacts are now well wide of the mark as the 
EU regulator continues to build its case law. Here, as we see in the other two case studies in this 
section, failings of communication and planning are most likely to create difficulties for bidders facing 
major regulatory inquiries. 
Small private companies can fall foul of regulators just as easily as listed companies.  The broad test 
is whether the newly combined businesses dominate their sector even within a relatively narrow 
geographic area.  
The second key issue for all bidders, but particularly those based in another country from their targer, 
is whether there are local rules specifically relating to ‘proper behaviour’ during a takeover:  the 
corporate law of takeovers, whether explicit legislative laws or legal case history. For example, under 
the UK’s Takeover Code, which covers all transactions relating to publicly listed companies in the 
UK, all bidders for UK listed companies are bound by the code be they foreign or domestic. Global 
retail and property magnate Sir Philip Green famously fell foul of the code when he was held by the 
Takeover Panel to his promise that his doomed bid for Marks  & Spencer was his final offer, since 
he stated publicly in July 2005, that "this is my final proposal." He added that if Marks & Spencer 
rejects it, "I'll go home." Once said, such a statement prohibited him for a time from changing his 
proposal without the permission of the target. 
However, such rules are particularly easy to overlook for overseas bidders used to dealing with a 
different legal system. In this regard we consider whether Kraft in its 2010 bid for Cadbury overpaid 
because it did not take sufficient care to abide by these rules.  
The third sort of regulator we consider is each country’s national government. Governments around 
the world take their own approach to foreign investors. Most dramatic is the recent upswing in regu-
latory or legislative reviews through political intervention against foreign investments, with national 
governments considering the impact of takeovers on local jobs, economies and national security. In 
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fact, elected officials often use public statements to oppose or support M&A deals even without the 
formal powers to do so, again as we will see in the Kraft acquisition of Cadbury. 
The ‘Danone Law’ 
Government interventions in cross-border M&A deals can be hidden behind an aura of anti-trust 
control or national security as governments around the world from France in Europe to the US in 
North American and China in Asia have done.  
One example of a company protected by its government in obviously nationalist circumstances is 
Danone, the French dairy food group. Due to its narrow focus and small size, Danone has long been 
viewed as an attractive target for food groups such as Nestlé and PepsiCo.  
After the company’s share price spiked in 2005 on a rumoured bid by PepsiCo, the French govern-
ment stepped in with a law protecting certain industries from takeovers. The law was dubbed the 
“Danone Law” and was designed to protect “strategic sectors”, including those likely to impact on 
public order, national security and defence.  It has often been joked that the company is strategically 
important for France because the army relies on Danone yoghurt at breakfast.  
The US government is not often viewed as one of the worst culprits for protectionism, yet our case 
study later in this section shows that a government can step in even when there are no real “national 
security” issues. As with our case study on Deutsche Börse, this emphasises yet again the huge 
importance of good communication if you plan to launch a controversial bid.  
Kraft’s takeover of Cadbury hits a sour note 
The £10.1 billion takeover of Cadbury, the UK-listed global confectionary business, by Kraft, was a 
deal that had been years in the making. With key shareholders in common, particularly activist Nel-
son Pelz, a combination of the two companies seemed inevitable, even if it was unwelcome to the 
board of Cadbury, who hoped until the end to be saved by a white knight bidder such as the American 
chocolate manufacturer, Hershey or the Italian chocolatier, Ferraro.  
Having coveted Cadbury for years, Kraft was determined to get its target and looked likely to do so 
from the outset of its bid. There were no significant competition issues; the businesses were compli-
mentary, not competing, both in terms of product and geographies.  Thus regulators were never in 
danger of de-railing the deal completely. Yet Kraft certainly made mistakes that others can learn 
from, errors that fall absolutely within our Big Three. 
Other than gaining the approval of Cadbury shareholders in light of the opposition of the Cadbury 
board, the most high profile hurdle for Kraft was the vocal opposition raised to the deal by UK politi-
cians. The Business Secretary, Lord Peter Mandelson, warned that the British government would 
scrutinise any foreign takeover of Cadbury and would oppose buyers who did not “respect” the con-
fectioner.  In reality, the British government’s actions were heavy on the bark and light on the bite. 
The UK is one of the most open countries in the world to foreign investors and is consistently one of 
the most attractive because of this, according to Cass Business School’s annual M&A Market At-
tractiveness Survey. Its appeal is strengthened by its legal regime as the UK cannot challenge for-
eign takeovers other than on grounds of national security. 
Unlike our example of the French government and Danone yoghurts, this definition is never really 
stretched and in this case the UK government made no regulatory challenge to the takeover. Here 
Kraft got it right; the company knew at the outset that its deal could not be blocked. 
However, the deal fall prey to errors in planning and communication, as they ultimately needed the 
approval of shareholders, including some large UK institutional investors.   To gain this approval, 
during the takeover Kraft promised keep open a factory in Southern England. The company made 
the promise in a bid to win over public opinion, but it did so without any real evidence of the factory’s 
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viability. Because it was a hostile bid, the bidder had no access to proprietary target company infor-
mation and certainly not the internal confidential plans to close a plant that would result a large 
number of employee redundancies.  
Once Kraft took over Cadbury, it found the plant was not critical to the business and indeed discov-
ered that Cadbury itself had been planning to shut it down. Kraft therefore subsequently announced 
that they would close it, leading to a massive public outcry. There were two consequences to this 
failure of planning and communication: the first was that the company was twice summoned before 
an influential Parliamentary committee to give an account of itself.  
More critically, during the bid battle, Kraft breached the UK’s Takeover Code. As Cadbury was in an 
offer period when Kraft’s statements on factory closure were made, all company statements were 
being monitored closely by the UK’s Takeover Panel. Under the code, companies in a formal bid 
situation are bound by any public statements about the takeover and must be especially careful not 
to say anything that is deemed to be untrue or misleading. The Panel subsequently censured both 
Kraft and its investment banking advisor Lazard for the mis-statements.  
Such action by the Panel is rare and thus was a significant embarrassment for both Kraft and Lazard. 
The fallout was most keenly experienced by Peter Kiernan, the Lazard banker leading the deal in 
the UK. Kiernan had just recently taken up the role as the next Director General of The Takeover 
Panel but had to recuse himself after the ruling. With better planning and communication by Kraft 
and its advisors, this could have been avoided.  
Kraft also fell foul of another important element of the Takeover Code that restricts a bidder’s ability 
to change its offer. It made its initial bid partly in shares and partly in cash. Later, CEO Rosenfeld 
announced the company’s intent to increase the cash component of its offer because some share-
holders, and most notably Warren Buffett, had complained that she was using too many of the com-
pany’s undervalued shares to fund the deal. Due to the provisions of Kraft’s own corporate constitu-
tion, by reversing the mixture from 60 per cent shares / 40 per cent cash to 40/60 respectively, 
Rosenfeld was able to avoid putting the deal to a shareholder vote, thereby cutting out the disgrun-
tled Buffett.  
Rosenfeld may have had a good reason for doing this, but under the UK Takeover Code, once you 
are within a formal offer period, you cannot easily change the terms. To comply with UK rules, Kraft 
was not allowed to withdraw or amend its initial offer without the approval of the Panel and the target, 
which in a hostile bid situation was unlikely to be forthcoming from Cadbury. Effectively Kraft would 
have to keep its old offer on the table in addition to any new offer, meaning it would be obliged to go 
ahead with the shareholder vote it was trying to avoid in the first place. This gave Cadbury a major 
tactical advantage. 
As it happened, shareholder opinion was moving and investors wanted the higher cash component. 
Once Kraft signalled it would raise its bid to 830p per share from its original indicative offer of 745p, 
Cadbury’s board agreed to open talks that ended with them recommending an offer for 840p per 
share, plus a ten pence per share special dividend. Once they provided that recommendation, Kraft 
would expect that the Cadbury board would then support Kraft’s application to the Panel to be al-
lowed to vary its initial formal offer.  
Kraft’s initial failure, one of planning, is particularly instructive because this restriction on variation is 
a quirk of the UK regime; no such provision exists in the US. It is unclear whether Rosenfeld knew 
about the restriction when she made her initial offer or whether she did but pushed on regardless. In 
this instance the mistake probably would not have stopped Kraft capturing its target, but because 
the company had to make a knock-out offer in order to get a board recommendation, it likely did 
mean the US company paid more than it initially intended or hoped to pay.  
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The critical lesson here is that, in cross-border acquisitions, every element of the local laws govern-
ing the target must be explored and expert local advisors hired before any irreversible moves are 
made. This should be done as early as possible during the takeover planning. The importance of 
doing this can be seen by the high levels of outbound M&A since 2005 especially in some of the 
larger developed countries.  
 
Deutsche Börse: You can’t always rely on the Germans 
The European Union was born of a Franco-German alliance risen from the ashes of World War II. 
Thus one perception in Europe is that if any company has the necessary political intelligence to 
negotiate a tricky European Commission anti-trust inquiry, it must be a Franco-German one. So, 
when the European Commission ultimately sounded the death-knell of a merger between Deutsche 
Börse, Germany’s principal stock exchange, and NYSE Euronext, a company itself formed from 
combining one of America’s major stock exchanges and a Paris-based stock exchange that encom-
passes Brussels and London, it came as a surprise. 
It was a particular shock that the block came in the stock exchange sector, where borses are viewed 
as national infrastructure assets and where arguments of national interest are particularly strong. 
Certainly Duncan Niederauer, the chief executive of NYSE Euronext, and Reto Francioni, his oppo-
site number at Deutsche Börse, who had together lobbied hard and leveraged every personal con-
nection they had to get the deal through, were taken aback by it.  This was a friendly deal where 
both exchanges wanted to merge with each other. 
2010 was the year when many of the world’s stock exchanges rushed to consolidate. London’s LSE 
and Toronto’s TMX planned a merger that was on course for regulatory approval, although both 
companies later called it off for reasons unrelated to the regulators. ASX of Australia and the Singa-
pore Exchange also tried to tie-up, but they were stymied by Asian regulators. The merger between 
Deutsche Börse and NYSE Euronext was by far the biggest and boldest of the three deals and would 
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With a proposition that dominant, you really have to sell such a deal to the regulators. While the two 
companies had a well-planned communications campaign, they seem to have used the wrong forms 
of persuasion. The companies were playing a risky game by seemingly ignoring economic issues in 
favour of political ones and by concentrating on the wider European Commission, and in doing so 
going over the heads of the European Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia and his team.  
The two sides presented the tie-up as an opportunity to create a Europe-based powerhouse able to 
take on the might of US exchanges such as Nasdaq and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. How-
ever, they neglected the pure anti-trust arguments within Almunia’s purview. At the same time, as 
part of the commission’s investigation, rival exchanges made convincing submissions to the Com-
petition Commissioner that the deal be blocked, or only approved on the basis that the newly com-
bined NYSE Euronext/Deutsche Börse firm would commit to make massive divestments in the areas 
where it would dominate.  
By the time the European Commission came to a formal decision, the US anti-trust authorities had 
already cleared the merger (albeit with some conditions), which was no small achievement for the 
companies and their legal teams. However, despite a year-long campaign by the two chief execu-
tives, the European Commission officially vetoed the deal in early February 2012, following a rec-
ommendation by Commissioner Almunia. Despite the support that NYSE Euronext and Deutsche 
Börse had from a cabal of European Commissioners led by Michel Barnier, French Commissioner 
overseeing financial regulation who backed the national champion argument, it was not enough. The 
commission, as it invariably does, ultimately supported the ruling of the Competition Commissioner.  
Almunia told The Financial Times in an interview that the two companies had used the wrong ap-
proach. “They tried a public relations campaign, lobbying, political pressure to get a positive decision. 
I told them from the beginning ‘you don’t know how to deal with the commission.’ This is not the best 
way to convince us - quite the opposite, it is the wrong way.” In summing up why he opposed the 
merger, Almunia left little room for doubt: “The deal would have led to a near monopoly in European 
financial derivatives worldwide.”  
Niederauer admitted that he had misjudged the Competition Commissioner’s investigation into the 
market, which Almunia always insisted be considered on a pan-European, not an international level. 
One senior person close to one of the two exchanges told The Financial Times: “Duncan has good 
relations with a lot of top European officials, including [International Monetary Fund managing direc-
tor, Christine] Lagarde, and I think he thought he’d be able to persuade Almunia. But that was not 
going to work with Almunia.” 
Angry at the decision, Deutsche Börse threatened to take the European Commission to court to try 
to reverse it. Even after NYSE Euronext decided to walk away from the failed merger on the basis 
that a challenge would mean a protracted and expensive legal campaign, the German exchange 
insisted on pursuing its case, lodging it with the European Union court in 2012.  
When it came up for review in March 2015, the Deutsche Börse contended that the European Com-
mission had not adequately considered that some merger efficiencies would have benefited custom-
ers, counteracting the negative impact of competition.  They further argued that the commission had 
not properly taken consideration of the remedies it proposed, such as offers to sell off parts of the 
merged entity.  
However, the General Court, the EU’s second highest authority, rejected the case saying the com-
mission had made no legal errors in its assessment of the market. As the European Commission is 
notoriously difficult to challenge and very few disappointed merger proponents ever try, few observ-
ers were surprised this time around.  
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There was a silver lining for Niederauer, a one-time Goldman Sachs executive. NYSE Euronext was 
heavily dependent on him to provide it with a new direction once the merger fell apart so it doubled 
his exit package to two times his salary as part of a pay hike. It also increased his potential equity 
bonus by $250,000.  As to the Deutsche Börse, it launched a bid in early 2015 for it’s London-based 
rival, the London Stock Exchange, in a deal structures as a friendly ‘merger of equals’.  For the 
Deutsche Börse, it was a case of hoping that they’d be ‘third time lucky’, as twice before, in May 
2000 and December 2004, the London Stock Exchange had resisted merging or being acquired by 
the Deutsche Börse. 
DP World: Stuck in Port 
Even a relatively open economy like the US can resort to anti-foreign bias on occasion as is demon-
strated by the fate of the Dubai Port World (DP World) bid for London-listed P&O in 2006. P&O was 
at the time primarily a ports operator, having recently divested a number of businesses including its 
cruise ship Princess Cruise line. Its portfolio still included container terminals in a number of major 
US ports including Baltimore, Miami, New Orleans, New York and Philadelphia.  
In a rapidly consolidating global marketplace for shipping infrastructure, the company was a highly 
desirable target and a bidding war ensued between the Port Authority of Singapore (PAS) and DP 
World, the growing infrastructure business owned by the government of Dubai. On January 10th 
2006, DP World made a bid for London-listed P&O, trumping the previous high bid frin the Port of 
Authority of Singapore, owned by the government of Singapore.  
As the battle escalated, both sides moved to put in place the necessary regulatory permissions, the 
most important of which was an application to CFIUS, the bi-partisan political body that regulates 
overseas investment in the US.  
At the time, CFIUS had the power to either approve a foreign buyer or open an investigation period 
to look into it more carefully; its powers have since been significantly bolstered. Historically, CFIUS 
tended to approve bids but there are some examples when it effectively blocked a deal by delaying 
it and causing attendant publicity. One such example was a $18.5 bid by the China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation for US-listed oil major Unocal, which was blocked by CFIUS in 2005. 
In January, a CFIUS panel chaired by the Deputy Treasury Secretary and representing the views of 
the Departments of States, Justice, Defense and Homeland Security voted unanimously to approve 
DP World's bid for P&O. Had any of the panelists objected, there would have been a mandatory 45 
day investigation period and the matter would have been referred to the US President for his per-
sonal clearance, but this did not happen. 
Opposition to the deal grew as the M&A process moved on and P&O's board and shareholders 
approved a takeover by DP World. At this time, memories of the September 11 attacks were still 
painfully raw and the US still had more than 100,000 soldiers stationed in Iraq. Although Dubai, and 
the wider United Arab Emirates (UAE) of which it is a part, were key Middle Eastern allies in the US’ 
War on Terror, Dubai also had some links to Al Qaeda: two of the 9/11 terrorists were from the UAE 
and some Dubai-based intermediaries had been involved in financing the plot.  
The Bush administration tried persuasion to get the deal through, stressing the importance of the 
UAE to US interests in the Middle East and assuring the country that Gulf ownership of American 
infrastructure assets was perfectly safe. But critics of the deal, including Senator Hilary Clinton, drew 
no distinction between Dubai and other, less friendly, regimes in the region and continued to object. 
On February 22nd, the President threatened to veto any legislation Congress introduced the block 
the deal, but neither presidential persuasion nor force dampened the growing storm. 
In this volatile environment some of the criticism of the deal was considered, linking security objec-
tions to allegations of cronyism by current and former members of the Bush administration, which 
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had close business links to DP World. Other comments, such as on CBS' 60 Minutes, one of Amer-
ica's most-watched TV news shows (see box below), bordered on the racist and jingoistic. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Andy Rooney, Dubai Ports, CBS’ 60 Minutes, March 24 2008 
“A lot of Americans are concerned that it [the Dubai Ports takeover] might be a security risk. Security 
isn’t what matters to me. What I don’t understand is why the hell we can’t run our ports ourselves. 
Too hard for us? Aren’t we smart enough?” 
….Too much of our work is being outsourced. Why don’t they outsource the White House? Or Con-
gress? Get some really smart people from other countries to run ourselves for us. A Congressman 
gets about 162,000 [dollars] a year and all he can eat. I bet we can get some natives of Dubai to do 
the same work twice as well for half the price.” 
I hope CBS doesn’t decide to outsource 60 Minutes and get someone from Dubai - Anwar Rooney 
- to the work for a quarter of what they pay me.” 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
On February 27, in an attempt at damage limitation, DP World itself requested a 45 day CFIUS 
investigation. But by this point US politicians were asking for more. On March 7, Jerry Lewis, the 
Republican Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, said: "It is my intention to lay the 
foundation to block the deal." The next day his committee voted in favour of an amendment to do 
just that. 
On March 9, DP World capitulated, announcing a personal decision by the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum to "transfer" P&O's American assets to a US-owned entity. Even-
tually the assets were sold to the asset management division of American International Group.  
Reaction in the Arab world was furious. "People, businesses as well as the government of the UAE 
are deeply offended as a result of the ports deal fiasco. People across the UAE are angry to the 
extent to which their moderate and open country has been demonised by the American media and 
lawmakers in Washington," said political scientist Abdul Khaleq Abdullah in a column in the Dubai-
based Gulf News on March 17th 2006.  
The decision was both a foreign policy problem for the administration and, in the longer term, a stain 
on the country's reputation as an open economy. It also had a big impact on US policy, leading to 
the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, which greatly increased the power and 
jurisdiction of CFIUS. 
But is there anything DP World as a bidder could have done to avoid the fiasco that unfolded? Pos-
sibly. There were clear errors in planning and communication, two of our Three Big Mistakes of Deal-
making. DP World made little attempt to “warm up” or lobby the broader body of US lawmakers or 
the US public to the possibility of the ownership of American ports by a friendly Gulf nation.  
A poll of Americans at the time revealed that they cared a lot about the nationality of port operators. 
While only 26 per cent thought the Federal government should not allow companies from the UK to 
own cargo operations at US ports, according to a Gallup poll, 50 per cent would ban the French, 56 
per cent any Arab country and 65 per cent China.  
Any campaign to alter public opinion would have to have been long-running and persuasive to 
change such ingrained prejudices. But a well-planned PR and lobbying campaign that focused on 
the neutrality of DP World’s arms-length corporate ownership and reinforced the benefits of a merger 
might have had a chance of success.  
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What actually happened was that DP World, much like Deutsche Börse in other example, thought 
they had regulatory clearance sewn up thanks to strong connections to the government, or in the 
case of Deutsche Börse, the European Commission. DP World did not even hire a lobbying firm until 
late on in the process when it sought to sway Congress to its side.  However, it was probably just 
too late.  
Since the turn of the millennium, the likelihood of deals being blocked has increased significantly in 
Europe and the US, while emerging markets race to keep up with Western regulators. In 2015 alone 
US competition regulators had a bumper year, blocking Comcast’s $45 billion acquisition of rival 
Time Warner Cable, Tokyo Electron’s $30 billion takeover of US chipmaker Applied Materials and 
Electrolux of Sweden’s $3.3 billion bid for General Electrics vacuum business. Regulation is here to 
stay. 
Beware the Regulator: THE DOs AND DON’Ts 
 DO remember that even if shareholders agree to the deal, it can be stopped by the 
government 
 DO know who in the government is making the final decision, whether it’s regulators 
or politicians 
 DON’T assume that the takeover rules are the same in another jurisdiction 
 DO abide by the rules once you know them 
 DON’T forget communication is key with regulators – and with influencial politicians 




0.9. Doing the Deal Right 
Franklin D Roosevelt took office as the President of the United States of America in the depths of 
the Great Depression. Finding the ravages of several years of runaway employment, deflation and 
falling output, FDR knew he needed to act quickly: between March and June 1933 he introduced a 
raft of measures to prime the pump of the US economy, including the Glass-Steagall Act, which 
safeguarded the financial infrastructure of the country through the legal separation of commercial 
and investment banking until it was repealed in 1999. 
FDR’s so-called New Deal might be a little too Keynesian for the tastes of some in business today, 
but the method by which the policy was implemented was the political forerunner of a major corporate 
concept: the first 100 days. The 100 Day turnaround timeline - which can be traced back to Napoleon 
Bonaparte who returned from exile, re-instated himself as the ruler of France and declared war on 
England and Prussia before capitulating at the battle of Waterloo just over a hundred days later - is 
used across business by incoming executives and owners to provide a structured action plan that 
puts a company on the front foot. It is a fundamental part of M&A strategy.  
Successful M&A - and the beneficial impact on the wider economy that we discussed in the preface 
to this book - starts with doing the right deal, at the right time. The second part of the equation for 
success, which we will consider in this section, is ’doing the deal right’. The latter typically attracts 
less attention and scrutiny than the former, but is, in our experience, where real value can be added 
or destroyed, irrespective of the rationale for the deal.  
While the 100 Day Plan is corporate shorthand for deal integration - and a key part of it - it is by no 
means the whole.  Deal implementation begins with the disciplines we discuss in earlier sections 
about where you formulate a merger strategy in line with your company's overall strategic aims and 
rigorously target acquisitions that can deliver this. Determining if you have the capacity to spend the 
time and resources on integration should be part of the planning as discussed earlier.  More specific 
post-closing planning for the integration should begin as soon as a target is identified and should be 
an intrinsic part of drawing up a list of target companies. After all, how can a deal be costed and its 
benefits and synergies assessed unless you have at least a skeleton integration plan? This section 
should be read in conjunction with the earlier section on due diligence, which if done properly, will 
provide the foundations for the integration of your new business, highlighting any particular issues 
that may arise in terms of culture, people, processes and indeed almost every aspect of the newly-
combined businesses. 
As should be clear from the above, a deal’s longer-term success depends on what is done on inte-
gration throughout the deal process including during both the post announcement and post comple-
tion periods. Particularly important is whether planned synergies have been captured and staff mo-
rale raised as quickly as possible to realise the deal’s potential. In times of economic uncertainty and 
low growth, delivering the full and promised value of acquisitions becomes even more important. 
Success of a transaction is often defined by the ability to deliver the promised synergies, either of 
revenue or cost, and to implement a change in operating model. This is crucial and applicable to all 
sort of sizes – small, medium size and large - and types of deals – public or private, including deals 
amongst charities. 
For an excellent example of the latter, look no further than the Royal National Institute of Blind People 
[RNIB]. On 1 April 2009, RNIB formally announced that Action for Blind People [Action] had become 
the third member of their sight loss group alongside National Talking Newspapers & Magazines and 
Cardiff Vales and Valleys, the first three of many more in RNIB’s consolidation of related charities in 
the UK.  The formation of this group cemented RNIB’s position as the number one sight loss charity 
in the UK.  
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The driving force behind the ‘mergers’ was both financial and political but the vision behind the group 
came from RNIB’s CEO, Lesley-Anne Alexander, CBE, who felt that having over 700 charities in the 
UK seeking to achieve the same objective was counter-productive to achieving their charitable ob-
jective of providing the best possible support for blind and partially-sighted people. 
RNIB recognised that there could be significant synergies in these mergers as, for example with this 
deal, the services provided by Action, which were primarily community-based and in England, would 
complement its own services, which were based either principally nationally or specifically in Scot-
land, Northern Ireland or Wales. The combination would therefore cover all of the regions of the 
United Kingdom, thus enabling it to gain maximum return from its increasingly difficult quest to raise 
resources.  
As such, the decision to combine operations was made and a five-year partnership deal was entered 
into. The deal comprised Action taking on responsibility for all of RNIB’s and Action’s regional and 
contract services and staff in England, whilst RNIB took over fundraising for both charities. The deal 
reflected the fact that front office operations were to merge but back offices were to stay separate. 
Alexander said more about realistic achievement of the synergies and benefits of their merger:  
Before we did anything with Action we had 0% of the benefits of the merger, and possibly if 
we had done a traditional takeover and merged completely the front office and back office, 
we would have got 100% benefit. I estimate that with the new structure we achieved about 
50% of the benefit. In my book, 50% is a whole lot better than 0% and the door is open to 
increase from 50% as time passes. 
That benefit is derived from blind and partially-sighted people having one place to go for their 
services, on the high street in Liverpool, Birmingham, Bristol and Manchester, and all those 
other places where we have a presence. Everyone says economies of scale can be derived 
from merging back office activities but that was not on offer and I was not going to be pre-
vented from merging front office – the real places that real blind and partially-sighted people 
visited – because I could not have it all!  I can put up with back office complexity if that is the 
price we are paying for making the landscape simpler for our service users. 
Crucially the pre-completion integration phase also operates as a canary in the coal mine for your 
deal. If the headline integration plans - such as the selection of an executive board team - are coming 
unstuck, this is definite signal to walk away. Similarly, if the market shifts during the negotiation 
phase, this might be a last opportunity to get out and avoid the sort of corporate Armageddon expe-
rienced at the Royal Bank of Scotland.   
Integration can mean a complete blending of the two businesses from executive level downwards, 
or as completely separate businesses, common with private equity portfolios, or anything in between. 
What matters is that the post-closing phase be properly planned and that the rationale for buying the 
business be implemented in expertly rendered fine detail. 
Broadly, the integration process can be broken down as follows: 
 Phase One: Pre-Closing 
o Stage 1: High level merger planning. Discussion restricted to a very small group of 
senior level executives representing the key areas of integration, avoiding leaks 
o Stage 2: Announcement. The expectations of management and employees should 
be carefully managed from the outset. At least the top level of management, if not the 
second tier, should be in place by announcement. 
o Stage 3: Informal integration can begin. The more uncertainty, the more unstable the 
target organisation will be. It may be essential to begin the combination of particularly 
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challenging systems, such as major IT and HR systems, at this point, if possible, but 
not at the very least to be planning for these.  
Or, if the negotiations turn sour at this point, be prepared to walk away.  
 Phase Two: Post-Closing   
o Stage 4: The 100 Days - the key window to set up the right foundations for integra-
tion.  
o Stage 5: Stabilisation and organizational andcultural integration. This is a long-term 
process and can require several years to finalise; the journey is complete when em-
ployees, customers, suppliers and investors consider the combined company to be 
“business as usual” and when few refer back to the legacy organisations; a good rule 
of thumb is that this stage should not last more than three years, and ideally be much 
shorter.  
As a deal moves towards completion, the corporate team steering group is likely to change, with 
new personnel - either in-house or external advisors - taking over from the deal negotiation team. 
However, it is important that communication and handover between the teams is good with at least 
some executives providing continuity or work alongside each other for a specific time period. Dis-
connects between the two teams can be and is often one of the biggest impediments to the proper 
implementation of the developed integration strategy. 
As well, throughout the process, management needs to remember that their biggest challenge may 
not be the integration but making sure that employees keep the core businesses running success-
fully. 
Phase 1: Giving diligence its due 
Good integration begins with good due diligence that means using an “issue led” approach to identify 
and address the key issues at the outset, instead of falling back on a compartmentalised box-ticking 
approach of separate tax, financial, legal and other assessments. Time and time again we have 
seen companies pay for due diligence (advice), then throw it away once it has been used to establish 
price..  
Comprehensive due diligence information should be used to provide a blueprint for the post-deal 
integration that will allow a buyer to maximize its financial and strategic goals and avoid the identified 
pitfalls that have been uncovered. In this way good due diligence should easily pay for itself. This 
blueprint of the merged business should set out the key elements of its new strategy, re-iterating the 
value drivers for the deal outlined when the target was first selected.  
The merged company should have a very clear idea early in the deal process of what they will do 
differently compared with the target’s – and perhaps even the buyer’s - former business plans. Once 
this is identified, the CEO – and yes, it needs to be led throughout from that level of the firm – should 
comprehensively allocate responsibilities to selected senior managers so that it is very clear to all 
who has the responsibility to implement the plan.  This needs specific timeframes and milestones 
and should be clearly linked to management performance targets and assessments.  
Once that is done, management should develop a clear Day One plan that will ensure how the new 
combined organisation will start to operate from the outset. Despite the point we made earlier about 
a damaging disconnect between deal negotiation and implementation teams, it can - provided there 
is sufficient oversight - be advantageous to use a “clean team” comprised of both internal staff and 
external advisors to prepare this plan. A clean team will operate between both organisations and 
develop integration plans and business cases consisting of commercially sensitive information which 
normally could not be shared between announcement and completion phase of the deal. This is 
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particularly the case where there is a hiatus between deal recommendation to the stakeholders and 
the date of closing, for instance where there is a lengthy regulatory review.  
This Day One plan should also be designed with maximum flexibility in mind, as better information 
will be available in Phase 2 below and therefore the integration plan should allow for changes using 
that new data. This is also the point, if your deal is not going to plan, that you need to consider 
whether to press ahead or alternatively cut your losses and step aside 
Phase 1 Off the Rails: Stopping Runaway Trains 
By the time a deal is nearing completion, a buyer's management team will have invested months, or 
possibly years, of executive time in planning the takeover. They will have paid advisors and may 
have arranged deal financing. In such a situation the momentum behind an acquisition will be such 
that the team will feel the only possible way is forward.  
But the best chief executives will be able not just to spot a losing hand, but have the courage to fold 
when necessary, even if they have taken a big financial gamble on an acquisition. The Omnicom - 
Publicis merger we outline below descended into ever more public rows about board representation 
until it was called off in 2014, clearly picking up on a classic sign that a deal had not been properly 
thought through. Trains tend not to fall off the tracks with no warning.  Here, as is often the case, 
failures in strategy - and most importantly in due diligence - are what has unbalanced the carriages. 
Holding hands across the Atlantic 
When Paris-based Publicis Groupe and New York-based Omnicom Group announced their $35.1 
billion merger in mid-2103, they raised the tantalising prospect of an advertising marketing giant that 
would combine the accounts of global super-brands such as Pepsi and Coca-Cola and provide real 
competition for the sector's biggest player WPP.  
According to the Financial Times this rare "merger of equals" began with a joke. Omnicom's chief 
executive John Wren was visiting Publicis' Paris headquarters in 2013 when he paused to admire 
the outstanding view from the rooftop, which overlooked the Arc de Triomphe. Maurice Levy, Publi-
cis' chief executive and Wren's long-time rival, replied: "It can be yours," and with that the idea of the 
deal was born.  
The combination of the two listed businesses seemingly made perfect commercial sense. In an era 
where massive new internet and social media players – such as Google and Facebook - typically 
wanted to work with agencies close to their own size, smaller scale businesses felt that business 
was passing them by. A merged Omnicom-Publicis would have been much larger than rival WPP 
with US revenue alone of  $11.4 billion - twice as much as that of WPP - and would have been in 
pole position to deal with the new media and technology giants. Even the timing of the merger was 
perfect; in 2013, advertising was finally emerging from the slump it fell into during the financial crisis 
and subsequent recession.  
Yet by the time the deal was announced in July, talks aimed at coming up with a management 
structure for the new business were already stalling. The two companies are "people businesses" 
whose job it is to be emotionally intelligent and sensitive to clients' needs. It is more than possible, 
however, that they forgot that in their own deal when doing proper due diligence that consideration 
of these human factors is absolutely vital. Corporate culture and the ways of working/operating are 
often overlooked during the due diligence process, but it is on this rock that takeovers can crash. It 
is vital that executives consider the “soft” cultural issues as they are often outward manifestations of 
very different management styles, ways of working and an indication of how far power is devolved 
within an organisation.  
Within the advertising sector, Omnicom and Publicis - and their two chief executives - could not have 
had more different corporate cultures. Wren, an American, was a former accountant who kept a low 
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profile in a glamorous industry while Levy, according the Financial Times, was a European charmer 
with a real year-round St Tropez tan. These different styles, likely reflected deeper in the two organ-
isations, are issues that should have been identified early on in the due diligence phase and an 
action plan drawn up to deal with them.  
What actually happened was that the two men agreed the most important jobs at the business - their 
own - as a precondition to a merger. They would share the job of chief executive for the first 30 
months, then Levy would step up to the role of Chairman. However they did not go much further. In 
most mergers, it will be important to identify most or all of the top level executives at the outset. This 
is particularly true where the deal involves people businesses where human resources are the com-
panies’ biggest asset or where management has specialist expertise that is crucial to the success of 
a merged business (witness the example in earlier sections of the HP purchase of Autonomy). This 
is doubly true where the two businesses are similar in size and power and therefore where the "mer-
ger of equals" idea is real, or close to it. We saw a similar issue in an earlier case study where Britvic 
and A.G. Barr decided not to restart their merger talks in part because they could not agree on board 
roles. 
The flashpoint came for Wren and Levy over who got the role of chief financial officer. Both men 
wanted to make this crucial appointment and realised it was key to getting their vision imposed on 
the overall business. Because the culture of the two businesses was different - Publicis was very 
centralised and Omnicom very devolved - this was a particularly important appointment. Claudio 
Aspesi, an analyst at Bernstein, said “It was only human for both CEOs to want their trusted staff 
around them but you can only have one CFO." 
But according to Levy, Wren also wanted to bring across his general counsel, meaning the two most 
important financial and legal functions of the Franco-American business would be filled by Ameri-
cans, an outcome that was culturally sensitive for the Paris-based Publicis.  “The balance was not 
being respected,” Mr Lévy told the Financial Times. “He wanted to have his CFO as CFO, and his 
general counsel as general counsel. So as you can see, the key positions of the holding company 
would have been in the hands of Omnicom people and this was unacceptable. ”A number of tax and 
regulatory issues also raised their heads and, in 2014, the two sides called the deal off.  
In a joint statement the two CEOs said: "The challenges that still remained to be overcome, in addi-
tion to the slow pace of progress, created a level of uncertainty detrimental to the interests of both 
groups and their employees, clients and shareholders. We have thus jointly decided to proceed 
along our independent paths. We, of course, remain competitors, but maintain a great respect for 
one another.” Levy said separately that Publicis founder Marcel Bleustein-Blanchet would have 
“turned in his grave” over the proposed merger and that his company would stay single.  
Other Obstacles on the tracks 
Some deal processes should just never have been started. But what should you do when the market 
shifts around you in a way that you hadn’t - but should have - anticipated or perhaps that could not 
evenhave been foreseen, the proverbial ‘black swan’ event. In the standout example of the former, 
in the banking sector, RBS pressed on with its ill-conceived pursuit of ABN Amro as the financial 
storm clouds gathered in 2007 after its rival, Barclays, gave up on the deal.  
 
With oil prices falling thanks to falling demand and the impact of new North American sources on 
supply, how will consolidation in the energy sector be affected over the next decade, and have deals 
already in the pipeline been affected?  
Any number of deals have quite rightly been called off because markets, including the competitive 
environment, have changed since the deal was first conceived. If, for example, RBS' chief executive 
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and board had been less driven by ego and more driven by the markets, the bank could have avoided 
the disastrous takeover of ABN Amro discussed earlier in this book.  
The merger mania that hit aluminium and iron ore producers, including Rio Tino and Glencore 
Xstrata, did not look as well conceived following the collapse of commodities prices; the commodities 
super-cycle theory beloved by Rio's Tom Albanese and others turned out to be subject to exactly 
the same cycle of boom and bust that has always governed the economy. BHP Billiton had what 
may have been a lucky escape from some of the fallout from the collapse of commodities prices 
because it abandoned its 18 month pursuit of Rio Tinto in 2008 just as the downturn began.  
The decision to drop Rio was, in part, due to hostility of Chinese regulators to the deal, in part due 
to shareholder opposition to it and in another part due to turbulent markets that made it difficult for 
BHP to secure the financing for the takeover.  In this case, they listened to outside signals.  
When BHP walked away, however, the company blamed the collapse of its transformational merger 
on end of the super-cycle. "This decision is set against the global economic crisis and its impact on 
our assessment of its benefits... I think the commodity prices across our suite of assets and for most 
of the other players have gone down by 50 per cent over the last six weeks. It has clearly impacted 
our cash flows already," BHP CEO Marius Kloppers is quoted as saying by the Wall Street Journal.  
Hitting the political sidings 
The world's regulators and politicians have a large and growing influence over the fate of the biggest 
and most important deals. In many cases there is simply no getting around the regulator especially 
- as we saw with Danone - if the politicians in question are French and believe their nation's army 
marches on its yoghurt. This sort of overwhelming opposition to a takeover simply cannot be fought, 
or a least not without a campaign over decades or some hefty political influence. 
Many companies will wish to "kick the tyres" to establish how far they can push expansion and will 
do so in the full knowledge that they will have to spent money on advisory fees and time on an 
exploratory deal to get a firm answer to their questions. The difference between those who have a 
good M&A strategy and those who do not, is that the former know when to walk away.  
In 2012, two of the world's defence and aerospace giants, London-based BAE Systems and Paris-
based EADS, had a tilt at a merger that would have catapulted them into the same league as US 
giants like Boeing and Lockheed Martin. The tie-up faced huge political and regulatory hurdles from 
the outset; the UK, Paris and Germany all have stakes in the businesses while even the US, BAE's 
biggest client, took an interest in its ownership. A month later the two companies called the deal off 
saying: “It has become clear that the interests of the parties’ government stakeholders cannot be 
adequately reconciled with each other or with the objectives that BAE Systems and EADS estab-
lished for the merger.” 
The two sides had managed to agree on strategy, management, and even dividends. They had initial 
support from the UK government, which had a golden share in BAE that allowed it to block a deal if 
it wished, and traction from the French government which owned 15 per cent of EADS.  But they 
had failed to convince Germany, which held a stake in EADS through Daimler, the car giant.  
On one interpretation, the deal’s collapse was a failure, and could have left BAE vulnerable to unso-
licited takeover bids. However, on another, the companies managed to close down one avenue 
quickly with little loss of management time or damage to their reputation. Contrast this with Deutsche 
Börse who fought to the end - and beyond - in an attempt to force regulators to back its merger with 
New York-based exchange NYSE. Where there is real regulatory risk, knowing when to cut your 
losses is crucial. 
 
However, dramatic market movement alone should not necessarily mean that a deal should be 
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abandoned. In fact falling prices can be a driver to industry consolidation.  Oil prices fell by around 
50 per cent from the middle of 2014 to the end of 2015, but against this backdrop the oil and gas 
industry has seen a wave of consolidation. The trend echoes what happened when oil prices were 
similarly depressed in the late 1990s, a period that saw BP join forces with Amoco and Arco, Chevron 
combine with Texaco and Exxon with Mobil. According to the Financial Times, private equity firms 
including Carlyle and Blackstone have in parallel raised billions of dollars to spend on oil and gas 
acquisitions in expectation of corporates disposing of non-core assets. 
The guiding principle when making tough decision should be look back at the original deal rationale 
and due diligence. Will a merger still deliver the strategic wins identified? If the answer is yes, push-
ing ahead may be the right thing to do. If not, you should have the courage to walk away. Again, this 
is no different for a small or medium sized company that is undertaking a deal. Reassessing and 
walking away is as important for smaller companies or private equity firms like the Gores Group 
walking away in 2012 from the auto and parts repair company Pep Boys.  In that deal, despite nearly 
two years of discussions with Gores and others, the buyer decided that poor financial results in the 
target meant that the deal could not proceed. 
Phase 2: Day 1 of the 100 Day Plan 
In a takeover situation the buyer will never have access to all the information it would like. This is 
particularly true in a public deal or a hostile deal where access to proprietary internal due diligence 
is very limited if not even non-existent.  
 
Following completion however - as the proud new owner of the target – the acquirer can re-calibrate 
its original deal rationale against a whole new set of data. From then on, it will be able to review 
integration plans against the real numbers and facts while the 100 Day integration plan is being 
implemented.  Reviews should be regular and often, allowing management to monitor progress 
against the original drivers of the deal.  
Figure 0.9-A: What strategies are available? 
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In most deals, the delivery of synergies - defined as the financial benefits of cost savings and revenue 
growth attributable solely to the combination of two previously-separate companies - will determine 
the success or failure of the enterprise. Many buyers will already have outlined a timetable for the 
achievement of synergies in pre-close conversations. In the UK and some other jurisdictions, this 
description and quantification of savings is even required in the formal merger documents filed with 
the regulators for public companies. 
One technique for determining synergies is “triangulation,” a process that evaluates identified syn-
ergies (cost and revenue) and compares them against the historical delivery track record and exter-
nal industry-specific benchmarks. By comparing the identified synergies in this way, they receive 
substantial indication of the robustness and quantum of the identified synergies. 
Our experience suggests that stakeholders, such as financial institutions, have three key questions: 
1. How much are the synergy benefits worth? Are they cost or revenue based, or both? 
2. When will the synergies be delivered? Transformational change should be done at a reasonable 
pace to extract the maximum possible overall benefit.  
3. To achieve those synergies, what one-off costs are estimated in the integration program? Has 
management completed a robust analysis of these one-off costs required to deliver the identified 
synergies (cost and revenue)? 
Once this has been established, synergies should be made a priority part of the integration plan, 
with internal targets often 20-30 per cent higher than those made public – the ‘under promise, over 
deliver’ point discussed as a PR tactic in an earlier section. As well, the costs to achieve those 
synergies – often requiring pain to the organization in terms of employee redundancies and the 
closure of plants or business lines – should be taken early.  Delaying the inevitable doesn’t make it 
easier and may indeed make it more expensive, 
Of the factors that determine whether M&A adds or destroys value, integration is arguably the most 
important, although it is possible for an acquisition to be a huge financial success even if it is never 
integrated into the parent company. What is important is that the rationale for the deal is sufficiently 
well enunciated ahead of the deal in order to determine properly what the post-deal operating busi-
ness model of the combined organization will be.  
Unsurprisingly it is clear that serial acquirers are better at integration as well as at target selection. 
In a report issued by AT Kearney in 2016, they found that 'the enterprise value growth rate of serial 
acquirers [who did more than five deals per year] is 25 per cent higher than the growth rate of com-
panies that had no acquisitions. The stellar examples we consider earlier certainly fall into this cate-
gory - from Diageo’s emerging markets targeting triumphs to CKI’s due diligence machine. Time and 
again, we see that buyers who get the fundamentals right have the tools they need to continue 
building post-deal integration and beyond.  
96 
Figure 0.9-B: Serial acquirers create value faster than other companies 
 
 
Getting it right: the Centrica way 
When Venture Production grudgingly accepted defeat in 2009 in its battle to thwart a £1.3 
billion takeover by Centrica, the history of the tussle did not bode well for a successful inte-
gration.  
Centrica, the UK’s biggest utility company whose Chairman, Sir Roger Carr also was Chair-
man of Cadbury during the takeover battle with Kraft, had acquired its new division by way 
of a hostile takeover bid in which it appealed to Venture’s shareholders in the teeth of strong 
opposition from the company’s management. Even when Centrica captured 50 per cent of 
the company’s shares and its board finally recommended that investors accept Centrica’s 
845p a share offer, Venture’s management continued to insist that the Centrica offer under-
valued the company.  
Unusually for a hostile takeover, Venture Production’s executives - or at least those below 
the CEO level - were key attractions for Centrica. Venture was a successful start-up where 
the board and management were significant shareholders. While the Chief Executive and 
Chief Financial Officer, who together led the bid defence, were expected to retire along with 
the company’s founders, Centrica was very keen to hold onto Venture’s operating manage-
ment. 
At the point when it became clear that shareholder’s acceptance would reach the 75 per 
cent threshold to gain even greater control of the company, Centrica brought in an external 
team of advisors to help with the integration.  
Early planning combined with good communication helped Centrica to tie down one of its 
target’s most important assets: people. A team of advisors developed a plan to approach 
Venture’s staff with a clear and consistent message. At its core was a promise to Venture’s 
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highly entrepreneurial executive team that if they stayed on after the takeover, they, not 
Centrica’s upstream gas division with which it overlapped, would be in charge of that merged busi-
ness. The Venture team found the seniority of the people talking to them and the consistency of the 
messages impressive. 
Centrica was prepared to invest management time into the initiative in addition to money spent on 
advisors. The utility giant’s then Chief Executive Sam Laidlaw spent three days speaking to execu-
tives both as a group and individually in an attempt to convince them to stay on. Good communica-
tions cut both ways and the executive in charge of Centrica’s existing upstream business was told 
immediately that he would be made redundant as a result of the deal. In return for this respectful 
treatment - and a generous severance package - he stayed on to help manage the integration.  
As a result, just under 10 per cent of Venture Production’s employees left in the wake of the takeover 
and nearly all of those were back-office staff who were made redundant because their functions 
were duplicated inside Centrica. Also crucial to retaining talent was the upfront decision to move the 
head office of the newly merged upstream business from Centrica’s divisional headquarters in Wo-
king, near London, to Venture’s HQ in Aberdeen, Scotland where many of Venture’s staff worked 
and lived.  
The move also helped to define the culture of the new organisation. Centrica had the reputation of 
being a big, slow, bureaucratic company that would crush any entrepreneurial spirit. But working 
with its new parent company, the team from the Venture Production side was actively encouraged 
by Centrica and able to help design an approval processes that ensured the newly-combined organ-
isation would operate better and more efficiently than previously. For example, new procedures en-
sured that the merged business - which was called Centrica Energy - could make a decision about 
capital investment within only three weeks of receiving a request, in line with Venture’s practices 
before the merger. This was visible demonstration that the entrepreneurial culture of Venture would 
be maintained under Centrica ownership.  
The Centrica Energy integration was particularly unusual because it was done without that business 
having a CEO. Jonathan Roger ultimately took up the role on completion of the integration. The 
integration was done using a detailed milestone plan of just four months from a standing start to 
complete merger. This was one month longer than the normal 100 days we refer to in the book but 
after the four months the new organization could operate already on a ‘business as usual’ basis. In 
that time the business consulted employees, moved head office, rebranded with a complete name 
change and introduced a new set of financial controls.  
One of the external advisors for the deal, David Overd who worked on the integration, said that “one 
of the most important factors was that we all knew what we were supposed to do by a given date 
and nobody wanted to be late. Nobody missed a deadline in the whole four-month period, which 
created a fantastic momentum.”  
Crucially the integration also had the full commitment and support of Centrica’s leadership team, 
which was involved from the outset in employee communication. But in addition to having top-level 
buy-in, the integration plan also saw decision-making delegated to the right levels with a steering 
group directing individual project teams on areas such as IT and HR.  
In terms of relative size, this was a small deal for Centrica that at the time of the transaction had a 
market capitalisation of around £26 billion. Therefore, the focus during the integration was not on the 
cost-cutting redundancies, an integration strategy that tends in other deals to make this phase more 
painful and difficult. Venture Production was instead an important strategic investment for Centrica, 
at the heart of Centrica’s longer term strategy for securing greater energy supplies to meet growing 
consumer demand.  
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Getting it wrong: the Zain way 
But not everybody gets it right and even the best business concepts can fail because of poor inte-
gration. The idea behind the expansion of Zain, formerly the MTC Group, was better than average; 
in fact, it was very good.  
In a nutshell, Zain and its chief executive Dr. Saad Al-Barrak - affectionately known by his staff as 
“Dr Saad” or, more simply, “The Doc” - realised what any student of the colonial history of North 
Africa and the Middle East knows: that many of those post-Colonial national borders drawn in the 
wake of World War I are wholly artificial.  
For Dr Saad, this simple concept inspired his approach to telecommunications consolidation in the 
region. In the first decade of the 21st Century, Africa, and to some extent the Middle East, was 
making a giant leap in telecommunications, leap-frogging fixed line telephony, which was expensive 
to install and rare, and taking customers straight to mobile.  
Thus, although sub-Saharan Africa remained at the periphery of global markets, it was growing fast, 
with GDP increasing by six per cent per annum thanks to the global demand for natural resources 
and with it, rising commodities prices. Indeed, with 800 million people, it was the world’s fastest 
growing market in the mobile telecommunications industry, with the lowest telecom penetration rate 
in the world.  
Many Africans, especially from the nomadic tribes, regularly crossed national boundaries taking their 
mobile phones with them. This was, and is, especially the case in sub-Saharan Africa. Cheap Chi-
nese handsets were combining with cost-cutting at global giants such as Motorola and Philips to 
open the market up even further. By the time Dr Saad came along, it was ripe for exploitation. 
Dr Saad had helped MTC grow from a single country mobile operation in Kuwait to a regional Middle 
Eastern giant with operations also in Bahrain, Lebanon and Jordan. In 2005, Dr. Saad was thinking 
about further expansion into Africa, the hot new market for telecommunications. Meanwhile one of 
the continent’s biggest operators, Celtel, was run by his friend Mohammed “Mo” Ibrahim who had a 
group of committed investors including International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Actis Capital, an 
arm of the UK’s international aid agency.  
Celtel was the largest pan-African wireless service provider with forecast revenues of $1 billion for 
2005 and a bright future. As Ibrahim put it: “Everyone thinks Africa is full of starving people and pretty 
lions. They don’t realise that it is also full of normal people who want to make a telephone call.” One 
$3.4 billion merger later (in March 2005) and MTC Group was the owner of Celtel. 
For two years MTC adopted a completely hands-off approach to the Celtel operations where the 
business benefited from MTC’s access to and reputation in the financial markets, but there was little 
further by way of integration. With little pan-African competition, Celtel, which at the point of its ac-
quisition had operations in 11 countries, continued to perform well. MTC helped to fund its further 
expansion into Madagascar, Sudan and Nigeria.  
However, by 2007 the situation was changing as aggressive new entrants from Asia and the Middle 
East began to compete to transform the mobile telecommunications market. With this increased 
competition came increased expansion costs. For example, when MTC made its investment in 
Celtel, it paid the equivalent of $950 per mobile phone subscriber, but less than a year later, when it 
bought the 61 per cent of Sudan’s Mobitel it didn’t already own, it needed to pay $1,100 per mobile 
phone subscriber.  
MTC tried a number of special offers to increase its market share, including the introduction of a 
“Top Up” service that allowed customers to top up credit at major supermarket chains using cash, 
critical in a region where many potential customers had no credit cards. Its central differentiating 
strategy, however, was the ‘One Network’ which provided regional tariffs without roaming charges. 
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The service, which launched in 2006, was the world’s first borderless mobile phone network allowing 
a region with 160 million people in six countries across East, West and Central Africa to make calls 
without roaming surcharges. The technology behind the service was relatively simple.  More difficult 
were the required regulatory approvals.  
Then came a rebrand, which saw the entire Middle-Eastern-African network become ‘Zain’, a word 
which means ‘beautiful’ or ‘wonderful’ in Arabic. Dr Saad’s ambition was to make the brand one of 
the world’s biggest: a name that could stand alongside Coca-Cola or Microsoft. Dr Saad was not 
daunted by the fact that no telecoms operator had yet managed to achieve such brand recognition. 
Zain continued to expand, rolling out the One Network and buying more assets in Nigeria - a crucially 
large African country - and back closer to home in Saudi Arabia, and then finally, in 2009, in Morocco. 
By that point, the group had operations in 24 countries across the region. However, the acquisitions 
had been made at lightning speed with no apparent overall plan and - despite headline-grabbers 
such as the company rebranding and the One Network concept - by 2010 there had still been very 
little by way of group integration. Partly as a consequence of poor management and partly because 
competition in Africa continued to grow, Zain’s African operations accounted for approximately 62 
per cent of its million customers, but only 15 per cent of its net profit, according to the Financial 
Times. 
With the large networks in Kenya and Nigeria in particular underperforming and the group facing 
liquidity issues, the Al Kharafi family (its major shareholder) became concerned and began to discuss 
the disposal of the African network. Dr Saad resigned and was replaced as chief executive by Nabil 
bin Salama who, later that year, sold almost all its African assets to India’s Bharti Airtel, for $10.7 
billion.  
Zain refocused on its core Arab market and went on to make a very successful push into Iraq, where 
in 2012 it had more than half of the market. The Financial Times described the company as “the 
model for the pruned [telecommunications] industry in 2012”. That was probably not the legacy that 
Dr Saad had wanted to have. 
As we have seen, the 100 day post-closing period is crucial for the success or failure of a deal in the 
medium and long term. But it is important not to take a myopic approach to this truncated period. A 
good acquirer will bring skills and intelligence gleaned in the deal strategy as well as remembering 
that integration does not end on Day 100. The integration plan should make sure that the newly-
combined organisation becomes ‘business as usual’ as rapidly as possible.   
What is the litmus test of success in integration?  When the employees stop talking nostalgically 
about the legacy companies.   
When finally complete, it will hopefully be a time of both relief and pleasure that it is over.  Sebastian 
James, following the merger of electronic retailers Carphone Warehouse and Dixons in 2014, told 
Management Today that during the process ‘we were worried it could all turn a bit Game of Thrones 
– you know swords through the head type problems.  But no. We’ve moved into our boyfriend’s flat, 
we’re off the honeymoon period now and have decided who puts the bins out and who does the 
washing up – the tasks are allocated.’ 
To achieve this, it is impossible to overstate the importance of early focus of time and resources on 
this phase of the deal. Where integration is not done comprehensively and effectively, the end result 
can be the one we discuss in the next section: corporate divorce. 
Doing the deal right: THE DOs AND DON’Ts 
 DO walk away where there are a number of very clear signs that you should not do the 
deal, or that it is starting to unravel 
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 DON’T hang on because you have put so much emotional currency into the deal: it’s 
braver to walk away than cling on 
 DON’T underestimate the potential cultural challenges of a merger 
 DON’T forget that people are the most important business asset 
 DO be very clear up front about which executives will get senior positions in the 
merged business.  
 Don’t forget that you must keep running the current business whilst at the same time 
integrating the new. 
 DO take pain early - when you have difficult news to impart it doesn’t get any easier 
as time goes on 
 DON’T throw away your due diligence, as it will be critical for developing your 100 Day 
Plan 
 DON’T forget the need to get target employees onside early on - or at least be as hon-
est with them as possible; this will benefit the new owner 
 DON’T stop integrating after 100 days as a thorough merger could take years 
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0.10. A Most Amicable Divorce 
Even the best corporate relationship does not always last forever. With this section, we have come 
full circle from corporate strategy, target selection and execution to divestments and spin-offs, some 
of the strategic alternatives to purchases we considered early in this book.  
Mistakes in doing a deal are not the only causes of corporate divorce. Sometimes a corporate rela-
tionship that was right in the past is no longer so, as one or both of the parent or subsidiary change 
their strategy, the market conditions alter significantly, or technological disruption drives fundamental 
changes in their industry.  
There are, however, also a significant number of instances where an acquisition was flawed for one 
reason or another and subsequently needs to be resold. There are even some where the parent has 
made a series of mistakes over a longer period and ultimately has little choice but to split itself into 
two.  
Breaking up is, as they say, hard to do.  This can be case whether the demerger is done by a full 
sale to a new owner or by spin-off through a separate public listing, effectively retaining the same 
owners under separate structures.  
Once a split is inevitable, attention needs to be paid to issues as governance, strategy and talent to 
ensure an amicable break-up, to maximising the best possible sale price and to ensure the continued 
business of the two companies.  This can work well where the acquisition was a fundamentally good 
one and it is then sold for a substantial profit, as we will see with Mergermarket Group, our main 
case study for this section. 
Why split up?  
The decision to divest a business need not mean that the original decision to buy it was wrong. 
Companies often engage in acquisitions which subsequently turn to divested assets. A study by 
Donald Bergh in 1997 showed that acquisitions of unrelated or non-core assets have little more than 
a 50/50 chance of being retained five years after acquisition.  
This continues today.  Following a quiet period of activity during the financial crisis, divestments 
began to rise again. As the overall M&A market continues to rise, that trend is expected to continue.   
A study by EY in 2015 based on 800 interviews with corporate executives of medium sized to large 
companies found that 45 per cent had recently divested a business or placed one on a watch-list. 
That study found that 74 per cent of companies surveyed are using divestments, somewhat counter 
intuitively, to help fund growth, as we saw with Diageo’s early disposals. 
The growth in shareholder activism is one of the most important drivers of this corporate behaviour 
for publically listed firms as the activists pressure company boards to make hard strategic choices 
at a time of persistent slow economic growth or unclear strategic direction. Of those companies 
surveyed  by EY, 16 per cent said that shareholder activism was the most important trigger for their 
last divestment, while another 45 per cent said it was a major consideration. 
102 
Figure 0.10-A: What drives divestments? 
 
A business or division’s non-core or weak competitive position will lead to probable divestment, 
whether pressured by activists or a company’s own internal strategic reviews. As we saw in the case 
of CKI investing in UK Power Networks, many companies go through a continuous cycle of defining 
core operations and will look to sell divisions to raise cash and free up management resources to 
focus on operations closer to that core.  
However, companies are also increasingly willing to divest for opportunistic reasons.  According to 
that EY survey, 47 per cent said that they would consider selling at a premium of 10-20 per cent 
were they to get an unsolicited bid.  As an acquirer, it pays to be alert for available assets, even if 
the owner has not put up a ‘for sale’ sign.  This relates to the need to develop a long list of potential 
targets. 
Global macro-economic factors are an increasingly important divestment deal driver. Many of the 
world’s biggest companies are seeking to rebalance their portfolios towards emerging markets, as 
we saw earlier with Diageo. The status quo has fundamentally changed. As companies realise this 
and rush to jump on the bandwagon, they will continue to divest their lower growth divisions based 
in the developed world.  
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One further point from that study:  When economic growth is heading up and valuations are increas-
ing, the need for speed and ‘getting the deal done’ seems to have risen to the top of the M&A agenda. 
Half of the companies surveyed said that the imperative to close deals quickly and with certainty was 
more important than waiting longer secure a higher price.  
HP: The 15 year road to divorce 
As discussed above, there are many reasons that a merger might not survive in the medium to long-
term and by no means all of them signify that the acquisition was flawed. However, some companies 
are forced into disposals, demergers or spin-offs because they have a poor track record of buying 
and integrating businesses  
One such company is HP. This once-great corporate’s merger with Compaq was probably ill-advised 
while the takeover of UK-listed Autonomy was simply a disaster, as discussed in earlier sections.  
In mid-2014 under pressure from its investors, the company announced that it would split into two 
publicly traded units: Hewlett Packard Enterprise and HP Inc., the former a more forward-looking 
business selling servers, software, networking and associated services and the latter the more tra-
ditional part of the business selling printers and PCs – thus including a large portion of what was 
Compaq. In November 2015, that split took effect.  
There has been much debate about exactly where it went wrong for HP, but the Compaq purchase 
in 2001 seems to have begun the decline.  The company itself was built on acquisitions, with the first 
taking place back in 1958 but accelerating in the 1990’s and into the new millennium:  in the period 
from 1989 to 2015, 125 acquisitions were made. 
In the wake of the Compaq acquisition, HP embarked on a series of very large deals, each one 
seemingly worse than the last, culminating in the Autonomy debacle. Before HP was forced to write 
off that $8.8 billion of the $11.1 billion purchase price of Autonomy in 2011, it took an $8 billion write-
down on its 2008 acquisition of EDS, the computer services business for which it paid $13.9 billion. 
Before Leo Apotheker, the CEO in charge during the Autonomy deal, was fired, he had proposed a 
plan to sell off HP’s PC division, but it was abandoned by his successor Meg Whitman when she 
took charge. Whitman finally threw in the towel and backed the demerger in 2014. In 2015, sixteen 
years after the initial merger, HP Compaq formally split into two separate companies. 
For all its difficulties, HP did take time to execute carefully an incredibly complicated demerger. For-
mal paperwork for the deal was filed in 2014, 18 months before the split, and the company began to 
operate as two businesses for internal purposes six months before the demerger was formalised.  
The financial terms of the split also seemed sensible with the supposedly higher-growth Hewlett 
Packard Enterprise shouldering the costs of its own restructuring, rather than heaping losses on the 
legacy printer and PC business. In a move that will at least provide board continuity, Whitman was 
made CEO of Hewlett Packard Enterprise as well as chairwoman of HP Inc.  
The spin-off dumping ground 
Spin-offs can be an effective way of separating assets with fundamentally different characteristics, 
allowing the stock market to price the growth prospects of each segment more accurately.  However, 
the financial and strategic rationale of spin-offs is not always so clear; some deals use the spun-off 
company as a dumping ground for either liabilities or less attractive assets that cannot be sold.  
One such example is the 2013 split of Rupert-Murdoch’s US-listed media giant News Corporation 
into its traditional print newspaper arm, which includes The Wall Street Journal and The Times, 
and 21st Century Fox, which owns the eponymous film studio, Fox News and a stake in BSkyB, the 
European broadcaster. The decision to split was made in the wake of the phone hacking scandal 
104 
which saw Murdoch close his UK-based newspaper The News of the World, but failed to avoid a 
wider shareholder revolt from investors with no interest in the other print media assets.  
In this case, however, Murdoch left his print empire with a around $2.6 billion in cash with no debt, 
plus some legacy Australian TV assets which were still profitable and thus able to offset the ongoing 
losses at the newspapers. The split seems to have worked: the share price of 21st Century Fox has 
soared, while News Corp has fluctuated, but not fallen more than 25 per cent below the issue price 
– in today’s world of on-line news delivery, that’s a victory for an “old media” company.  
A less edifying example was Viacom’s flotation of its video rental chain Blockbuster. Unable to sell 
the company, Viacom spun it off in 1999 but just before doing so arranged for it to borrow $1 billion 
to cover a final special dividend of $905 million. Blockbuster was soon overtaken by massive 
changes in the media industry as the internet developed. After many years of struggling, the busi-
ness filed for bankruptcy in 2010.  
Another option to offload undesired assets is to pay someone else to take it off your hands. This was 
the route followed by UK-listed Anglo-French retailer Kesa when disposing of its troubled electrical 
retail arm, Comet. To sweeten the sale, Kesa left Comet with a £50 million dowry, as well as retaining 
responsibility for its employee pension liabilities. The business was sold to OpCapita, the investment 
vehicle of US financier Henry Jackson for £2. Yet less than two years later it collapsed, owing the 
UK government nearly £70 million in tax and statutory redundancy payments. OpCapita banked 
£100 million from the deal, leaving the government fuming, but ultimately unwilling to take legal 
action. 
Getting divestment decisions right - the basics: 
In making and executing decisions to invest and divest, companies should follow four basic rules: 
1) Ensure you have the right information to manage a portfolio successfully 
Frequent portfolio reviews enable companies to react quickly to changes in the market and 
reallocate capital accordingly; by doing this, non-core businesses can also be sold at the 
optimal time. However 58 per cent of executives of the companies surveyed by EY in 2015 
acknowledged that they do not go through this process frequently enough. Best practice 
would suggest that a review should be done every six months, if not more frequently.  This 
applies to large companies and small alike, although the larger, older companies are more 
likely to have amassed a greater number of now non-core businesses than a newer one.  But 
that doesn’t mean that every company of any size shouldn’t continuously assess what could 
be spun off.  They should. 
In order to complete such a review, companies must understand the way costs are allocated 
to different business units, use the right industry benchmarks and develop tailored analytical 
tools to make sense of any big data that’s available. As part of this process, medium and 
large corporates should also improve communication between the board and the in-house or 
external M&A team and their shareholders  
2) Learn value creation lessons from private equity 
Private equity firms can be masters of value creation at sale. The key to this is planning: 
prepare for a sale early. If the company has 12 to 24 months to prepare, the business being 
divested should be treated internally as a standalone entity as soon as possible. There might 
also be time to be creative, for instance, by expanding to different geographies or markets 
using a joint venture agreement, although here beware of the pitfalls discussed earlier. Ex-
tracting working capital, which buyers tend not to pay more for, is an easy-to-achieve option. 
If the company has less than 12 months, at least establish a clear story of how this asset 
might be attractive to prospective buyers. 
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3) Improve divestment execution 
Again, planning is key here, with EY’s study finding that high-performing companies are 50 
per cent more likely to start to have begun their sale preparation at a much earlier stage than 
low-performers, who start late and therefore have to take short cuts.  
The key to doing this lies in putting in place the right governance structure for a sale, probably 
with an executive steering committee that can make quick decisions. The specific asset(s) 
for sale should also be rigorously defined, but this specification should allow for different 
sales options for potential buyers who may not want all parts of the business.  
IT can often be the most complex area of any organisation or division to be sold, so this issue 
will usually require the longest lead time. The tax structure of any divestment should also be 
optimised (yet kept flexible as the final tax structure it is dependent on the buyer).  Finally, 
the sale should be analysed from the perspective of different types of buyers both trade and 
private equity in order to create the best possible sales pitch. 
4) Strike the right balance between speed and value 
The ideal solution is to prepare the sale over a long period, but that assumes flexibility on 
timing that many companies don’t have.  There may be significant pressures on timing be-
cause deal uncertainty could damage an asset, the window of opportunity to sell may be 
narrow or the capital may be needed urgently to invest elsewhere.  
However, to maximise value, a seller should make sure to invest – and not underinvest as 
will be the temptation - during the sale preparation period in to create additional value for the 
asset, find additional buyers, and try to put yourself in the buyers’ position to understand 
better what ‘story’ will sell most strongly, including the potential synergies for each type of 
buyer. 
Mergermarket Group: From start up to global player 
The business life cycle of financial news and data provider Mergermarket Group since 2000 shows 
that there are times when it is beneficial to be part of a large corporate and times when it is better to 
be a standalone company.  
Mergermarket had a modest start at an inauspicious time. Born in 2000 in the wake of the dotcom 
bust, it was the brainchild of Caspar Hobbs, a former army major and Charlie Welsh, a journalist at 
Financial News, a London-based publication.  
At the core of the business was its subscription revenue model, a system that the world’s biggest 
newspapers are still struggling to push through a decade and half later. The service mixed timely 
and proprietary intelligence from and about expected and completed corporate events (M&A deals, 
IPOs and other capital raising activities) with good data from external sources. It really found its feet 
with the almost universal adaptation amongst bankers and other advisors of the BlackBerry, which 
allowed them to receive instant intelligence direct to their mobile phone wherever they were.  
Fast forward to 2005 and Mergermarket’s revenues were £18 million, sufficient to get the early stage 
investors an exit. The business was sold to Pearson, the London-listed media giant and owner of 
the Financial Times for £101 million. 
At the time Pearson was headed by Dame Marjorie Scardino, who famously promised Pearson 
would sell its crown jewel asset, Financial Times, only “over her dead body”. Chief executive of the 
Financial Times Group subsidiary at the time was Rona Fairhead, who saw in Mergermarket a busi-
ness that had already mastered the digital environment at a time when the FT’s online service 
FT.com was relatively young, free to use and loss-making. 
106 
 
Hamilton Matthews, CEO of Mergermarket Group, had been brought in in 2001 from the capital 
markets division of Thomson Financial to drive the commercial side of the operation; by 2009 he 
was running the business. “We didn’t have to go through the digital integration legacy issues, which 
was why the FT wanted us so much. When newspaper sponsorship started to fall, it suddenly be-
came a very hard model to make work,” says Matthews.  
Explaining the rationale for the deal at the time, Fairhead said Mergermarket: would add “proprietary 
content, a premium customer base, reliable growth from new revenue sources and attractive finan-
cial characteristics” to her group. Fairhead also highlighted opportunities to jointly develop new prod-
ucts, increase advertising and sponsorship revenues and share IT with other parts of the FT Group. 
As we will see, however, the FT Group only ever took advantage of one of those potential factors - 
the attractive financial characteristics of Mergermarket, which enabled Pearson to reap more than 
three times its purchase price when it sold the business seven years later.  
The terms of the acquisition included a two year earn-out that prevented any meaningful integration 
during that period, meaning Mergermarket was left alone to concentrate on its globalisation strategy. 
But even after that, the businesses were kept almost completely separate with no integration of 
customers and IT and very few joint product launches. Notably, the FT journalists covering the capital 
markets even used and quoted data from competitor (Dealogic) rather than their sister in-house 
source, Mergermarket. 
Nevertheless, for Mergermarket the tie-up was helpful, Matthews claimed: “It was great for us to join 
such a credible media organisation and it made it much easier for the editorial team to be able to get 
leads and sources once we were part of the FT”. 
He added, “But any form of integration cannot be forced because it won’t work and the argument 
was that the brands and the culture were very different, both on the sales and on the editorial side. 
But some of it was madness such as people who wanted to join us from the FT - or vice versa - 
having to interview in the open market.”  
Later, even though Fairhead tried to get the five divisional CEOs of the FT Group to collaborate on 
smaller projects, there was still no real integration. When the financial crisis hit in 2008, the group 
moved into defensive mode and the individual CEOs prioritised their own businesses. As time went 
on, Pearson shifted even further towards its focus on the education sector and, when Dame Scardino 
was replaced as chief executive by John Fallon, the group made clear that its future focus would be 
100 per cent on that area. 
As a result, Mergermarket was put on the block in 2013. The sale to the private equity firm BC 
Partners for £382 million was used to fund the initial losses incurred on setting up FT.com and in 
the long run helped turned that business to a profitable venture with over 500,000 paying subscribers 
in 2015.  
Subsequently, Pearson also sold both the Financial Times Group and their investment in The Econ-
omist Group (publisher of The Economist), long regarded as the jewels in its corporate crown.  
Meanwhile, Mergermarket was finding that life was very different under BC Partners. 
“We loved being part of Pearson for seven years,” said Matthews. “It was the right home for us, but 
we were crying out for investment. We are an innovative business - we wanted to be able to make 
acquisitions, launch new products and do it quickly”. 
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BC Partners, who already used Mergermarket’s products, knew the business very well by the time 
they bought it. The first thing they did was help Matthews to transform Mergermarket’s technology 
platform, bringing in a new chief technical officer they had worked with in another portfolio company 
and building a completely new 45-person IT team.  
The plan – an IT consolidation initiative together with a number of focused acquisitions  - was to 
drive pre-tax profits to levels double to where they were when BC Partners purchased it.  By 2015, 
Mergermarket had grown to include over 1000 staff, including 500 editors, researchers and analysts, 
each expert in that niche financial market. 
The Investor’s View 
At 30 years old, BC Partners is one of the most venerable private equity houses, managing over €12 
billion assets globally. Where some rivals have eschewed the media sector, particularly publishing, 
BC has been prepared to take a punt on the right business, also buying Berlin-based Springer, the 
science and business publisher in 2013.  
So when Pearson put Mergermarket up for auction, BC was at the front of the queue. BC Partners’ 
Managing Partner Nikos Stathopoulos explained: “A combination of reasons attracted us. First of all, 
it is the market leader in a highly attractive and fast-growing segment of the market, it is diversified 
and revenue generative and the space is highly fragmented so we could see opportunities for both 
organic growth and acquisitions.”  
With all the usual private equity investment drivers ticked, BC drilled down during their due diligence 
process and found strong management, a subscription business model that allows Mergermarket to 
get paid in advance for the year and renewal rates of 90 per cent.  
Did BC have any doubts about taking on journalists, a section of the populace most in private equity 
go out of their way to avoid?  
“As an investor you always have some concern when the assets go home every night. What gave 
us comfort here is that you have a market-leader who we feel historically has managed to recruit 
and retain its staff because of a combination of the company’s growth prospects, pay or conditions.  
“We also looked at Mergermarket's pre-publication verification process and its accuracy and were 
highly comforted by the company's very low record of editorial complaints,” says Stathopoulos. The 
breadth and depth of Mergermarket’s talent pool across editorial, research and data analysis was 
seen by BC to be a competitive advantage and a significant barrier to entry as having such scale 
and reach is hard to replicate, but also means no one individual is indispensable to the business. 
After taking over, BC took a four-pronged approach to growing Mergermarket which included having 
no significant losses of personnel, investing cash in IT infrastructure, funding acquisitions for Mer-
germarket to expand its products and services and finally, and perhaps most importantly for what 
was already a successful people business, leaving Mergermarket’s employee culture and environ-
ment virtually intact.  
On this final point, the Mergermarket journalists have even been allowed to write totally inde-
pendently about investments related to BC Partners. In line with its private equity mantra of incen-
tivising performance by linking it to pay, BC realigned the packages of sales staff. It also introduced 
a management equity scheme that includes not just the executive board of the company, but also 
the second tier of management so all the key executives have private equity’s desired “skin in the 
game”. The scheme was believed to be one of the broadest in place at a private equity-owned busi-
ness. 
For many financial buyers, corporate spin-offs are low hanging fruit. “We feel that spin-offs have 
been broadly successful investments mainly when they involve small divisions of large corporates 
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where they tend to be under-invested and under focused,” says Stathopoulos, noting that under 
Pearson in its last full financial year (2012), Mergermarket’s turnover of $100 million equated to only 
around 1.5 per cent of the parent group’s revenue so was clearly non-core. “Once they become 
standalone, the management is better motivated and focused to grow and the owners to invest. This 
is especially true with a fast-growing business like Mergermarket.” 
When the time is right, Mergermarket will be sold, either through a trade sale, to another private 
equity investor, or listed via an IPO. If it is the former, will Mergermarket find a more permanent home 
inside a big corporate the second time around? The answer, thinks Stathopoulos, may be “yes”. A 
more mature business, he feels, might benefit from adding a fast-growing diversified global busi-
ness.. It would offer synergies, while not needing the same level of hands-on attention and invest-
ment that had been required during Mergermarket’s high-growth phase in the period immediately 
following BC’s purchase in 2013. 
This case also demonstrates what can be done in M&A by financial sponsor firms, such as those 
doing private equity, whose business it is to buy and sell companies. This is directly related to the 
principal focus of this section - amicable corporate divorces – because selling all their acquisitions 
is the goal of these firms.   
These expert acquirers have shifted their business models over the years, and clearly recognise the 
necessity to focus on the Big Three issues that have been discussed throughout this book:  planning, 
communication and people.  Indeed, the global co-head of private equity at White & Case, Ian 
Bagshaw, explained it to us as follows:   
Over leverage has historically been the key cause of PE [private equity] deal failure with the 
focus on servicing debt and ultimately managing creditors. But now it's a case of "back to the 
future" as the key challenge is ensuring that the executive team is right and that they are 
hitting the plan, which can often involve a series of bolt on acquisitions through the investment 
period. As the private equity industry has developed and moved away from financial 
engineered returns to focus again on growth as a primary driver of buyout returns, the need 
for a team to run the business and execute synergy extraction through an executed build out 
has never been higher.  
PE deal doing is ultimately about backing the right people and therefore the biggest issue is 
whether you have them in the team. 
In summary, as the Mergermarket deal demonstrates, breaking up is not necessarily a bad thing to 
do. Indeed, with the right attention, investment and planning, once unloved assets can be polished 
up into real gems. However, for buyers and sellers alike, the foundation is in the planning and making 
absolutely sure that a sale or an acquisition fits with the company’s strategy. And if staff or the 
incumbent management are crucial to that business, that includes keeping them onside too.  
A Most Amicable Divorce: THE DOs AND DON’Ts 
 DO keep it friendly. Make sure management remains on good terms during a split; you 
might get less money for a sale without them.  
 DO remember that, if you are a buyer, corporate carve-outs have a track record of 
being good bargains  
 DO take a page on value creation lessons from private equity; go for a high-growth 
business if the acquisition is central to your strategy, at least you will be able to sell it 
on for a profit later, if necessary 
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 DON’T become complacent in your approach to your business portfolio. Evaluate 
market conditions for selling assets or subsidiaries continually, and formally at least 
semiannually 
 DO expedite the sale process: the market hates uncertainty 
 DO act before an activist investor joins your shareholder register and forces you to 
take action 
 DON’T procrastinate your sales preparation process: start 12-18 months prior to a sale 
if possible, focusing both on operational and financial housecleaning but also on 
crystalizing the value proposition for key buyers
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0.11. Hunting the Corporate Yeti 
 
M&A is here to stay.  
As the global economy continues to grow and businesses push to expand and integrate across 
national boundaries, the long-term trend is for more and more mergers, whatever the cyclical 
hiccups along the way.  This is true whether the companies managing are large or small, in 
high tech or traditional industries. 
Against this backdrop it is hard to underestimate the importance of M&A to the world economy 
and to global prosperity. As we discuss in the introduction to this book, numerous studies have 
found that in the longer-term mergers and acquisitions actually destroy value in more than half 
of deals even if the overall contribution of those deals both to companies and the economy 
overall is positive. 
Many of those studies have also found that successful buyers can add huge financial value 
for their shareholders in both the short and long term if the deals are done well.  But too many 
failed deals still occur – a surprising fact given that the reasons for failure, as discussed 
throughout this book, are very often very public and are clearly there for other deal 
practitioners to see. 
The M&A equation should be simple: well-run and well-managed companies can execute good 
acquisition strategies with an overall financial benefit for their shareholders and the wider 
economy.   
Disappointingly, although more and more acquisitions are being made, there is little evidence 
that companies since the turn of the millennium are getting any better at them. Yes, the level 
of deal success is much better than during the 1980’s and 1990’s when failure rates were as 
high as 70-80 percent according to some studies.  But the improvement to a 50/50 success 
rate in the early 2000’s has not improved since.  And that still is no better than a flip of the 
coin. 
We are currently operating in a different paradigm. During the recent merger booms, the 
consequences of bad decision-making were magnified when the markets turned. Readers 
need only look at some of the pre-financial crisis deals outlined in this book to be concerned 
that history will repeat itself if lessons are not learned.  Bad deals don’t necessarily manifest 
themselves as such until the good times stop.  Thus we expect that some of the deals being 
done now – that look today to be excellent – will turn into failures, too. 
We have set out a simple, easy to follow set of rules that will help companies to avoid the 
obvious mistakes that sink so many deals. We hope in doing so to champion a more rigorous 
and thoughtful approach to M&A that will benefit the wider economy at the macro level. If this 
is too ambitious a goal, we hope at least that these ideas will help readers to make their 




Throughout this book we have tried to distill our thoughts to useable, bite-sized practical 
nuggets.  In one last attempt to concentrate our mantra, we end here with our final five 
recommendations: 
DON’T treat M&A as a strategy – it is only a tactic to achieving the company’s 
long-term goals. 
M&A is not the only method by which you can achieve long-term goals. Consider the others 
first, but once you have plumped for M&A you will need to dedicate significant time, money 
and management time to executing the deal.  
DO remember that M&A deal-making is an art, not a science. 
At the same time, do remember that M&A deals involve emotions and pressure for the CEO 
and the Board to perform, and this percolates throughout the organisation once the deal is 
announced. Those executives who see the main chance and are agile enough to reach it, 
who can listen and negotiate and who are focused but still flexible will carry the day. They will 
also realise that sometimes ‘carrying the day’ will mean walking away from a broken deal.  
DON’T focus only on ‘doing the right deal’ as ‘doing the deal right’ is equally 
important. 
This is perhaps our single most important lesson. Doing the groundwork of good target 
selection, extensive due diligence and careful pricing will provide you with the right foundations 
for this. Remember it is only at this post-closing stage that you will reap the benefits of all your 
hard work; post-deal implementation attracts less attention and scrutiny than the pre-deal 
period but is where the real value can be added or destroyed irrespective of the rationale of 
the deal. Having the perfect business and synergy case but with flawed execution will not yield 
success. 
DON’T make the same mistakes twice: make sure to do a post-audit review of 
each deal whether successful or not, so that you can learn for the next time 
Even legendary serial dealmakers such as GE in the 1980s and 1990s and Cisco Systems in 
the first decade of this millennium get it wrong sometimes. The difference is that they learn 
from their mistakes and when they do it again, they have a better chance to do it right.  Having 
a thorough and objective understanding of what went well or badly at each stage of the deal 
is vital in order to avoid falling into the same pitfalls next time. Creating a corporate knowledge 
base which is actively applied by and institutionalised with the company as a whole (versus 
being resident only in the heads of a few executives) is a critical component of whether deal-
making will be a success of failure next time.  If things do go wrong, cut your losses and 
remember our guidelines for a good divorce. 
And finally… 
DON’T forget The Three Big Mistakes of Deal-Making:  planning, communication 
and people. 
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As we have shown throughout this book, companies who make mistakes in these areas fail. 
The soft stuff is the hard stuff.  You might be lucky and just about get away with one or two, 
but do any more deals than that and, like HP in many of its acquisitions but especially its 
disastrous purchase of Autonomy, you will fail. 
And with that, we would like to leave readers with a challenge. As authors and practitioners 
have been unable to a find a deal where more than one of the Big Three Mistakes were made 
and where the acquirers subsequently managed to bring it back from the brink of disaster.  
The reason we wrote this book is because we believe the best way to learn is from mistakes 
- our own and those of others. So we invite you to hunt with us for the “M&A Yeti” - the worst 
deal to come back from the brink.  Readers are asked to submit ideas to our microsite blog: 
www.whydealsfail.org   
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1. Assessing market attractiveness for mergers and 
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Abstract 
This paper presents a new scoring methodology designed to measure a country’s capability 
to attract and sustain business investment activity in the forms of cross-border inflow and 
domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We compute a theoretically grounded index of 
attractiveness for M&A purposes based on groups of country development factors which have 
been identified as key drivers of corporate investment activity in economics, finance and 
management literature. By using the Index, which has been successfully tested against 
country-level M&A activity in a time series analysis, we show that the drivers of M&A activity 
differ significantly at different stages of country maturity. Specifically, for mature countries, the 
quality of their regulatory systems, political stability, socio-economic environment and the 
sophistication of their physical infrastructure as well as the availability of sizeable assets all 
determine differences in country-level M&A volume and value activity. For countries at the 
transitional stage, it is instead their economic and financial health, socio-economic 
environment, technological developments and the quality of their infrastructure and the 
availability of sizeable assets which drive M&A activity. We also prove the predictability power 
of the Index, by a set of Granger causality tests, showing how country-level development 
drives future M&A activity but also how, to some extent, the inverse relationship is also true, 
i.e. that M&A activity can contribute to country development. 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Despite the ongoing negative influence of the global economic and financial crisis of 2008-
2009, as well as the continuing sovereign debt crises, global foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows grew by 16% in 2011 (Global Investment Report, 2012), exceeding their 2005-2007 
pre-crisis level for the first time. The so-called developing markets around the world are 
making headlines with faster economic recovery and stronger consumer demand, at least as 
compared to the more developed markets, as well as large-scale investment liberalisation and 
promotion. For companies wishing to operate globally, it is no longer a question of whether to 
invest in the developing markets, but rather a matter of in which of these alternative markets 
they should focus their investments and future growth.  
There are four distinct, albeit interrelated, themes in economics and finance literature that are 
identified as making a country attractive for M&A activity. First is the voluminous area of 
research which explores the drivers of FDI in general (see, e.g., Delios and Henisz, 2003; 
Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008; Busse and Hefeker, 2007; and Kolstad and Villanger, 2008 for 
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analyses of the regulatory and political group of FDI drivers, and Buch and De Long, 2001; 
Fontagne and Mayer, 2005; as well as Rugman and Li, 2007 for analyses of the economic 
and financial group of FDI drivers). Second is the emerging literature which focuses on the 
drivers of FDI in developing, as opposed to developed, economies and the need to distinguish 
explicitly between different stages of country development when analysing the drivers of FDI 
(see, e.g., Heshmati, 2003; and Duarte and Restuccia, 2007).1 Third are the studies which 
call for the need to analyse M&A as a separate process instead of considering it under the 
more general FDI umbrella (see, e.g., Ryan et al., 2009; Nocke and Yeape, 2007; as well as 
Haller, 2008). Finally, the extensive research on the impact on finance of the rule of law, 
triggered by the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998), which proposes theoretical arguments 
and empirical regularities on how differences in legal investor protection between countries 
determine investor confidence and, ultimately, market development. One of the outputs of the 
analysis of La Porta et al. (1998) was the development of a now well-known index which 
measures the quality of shareholder protection at the country level, namely the anti-director 
rights index. The wealth of research on cross-country variation in governance structures has 
linked, on one hand, shareholder legal protection to the development of stock markets around 
the world (La Porta et al., 1997), types of law (common/civil; La Porta et al., 1998), efficiency 
of capital allocation (Wurgler, 2000), firm valuation (La Porta et al., 2002), listing in the US 
(Reese and Weisbach, 2002), earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003), cash-holdings 
(Dittmar et al., 2003) and expropriation by corporate insiders (Djankov et al., 2008) on the 
other. La Porta et al.’s (1998) index has since been criticised (Cools, 2005), revisited (Djankov 
et al., 2008) and given suggested alterations in subsequent literature (Spamann, 2010). 
Djankov et al. (2007) construct a legal index which focuses on creditor rights as opposed to 
shareholder rights. 
Following on from this research into the identification of the factors which influence M&A 
activity at the country level, this paper thus develops a multi-factor index incorporating these 
factors, designed to measure a country’s attractiveness for M&A purposes (the M&A 
Attractiveness Index Score [MAAIS]), based on country development factors categorised into 
the following five groups: 1) Regulatory and political factors (e.g., rule of law (DeLong et al., 
2001 and Rossi and Volpin, 2004) and corruption of officials (Yartey, 2008)); 2) Economic and 
financial factors (e.g., GDP growth (Berthelemy and Demurger, 2000 and Liu et al., 2009), 
stock market capitalisation and access to financing (Yartey, 2008 and Saborowski, 2009)); 3) 
Technological factors (e.g., innovation (Porter, 1993; Tsai, 1994;  and Chung and Alcacer, 
2002)); 4) Socio-economic factors, such as people and demographics; and 5) Infrastructure 
and availability of asset factors, such as the level of physical infrastructure development, e.g. 
roads and railways, and the number of sizeable corporate assets (see, e.g., Wheeler and 
Mody, 1992; Loree and Guisinger, 1995; Asiedu, 2002; Mateev, 2009; and Anyanwu, 2012). 
Based on a percentile classification methodology, each country receives an Index score as an 
average from these factors which ranges between 100% and 1%, with 100% being the best 
achievable score in terms of M&A attractiveness.  
                                                 
1 Specifically, Pan (2003) argues that FDI patterns in developed countries should not be generalised to incorporate 
developing and transitional economies. Furthermore, according to Blonigen and Wang (2005), the factors which 
affect FDI location differ systematically between developed and developing countries. Phylatkis and Xia (2006) 
demonstrate that country-level factors are more important than industry factors when analysing the differences in 
performance of firms involved in FDI. 
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We adopt the country development classifications used by the United Nations Statistical Office 
[UNSO] that describe a mature stage (reached by all developed countries), a transitional stage 
(reached by all developing countries) and an emerging stage (reached by less developed 
countries). The average Index score for mature markets is found to be 70%, whereas the 
transitional average score is 50% and the emerging average score 32%. Interestingly, the 
results reveal that although the quality of a country’s regulatory system and its political stability 
are found to be prerequisites for reaching full market maturity, they are not significant drivers 
of M&A activity for countries classified as transitional and emerging. At the transitional stage 
of development, a country’s technological, economic and financial, and socio-economic 
factors, as well as the quality of its infrastructure and assets, all show a significant relationship 
with M&A activity. The results also show that the model is a poor fit for M&A activity in 
emerging economies, suggesting that dealmaking activity in these markets has a very different 
set of drivers.2 Finally, we find the Index to be able to forecast country-level M&A activity with 
statistical significance using a set of Granger causality tests. The relationship is also significant 
in the opposite direction, albeit not as strong or with as many lags, suggesting that M&A activity 
in itself also contributes to country development. 
Of the two main components of FDI in terms of both volume and value, namely greenfield 
investment and cross-border M&A, it appears to be the latter which has become the key driver 
of international business activity over the last three years. In 2011, cross-border M&A 
increased by 53% in terms of deal value while greenfield investment remained relatively flat 
(Global Investment Report, 2012). Along with this major shift in the form of global investment 
activity, the proportion of developing markets participating in M&A has risen substantially from 
approximately 10% of total global activity in 1998 to almost 40% in 2011, according to the SDC 
Platinum database. In light of this increasing importance of developing markets to the global 
economic and financial environment in general and to the M&A environment in particular, this 
paper develops a universal and updatable scoring methodology for determining a country’s 
attractiveness for M&A activity. 
Section 1.2 discusses the variables included in the Index. Section 1.3 describes the sample 
as well as the methodology used in the study. Chapter 1.4 discusses the empirical results and 
Chapter 1.5 concludes. 
1.2. The MAAIS variables 
MAAIS is a scoring methodology designed to evaluate a country’s capacity to attract and 
sustain M&A activity. Hence, it is designed to provide an overview of how developed a country 
is for current and future M&A activity – arguably an important barometer of the health and 
sustainability of the national business environment, irrespective of the nationality of the 
acquirer firm. For the same reason, we include factors measuring the ease and attractiveness 
for any buyer – domestic or cross-border – of making an acquisition and test their fit and 
predictive powers on the same set of data. The Index is based on the following country 
development factor groups, all of which have been identified as important for these purposes 
in the relevant literature or by market practitioners: regulatory and political, financial and 
economic, technological factors, socio-economic and factors relating to the development of 
                                                 
2 One suggestion here is the abundance of natural resources, which intuitively drives a significant proportion of 
investment – local or inward from other countries – in these types of countries (e.g. in Africa). 
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physical infrastructure and the availability of assets. Since we aim to provide an updatable 
scoring methodology and database, it is important that data sources and updates are available 
for all countries when changes occur as these countries develop. Hence, for each factor group, 
several widely recognised surveys, reports or databases (sourced from international 
institutional bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) were identified for 
inclusion.  
Table 1.2-A: Sub-factor variables descriptions and sources 
 
Panel B: Economic and Financial [EconFin] factor group 
Panel A: Regulatory and Political [RegPol] factor group 
 
Rule of Law 
The rule of law concerns the consistency of the application of the law. The data for this comes 
from the World Bank's Governance Matters report. The sub-factor percentages were developed 
by percentile classification based on the full country dataset. 
Completion For-
malities 
Completion formalities concerns the level of administration involved in setting up a business, 
measured in administrative time (days). The data for this comes from Doing Business by the 
World Bank. The sub-factor percentages were developed by percentile classification based on 
the full country dataset. 
Registering 
Property 
Registering property concerns the procedures necessary for a business to purchase a property 
from another business, measured in administrative time (days). The data for this comes from 
Doing Business by the World Bank. The sub-factor percentages were developed by percentile 
classification based on the full country dataset. 
Paying Taxes 
Paying taxes concerns the level of taxes and the related administration involved in paying taxes, 
measured in administrative time (days). The data for this comes from Doing Business by the 
World Bank. The sub-factor percentages were developed by percentile classification based on 
the full country dataset. 
Trading Across 
Borders 
Trading across borders concerns the procedural requirements for exporting and importing, meas-
ured in administrative time (days). The data for this comes from Doing Business by the World 




Enforcing contracts concerns the efficiency of the judicial system in resolving commercial dis-
putes, measured in administrative time (days). The data for this comes from Doing Business by 
the World Bank. The sub-factor percentages were developed by percentile classification based 
on the full country dataset. 
Political Stability 
Political stability measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilised. 
The data for this comes from the World Bank's Governance Matters report. The sub-factor per-
centage was developed by percentile classification based on the full country dataset. 
Sovereign Debt 
Rating 
Sovereign debt rating is an overall assessment of fiscal policies. The data for this comes from 
Fitch’s Complete Sovereign Rating History. The sub-factor percentages were developed by per-
centile classification based on the full country dataset. 
Control of Cor-
ruption 
Control of corruption measures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain. The data for this comes from the World Bank's Governance Matters report. The sub-
factor percentage was developed by percentile classification based on the full country dataset. 
  
GDP Size 
GDP size measures the economic size of the market. GDP size is measured as the average 
estimated GDP size for the next five years, i.e. a rolling average. The data for this comes from 
the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Database. The sub-factor percent-
age was developed by percentile classification based on the full country dataset. 
GDP Growth 
GDP growth measures the economic growth of the market. GDP growth is measured as the 
estimated compounded average growth rate for the next five years, i.e. a rolling average. The 
data for this comes from the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Database. 
The sub-factor percentage was developed by percentile classification based on the full country 
dataset. 
Inflation 
Inflation concerns economic growth and monetary policy. Inflation is measured as the average 
from 2012 to 2016 (estimated). The data for this comes from the International Monetary Fund's 
World Economic Outlook Database. The sub-factor percentage was developed by percentile 
classification based on the full country dataset. 
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Panel C: Technological [Tech] factor group 
 
Panel D: Socio-economic [Socecon] factor group 
 
Panel E: Infrastructure and Assets [InfrAsst] factor group 
1.2.1. Regulatory and political factor group 
The extensive research on the effects of the rule of law is both interesting and relevant when 
considering the area of corporate finance that is M&A. Rossi and Volpin (2004) test the 
relationship between shareholder/creditor rights and cross-country M&A. Their findings show 
that M&A activity is more prevalent in countries with better accounting standards and stronger 
Development of 
Equity Market 
Development of equity market concerns access to equity financing through capital markets. It is 
measured as the stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP. The data for this comes 
from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The sub-factor percentage was devel-




Availability of domestic banking credit concerns access to financing and credit from domestic 
banks. It is measured as the private credit provided as a percentage of GDP. The data for this 
comes from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The sub-factor percentage was 
developed by percentile classification based on the full country dataset. 
High-Technology 
Exports 
High-technology exports concerns the volume and quality of domestically produced high tech-
nology. It is measured as the level of high-technology exports as a percentage of all manufac-
turing exports. The data for this comes from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. 
The sub-factor percentage was developed by percentile classification based on the full country 
dataset. 
Innovation 
Innovation concerns the level of innovation and entrepreneurship, and is measured by the 
number of patents granted per country of origin. The data for this comes from the World Patent 
Report Statistical Review by the World Intellectual Property Organization. The sub-factor per-
centage was developed by percentile classification based on the full country dataset. 
Internet Users 
Internet users measures the level of technological skills of the population. It is measured as 
the number of internet users per 100 people. The data for this comes from the World Bank's 
World Development Indicators. The sub-factor percentage was developed by percentile clas-
sification based on the full country dataset. 
  
Population Size 
Population size concerns the total population of the country. The data for this comes from 
the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The sub-factor percentage was developed 
by percentile classification based on the full country dataset. 
Population De-
mographics 
Population demographics is the percentage of the population aged between 15 and 64 out 
of the total population. The data for this comes from the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators. The sub-factor percentage was developed by percentile classification based on 
the full country dataset. 
Sizeable Assets 
Assets concern the number of registered firms (>$1m assets) in each country. The data for 
this comes from the ‘Orbis’ (Bureau van Dijk) database. The sub-factor percentage was 
developed by percentile classification based on the full country dataset. 
Ports 
Port capacity is measured by the amount of container port traffic (twenty foot equivalent 
unit). The data for this comes from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The 
sub-factor percentage was developed by percentile classification based on the full country 
dataset. 
Railway Lines 
Railway infrastructure is measured as the total length of railway lines (km). The data for this 
comes from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The sub-factor percentage 
was developed by percentile classification based on the full country dataset. 
Paved Roads 
Road infrastructure is measured as the percentage of paved roads in relation to the total 
number of roads. The data for this comes from the World Bank's World Development Indi-
cators. The sub-factor percentage was developed by percentile classification based on the 
full country dataset. 
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shareholder protection, with cross-border transactions playing a critical governance role by 
improving the degree of investor protection. In addition, their study shows that in cross-border 
deals, targets are typically from countries with poorer investor protection relative to those of 
acquirers, suggesting that cross-border transactions can play a disciplinary role by improving 
the degree of investor protection within target firms. Kose et al. (2010) further extend the 
research in this area by examining announcement returns in cross-border M&A by US 
acquirers and finding that returns decrease with the level of creditor protection and increase 
with the quality of accounting standards. However, for target countries with strong shareholder 
protection, acquirers experience negative share price reaction around the time of deal 
announcement when the target is public and positive share price reaction when the target is 
private.  
Whilst the aforementioned research has contributed greatly by establishing a link between 
certain aspects of a country’s legal environment and their effect on M&A activity, there are 
other factors that may influence a country’s ability to attract and sustain M&A activity which 
should be considered. We suggest that there are a number of other variables in this category 
which matter as they have practical implications which could hinder not only the transaction 
process but also continued business operations in the country. The complexity of a country’s 
tax system and the time and costs related to registering new property are two examples. In 
addition, DeLong et al. (2001) find that mergers tend to be less frequent if information costs 
are high, which supports the hypothesis that a more transparent business environment fosters 
M&A activity and therefore suggests that the Index should include measures such as control 
of corruption.  
We summarise the variables in the Regulatory and Political factor group in Table 1.2-A (Panel 
A), which include: Rule of Law; Completing Formalities; Registering Property; Paying Taxes; 
Trading Across Borders; Enforcing Contracts; Political Stability; Sovereign Debt Rating; and 
Control of Corruption. 
1.2.2. Economic and financial factor group 
Guerin and Manzocchi (2009) argue that democracy has a positive effect on the amount and 
probability of FDI flowing from developed to developing countries. Berthelemy and Demurger 
(2000) stress the importance of the potential for future growth in foreign investment in China. 
They find that FDI plays a fundamental role in China’s economic growth. Liu et al. (2009) find 
similar results while observing a two-way causal relationship between trade, inward FDI and 
inward M&A, and economic growth for most economies. It is evident that the presence of 
economic growth and business trade is a necessary condition for an M&A market to develop, 
which supports the inclusion of economic factors in the Index.  
The development of domestic capital markets is another key driver of M&A activity since 
investment requires capital and because it is more cost-effective to source capital from the 
local market. Yartey (2008) argues that macroeconomic factors, such as income level, gross 
domestic investment, banking sector development, private capital flows and stock market 
liquidity, are important determinants of stock market development in emerging market 
countries. His results also show that political risk, law and order, and bureaucratic efficiency 
are all important factors in the development of stock markets because they enhance the 
viability of external finance. They also suggest that the reduction of political risk can be an 
important factor in the development of stock markets in emerging economies. Saborowski 
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(2009) shows evidence that the exchange rate appreciation effect of FDI inflows is indeed 
attenuated when financial and capital markets are larger and more active. The main 
implication of these results is that one of the main dangers associated with large capital inflows 
in emerging markets – the destabilisation of macroeconomic management (due to a sizeable 
appreciation of the real exchange rate) – can be partly mitigated by developing a deep local 
financial sector. This is a key idea in this study since it highlights the importance of developed 
capital markets and a stable financial system to the ability to sustain M&A activity, thus 
supporting the inclusion of financial factors in the dataset. 
We summarise the variables in the Economic and Financial factor group in Table 1.2-A (Panel 
B), which include: GDP Size; GDP Growth; Inflation; Development of Equity Market; and 
Availability of Domestic Banking Credit. 
 
1.2.3. Technological and Socio-economic factor groups 
Following Porter (1993), Tsai (1994) and Chung and Alcacer (2002), the issue of a country’s 
social development as well as its level of technical innovation and entrepreneurship are shown 
to be of high importance in the formation of a sustainable M&A market, arguing that if 
unemployment is high and the workforce unskilled, there will be little scope for the 
development of businesses and low interest in growth in the country. Similarly, if no appetite 
or support for R&D or technological development exists, the country will stagnate internally 
and be unable to sustain M&A activity. All of these factors provide a rationale for the inclusion 
of technological and socio-cultural factors in the database, although our analysis has led to 
the expansion of these two categories beyond the level suggested by existing literature.  
We summarise the variables in the Technological factor group in Table 1.2-A (Panel C), which 
include: High-Technology Exports; Innovation; and Internet Users, and the variables in the 
Socio-economic factor group in Table 1.2-A (Panel D), which include: Population Size and 
Population Demographics. 
1.2.4. Infrastructure and assets factor group 
Finally, studies have also demonstrated that the size of a country’s market and, therefore, the 
availability of assets are an imperative driver of FDI flows (see, e.g., Mateev, 2009; and 
Anyanwu, 2012). This is particularly important for country-level M&A activity as many countries 
have concentrated ownership across industries for historical, cultural or political reasons, 
which hampers the process of reallocating inefficient capital. Also, assets, i.e. target firms in 
this context, need to be ‘sizeable’ in order to be attractive as the potential return on investment 
needs to exceed the costs associated with the acquisition. In addition, a number of studies 
demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that the quality of transportation infrastructure 
can affect FDI flow, i.e. higher quality of roads, ports, runways, etc. is positively and 
significantly related to FDI (see, e.g., Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Loree and Guisinger, 1995; 
and Asiedu, 2002). 
We summarise the variables in the Infrastructure and Assets factor group in Table 1.2-A 
(Panel E), which include: Sizeable Assets; Ports; Railway Lines; and Paved Roads. 
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1.3. Data and Methodology  
As demonstrated in Table 1.2-A, a total of 23 country development variables populate the five 
factor groups,3 with the regulatory and political group consisting of nine factors, the economic 
and financial group including five, the technological group three, the socio-economic group 
two and the infrastructure and assets group four. In total, our sample includes 148 countries, 
restricted by the availability of data on both GDP size from the IMF's World Economic Outlook 
Database of April 2012 and total deal value activity in 2012 from SDC Platinum. Due to the 
lack of available historical data for some of the variables included in the five factor groups, we 
also restrict the time series to seven years, thus the panel data set covers the period from 
2006 to 2012.  
In order to standardise the country data, each variable has been converted into percentile 
scores, where 100% is the best achievable score in terms of the level of 
attractiveness/development. As we could find no support in the literature or in discussions with 
market practitioners for overweighting any of the factors or groupings consistently, the 23 
variables were equally weighted within each factor group to determine the factor group score. 
Finally, each factor group’s score was equally weighted in order to determine the overall score 
for each country.  
For the purposes of analysing the drivers of M&A activity at the different stages of a country’s 
development, the classifications provided by UNSO were followed. The use of country 
attractiveness classifications external to the analysis of those presented in this study leads to 
subjectivity in analysis of the relative importance of the different factors at play at different 
stages of a country’s development. UNSO distinguishes between developed, developing and 
less developed countries – termed mature, transitional and emerging respectively – for the 
purposes of this paper.   
This study uses the aforementioned UNSO country classifications to measure the ability of the 
Index to classify countries into their pre-defined stages of maturity. In order to achieve this, 
the study performs a linear discriminant analysis. This makes it possible to identify the ability 
of the Index to describe the differences between the mature, transitional and emerging 
economies, and exploit these differences in order to classify the sample countries into their 
correct membership group, i.e. their stage of development.  
The restrictions on the M&A data, downloaded from SDC Platinum, follows Rossi and Volpin 
(2004), thus M&A in the form of LBOs, spin-offs, recapitalisation, self-tenders, exchange 
offers, repurchases and privatisation have been excluded. However, in contrast to the 
aforementioned study, our sample also includes minority purchases and purchases of 
remaining interest. This is due to the heavy restrictions on foreign investments in many 
developing countries, making not-for-control transactions the only available option for cross-
border inflow. The sample is also restricted to completed transactions. For the bulk of tests in 
the paper, we include both domestic and cross-border data. This is because we are aiming to 
test the ability of our Index to determine country-level M&A activity, especially at different 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that at a preliminary stage of the analysis, a larger number of variables constituted each of the 
five factor groups (45 in total). The number of factors for inclusion was reduced on the basis of correlation analysis 
and following the principle of parsimony. In addition, some of the original factors were excluded as the data is either 
only available for a small selection of the country sample or because it is static. 
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stages of country maturity. In particular, when a country is not fully mature, i.e. transitional or 
emerging according to our definition, we expect the drivers of domestic country-level M&A 
activity to be very similar in direction and significance to those of cross-border M&A activity as 
underdevelopment in a certain area poses the same threat for both domestic and cross-border 
buyers.4  Investors and companies within these countries also purchase companies and 
assets outside their country, but these deals are not included. However, it should be noted 
that such deals might impact the overall M&A attractiveness of the domestic market. Note that 
throughout the following section, we present our results using both country-level M&A volume 
and value data. In the emerging stage of country development, the total country-level volume 
of transactions is the most reliable indicator of activity as these transactions tend to be very 
small, hence the data on the value of the transactions will often not be disclosed.  As a country 
matures, it should start attracting larger transactions in terms of value – for which the details 
around the consideration are more likely to be disclosed – which in itself will spur further 
industry growth and larger transactions, hence the total country-level value of transactions 
becomes a more appropriate measure of activity. 
1.4. Results 
Table 1.4-A shows the overall score as well as those of each of the five major factor groups 
for the top 100 ranked countries for the 2012 annual update of the Index.  
Table 1.4-A: MAAIS for the top 100 ranked countries in 2012. 
Table 1.4-A shows the top 100 countries based on the 2012 Index ranking. Rank is the index ranking for 2012. 
5YR ∆ is the change in ranking over the five-year period ending in 2012.  MAAIS is the M&A attractiveness index 
score for 2012 per country, computed as an equal average of the five factor group scores. MA_Vol is the country-
level M&A volume for 2012 as reported by the SDC database. MA_Val is the country-level M&A value ($m) for 
2012 as reported by the SDC database. RegPol is the 2012 score for the Regulatory and Political factor group, 
computed as an equal average of the sub-factor variables listed in Table 1.2-A (Panel A).  EconFin is the 2012 
score for the Economic and Financials factor group, computed as an equal average of the sub-factor variables 
listed in Table 1.2-A  (Panel B).  Tech is the 2012 score for the Technological factor group, computed as an equal 
average of the sub-factor variables listed in Table 1.2-A (Panel C). Socecon is the 2012 score for the Socio-eco-
nomic factor group, computed as an equal average of the sub-factor variables listed in Table 1.2-A (Panel D).  
InfraAsst is the 2012 score for the Infrastructure and Assets factor group, computed as an equal average of the 
sub-factor variables listed in Table 1.2-A (Panel E)  
                                                 
4 For example, a country’s lack of availability of finance or poor rule of law will have the same determining effect 
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United States 1 0 87% 6,860 581,014.77 85% 82% 90% 78% 99% 
South Korea 2 3 83% 755 29,073.83 78% 74% 93% 91% 79% 
Singapore 3 -1 82% 256 28,517.96 93% 70% 89% 69% 92% 
United King-
dom 
4 0 81% 1,950 98,425.01 80% 69% 91% 70% 95% 
Hong Kong 5 3 80% 183 11,729.72 86% 76% 78% 73% 88% 
Germany 6 -3 80% 1,014 42,509.77 76% 66% 89% 73% 97% 
Canada 7 -1 80% 1,387 116,861.65 85% 78% 86% 78% 74% 
France 8 1 79% 1,373 25,470.14 79% 70% 91% 64% 93% 
Netherlands 9 1 79% 410 27,073.41 89% 72% 92% 61% 80% 
China 10 2 78% 1,235 76,858.87 43% 82% 81% 98% 88% 
Japan 11 -4 78% 1,373 65,991.56 72% 76% 91% 66% 87% 
Australia 12 -1 77% 1,049 48,082.40 90% 75% 83% 68% 71% 
Spain 13 1 76% 650 53,515.71 69% 73% 74% 75% 91% 
Switzerland 14 -1 75% 282 56,569.65 87% 78% 93% 59% 61% 
Malaysia 15 9 75% 318 15,695.53 71% 83% 85% 64% 73% 
Thailand 16 2 73% 114 2,337.01 53% 79% 66% 88% 82% 
Norway 17 5 72% 408 13,756.15 94% 65% 90% 47% 66% 
Sweden 18 -3 72% 599 14,775.72 85% 74% 87% 48% 67% 
United Arab 
Emirates 
19 8 72% 65 2,570.70 79% 65% 59% 71% 84% 
Denmark 20 -1 72% 235 9,021.87 91% 65% 88% 43% 72% 
Austria 21 -5 71% 93 4,653.43 80% 59% 84% 59% 74% 
Belgium 22 1 71% 156 6,035.90 75% 65% 81% 54% 79% 
Czech Repub-
lic 
24 1 71% 117 3,759.20 58% 54% 81% 71% 90% 
Italy 24 -4 71% 358 29,628.12 56% 63% 75% 67% 94% 
New Zealand 25 1 71% 133 4,270.72 92% 67% 81% 46% 67% 
Finland 26 -9 69% 163 2,981.21 89% 60% 84% 43% 71% 
Russia 27 2 69% 1,678 89,890.31 45% 52% 73% 94% 82% 
Poland 28 5 69% 151 7,441.59 52% 60% 72% 86% 75% 
Ireland 29 -8 68% 108 14,008.33 74% 63% 86% 48% 70% 
Luxembourg 30 0 67% 25 2,480.44 86% 65% 82% 44% 61% 
Chile 31 0 67% 142 9,978.10 67% 73% 63% 72% 62% 
Turkey 32 5 67% 202 11,420.17 61% 55% 57% 81% 82% 
Malta 33 -5 65% 4 96.21 70% 53% 80% 48% 76% 
Brazil 34 1 65% 515 41,276.70 41% 64% 69% 84% 68% 
Hungary 35 -1 65% 39 278.19 66% 44% 80% 65% 69% 
Slovakia 36 0 65% 17 3,614.34 63% 47% 71% 68% 74% 
Portugal 37 -5 64% 48 6,894.26 68% 63% 61% 58% 70% 
Mexico 38 5 64% 126 24,658.03 48% 58% 71% 70% 72% 
Kazakhstan 39 9 63% 23 4,185.28 43% 49% 77% 69% 79% 
Romania 40 6 63% 48 190.13 58% 47% 69% 75% 68% 
Morocco 41 6 63% 11 1,171.47 49% 74% 62% 71% 57% 
South Africa 42 0 62% 165 6,212.27 55% 69% 54% 69% 65% 
India 43 -4 62% 616 18,595.60 36% 65% 57% 73% 81% 
Qatar 44 6 62% 16 635.31 74% 68% 48% 63% 55% 
Indonesia 45 4 62% 150 4,628.91 40% 61% 56% 83% 68% 
Israel 46 -5 61% 5 55.61 47% 70% 81% 42% 66% 
Vietnam 47 -2 61% 226 3,890.36 35% 53% 60% 91% 64% 
Ukraine 48 3 60% 183 170.37 30% 50% 57% 84% 78% 
Greece 49 -11 59% 44 1,296.77 48% 58% 69% 60% 60% 
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Cyprus 51 -7 59% 52 3,764.47 68% 42% 78% 51% 55% 
Kuwait 52 1 58% 26 3,392.31 58% 55% 51% 60% 64% 
Bulgaria 53 2 58% 28 1,224.80 49% 51% 65% 59% 64% 
Lithuania 54 5 57% 25 295.03 73% 48% 68% 54% 45% 
Saudi Arabia 55 -3 57% 33 2,366.83 61% 55% 52% 70% 49% 
Iceland 56 -16 57% 7 464.87 80% 41% 84% 35% 47% 
Panama 57 16 57% 17 828.03 52% 64% 68% 38% 64% 
Slovenia 58 -2 57% 19 494.53 57% 47% 69% 52% 61% 
Oman 59 12 57% 15 62.17 71% 49% 48% 56% 61% 
Mauritius 60 -2 57% 7 106.00 72% 56% 40% 56% 60% 
Croatia 61 -4 57% 23 137.54 52% 53% 70% 52% 58% 
Philippines 62 6 56% 89 3,976.73 35% 70% 68% 63% 45% 
Bahrain 63 -2 56% 8 290.25 61% 66% 44% 59% 51% 
Serbia 64 -4 56% 13 5.90 50% 38% 62% 61% 69% 
Belarus 65 2 56% 11 5.91 54% 33% 56% 72% 64% 
Estonia 66 -1 55% 30 203.02 80% 45% 74% 41% 35% 
Peru 67 7 55% 101 3,308.33 52% 62% 53% 60% 47% 
Latvia 68 -4 55% 26 2.84 62% 51% 71% 47% 44% 
Tunisia 69 -6 55% 3 2.65 56% 54% 47% 71% 46% 
Iran 70 -8 55% 2 32.50 31% 34% 46% 92% 71% 
Bosnia and Her-
zegovina 
71 15 54% 5 4.33 39% 54% 53% 61% 63% 
Macedonia 72 10 54% 11 28.24 63% 48% 57% 57% 43% 
Argentina 73 -19 53% 84 1,864.70 37% 35% 63% 64% 67% 
Egypt 74 -4 53% 64 5,247.32 35% 52% 36% 65% 76% 
Uzbekistan 75 2 52% 5 5.70 34% 39% 54% 70% 66% 
Moldova 76 -1 52% 1 15.54 50% 33% 56% 63% 57% 
Montenegro 77 -8 51% 1 0.00 50% 51% 50% 44% 63% 
Bahamas 78 0 51% 4 145.84 62% 54% 40% 50% 53% 
Lebanon 79 6 51% 10 491.50 36% 57% 49% 56% 59% 
Costa Rica 80 3 51% 13 319.44 51% 42% 66% 59% 39% 
Azerbaijan 81 6 51% 2 0.00 47% 33% 54% 75% 46% 
Georgia 82 -1 51% 13 3.09 63% 43% 45% 58% 46% 
Jordan 83 -11 51% 47 71.13 57% 63% 45% 36% 53% 
Brunei 84 -5 50% 0 0.00 54% 53% 64% 48% 32% 
Sri Lanka 85 -9 50% 23 357.67 39% 53% 31% 64% 62% 
Pakistan 86 -6 46% 7 221.44 21% 39% 35% 65% 70% 
Armenia 87 10 46% 5 22.50 52% 34% 42% 53% 47% 
Trinidad and To-
bago 
88 1 45% 4 68.19 40% 41% 38% 58% 49% 
Algeria 89 -1 45% 0 0.00 28% 38% 31% 79% 48% 
Syria 90 1 45% 0 0.00 35% 54% 31% 50% 54% 
Bangladesh 91 9 44% 6 19.00 19% 56% 28% 73% 45% 
Dominican Re-
public 
92 -8 44% 6 1,237.00 40% 40% 37% 47% 56% 
Mongolia 93 9 44% 7 82.27 52% 42% 47% 50% 29% 
Uruguay 94 -4 43% 27 295.93 53% 29% 56% 35% 42% 
El Salvador 95 14 43% 3 802.15 42% 49% 39% 40% 45% 
Cape Verde 96 9 42% 0 0.00 60% 51% 29% 26% 45% 
Kenya 97 1 42% 9 131.43 25% 53% 45% 49% 40% 
Mozambique 98 12 42% 5 50.33 39% 48% 47% 39% 36% 
Albania 99 5 42% 1 0.50 50% 48% 34% 52% 24% 
Jamaica 100 -6 41%  0.00 39% 36% 36% 35% 61% 
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The US remains in the top spot, mirroring its position in terms of global M&A activity (currently 
21% of global volume (SDC Platinum)), with the UK in fourth position. However, we note that 
three Asian countries occupy top five positions, with South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong 
in second, third and fifth place, respectively. Further analysis of the database leads us to 
conclude that Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s high rankings are driven mainly by their highly 
developed infrastructure, the availability of sizeable assets to purchase (measured as the 
number of companies with assets valued at $1m or higher) and business-friendly regulatory 
environments. This is in contrast to most of the remaining top ten countries, their competitive 
advantage mainly being their highly developed technological environments, including high 
levels of high-tech exports and innovation in terms of patents filed, indicating an extremely 
skilled business community which should attract investment interest.  
In Table 1.4-A, we are also able to see trends in M&A attractiveness over the last five years, 
which should help in determining future markets for M&A activity. Among the countries 
characterised by a significant jump in MAAIS ranking, Malaysia and the UAE stand out from 
the rest of the top 25 ranked countries, climbing nine and eight places respectively in the 
ranking over the last five years. Further analysis of the underlying data in the database reveals 
that both Malaysia and the UAE’s rankings are mainly driven by an improvement of 6% and 
2% respectively in regulatory and political factors over the five-year period. Further down the 
top 50 table, we find that Colombia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Norway, Mexico, Qatar, 
Kazakhstan and Morocco are the front-runners in terms of improvement in their scores over 
the last five years as they have all risen by at least five places over that period. Not surprisingly, 
the rise in the rankings of developing countries has often come at the expense of developed 
countries in Europe. Most notably, Greece has lost significantly in terms of relative 
attractiveness for M&A, falling 11 places over the last five years. 
Table 1.4-B provides the descriptive statistics of the average Index score and the five major 
factor groups at different levels of M&A volume and value activity. Both levels of M&A activity 
appear to increase in line with the overall MAAIS as well as the scores corresponding to the 
five factor groups, providing evidence that the Index closely corresponds to country-level M&A 
activity. 
Table 1.4-B: Average Index score and factor group scores at different levels of country M&A activity 
This table shows the average M&A attractiveness score and factor group score for five sub-samples of countries, 
classified into percentiles determined by their yearly (logged) M&A volume or (logged) M&A value activity for 2012. 
MA_Vol is the maximum M&A volume (logged) for 2012 for each percentile group. MA_Val is the maximum M&A 
value ($m, logged) for 2012 for each percentile group. MAAIS is the average M&A attractiveness index score for 
2012 per percentile country group.  RegPol is the average Regulatory and Political factor group score for 2012 per 
percentile country group. EconFin is the average Economic and Financial factor group score for 2012 per percentile 
country group.  Tech is the average Technological factor group score for 2012 per percentile country group.  
Socecon is the average Socio-economic factor group score for 2012 per percentile country group.  InfraAsst is the 
average Infrastructure and Assets factor group score for 2012 per percentile country group. 
 
Panel A: M&A volume activity 
Percentile MA_Vol MAAIS RegPol EconFin Tech Socecon InfrAsst 
20 1.16 38% 39% 42% 34% 40% 34% 
40 2.08 42% 42% 44% 39% 47% 41% 
60 2.93 49% 48% 49% 48% 52% 48% 
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80 4.57 62% 57% 57% 65% 63% 65% 
100 6.70 66% 63% 64% 71% 64% 70% 
 
Panel B: M&A value activity 
Percen-
tile 
MA_Val MAAIS RegPol EconFin Tech Socecon InfrAsst 
20 1.13 40% 41% 42% 37% 43% 36% 
40 4.23 42% 43% 44% 39% 45% 40% 
60 6.29 49% 46% 48% 47% 53% 49% 
80 8.31 60% 55% 58% 63% 61% 62% 
100 10.70 66% 63% 64% 70% 64% 69% 
 
In order to determine the drivers of M&A at different stages of development, we use the 
development classifications devised by UNSO. According to these classifications, countries 
are divided into three stages of development for the purposes of M&A investment: mature 
(consisting of countries which are classified as ‘developed’ by UNSO), transitional (consisting 
of countries which are classified as ‘developing’ by UNSO) and emerging (consisting of 
countries which are classified as ‘less developed’ by UNSO).  
We first test the fit of UNSO’s classifications of market development with the MAAIS using a 
discriminant analysis technique. Table 1.4-C shows the results of the analysis using both the 
overall Index score (Panels A and B) as well as its constituent groups (Panels C and D) to 
distinguish between the different stages of a country’s development.  
Table 1.4-C: Discriminant analysis 
This table presents the results from a linear discriminant analysis which aims to test the ability of the M&A attrac-
tiveness score (Panels A and B) and the five factor groups (Panels C and D) to classify countries into the correct 
market development categories (i.e. developed, developing and less developed) obtained from UNSO. The table 
shows the number and percentage of correctly classified countries as well as the number and percentage of mis-
classified countries at each stage of development. In addition, the analyses in Panels A and C are based on equal 
prior probabilities (i.e. each country is assumed to be equally likely to belong to any of the three development 
categories obtained from UNSO) whereas the analyses in Panels B and D are based on proportional probabilities 
(i.e. the prior probabilities are adjusted for the fact that there are a different number of countries belonging to each 
UNSO development category). 
 
Panel A: Analysis based on the MAAIS score - Proportional priors 
 
True Classified    
 Mature Transitional Emerging Total 
Mature 167 78 0 245 
 68.16% 31.84% 0.00% 100% 
Transitional 70 513 33 616 
 11.36% 83.28% 5.36% 100% 
Emerging 0 67 108 175 
 0.00% 38.29% 61.71% 100% 
Correctly classified 167 513 108 788 
 68.16% 83.28% 61.71% 76.06% 
Total 237 658 141 1,036 




Panel B: Analysis based on the MAAIS score - Equal priors 
 
True Classified    
 Mature Transitional Emerging Total 
Mature 199 46 0 245 
 81.22% 18.78% 0.00% 100% 
Transitional 132 302 182 616 
 21.43% 49.03% 29.55% 100% 
Emerging 0 7 168 175 
 0.00% 4.00% 96.00% 100% 
Correctly classified 199 302 168 669 
 81.22% 49.03% 96.00% 65% 
Total 331 355 350 1,036 





Panel C: Analysis based on the five factors groups - Proportional priors 
 
True Classified    
 Mature Transitional Emerging Total 
Mature 202 43 0 245 
 82.45% 17.55% 0.00% 100% 
Transitional 30 534 52 616 
 4.87% 86.69% 8.44% 100% 
Emerging 0 61 114 175 
 0.00% 34.86% 65.14% 100% 
Correctly classified 202 534 114 729 
 82.45% 86.69% 65.14% 82.04% 
Total 232 638 166 1,036  
 22.39% 61.58% 16.02% 100% 
 
 
Panel D: Analysis based on the five factors groups - Equal priors 
 
True Classified    
 Mature Transitional Emerging Total 
Mature 224 21 0 245 
 91.43% 8.57% 0% 100% 
Transitional 57 425 134 616 
 9.25% 68.99% 21.75% 100% 
Emerging 0 15 138 175 
 0% 8.57% 91.43% 100% 
Correctly classified 224 425 138 719 
 91.43% 68.99% 78.86% 80.97% 
Total 281 461 294 1,036 
 27.12% 44.50% 28.38% 100% 
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The discriminant analysis confirms that the initial classification process classifies 76% of 
countries at the correct level of maturity based on the overall Index score and 82% at the 
correct level of maturity based on the five major factor groups which constitute the Index.5 Two 
conclusions can be drawn from this. Firstly, in both cases (i.e. based on the overall score and 
the five major factor groups), the results are stronger when using proportional prior 
probabilities as opposed to using equal prior probabilities. This finding is not surprising given 
the fact that the number of sample countries which belong to each stage of development differs 
substantially, with transitional economies accounting for the highest proportion (59% of the 
sample), followed by mature economies (24%) and emerging economies (17%). Secondly, 
the results are stronger when using the five major factor groups, where the model correctly 
classifies 82% of the countries (Table 1.3-C, Panel A), as opposed to using the overall score, 
where the model correctly classifies only 76% of the countries. This finding demonstrates that 
there are informational advantages in using the five major factor groups as opposed to the 
overall M&A attractiveness index. This is due to the fact that the overall index gives equal 
weight to each of the five constituent factor groups and, as argued in this study, each factor 
group can be relatively more or less important depending on the stage of maturity of a given 
country.  
1.4.1. Drivers of country-level M&A activity at different stages of market 
maturity 
Table 1.4.1-A shows the results of the univariate analysis of the average6  Index score 
depending on market maturity. As demonstrated by the analysis, the difference between the 
mature stage of development and the developing stages – transitional and emerging – is 
greatest in terms of regulatory and political development as well as technological 
advancement. These results show that the quality of a country’s regulatory system, its political 
stability and a developing technological environment are all prerequisites for a market to reach 
the stage of mature development, supporting the work of Rossi and Volpin (2004), Guerin and 
Manzocchi (2009), Yartey (2008) and Porter (1993).  
                                                 
5 These percentages are based on the use of proportional prior probabilities. 
6 Note that in an unreported table, we tested the differences in medians between the three stages of market attrac-
tiveness and concluded that the results are not materially different from the analysis of averages.  
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Table 1.4.1-A: Univariate analysis - Average MAAIS score and average factor group scores for different 
stages of market attractiveness 
This table presents the average M&A attractiveness score (MAAIS) and factor group scores (RegPol, EconFin, 
Tech, Socecon and InfraAsst) for 148 countries for the seven years of the sample period. The table also shows the 
corresponding average for the three sub-samples of country development – mature, transitional and emerging – 
as well as the results from unpaired mean comparison tests (Dixon and Massey Jr., 1983; and Hoel, 1984). ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Multivariate regression analysis is performed on the country-year panel data set, covering 
seven years from 2006 to 2012, in order to determine which factor groups explain the 
differences in M&A activity between all of the sample countries as well as between countries 
at different stages of maturity. Table 1.4.1-B shows the results of a regression analysis of the 
relationship between M&A activity as the dependent variable – measured both in terms of 
volume (Panel A) and value (Panel B) – and the five factor groups as the explanatory variables. 
In addition, we test the explanatory power of the five individual factor groups with cross-border 
M&A data only (Panel C and Panel D). 
Table 1.4.1-B: Multivariate regression analysis – Drivers of M&A activity 
This table presents the results from the panel data regression analysis of the factor groups (RegPol, EconFin, 
Tech, Socecon and InfraAsst) which explain M&A activity for the 148 countries included in this study for the period 
2006 to 2012. Model 1 presents the analysis of drivers of M&A activity on the basis of a sample of all the countries 
included in this study and Models 2, 3 and 4 present the analysis of the drivers of M&A activity on the basis of sub-
samples of countries at the mature, transitional and emerging stages of their development. Countries are classified 
as mature, transitional or emerging on the basis of the definition used by UNSO. Panel A presents the results when 
M&A activity is measured by logged M&A volume (MA_Vol) and Panel B presents the results when M&A activity is 
measured by logged M&A value (MA_Val). Panel C presents the results when M&A activity is measured by logged 
cross-border M&A volume (CB_MA_Vol) and Panel D presents the results when M&A activity is measured by 
logged cross-border M&A value (CB_MA_Val). Z-scores are reported below each independent variable. To correct 






MAAIS RegPol EconFin Tech Socecon InfrAsst 
All 1,036 52% 50% 52% 52% 54% 52% 
Mature (1) 245 70% 74% 62% 81% 62% 72% 
Transitional (2) 616 50% 46% 51% 48% 55% 52% 
Emerging (3) 175 32% 33% 40% 25% 37% 25% 
diff. (1) - (2) 
(pp) 
 0.20*** 0.29*** 0.11*** 0.32*** 0.06*** 0.19*** 
t-stat (859) 22.23 25.20 10.93 27.52 4.86 14.84 
diff. (2) - (3) 
(pp) 
 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.28*** 
t-stat (789) 18.62 9.76 9.53 16.48 11.80 19.32 
diff. (1) - (3) 
(pp) 
 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.22*** 0.55*** 0.24*** 0.47*** 
t-stat (418) 52.32 34.69 20.46 52.96 20.39 35.80 
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of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), all of 
the models have a robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression analysis of the relationship between M&A volume and the five major factors consti-
tuting the MAAIS 
 
Panel B: Regression analysis of the relationship between M&A value and the five major factors constituting 
the MAAIS 
 
Dependent variable:  MA_Val Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 All Mature Transitional Emerging 
RegPol 1.758* 4.966** -0.077 -4.540 
 1.950 2.350 -0.070 -1.330 
EconFin 5.920*** 7.977*** 6.509*** -2.788 
 5.550 3.440 5.140 -1.130 
Tech 2.061** 1.952 2.651** -2.891 
 2.210 1.410 2.320 -1.360 
Socecon 4.343*** 8.538*** 3.988*** 0.981 
 3.550 8.301 2.700 0.260 
Dependent variable:  MA_Vol Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 All Mature Transitional Emerging 
RegPol 1.516*** 1.470* 0.148 1.320 
 3.020 1.720 0.240 0.880 
EconFin 1.692*** 1.412 2.185*** -0.861 
 3.100 1.350 3.040 -1.110 
Tech 1.628*** 5.200*** 2.030*** -0.465 
 4.120 4.310 4.130 -0.700 
Socecon 3.768*** 6.737*** 3.079*** 1.793 
 5.390 8.020 3.370 1.310 
InfrAsst 2.071*** 1.647** 1.861*** 1.379 
 4.530 2.570 3.000 1.120 
Constant -2.309*** -6.131*** -1.501*** 0.291 
 -8.250 -5.810 -4.120 0.340 
Number of observations 1,036 245 616 175 
Wald Chi squared (five degrees of freedom) 473.87 154.55 171.29 16.16 
Adjusted R2 0.5396 0.5667 0.3996 0.0214 
Chi2 test for difference in regression coefficients     
A. Between the three country groups 47.90***    
B. Between mature countries and the other 
country groups 
 
53.81***   
C. Between transitional countries and the other 
country groups 
  26.27*** 
 
 







InfrAsst 3.644*** 2.478* 3.021*** 4.868 
 3.790 1.850 2.270 1.530 
Constant -3.417*** -8.180*** -2.860*** 4.570** 
 -6.990 -4.850 -4.680 2.110 
Number of observations 1,036 245 616 175 
Wald Chi squared (five degrees of freedom) 558.07 392.87 470.39 22.54 
Adjusted R2 0.3721 0.5287 0.2403 0.0256 
Chi2 test for difference in regression coefficients     
A. Between the three country groups 67.70***    
















Panel C: Regression analysis of the relationship between cross-border M&A volume and the five major 
factors constituting the MAAIS 
 
Panel D: Regression analysis of the relationship between cross-border M&A value and the five major fac-
tors constituting the MAAIS 
 
Dependent variable:  CB_MA_Vol Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 All Mature Transitional Emerging 
RegPol 1.390*** 2.038** -0.142 1.328 
 3.010 2.350 -0.270 1.190 
EconFin 1.222** 0.051 1.931*** -1.226 
 2.330 0.040 3.200 -1.560 
Tech 1.259*** 3.842*** 1.615*** -0.593 
 3.250 2.900 3.650 -0.850 
Socecon 3.034*** 8.141*** 1.928*** 1.674* 
 5.050 10.070 2.650 1.710 
InfrAsst 1.684*** 0.389 1.738*** 0.833 
 4.180 0.950 3.250 0.830 
Constant -2.015*** -5.733*** -1.416*** 0.227 
 -8.210 -9.210 -4.600 0.340 
Number of observations 1036 245 616 175 
Wald Chi squared (five degrees of freedom) 470.39 274.28 173.63 17.30 
Adjusted R2 0.522 0.469 0.383 0.025 
Chi2 test for difference in regression coefficients     
A. Between the three country groups 165.15***    
B. Between mature countries and the other 
country groups 
 83.87***   
C. Between transitional countries and the other 
country groups 
  55.42***  
D. Between emerging countries and the other 
country groups 
   80.42*** 
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Dependent variable:  CB_MA_Val Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 All Mature Transitional Emerging 
RegPol 1.631* 6.568*** -0.777 -0.389 
 1.730 3.040 -0.730 -0.130 
EconFin 5.444*** 7.391** 6.150*** -2.543 
 4.440 2.170 4.240 -0.980 
Tech 1.969** -0.730 2.270* -1.676 
 2.000 -0.270 1.790 -0.840 
Socecon 3.666*** 11.137*** 2.916** 1.095 
 3.130 5.130 2.130 0.340 
InfrAsst 3.779*** 1.162 3.837*** 2.917 
 3.850 0.820 2.870 0.870 
Constant -3.749*** -8.784*** -2.967*** 2.361 
 -7.790 -5.260 -4.560 1.200 
Number of observations 1036 245 616 175 
Wald Chi squared (five degrees of freedom) 565.03 142.00 198.39 5.34 
Adjusted R2 0.3215 0.3858 0.1776 0.0152 
Chi2 test for difference in regression coefficients     
A. Between the three country groups 59.88***    
B. Between mature countries and the other 
country groups 
 39.40***   
C. Between transitional countries and the other 
country groups 
  21.15***  
D. Between emerging countries and the other 
country groups 
   27.18*** 
 
In Panels A and B (Model 1), we confirm that all five factor groups individually explain some 
of the differences in country-level M&A volumes. The analysis shows that, in line with other 
authors, regulatory and political factors (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; DeLong et al., 2001; and 
Yartey, 2008), economic and financial factors (Berthelemy and Demurger, 2000; Liu et al., 
2009; Yartey, 2008; and Saborowski, 2009), as well as technological (Porter, 1993), are 
positively and statistically significant determinants of M&A activity, in terms of both volume 
and value. This paper adds to the existing literature by proving the existence of a positive 
relationship between M&A activity and a country’s socio-economic development, i.e., 
population size as well as the percentage of working age people. We also demonstrate that 
there is a positive relationship between M&A activity and the quality of a country’s 
infrastructure and assets, i.e., the availability of adequate roads, railway lines and ports as 
well as the availability of sizeable assets to acquire. Panels A and B (Models 2 to 4) also 
provide insight into the relative degree to which the five factor groups are responsible for 
variations in M&A activity at the three stages of country development.7 Notably, we find that a 
                                                 
7 Following the Chow (1960) test methodology, we estimate an equation of the form: M&A_Activity = β1RegPol + 
β2EconFin + β3Tech + β4Socecon + β5InfraAsst + β6RegPol x Transitional + β7EconFin x Transitional + β8Tech x 
Transitional + β9Socecon x Transitional + β10InfraAsst x Transitional + β11RegPol x Emerging + β12EconFin x 
Emerging + β13Tech x Emerging + β14Socecon x Emerging + β15InfraAsst x Emerging + β16Transitional_Dummy + 
β17Emerging_Dummy. In order to test whether the coefficients corresponding to each of the factor groups are 
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country’s regulatory and political environment is only a significant determinant of country-level 
M&A activity for countries in the mature country group. Thus, our findings extend the existing 
body of research by showing that the development of the regulatory and political environment 
is not a significant determinant of M&A activity for countries which are less developed, where 
other factors, such as their economic and financial, technological and socio-economic 
development, as well as the quality of their infrastructure and assets, have been accounted 
for. However, as discussed earlier, the quality of a country’s regulatory environment and its 
political stability appears to be a prerequisite for the highest level of development. As can be 
seen in both Panel A and Panel B, Model 3, in the transitional stage of country development, 
all of the factor groups except regulatory and political appear to drive both M&A volume and 
value activity. As countries move to the mature stage, the economic and financial factor group 
becomes less significant when it comes to M&A volume activity as does the technological 
factor group when it comes to M&A value activity. As demonstrated in Panels A and B, Model 
4, the multivariate regression of the five factor group scores which constitutes the MAAIS is 
overall a poor fit with emerging markets’ country-level M&A activity. We conclude that M&A 
activity in countries at an emerging stage of development are likely to be driven by a very 
different set of determinants, such as the abundance of natural resources. However, this result 
is also a reflection of little variation within the other factor scores as all of the countries which 
belong to this stage of maturity have to play catch-up in all of the areas which drive M&A 
activity. 
All of the aforementioned conclusions hold when we restrict the sample data to cross-border 
country-level M&A data only (Table 1.4.1-B, Panels C and D). We conclude that five factor 
groups, and by extension the MAAIS, are – as hypothesised – all important drivers of country-
level M&A activity, both domestic and cross-border. 
1.4.2. Testing the forecasting power of the MAAIS 
Finally, it is useful to analyse the ability of the MAAIS to predict future M&A activity. Table 
1.4.2-A, Panel A examines its ability to predict M&A volume activity while Table 1.4.2-A, Panel 
B tests value activity. Each of the regression models presented in Table 1.4.2-A is based on 
the following general equation: 
M&A_Activity year 0 = βkM&A_Activity year – t + βjMAAIS year 0 + βjMAAIS year – t  
                                                 
statistically significantly different from each other across the three country groups, we test whether the coefficients 
β6 to β17 are jointly significantly different from zero. The Chi2 test statistic, as reported in Table 6, Panels A to D, is 
highly statistically significant and we can therefore reject the hypothesis that the coefficients β6 to β17 are jointly 
equal to zero. We perform two additional Chow tests to ascertain the difference in regression coefficients between 
transitional countries relative to the other country groups and between emerging countries relative to the other 
country groups. The former test consists of assessing whether coefficients β6 to β10 and β16 are jointly equal to zero 
and the latter of assessing whether coefficients β11 to β15 and β17 are jointly equal to zero. The tests statistics 
associated with both tests are highly statistically significant and we therefore conclude that the regression coeffi-
cients corresponding to each of the five factor groups are statistically significantly different from each other at the 
three different levels of country development for M&A purposes.  
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where  the MAAIS is the M&A attractiveness score for each country and year, M&A Activity is 
measured by the natural logarithm of M&A volume (Panel A) or the natural logarithm of M&A 
value (Panel B) and the number of time lags t goes up to five years.  
The purpose of the above equation is to determine the ability of the MAAIS to predict M&A 
activity after accounting for other important predictors. We use previous M&A activity (from t-
1 to t-5) in order to capture the effect of these other predictors. The results presented in Table 
1.4.2-A, Panel A demonstrate that the scores corresponding to years t-2 (Models 4 and 6), t-
3 (Models 4 and 6) and t-4 (Model 6) are statistically significant determinants of M&A volume 
activity. This finding provides statistical evidence that the M&A attractiveness score can be 
used to predict future M&A activity. Intuitively, the finding that the predictive power of the 
attractiveness score is present over a three-year time period (i.e. from t-4 to t-2) can be 
explained by the fact that the MAAIS is a relatively stable measure on a year-to-year basis, 
with major changes taking place over a period of time which is greater than one year. In 
untabulated results, we test the opposite relationship, i.e. whether M&A volume activity causes 
the M&A attractiveness score. The Granger causality tests show that the coefficients 
corresponding to the M&A attractiveness score in years t 0 and t-2 are jointly significantly 
different from zero. This is interpreted as evidence in favour of the hypothesis that M&A 
volume activity causes the M&A attractiveness score when considering a time period of one 
year before the current year. We therefore conclude that a fundamental prerequisite for the 
development of a country’s M&A market are the five factor groups which underlie the MAAIS 
as the score has a more persistent time effect on M&A volume activity, materialising over a 
period of three years. However, we also recognise that the opposite relationship shows some 
causality. These results are not intuitively surprising as we would expect that M&A activity in 
yeart-1 would improve the attractiveness for M&A activity in yeart0 due to positive spillover 
effects.8 
In Table 1.4.2-A, Panel B, we confirm that the same conclusion can be made for the ability of 
the MAAIS to predict M&A value activity, i.e. that the MAAIS is a better predictor of M&A value 
than vice versa although the opposite relationship also shows some level of causality. 
                                                 
8 For example, M&A transactions will specifically increase the availability of sizeable assets, whilst GDP size 
and high-technology exports are likely to increase with better allocation of capital. Also, the regulatory environ-
ment is expected to improve as a result of investments by firms from more mature and transparent markets. 
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Table 1.4.2-A: Granger causality tests. 
 
 
This table shows an analysis of the ability of the M&A attractiveness index to predict future M&A value activity 
(Panel A) and M&A volume activity (Panel B). The general form of the equation estimated in each model is: 
M&A_Activity year 0 = M&A_Activity year – t + MAAIS year 0 + MAAIS year – t. The table also shows the result of a 
Granger Causality test between the M&A attractiveness score (MAAIS) and logged M&A volume (MA_Vol) and 
logged M&A value (MA_Val) as well as the statistical significance of the Chi2 test statistic. All models are esti-
mated on the basis of a panel regression specification in which each country and year represents the two di-
mensions of the panel. Z-scores are reported under each independent variable. To correct for the possibility that 
our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of our independent 
variables and regression residual are not independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), all of the models have 
a robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Granger causality test of the MAAIS on M&A Volume 
Dependent variable:  
MA_Vol 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
MAAIS 1.423*** 2.053* 0.237 -0.511 -0.444 -0.878 
 7.570 1.730 0.150 -0.290 -0.210 -0.360 
L1_MA_Val 0.865*** 0.866*** 0.707*** 0.684*** 0.657*** 0.597*** 
 51.350 50.980 15.600 11.780 10.190 7.580 
L1_MAAIS  -0.638 0.324 0.251 0.336 -0.833 
  -0.530 0.170 0.110 0.110 -0.200 
L2_MA_Val   0.210*** 0.107* 0.059 0.014 
   4.460 1.660 0.790 0.150 
L2_MAAIS   0.211 4.806** 3.345 7.071* 
   0.160 2.200 1.140 1.940 
L3_MA_Val    0.157*** 0.130** 0.086 
    3.570 2.090 1.170 
L3_MAAIS    -4.251** -0.962 -7.523** 
    -2.580 -0.380 -2.010 
L4_MA_Val     0.115** 0.285*** 
     2.200 3.350 
L4_MAAIS     -2.071 4.846* 
     -1.280 1.680 
L5_MA_Val      -0.023 
      -0.320 
L5_MAAIS      -2.554 
      -1.320 
Constant -0.310*** -0.309*** -0.194*** -0.075 -0.091 -0.153 
 -6.340 -6.300 -3.330 -1.240 -0.840 -1.200 
Number of observations 817 817 664 520 383 250 
Wald chi2 22758.08 22925.96 22697.14 17371.57 12197.81 7879.42 
F-stat (Granger cau-
sality test) 




The paper provides a proprietary methodology for measuring a country’s attractiveness for 
M&A purposes. Each country’s regulatory and political, economic and financial, technological 
and socio-economic environments, as well as the quality of its infrastructure and assets, are 
measured in order to provide an overall country- and year-specific index score. By studying 
the factor scores at different stages of a country’s development, we conclude that 
technological advancement as well as the quality of the country’s regulatory system and its 
political stability are prerequisites to becoming a mature – and therefore attractive – market 
for M&A purposes. The findings of the paper also provide support for previous studies 
examining macro- and micro-economic determinants of M&A activity, proving that all of the 
factor groups in the Index – regulatory and political, economic and financial, technological, 
socio-economic and infrastructure and assets – are significantly related to M&A activity. 
However, we extend the findings of previous studies by suggesting that there is a significant 
difference between the relationship of the five factor group variables which constitute the Index 
and M&A activity, dependent on the country’s stage of development. The results show that for 
a transitional stage country, its economic and financial, technological and socio-economic 
factors, as well as the quality of its infrastructure and assets, become determinants of M&A 
activity. As the country moves towards a fully mature stage of development, all of the factor 
groups are found to be significant drivers of M&A activity, hence at this stage of maturity the 
quality of the country’s regulatory environment and its political stability are also significant 
determinants of country-level M&A activity.  
Panel B:  Granger causality test of the MAAIS on M&A Value 
Dependent variable:   
MA_Val 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
MAAIS 7.811*** 9.232* 6.861 8.397 2.404 12.214 
 9.820 1.650 1.110 1.170 0.290 1.110 
L1_MA_Val 0.505*** 0.505*** 0.335*** 0.365*** 0.300*** 0.239*** 
 11.750 11.820 8.550 7.180 5.240 3.940 
L1_MAAIS  -1.428 -14.690 -21.913* -19.998 -35.420* 
  -0.260 0.136 -1.690 -1.280 -1.880 
L2_MA_Val   0.238** 0.195*** 0.178** 0.163* 
   4.900 3.070 2.410 1.930 
L2_MAAIS   14.406*** 25.702** 30.263*** 41.711*** 
   2.160 2.480 3.030 2.950 
L3_MA_Val    0.228*** 0.167** 0.079 
    4.190 2.320 0.880 
L3_MAAIS    -9.556 4.716 -8.330 
    -1.420 0.500 -0.620 
L4_MA_Val     0.228*** 0.335*** 
     3.440 3.370 
L4_MAAIS     -16.267*** -6.007 
     -2.720 -0.530 
L5_MA_Val      0.086 
      1.160 
L5_MAAIS      -2.834 
      -0.370 
Constant -1.112*** -1.112*** -0.987*** -0.265 0.029 -0.499 
 -4.280 -4.280 -3.350 -1.070 0.090 -1.130 
Number of observations 817 817 664 520 383 250 
Wald chi2 1692.31 1691.59 1692.79 2044.33 1407.59 926.03 
F-stat (Granger causal-
ity test) 
96.45*** 97.84*** 55.88*** 17.31*** 22.99*** 12.56* 
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According to Tong, Alessandri, Reur and Chintakananda (2008), it is country, as opposed to 
industry, effects which influence the performance of companies involved in cross-country 
investment activities. Hence, we suggest that the ability to determine a country’s M&A 
attractiveness can contribute to a better understanding of the factors which affect the 
performance of companies involved in acquisitions, particularly cross-border acquisitions. In 
addition, knowledge of a country’s M&A attractiveness can also provide deeper insight not 
only of firm-level drivers of financial performance but also of country-level drivers of economic 
and financial progress, as shown by the two-way causal relationship between M&A activity 
and country development. Furthermore, an accurate measure of country-level drivers of M&A 
activity can shed light on the capacity of a given country to develop and sustain M&A activity 
levels, hence making it possible to forecast medium- and long-term future M&A activity in that 
country. 
This updatable index can help acquiring companies in their investment decisions related to 
the acquisition of a stake in a company based in a country outside the location of the acquirer’s 
headquarters. It should be stressed that this type of investment decision may ultimately be 
determined principally by factors unique to the specific company being acquired (such as the 
target company’s financial situation, management, market position, intellectual property, etc.), 
although, as shown in this paper, factors unique to each country within which a company 
operates are also critical. Therefore, knowledge of the level of M&A attractiveness of each 
country is vital both at an aggregate level and within each group of factors, and the M&A 
attractiveness index devised by this study will hopefully provide acquiring companies with a 
tool which they can use to assess investment decisions. 
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2. Naked M&A transactions: How the lack of local ex-
pertise in cross-border deals can negatively affect 
acquirer performance – and how informed institu-
tional investors can mitigate this effect 
 




We test how informed investors with local expertise can affect cross-border deal success us-
ing a comprehensive dataset of corporate acquirers’ share registers. We posit that deals in 
which long-term investors have a high level of expertise in the target firm’s region are more 
likely to perform better than if the deal is ‘naked’, i.e. when such regional expertise amongst 
the investors is low. We show that the strength of this effect depends upon an index of country-
level M&A maturity which measures the relative divergence between acquirer and target coun-
tries. Specifically, we investigate whether acquirers investing in countries with low M&A ma-
turity gain greater benefit from investors with regional expertise. We present evidence which 
confirms the hypothesis that acquirers in cross-border corporate transactions are more likely 
to be successful if the acquirer’s investors have a higher level of expertise in the target region, 
and that this effect is strongest when the maturity for corporate transactions of the target coun-
try is low. This provides a specific setting which is consistent with earlier theoretical work that 
argues in general that information flows should not just be from firms to capital markets but 
also in the opposite direction, and that this flow of information is particularly important when-
ever information is dispersed. 
2.1. Introduction 
Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2009), hereafter FMM, consider cross-border M&A deals and find 
(Subsection 4.3) that the extent to which a deal is value-increasing depends on whether there 
is foreign institutional ownership of the companies. Specifically, they find (p. 640) that “foreign 
institutional ownership in both target and acquirer firms is associated with higher combined 
returns in cross-border deals. This is consistent with the “facilitation hypothesis” that foreign 
institutions promote deals that offer greater value creation (synergy).” They argue that this is 
because foreign institutional investors may reduce transaction costs and informational 
asymmetries between potential acquirers and targets. However, they do not propose in detail 
how these advantages arise. 
Building upon the theory of Financial Geography and the work of Dye and Sridhar (2003), we 
argue that the reason that the holdings of foreign institutional investors is positively associated 
with the performance of acquirer returns is because a subset of the investors may hold key 
expertise in the target region. That is, in an economic setting in which information is hard to 
gather and diverse in nature, it may be reasonably argued that those investors with regional 
expertise hold information which the management of the acquirer finds hard to collect. Thus, 
they may have a role to play in reducing cross-border M&A deal informational asymmetries. 
To summarise, one goal of this research is to refine the earlier hypotheses of FMM in order to 
138 
provide a more nuanced understanding of the specific reasons behind the observation of this 
positive association. 
In order to try to detect these effects, we conduct this research at acquirer share register level 
and measure the success of transactions at deal level. Additionally, since we argue here that 
the effects are most likely to arise with those institutional investors who are both knowledge-
intensive and who have regional expertise, the investor sample is further refined. First, we split 
institutional investors into those who are relatively more knowledge-intensive (informed) 
versus those who are not. The latter group includes those who only invest in specific stocks 
for very short periods of time and, therefore, are not assumed to conduct detailed firm-level 
analyses. Second, in order to identify informed institutional investors, we conduct an analysis 
of the company share registers which they invest in to ascertain their portfolio allocation, which 
we then use as a proxy for measuring regional expertise. We, therefore, suggest that simply 
looking at aggregate institutional investor holdings is an imperfect measure of the potential for 
reductions in informational asymmetries by acquirer firms learning from institutional investors. 
Instead, we test to see whether the holding positions in the target region of informed 
institutional investors is positively associated with post-M&A deal performance. Our 
statistically significant results confirm the above thesis.  
In addition, we posit that this two-way communication is of particular importance when the 
acquiring firm is investing in a country where the maturity for corporate investment purpose is 
low, which we relate to the relatively higher information asymmetry in these situations. Thus, 
we suggest that the relationship established by FMM between the composite of investors on 
the share register and deal success is due to a reduction in information asymmetry. This effect 
is most marked when the investment is being made in countries with less developed M&A 
markets. Our conclusions add to the existing literature by highlighting the importance of 
maintaining in general terms a constructive dialogue with long-term and strategically-savvy 
investors about M&A programmes and strategies. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2.2 is a review of the literature on financial 
geography, the choices open to management of strategic options contingent on market 
reaction and other related literature which can be used to provide support for our 
aforementioned primary hypothesis; Section 2.3 discusses the data sources, provides a 
description of the data and a full list of variables; Section 2.4 presents empirical tests of the 
hypotheses and robustness tests; and the conclusion is presented in Section 2.5. 
2.2. Related literature 
This section considers the previous literature on the benefits which can accrue to the man-
agement of an acquirer by consulting its investors when it is considering making a cross-bor-
der M&A deal. With regard to this, it has long been recognised (see, for instance, Jennings 
and Mazzeo, 1991) that when an initial M&A bid is issued, the management of the potential 
acquirer needs to be cognisant of the stock market reaction to the initial announcement. For 
instance, shortly after Hewlett Packard (HP) withdrew from a much touted potential deal with 
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PwC, HP’s CEO, Carly Fiorina, stated, “I recognise that a number of you verbalised your con-
cerns over the past few weeks, and others simply voted with their positions in the stock. ... I 
realise you made some valid points.”9 
Expressed more generally, Dye and Sridhar (p.389, 2003) argue that “The existing literature 
… primarily views the information flows between firms and the capital market as one way - 
from firms to the capital market. This paper is premised on information flows also occurring 
from capital markets to firms…” In their model, investors form an opinion on the potential (net 
cash flow) prospects associated with an option to invest in a project, here interpreted as an 
M&A deal. Furthermore, they argue that information about the potential success of the new 
deal project is widely dispersed and it is reasonable to assume that the management of the 
acquirer will want to have access to some of the information held by others before making a 
decision on whether or not to invest. Hence, the only way that management can access infor-
mation on the value of a new project is by observing the reaction of investors - in terms of 
aggregate price - when it is announced that the potential deal is ‘live’. Just as in the real case 
of HP above, management can choose to back out of the deal if the price reaction is sufficiently 
negative.  
However, we note that there may be other ways in which the management of the acquirer can 
learn from investors. For example, the senior management of firms meet their major institu-
tional investors on a regular basis and talk in general terms about strategy. Holland (2006), 
for instance, discusses how senior management and institutional investors exchange infor-
mation while staying within the spirit of disclosure regulations such as Regulation Fair Disclo-
sure (Reg FD) in the US or the equivalent in other locations. It is, for instance, not illegal for 
senior management to ask institutional investors what factors, in their view, determined the 
success or failure of deals in which they had a position. In addition, they can talk about the 
general economic performance of and ease of doing business in certain foreign countries and, 
in general terms, the desirability of foreign acquisitions in order to, for instance, get an early 
toe hold in an emerging economy without naming any specific targets. Management can use 
such carefully conducted meetings in order to collect information and, in principle, learn from 
knowledgeable institutional investors. For example, before a UK company considers any spe-
cific acquisitions in Brazil, it could be helpful to hear from informed institutional investors what 
socio-political and regulatory constraints previous UK-Brazil deals had encountered. If that 
company is in the oil sector and considering an acquisition in Brazil, it could be instructive to 
hear what role the Brazilian government took in regulating the oil industry and what special 
role the mixed state-private organisation of Petrobras plays in influencing the competitiveness 
of the oil sector. The potential for such learning when cross-border deals are being considered 
is the principal focus of this research. 
Dye and Sridhar assume that information is widely dispersed, so management find it hard to 
collect it all themselves. Given the collection problems, management may choose to consult 
investors who hold information which is difficult to come by. Rather than simply asserting that 
such dispersion exists, we consider the institutional reasons for its existence in certain settings 
and not in others. The principal reason which we propose here for the existence of dispersion 
is based on the notion of country-level relative diversity in M&A maturity. That is, we suggest 
                                                 
9Recorded on numerous press wires at the time, including Canada’s Financial Post (National Post) on 14 Novem-
ber 2000, ‘Hewlett shelves PWC deal’ by David Akin with files from Simon Avery. 
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that dispersion may be relatively low in cross-border deals between similarly mature M&A 
markets (e.g., US to UK), whereas when there is divergence in maturity (e.g., US to India), 
there may be high dispersion of information. To summarise, we assume that the potential 
value to management of informed investors is greatest when the M&A maturity in the target 
region is low. In order to provide support for the assumption that informed investors are likely 
to hold valuable dispersed information and to explain how to identify such investors, it is nec-
essary to review the literature on financial geography briefly. 
The earlier research in this area concentrated on how certain investors try to build up propri-
etary ‘local’ information expertise. For instance, Huberman (2001) looks at regional Bell-oper-
ated companies and shows that investors tended to prefer to invest in local Bell firms rather 
than those in other regions and, in a similar fashion, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that US 
institutional investors exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms in their do-
mestic portfolios. More recently, Uysal et al. (2008) examine the impact of geographical prox-
imity on the acquisition decisions of US companies and find that “acquirer returns in local 
transactions were more than twice that in non-local transactions.” Bae et al. (2008) suggest 
that local analysts have a significant informational advantage over foreign analysts, basing 
this conclusion on data collected from a large sample of countries. They argue that a plausible 
explanation for their ability to identify a local advantage “is that local analysts have better 
access to information because they can talk to firm representatives in person and observe 
what goes on in firms directly.” Thus, their research suggests that some institutional investors 
may be characterised as collecting and processing local information which is difficult or costly 
to access. This then begs the question of how to identify institutional investors who develop 
local expertise. 
In an attempt to answer this question, Chen, Harford and Li (2007) argue that it is a mistake 
to view all institutional investors as having common information sets and processing ability.  
They argue that all institutional investors “face a cost-benefit analysis of monitoring versus 
trading, where monitoring includes both information gathering and efforts to influence man-
agement. Monitoring is distinguished from trading by both the type of information gathered 
(long-term versus short-term) and the effort to influence management rather than to simply 
trade on that information.” They define a class of institutional investors which they describe as 
specialist monitors who invest significant resources in understanding the complex business 
environment of the firms in which they invest. They argue that those investors are character-
ised as conducting ‘deep research’ and, furthermore, that they typically invest for the long 
term. In addition, they posit that such investors can be identified by looking at portfolio turnover 
styles. Thus, we identify the informed investors most likely to collect local (regional) infor-
mation as those investors who have a low portfolio turnover style. 
To summarise the above, the literature on financial geography suggests that investors may 
earn higher returns if they collect complex local information. Dye and Sridhar’s work suggests 
that this is exactly the sort of information which management may need to access when it is 
making investment decisions with dispersed information. We suggest that a specific applica-
tion of these generic issues arises in the field of cross-border M&A deals. When the relative 
maturity of the M&A market of the potential target is significantly lower than that of the potential 
acquirer, the management of the acquirer may not have sufficient information on the target 
region, so, in order to increase the chance of a successful deal, it will want to collect infor-
mation which is held in diverse places. In such a setting, informed investors with regional 
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expertise may have a role to play in releasing difficult-to-collect dispersed information. This 
leads to our two primary hypotheses: 
H1: The Positive Effect of Regionally-Informed Investors on Deal Performance 
Medium- to long-term post-M&A performance is positively related to the level of expertise that 
the acquirer’s investors possess in the target region. 
H2: The Effect of Market Diversity on the Importance of Regionally-Informed Investors 
The effect of regionally-informed investors on post-M&A performance depends on the diver-
gence between the acquirer and the target markets. 
In order to test the relative success of various cross-regional deals, we adopt the standard 
approach of using medium- to long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns following the an-
nouncement of an M&A deal. Thus, we estimate the following equation for acquirer ex-post 
performance: 
BHAR_Reti,j =  H1  KnI_II i, jH2  KnI_II i, jRel_MaturityAcq.-Tar. j
k *(Control variables) + i, j        (1) 
where: 
BHAR_Reti,j = the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) which accrue to acquirers’ low and very 
low turnover shareholder i from deal j over a 13-month event window starting from one month prior to 
announcement, to capture the run-up period, and ending 12 months after the announcement. 
KnI_II i, j = the percentage of the total portfolio of the low and very low turnover shareholder i, holding 
shares in the acquirer of deal j, which is invested in the region of the target company for deal j. 
Rel_MaturityAcq.-Tar j = the difference in M&A maturity between the acquirer and target countries for 
deal j. 
 
To summarise, in order to confirm the hypotheses, the empirical tests need to show that the 
data is consistent with 
H1 > 0  and 
H2 > 0 
We use the following standard control variables which are found to be relevant to post-merger 
performance in the literature on mergers and acquisitions: 
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Acquirer borrowing capacity: Bruner (1988) shows that when bidders with high lev-
els of debt capacity and liquidity buy targets with the opposite characteristics, this results in 
positive combined (acquirer and target) returns. We use the ratio of total debt to total assets 
of the bidder in order to estimate the debt capacity of bidder companies. We expect that the 
coefficient corresponding to this variable will be negative and significant. The results presented 
in Table 2.4.1-A (models 1 and 2) demonstrate that this variable is negatively and significantly 
related to the post-merger performance of the bidder. 
Deal hostility: Mitchell and Stafford (2000), Cosh and Guest (2001), Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemoller (2002) and Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2004) document that hostile bidders 
tend to outperform non-hostile acquirers. We account for this effect by including a dummy 
variable which is equal to one in the cases of hostile takeovers. Interestingly, the results pre-
sented in Table 2.4.1-A (all models) show that this variable has a negative and significant 
effect on post-M&A performance. 
Growth versus value bidders: So-called ‘glamour’ acquirers, i.e. companies with 
high market-to-book ratios, are more likely to overestimate their ability to perform a successful 
M&A deal as compared to value acquirers, i.e. companies with low market-to-book ratios. We 
expect the block shareholders, CEOs and directors of value bidders to be more prudent. As a 
result, the market should view value bidders more favourably than glamour bidders. This hy-
pothesis is supported by Rau and Vermaelen (1998). In addition, Devos, Kadapakkam and 
Krishnamurthy (2008), as well as Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009), show that bidders with 
low market-to-book ratios tend to perform better than glamour acquirers. We expect that there 
is a negative association between the acquirer market-to-book ratio and post-M&A perfor-
mance, and the results presented in Table 2.4.1-A (all models) confirm our expectation.  
Industry relatedness: Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) and Martynova and 
Renneboog (2006) document that a high level of industry relatedness between the target and 
bidder can positively affect the post-M&A performance of bidders and vice versa. We use a 
dummy variable which captures the four-digit SIC (Standard Industry Classification) code re-
latedness between the target and bidder companies. In accordance with previous studies on 
post-deal performance and our a priori expectation, the four-digit SIC relatedness variable has 
a positive and significant coefficient (see Table 2.4.1-A, all models). 
Method of payment: Managers who view their companies as undervalued by the cap-
ital market prefer to finance acquisitions with cash, whereas those who view their company as 
overvalued are more likely to finance M&A deals with stock (Kang and Stulz, 1997). Previous 
studies show that cash-financed acquisitions tend to be more beneficial, or at least less harm-
ful, to bidder companies’ shareholders (e.g., Huang and Walkling, 1987; Travlos, 1987; 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; and Carow, Heron and Saxton, 2004). We account for the latter 
effect by including a dummy variable which equals one when the method of payment for the 
acquisition is all cash and zero otherwise. In line with our a priori expectation, this variable has 
a positive and significant coefficient in Table 2.4.1-A (all models). 
Acquirer liquidity: According Martynova and Renneboog (2006), acquirers charac-
terised by high liquidity levels experience worse post-M&A performance. We use the ratio of 
cash and cash equivalents to total assets in order to capture the influence of this variable. We 
expect that the level of acquirer liquidity will exert a negative and significant impact on post-
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deal performance in our model. In line with previous studies and our a priori expectation, the 
regression results presented in Table 2.4.1-A (all models) show that the level of acquirer li-
quidity is negatively and significantly related to post-acquisition performance. 
Acquirer share turnover: We expect that when the degree of information asymmetry 
between the bidder company’s management and its shareholders is higher, the long-term 
post-M&A performance of bidders will be poorer. Following Ferreira et al. (2009), we account 
for this effect by measuring the share turnover of bidders prior to the announcement of a deal. 
We expect this variable to be positively and significantly associated with our measure of post-
M&A performance. The results presented in Table 2.4.1-A (models 2, 3 and 4) show that ac-
quirer share turnover has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. 
Difference between acquirer and target countries’ corporate governance: 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) developed the so-called ‘positive spill-over by law’ hypoth-
esis, which posits that the corporate governance regulations of the bidder are imposed on the 
target in M&A deals in which the acquirer is domiciled in a country with strong shareholder 
protection. Danbolt and Maciver (2012) provide empirical evidence in support of the positive 
spill-over by law hypothesis by demonstrating that the acquisition gains that accrue to target 
companies are significantly larger in cases when the acquirer’s country of domicile is charac-
terised by a superior governance system. This can have a positive impact on the post-M&A 
returns which accrue to bidder companies.  To account for the latter effect, we calculate the 
difference between the acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-dealing indices. We expect this 
variable to have a positive and significant association with post-M&A bidder performance and 
that the higher the divergence between target and bidder shareholder protection, the more 
likely it is that synergies will be realised by strengthening the target company’s corporate gov-
ernance. According to the results presented in Table 2.4.1-A (models 1, 2 and 3), this variable 
has a positive and significant coefficient. 
Cultural difference between acquirer and target countries: We expect that acquirers 
can experience relatively poorer post M&A performance in cases when the cultural gap be-
tween the acquirer and target countries is relatively higher. This effect arises from difficulties 
in performing post-merger integration successfully when the cultural divergence makes inte-
gration a time consuming, difficult, and expensive process. In line with the results documented 
by Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2005), we provide empirical evidence in favour of this 
hypothesis (Table 2.4.1-A, models 3 and 4). 
We present all variables in Table 2.2-A. 











The buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) which accrue to acquirers’ 
low and very low turnover shareholder i from deal j measured over a 
12-month event window starting one month prior to announcement in 





Investor regional expertise: the percentage of the total portfolio of the 
acquirer’s low and very low turnover shareholders which is invested in 
the region of the target company. Note that for the purposes of perform-
ing the analysis at the deal level, this variable is defined as the number 
of all low and very low turnover institutional investors that have any port-
folio holding in the region of the target. 
+ 
3 Rel_Maturity 
Relative maturity: the difference between the M&A maturity of the ac-
quirer and target countries. M&A maturity is measured by the M&A Ma-
turity Index, which rates 148 countries in terms of their degree of devel-
opment for M&A purposes. The country index is calculated by using an 
average weighting of six groups of factors which have been identified in 
previous research as critical for a market to attract and sustain M&A 
activity, namely, regulatory and political, financial and economic, tech-
nological, socio-economic,  development of physical infrastructure and 





Knowledge-intensive institutional investors interacted with relative ma-
turity: this variable captures the effect of knowledge-intensive institu-
tional investors as determined by the M&A maturity gap between the 
acquirer and target countries. It is expected that in cases where the tar-
get country is less mature for M&A purposes than the acquirer country, 
the effect of knowledge-intensive institutional investors on post-M&A 
performance should be more positive. 
+ 
5 Prct_Held_B 
Percentage held before the deal announcement: the percentage of out-
standing bidder company shares that the low and/or very low turnover 
investor i holds in acquirer j measured three months prior to the an-
nouncement of the deal. 
+/- 
6 Cult_Dist The cultural distance between the acquirer and target countries. - 
7 Deal_Val 
Value of M&A deal: the natural logarithm of the M&A deal value meas-
ured in millions of US dollars. 
- 
8 Hostile 




Industry relatedness between target and acquirer dummy: variable 
which is equal to 1 if the target and acquirer four-digit SIC (Standard 
Industry Classification) codes are the same and 0 otherwise. 
+ 
10 All_Cash 
Method of payment is all-cash dummy: variable which is equal to 1 if the 
method of payment for the M&A deal is all cash and 0 otherwise. 
+ 
11 MV_BVAcq Y-1 
Market-to-book ratio of the acquirer company: equal to the market value 
divided by the book value of the acquirer one year before the announce-
ment of the deal. 
+/- 
 
Number Variable name Definition 
Expected 
sign 
12 TD_TAAcq Y-1 
Ratio of total debt to total assets of the acquirer company: 
equal to the total debt divided by the total assets of the acquirer 
company one year before the announcement of the deal. 
+/- 
13 LiquidAcq Y-1 
Liquidity of acquirer company: equal to the cash and cash 
equivalents divided by the total assets of the acquirer one year 
before the announcement of the deal. 
- 
14 TurnovAcq 
Share turnover of acquirer company: equal to the trading vol-
ume divided by the total outstanding shares of the acquirer 
company measured three months before the announcement 





The difference between acquirer country and target country in 
the anti-self-dealing index: the anti-self-dealing index, as de-





*** Please note that this is the dependent variable in our model. 
** Please note that this variable is used to control for cluster effects. 
* Please note that these variables are used to compare the characteristics of our final study sample to the sample 
of M&A deals which are excluded from this study. 
16 Prior_Exp 
Acquirer prior experience: equal to 1 when the acquirer has 
completed an earlier deal in the target region. 
+ 
17 Top_Advis 
Top advisor: equal 1 to when the acquirer is advised by a 
global investment bank. 
+ 
18 Prior_Sub 
Prior subsidiary: equal to 1 when the acquirer has a subsidiary 
in the target region. 
+ 
19 Domic_Tar_Reg 
Domiciled in the region of the target: equal to 1 when the insti-
tutional investor on the acquirer’s share register is domiciled in 





Prior joint venture or alliance: the natural logarithm of the num-
ber of joint ventures or strategic alliances that the acquirer had 
completed in the target region before the current deal. 
+ 
21 Geog_Dist’ 
Geographic distance: the natural logarithm of the geographic 
distance between the acquirer and target region. 
- 
22 Tender_Offer 
Tender offer: equal to 1 if the deal is classified as a ‘tender 
offer’ by the SDC Platinum Database and 0 otherwise. 
+ 
23 Competing_Bidder 
Competing bidder: equal to 1 if there are any competing bid-
ders and 0 otherwise. 
+/- 
24 Target_Term_Fee 
Target termination fee: equal to 1 if there is a target company 




Any institutional investors which leaves: the number of institu-
tional investors that dispose of their holdings in the acquirer 










Acquisitive company in terms of average cross border deals: 
equal to 1 when the number of international deals which the 
acquirer has completed is greater than the average number of 
international deals completed. 
+/- 
27 Investor name 
The name of the low and very low turnover investor that is 
present on the acquirer’s share register.  
** 
28 DV_MVAcq 
Ratio of deal value to market value: equal to the M&A trans-
action value divided by the market value of the acquirer 20 
days prior to the announcement of the deal. 
* 
29 MVAcq Y-1 
The market value of the acquirer one year prior to the an-
nouncement of the deal, measured in thousands of US dollars. 
* 
30 SalesAcq Y-1 
The net sales/revenue of the acquirer one year prior to the 
announcement of the deal, measured in thousands of US dol-
lars. 
* 
31 ROEAcq Y-1 
Acquirer return on equity: acquirer net income divided by com-
mon shareholder’s equity one year prior to the announcement 
of the deal. 
* 
32 EBIT_MGAcq Y-1 
Acquirer EBIT margin: equal to earnings before interest and 
tax divided by net sales one year prior to the announcement 
of the deal. 
* 
33 ICRAcq Y-1 
Acquirer interest cover ratio: equal to earnings before interest 
and tax divided by the net interest expense of the acquirer one 
year prior to the announcement of the deal. 
* 
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2.3. Data and methodology 
Following the approach of FMM, we merge a sample of cross-border M&A deals from SDC 
Platinum with the FactSet Lionshares Global Ownership database in order to obtain firm-level 
institutional ownership as of the quarter-end prior to deal announcement. In contrast to FMM, 
our sample consists of completed bids only as we are interested in testing the relationship 
between knowledge-intensive investors’ levels of regional expertise and ex-post success – 
measured here as medium- to long-term shareholder wealth creation.10 Next, we record the 
Factset region for the deals.  Our final sample includes only public acquirers. 
The data capture period is 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2011, and the resulting sample 
breaks down as follows: 
1. Potential cross-border deals from SDC     8,254 
2. M&A deals from 1 in which the acquirer has a share register in Factset   4,688 
3. Completed deals in 2 with acquirer share price data from t-1 to t+12 months   3,932 
4. Completed deals in 3 with all information for regression analysis available   2,065 
5. Completed deals in 3 including primary index-listed acquirers    1,236 
6. Completed deals in 5 with all information for regression analysis available  748 
Table 2.3-A records the sample descriptive statistics for the deal data. 
Table 2.3-A: Cross-border acquirers and transaction characteristics 
T 
Sample All (2,065) - A 
Study-sample 































Deal_val 495*** 59*** 1086 257 282*** 36*** -8.92 258.91 -13.59 421.78 
DV_MV 59% 5%*** 10% 2% 
77.05
%* 














-12.46 458.65 -18.97 770.07 
MV_BVAcq 
Y-1 



































10%*** -1.58 22.17 -1.87 38.9 
                                                 
10 Following a review of the acquirers’ share registers of the initial data sample of 3,932 cross-border deals, we 
further refine the sample to include only deals by acquirers which make out the constituency of the primary stock 
market index [primary index-listed acquirers], e.g. including firms listed on the FTSE 100 and excluding firms listed 
on, for example, AIM. We introduce this filter to the dataset as the initial dataset of acquirers display some anom-
alies related to the type of investor on the share registers. For example, we find an unusually low proportion of 
index-tracking investors in smaller stocks and an unusually high proportion of value investors in the initial data cut. 
It should be noted that we have tested for any potential bias that could be introduced to our analysis by the impo-









12%*** 12% 7% 
20.99
%*** 




5.84*** 28.04 6.12 
41.17*
** 
5.61*** -6.53 373.99 -9.67 582.33 
This table compares the key acquirer and deal characteristics of the study sample to the initial sample with all 
of the available information (i.e. including primary index-listed acquirers) and to the sample of excluded acquir-
ers. ‘All (2,065) - A’ refers to the sample of all public acquirers for which accounting and share register infor-
mation is available and which are also listed on non-primary exchanges. ‘Study-sample (748) - B’ refers to the 
final sample of deals used for the purposes of the analysis performed in this study. ‘Excluded (1,317) -C’ refers 
to the sample of deals which are excluded from the analysis due to the fact that they are not listed on a primary 
stock exchange index. Company financials are obtained from Datastream and measured in US$ while deal 
value is measured in millions of US$. ‘Deal_val’ stands for the value of the M&A transaction; ‘DV_MV’ is meas-
ured as the ratio of the M&A deal value to the acquirer market value as of 20 days before the announcement of 
the deal; ‘MVAcq Y-1’ stands for the market value of the acquirer as of one year prior to the announcement of the 
deal; ‘MV_BVAcq Y-1’ measures the acquirer market-to-book ratio as of one year prior to the announcement of 
the deal;  ‘SalesAcquirer Y-1’ measures the acquirer net sales as of one year prior to the announcement of the deal; 
‘ROE’ is measured in % terms and represents net income before preferred dividends less the preferred dividend 
requirement divided by last year's common equity, and is calculated by Datastream; ‘EBIT_MGAcq Y-1’ is meas-
ured as the ratio of EBIT to net sales as of one year before the announcement of the deal; ‘TD_TAAcq Y-1’ is 
measured as total debt divided by total assets; ‘LiquidAcq Y-1’ is measured as the ratio of acquirer cash and 
equivalents divided by total assets as of one year prior to the announcement of the deal; and ‘ICRAcq Y-1’ is 
measured as the  ratio of acquirer EBIT divided by net interest expense as of one year prior to the announcement 
of the deal. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 2.3-A shows a breakdown of the acquirer and deal characteristics for the final study 
sample and the acquirers which are excluded as they are not primary index-listed (see step 5 
above). As expected, the final sample displays the characteristics of a mature company sam-
ple. Specifically, the sample firms are larger in terms of revenue (a median revenue of 
$7.046bn compared to $296m) and market value (a median revenue of $8.807bn compared 
to $486m), than the excluded sample. The firms in the final sample are also more profitable 
than the excluded, less mature firms, with the median return on equity for the former being 
16% and the latter 11% in the year prior to the announcement of the deal. 
We present the cross-regional deal distribution using the full set of deals including primary 
index-listed acquirers (step 5 above) from acquirer region to target region in Table 2.3-B, Pan-
els A and B. 
Table 2.3-B: M&A deals and investor expertise per sample region 
Panel A: Number of completed cross-border deals per regional pair 
Target region → 
Acquirer region ↓ 







Africa 4 0 9 5 1 3 6 28 
Asia 0 74 52 2 1 43 14 186 
Europe 18 43 351 45 8 158 16 639 
Latin America 2 0 0 3 0 12 0 17 
Middle East 0 6 2 0 3 12 0 23 
North America 4 25 120 19 9 67 22 266 
Pacific 2 12 24 2 0 21 16 77 
All 30 160 558 76 22 316 74 1,236 
Panel A shows the cross-border deal flow (number) in the sample from the acquirer region to the target region over the 
sample period (1,236 in total from all regions to all regions). 
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Panel B: Proportion of completed cross-border deals per regional pair 
Target region → 
Acquirer region ↓ 







Africa 0.14 0.00 0.32 0.18 0.04 0.11 0.21 1.00 
Asia 0.00 0.40 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.08 1.00 
Europe 0.03 0.07 0.55 0.07 0.01 0.25 0.03 1.00 
Latin America 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.71 0.00 1.00 
Middle East 0.00 0.26 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.52 0.00 1.00 
North America 0.01 0.09 0.45 0.07 0.03 0.25 0.08 1.00 
Pacific 0.03 0.16 0.31 0.03 0.00 0.27 0.21 1.00 
Panel B shows the proportion of cross-border deal flow in the sample from the acquirer region to the target region over the 
sample period (1,236 in total from all regions to all regions). 
 
Panel C: Average investor regional expertise (KnI_II) 



























Africa 0.28 - 0.34 0.03 - 0.30 0.03 0.19 0.19 
Asia - 0.24 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.36 0.01 0.30 0.32 
Europe 0.01 0.11 0.48 0.01 0.02 0.28 0.02 0.35 0.22 
Latin America 0.00 - - 0.12 - 0.32 - 0.28 0.31 
Middle East - 0.11 0.32 - 0.33 0.44 - 0.21 0.21 
North America 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.64 0.01 0.26 0.16 
Pacific - 0.21 0.28 0.01 - 0.32 0.05 0.24 0.28 
Panel C illustrates the average level of expertise in the target region which acquirers have on their share registers pre-
announcement. Specifically, it shows the average portfolio allocation in the target region of the low and very low turnover 
investors on the acquirer share register in the quarter prior to the announcement of the deal, i.e. our definition of knowledge-
intensive institutional investors’ regional expertise (KnI_II). Note that the turnover classification is defined by the FactSet 
database and the average level of expertise is the equally weighted average for all low and very low turnover investors which 
are registered holder of the acquirers shares - for our sample of 1,236 completed deals – in the period reaching two quarters 
prior to the announcement. Columns 1 to 7 show the average expertise per regional pair, e.g. the value of 0.28 in the upper 
left cell shows that the level of regional expertise of African acquirers in our sample, i.e. the average portfolio allocation for 
low and very low turnover investor listed on the acquirer share register into the Africa region, is 28%. If we compare this to 
the cell corresponding to African acquirers investing in the European region, we can conclude that the level of expertise on 
the acquirers’ share register (34%) is on average higher than for their home region of Africa. The final two columns show the 
average regional expertise shown ex-ante on acquirers’ share registers per acquirer region but irrespective of target region. 
So, if we compare the top two listed acquirer regions, Africa and Asia, we see that Asian acquirers have on average more 
regional expertise – and should, therefore, be in a better position to evaluate investment opportunities abroad providing that 
their management teams consult their knowledge-intensive investors – on their share registers compared to African acquir-
ers. Finally, the last column takes the same average irrespective of target region but excludes intra-regional transactions. 
 
We present the descriptive statistics in three ways. Panel A shows a numerical count of the 
regional deals. The within region deals are recorded on the diagonal and all other entries 
represent cross-regional deals. It is not surprising to see that the largest number of cross-
regional deals is from Europe to North America, followed by North America to Europe. Inter-
estingly, the next highest cross-regional deal counts are for Asia to Europe and Asia to North 
America. The sum of these two-cross border counts in which the acquirer is Asian is actually 
greater than the deal count for within the Asian region. 
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One problem with this type of count is that some regions are much larger than others, so Panel 
B presents the same deal data but in proportionate terms to avoid the possibility of relative 
regional trends being masked by focusing on a simple numerical count. The proportions show 
some interesting features for the smaller regions. African acquirers complete 32% of all their 
deals with European targets compared to 14% within the region itself and only 11% with North 
America. In contrast, Latin American acquirers do 71% of all their deals with North American 
targets, only 18% are within region and the percentage with European targets is negligible. 
The other region which shows a clear pattern is the petro-dollar rich region of the Middle East 
where acquirers have 52% of targets in North America, 26% in Asia and a surprisingly low 
proportion of European targets of 9%. 
While these first two panels help to develop an appreciation of regional M&A geography, they 
do not provide any information on our key proposed explanatory variable of investor expertise. 
The next step is to analyse the final sample of cross-border acquirers’ share registers in order 
to construct the regional expertise variable. We identify the knowledge-intensive (informed) 
investor subset by selecting all of the institutional investors classified by FactSet as having a 
low or very low portfolio turnover.11 
We then record the regional investment pattern for this large sub-sample of investors. So, for 
instance, for illustrative purposes consider an acquirer based in Europe. Step 1 records all of 
the investors on the acquirer’s share register with a low or very low turnover investment style. 
Step 2 then records the cross-regional distribution of all the investments of each of these 
informed investors. Thus, when a US acquirer is considering a cross-regional M&A deal into 
Latin America, it is possible to identify how many of its institutional investors already have 
holdings in Latin America and how much larger that holding is – implying that a larger propor-
tion indicates a higher level of expertise. Specifically, our measure of foreign expertise is the 
percentage of each investor’s portfolio (measured by market capitalisation) which is invested 
in the target region.  If the deal is US (acquirer region: North America) to Brazil (target region: 
Latin America), we look at all of the investors which are on the US acquirer’s share register. 
For each investor, we have the data of their regional investment, i.e. the proportion of their 
portfolio which is invested in each global region (North America, Europe, Latin America, Asia, 
the Pacific and the Middle East). In this example, the foreign expertise for each investor would 
be the percentage of market value which is held in the Latin America region vs. the total for all 
regions. We use these target region holdings as the measure (proxy) for regional expertise 
given that it is unlikely that the investors will have invested in the target region without first 
conducting research and collecting data. In order to see the patterns of regional expertise, 
Panel C presents the average level of expertise on acquirers’ share registers, i.e. the average 
portfolio allocation which informed investors (‘Low’ and ‘Very Low’) hold in the target region. 
Panel C, Columns 1 to 7, show the average expertise per regional pair. As an example, we 
find that for African acquirers which invest in Europe, the average regional expertise on their 
share register is 34% compared to 30% for investing in North America.The final two columns 
present the average regional expertise measured ex-ante on acquirers’ share registers per 
                                                 
11 FactSet classifies investors on the basis of their portfolio turnover style in five categories: very high, high, me-
dium, low and very low. It also classifies an institution as low turnover if it has a two- to four-year holding period 
and its portfolio has an annual turnover of 25% to 50%. An institution is classified as very low turnover if it has a 
holding period of four years or longer and its portfolio has an annual turnover of less than 25%. Portfolio turnover 
is calculated by dividing the average value of transactions (as reported) by the market value of the portfolio. 
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acquirer region but irrespective of target region. If we compare the top two listed acquirer 
regions, Africa and Asia, we see that Asian acquirers have on average more regional exper-
tise. Therefore, Asian acquirers should be in a better position to evaluate investment opportu-
nities abroad as compared to African acquirers, providing that their management teams con-
sult the knowledge-intensive investors on their share registers. Finally, the last column takes 
the same average irrespective of target region but excludes intra-regional transactions. From 
this table, we conclude that European and Asian acquirers appear to have the highest level of 
knowledge-intensive expertise on their share registers when making cross-border deals. The 
average portfolio allocation in the target region for knowledge-intensive investors on the ac-
quirer share register for European acquirers is 35% with the corresponding allocation for Asian 
acquirers’ investors being 30%. However, these figures do not address the issue of the large 
flow of intra-regional cross-border transactions for which we assume the level of investor ex-
pertise is less relevant. The average knowledge-intensive regional expertise for cross-regional 
deals is presented in Column 9 of the same panel. Here we can see that it is instead Asian 
(32%), Latin American (31%) and Pacific (28%) acquirers which have the highest level of ex-
pertise in the target region represented on their share registers. 
In addition to the regional expertise of investors, the other explanatory variable, which we 
introduce as a proxy for market divergence, is the difference in the maturity for M&A purposes 
of the acquirer and target regions. We capture this by using the M&A Maturity Index developed 
by Appadu, Faelten, Moeller and Vitkova (2012). This index is based on a country scoring 
procedure which evaluates the factors that make a country attractive for and able to sustain 
M&A activity. More specifically, the M&A maturity index is based on five main groups of factors 
which have been identified by previous studies as the major drivers of M&A activity. These 
five factor groups are: 
 Regulatory and political factors (e.g., rule of law (see Rossi and Volpin, 2004) and 
corruption of officials (see Yartey, 2008)); 
 Economic and financial factors (e.g., GDP growth (see Berthelemy and Demurger, 
2000 and Liu, Shu and Sinclair, 2009) and stock market capitalisation and access to 
financing (see Yartey, 2008 and Saborowski, 2009)); 
 Technological factors (e.g., high-technology export and innovation (see Porter, 1993)); 
 Socio-economic factors (e.g., population and demographics (Appadu, Faelten, Moeller 
and Vitkova (2012)); and 
 Quality of infra-structure and assets (e.g. roads and railways, and the number of size-
able corporate assets (see, e.g., Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2004; Quazi, 
2011; Mateev, 2009 and Anyanwu, 2012)). 
The M&A Maturity Index allocates a score of between 0% and 100% for each factor group to 
148 countries worldwide – where 100% indicates the highest degree of development for M&A 
purposes and 0% the lowest level – and produces an overall M&A maturity score as a weighted 
average of the five groups. The top and bottom 15 countries represented in our sample are 
shown in Table 2.3-C, Panels A and B. 
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Table 2.3-C: Description of the M&A Maturity Index 
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Panel A: M&A Maturity Index country ranking and index score (2012), corresponding score for the five 
factor groups for the top 15 ranked countries represented in the sample 
 
















United States 1 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.92 0.80 0.89 
Singapore 2 0.84 0.96 0.75 0.90 0.68 0.92 
United Kingdom 3 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.93 0.71 0.90 
Hong Kong 4 0.81 0.87 0.76 0.83 0.72 0.88 
South Korea 5 0.81 0.76 0.65 0.95 0.91 0.78 
Germany 6 0.80 0.76 0.66 0.91 0.73 0.95 
Canada 7 0.80 0.84 0.76 0.89 0.81 0.71 
France 8 0.80 0.80 0.70 0.92 0.67 0.90 
China 9 0.79 0.44 0.87 0.81 0.97 0.87 
Japan 10 0.79 0.73 0.75 0.92 0.69 0.87 
Netherlands 11 0.79 0.86 0.71 0.94 0.65 0.79 
Switzerland 12 0.79 0.86 0.75 0.93 0.60 0.78 
Australia 13 0.77 0.90 0.73 0.85 0.69 0.70 
Spain 14 0.77 0.68 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.90 
Austria 15 0.74 0.80 0.58 0.84 0.60 0.88 
 
Panel B: M&A Maturity Index country ranking and index score (2012), corresponding score for the five 
factor groups for the bottom 15 ranked countries represented in the sample. 
 
















Egypt 65 0.56 0.38 0.54 0.47 0.66 0.74 
Peru 68 0.55 0.52 0.64 0.56 0.59 0.43 
Philippines 70 0.54 0.35 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.41 
Lebanon 76 0.51 0.37 0.59 0.59 0.51 0.50 
Macedonia 80 0.50 0.63 0.49 0.46 0.55 0.38 
Pakistan 86 0.47 0.21 0.46 0.37 0.65 0.64 
Bangladesh 90 0.44 0.20 0.61 0.32 0.69 0.39 
Syria 97 0.42 0.38 0.45 0.35 0.49 0.42 
Nigeria 101 0.41 0.23 0.50 0.40 0.53 0.38 
Ecuador 102 0.40 0.27 0.37 0.49 0.52 0.36 
Ghana 107 0.39 0.52 0.38 0.25 0.49 0.31 
Papua New Guinea 123 0.34 0.26 0.50 0.40 0.35 0.19 
Uganda 132 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.28 0.41 0.25 
Sierra Leone 133 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.29 0.20 
Dem. Rep. of Congo 143 0.27 0.19 0.39 0.42 0.25 0.12 
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The country rankings for 2012 demonstrate the emergence of Asia as a fast developing region 
for M&A activity, with the region claiming five of the top ten country positions. Despite the US 
(85%) and the UK (82%) claiming the top and third spots respectively, Singapore (84%) and 
Hong Kong (81%) are second and fourth respectively, with South Korea (5th), China (9th) and 
Japan (10th) following. By using the relative M&A maturity index score,12 i.e. the difference 
between the acquirer and target countries’ levels of development for M&A purposes, we 
should be in a better position to measure the true divergence between the two markets and, 
therefore, better identify the cross-border transactions for which management is in greater 
need of additional expertise. According to Tong, Alessandri, Reur and Chintakananda (2008), 
country- as opposed to industry-effects also influence the performance of companies involved 
in cross-country investment activities. 
In Table 2.3-D, Panels A to B we present a univariate analysis of acquirer ex-post shareholder 
wealth creation. 
Table 2.3-D: Long-term acquirer performance – Buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) 
Panel A: Regional acquirer BHAR – time dependent 
Acquirer region ↓ 
BHAR t-1m to t+12m 
t-stats (observations) 
BHAR t-1m to t+24m 
t-stats (observations) 
BHAR t-1m to t+36m 
t-stats (observations) 
Africa 0.042 0.076 0.032 
 0.616 (28) 0.461 (23) 0.104 (21) 
Asia 0.108*** 0.163*** 0.295*** 
 4.883 (186) 4.961 (164) 5.675 (140) 
Europe 0.053*** 0.121*** 0.215*** 
 5.061 (639) 6.729 (607) 7.144 (561) 
Latin America 0.175** 0.198* 0.086 
 2.257 (17) 1.928 (15) 0.729 (14) 
Middle East -0.105 -0.103 -0.151 
 -1.318 (23) -0.795 (19) -0.910 (17) 
North America 0.095*** 0.236*** 0.415*** 
 4.481 (266) 7.230 (243) 8.129 (209) 
Pacific 0.109*** 0.175*** 0.392*** 
 2.969 (77) 3.184 (70) 4.709 (63) 
All 0.072*** 0.151*** 0.266*** 
 8.499 (1,236) 11.567 (1,141) 12.826 (1,025) 
                                                 
12 Note that the M&A Maturity Index is measured on a time series basis starting from the year 2006, before which 
we use data for 2006 as the latest available year. 
Panels A and B shows the top and bottom 15 countries in the 2012 M&A Maturity Index represented in our 
sample. The Rank is the country ranking for 2012, based on the total of 148 countries ranked in the index. The 
M&A Maturity Index score  – which determines the rank – is the weighted average of the five factor group scores 
including 1) Regulatory and political factors (e.g., rule of law and political stability), 2) Economic and financial 
factors (e.g., GDP growth and access to financing), 3) Technological factors (e.g., high-tech exports and inno-
vation), 4) Socio-economic factors (e.g., population) and 5) Quality of infra-structure and assets (e.g. roads and 




Panel A shows the equally-weighted buy-and-hold portfolio returns (BHAR) for all acquirers which completed a cross-border deal 
during the sample period (1,236 deals). The matrix shows the performance per acquirer region and BHAR period, ranging from 
month -1, before the announcement, to months 12, 24 and 36 after the announcement. Each period shows the average abnormal 
total return, adjusted to the regional MSCI index and the corresponding t-statistics and number of observations. Note that for the 
Middle East and Africa – where no appropriate regionally defined indices for the sample period could be sourced – we use the 
MSCI Emerging Markets Europe and Middle East and the MSCI Emerging Markets Europe, Middle East and Africa indices, 
respectively. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
The general form of equation (1) shows that we use post-acquisition returns as the dependent 
variable in order to appraise the performance of individual M&A deals. More specifically, since 
the main focus of our analysis is to examine post-M&A performance from the perspective of 
investors with low or very low turnover (informed investors), we argue here that the most rel-
evant performance metric is the one which takes into account the post-acquisition returns over 
a 13-month investment horizon.13 We thus measure performance on the basis of acquirer 
share price returns using the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) which accrue to acquir-
ers over a 13-month event window starting from one month prior to the announcement of the 
                                                 
13 This investment horizon also coincides with the time period which Factset uses in order to distinguish between 
different levels of investor turnover.  
Panel B: Regional acquirer BHAR – target region dependent 




















Africa -0.02 - 0.15 0.11* 0.33 0.08 -0.20 
 -0.17 (4) - (0) 1.18 (9) 1.74 (5) - (1) 1.14 (3) -0.93 (6) 
Asia - 0.16*** 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.11** 0.08** 
 - (0) 3.46 (74) 1.30 (52) 0.25 (2) - (1) 2.80 (43) 2.11 (14) 
Europe 0.09 0.06 0.05*** 0.00 0.09** 0.05*** 0.04 
 1.36 (18) 1.51 (43) 3.51 (351) 0.12 (45) 2.04 (8) 3.21 (158) 0.51 (16) 
Latin America 0.26 - - 0.17 - 0.16 - 
 0.84 (2) - (0) - (0) 1.02 (3) - (0) 1.64 (12) - (0) 
Middle East - 0.14 -0.09 - -0.37* -0.16* - 
 - (0) 0.70 (6) -0.50 (2) - (0) -1.83 (3) -1.82 (12) - (0) 
North America -0.12 0.15* 0.09** 0.17* 0.14* 0.09*** 0.01 
 -1.43 (4) 1.97 (25) 2.82 (120) 1.69 (19) 1.88 (9) 2.59 (67) 0.15 (22) 
Pacific 0.09 -0.01 0.12* 0.17*** - 0.17** 0.10 
 0.59 (2) -0.06 (12) 1.74 (24) 4.39 (2) - (0) 2.13 (21) 1.43 (16) 
 
Panel B shows the equally-weighted buy-and-hold portfolio returns (BHAR) for all acquirers which completed a cross-border 
deal during the sample period (1,236 deals). The matrix shows the performance per acquirer and target region, with the BHAR 
period ranging from month -1, before the announcement, to month 12 after the announcement. Each cell shows the average 
abnormal total return, adjusted to the regional MSCI index and the corresponding t-statistics and number of observations. Note 
that for the Middle East and Africa – where no appropriate regionally defined indices for the sample period could be sourced – 
we use the MSCI Emerging Markets Europe and Middle East and the MSCI Emerging Markets Europe, Middle East and Africa 
indices, respectively. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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deal in order to capture the run-up period to 12 months post the announcement of the deal.14 
The BHAR approach to measuring abnormal returns has been widely used in studies involving 
share price performance (see, e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997 and Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) define BHAR as “the average multiyear return from a strategy of 
investing in all firms that complete an event and selling at the end of a pre-specified holding 
period versus a comparable strategy using otherwise similar non-event firms.” An advantage 
of using BHAR is that this approach to measuring company share price performance is closer 
to investors’ actual investment experience compared to the periodic rebalancing which other 
approaches to share price performance analysis involve. Given the specific cross-regional 
focus of this study, the BHARs are equally weighted and adjusted to the performance of the 
respective MSCI regional index of the acquirer company over the same period. Specifically, 
we consider the following regions for the purposes of calculating bidder BHAR: Africa, Asia, 
Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, North America and the Pacific.15 
In Table 2.3-D, Panel A, we provide an overview of acquirers’ BHAR across acquirer region 
and time. Our first conclusion is that, on average, acquirers appear to outperform their regional 
indices by 7.2% in the  t-1m to t+12m period around the announcement of the transaction. This is 
an interesting finding as many previous studies provide evidence to the contrary, i.e. that M&A 
deals typically destroy shareholder wealth for the acquirer (Schlingemann, Stultz and Moeller, 
2005). We explain this average positive acquirer return by the superior ex-ante financial per-
formance displayed by our study sample due to their status as listed on the primary stock 
exchange index. Some interesting regional differences are also evident from the results pre-
sented. When measuring BHAR over the t-1m to t+12m period, we find that acquirers from Latin 
America earn the largest statistically significant returns while acquirers from Africa and the 
Middle East do not earn any positive returns which are statistically significantly different from 
zero. This aggregate average as well as the relative returns pattern does not seem to change 
qualitatively when the period over which the BHARs are calculated is increased from t+12 to 
t+24 or t+36 months. 
Panel B presents the data on returns at a regional level. This shows a very different pattern to 
the aggregated statistics above. For instance, as mentioned earlier, Asian acquirers are rela-
tively big investors in both Europe and North America and even though, when all deals are 
taken together, they earn positive returns overall (10.8% Panel A), they do not earn statistically 
significantly positive returns on their European deals. There appear, therefore, to be significant 
variations in cross-regional deal performance. 
This naturally leads to formal testing in order to see whether the variations in performance can 
be explained by Hypotheses 1 and 2 – the role of investors with regional expertise when M&A 
markets are most divergent. 
                                                 
14 Note that the BHAR analysis uses the total returns of a company, i.e. it includes share price appreciation or 
depreciation as well as the return from reinvesting the paid dividends. 
15 Note that for the Middle East and Africa – where no appropriately regionally defined indices could be sourced – 
we use the MSCI Emerging Markets Europe and Middle East and the MSCI Emerging Markets Europe, Middle 
East and Africa, respectively. 
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2.4. Empirical Analysis 
2.4.1.  Empirical tests on the effects of institutional investors’ regional 
expertise 
Our three-level dataset consists of 748 cross-border deals, and 4,078 unique institutional in-
vestors representing 75,555 unique observations of institutional investor foreign expertise. 
Therefore, the average number of institutional investors that are present on each acquirer’s 
share register for a given deal is 101 (with a median of 7).16 Given that our final sample con-
sists of 4, 078 unique institutional investors, we conclude that there are approximately 18.5 
unique shareholders involved in each of the 748 M&A deals.17 
As our regressions are run at the institutional investor level (from the acquirer share register), 
we note that clustering issues might arise. It is certainly plausible that the same investor could 
be a shareholder in multiple acquirers in the sample, especially for acquirers in the same re-
gion. If two (or more) acquirers with the same investor(s) on their share register invest in the 
same region, the effect of our KnI_II variable on deal success might be overstated. We control 
for this issue by adding cluster controls on the Investor name in a panel regression setting. All 
regression models illustrated in Tables 6 through 12 control for this issue. Using the BHAR 
performance of bidders, adjusted to a size-specific index to control for the potential bias in our 
sample of primary index-listed acquirers being larger than the average firm, we test the rela-
tionship between the acquirers’ post-merger performance over an event window of t-1m to t+12m 
and the degree of regional expertise of the acquirers’ informed investors,18 i.e. estimating 
Equation (1) with the results reported in Table 2.4.1-A. 
Table 2.4.1-A: Analysis of t-1m to t+12m and t-1m to t+36m post-M&A performance 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12- and +36-months adjusted by the MSCI 
World Size Index corresponding to each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of 
the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio 
allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register mul-
tiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural dis-
tance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares which each 
institutional investor has in the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ 
equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, ‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in 
the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the method of payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, 
‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of total debt to total assets, ‘LiquidAcq’ 
is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by total outstanding 
shares three months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the 
acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-dealing index values, and ‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer 
and target M&A maturity. We estimate our regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where the unique in-
vestor name represents the cluster variable in the panel. For our main regression specification, where we use the 
acquirer BHAR returns over the 12-month period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index, 
the underlying deal data sample is 748 deals. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated 
                                                 
16 The substantial difference between the average and median number of investors registered on a given deal 
reflects the large difference between the maximum (956) and minimum (1) number of investors present on the 
acquirer’s share register for a given deal.   
17 In order to capture these different methods of accounting for our sample, Tables 6 through 12 report the number 
of unique institutional investors, the number of M&A deals and the number of observations for each estimated 
regression.  
18 To control for any potential diminishing time effect, we test the same relationship over a longer time period, 
namely the acquirer BHAR over an event window of t-1m to t+36m. Our conclusions are robust to this control, presented 
in Table 6, Models 3 and 4. 
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on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are 
not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have a robust estimate of variance following Huber 
(1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statis-
tical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
The results for H1 > 0  indicate that there is a significant and positive relationship between 
the level of regional expertise that the acquirer’s informed investors possess and post-bid 
performance. Specifically, models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 2.4.1-A show that the coefficient which 
corresponds to the variable that quantifies the regional expertise of each monitoring investor, 
namely KnI_II, is positive and statistically significantly different from zero. This latter result 
provides support for Hypothesis 1: that informed investors which possess specialised regional 
knowledge about the target’s geographical region (acquired due to existing investments in the 
region) can contribute to the success of cross-regional M&A deals. 
In addition, the regression results presented in Table 2.4.1-A, (models 2 and 4), provide sup-
port for the second hypothesis developed in this study: that H2 > 0 is positive. Specifically, 
the models show that the regional expertise of knowledge-intensive institutional investors is 
 
(1) Dependent 
variable:  t-1m to 
t+12m BHAR 
(2) Dependent 
variable:  t-1m to 
t+12m BHAR 
(3) Dependent 
variable:  t-1m to 
t+36m BHAR 
(4) Dependent 
variable:  t-1m to 
t+36m BHAR 
Institutional investor expertise 
Knl_II 0.062*** 0.053*** 0.024*** 0.004 
 15.640 13.200 4.380 0.700 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity  0.415***  1.698*** 
  6.750  10.340 
Control variables     
Cult_Dist 0.004*** 0.003*** -0.019*** -0.022*** 
 4.030 2.920 -10.150 -10.350 
Prct_Held_B 0.087 0.083 0.219 0.262 
 1.130 1.080 1.080 1.280 
Deal_Val -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.058*** -0.059*** 
 -24.880 -23.580 -35.900 -35.540 
Hostile -0.083*** -0.089*** -0.039*** -0.046*** 
 -13.070 -14.020 -3.920 -4.560 
Ind_Relat. 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 
 15.550 12.810 35.310 34.510 
All_Cash 0.084*** 0.076*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 
 40.780 37.700 18.920 21.630 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 -20.590 -18.980 -21.970 -21.010 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 -0.015** -0.022*** 0.254*** 0.252*** 
 -2.440 -3.490 11.700 11.670 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.321*** -0.324*** -0.174*** -0.154*** 
 -29.260 -29.370 -7.190 -6.320 
TurnovAcq 0.045*** -0.031** -0.060** -0.069** 
 3.690 -2.590 -2.240 -2.430 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.029*** 0.001 
 9.660 10.530 4.130 0.110 
Rel_Maturity  -0.103***  0.113*** 
  -5.450  4.060 
Constant 1.145*** 1.161*** 1.416*** 1.404*** 
 190.900 192.470 93.290 89.700 
Unique institutional in-
vestors 
4,078 4,078 3,758 3,758 
Cross-border M&A 
deals 
748 748 697 697 
Number of observations 75,555 75,555 64,945 64,945 
Wald Chi2 363.46 333.88 391.76 392.09 
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more useful (in the sense that it adds more value to subsequent acquirer performance) when 
the target country’s M&A market is most divergent from the acquirer’s home M&A market (as 
indicated by a positive and bigger difference in the M&A Maturity Index scores of the acquirer 
and target countries). Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction variable KnI_II x Rel_Ma-
turity is positive and significant. Models 2 and 4 show that the expertise of informed investors 
is more important in cases where the ‘distance’ between the M&A maturity of the acquirer and 
target countries is wider. 
As demonstrated by Table 2.4.1-A (model 2), the coefficient corresponding to the variable 
KnI_II, which measures the knowledge of the target region that each investor on the acquirer 
share register possesses, is equal to 0.053. The size of the coefficient indicates that for every 
percentage point increase in the investor’s expertise (or for every percentage point increase 
in the proportion of the knowledge-intensive investor’s portfolio that is invested in the target 
region), the t-1m to t+12m BHAR of the acquirer increases by 0.053 percentage points on average. 
Similarly, the coefficient corresponding to the variable KnI_II x Rel_Maturity, which measures 
the importance of knowledge of the target’s M&A market for cases where acquirer’s home 
M&A market is divergent from the target country’s M&A market, is equal to 0.415. The size of 
the coefficient indicates that for every percentage point increase in the product of the investor’s 
knowledge of the target region and the degree to which the acquirer’s home M&A market is 
more developed than the target’s (measured by the difference in M&A maturity scores be-
tween the acquirer and target countries), the t-1m to t+12m BHAR of the acquirer increases by 
0.415 percentage points. 
 
The fact that the regional expertise of the low and very low turnover investor class has a pos-
itive association with acquirers’ post-merger performance is in accordance with the line of 
argument put forward by Chen et al. (2007), who argue that independent, long-term institu-
tional investors gather information about the overall quality of firm management and its ten-
dency to make better or worse decisions. Independent, long-term institutional investors also 
gather information about the scope of their influence over the actions of firm managers and 
invest in companies where the benefits associated with the quality of management and the 
opportunity to influence managerial decisions outweigh the costs of gathering information and 
monitoring the companies. Moreover, the finding that there is a positive association between 
the post-merger performance of bidders with the pre-acquisition holdings of institutional inves-
tors which possess specialised knowledge about the M&A market of the target’s region 
demonstrates the idea that this class of informed investor is better positioned to gather infor-
mation about individual investment projects such as cross-border deals. 
2.4.2. Robustness tests 
We conduct a bank of further tests to determine whether our principal result H2 > 0 remains 
if we account for a number of additional factors that could be driving the regression results. 
2.4.2.1. Alternative sources of regional expertise 
First, we re-estimate our original models (presented in Table 2.4.1-A) by including a number 
of control variables that capture other potential sources of expertise about the target’s M&A 
environment. We account for any previous acquisitions that the acquirer has completed in the 
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target region by including the dummy variable ‘Prior Exp'. The results, presented in Table 
2.4.2.1-A, model 1, show that it loads with a significant positive coefficient, but does not affect 
the sign or significance of H2. 
Table 2.4.2.1-A: Analysis of t-1m to t+12m post-M&A performance (Alternative sources of regional ex-
pertise 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months period by the MSCI World Size 
Index corresponding to each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the 
knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio 
allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register mul-
tiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural dis-
tance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares which each 
institutional investor has in the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ 
equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, ‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in 
the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the method of payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, 
‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of total debt to total assets, ‘Liq-
uidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by total 
outstanding shares three months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference 
between the acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-dealing index values, ‘Prior_Exp’ equals 1 when the acquirer 
completed an earlier deal in the target region, ‘Top_Advis’ equals 1 when the acquirer is advised by a global in-
vestment bank, ‘Prior_Sub’ equals 1 when the acquirer has a subsidiary in the target region, ‘Domic_Tar_Reg’ 
equals 1 when the institutional investor on the acquirer’s share register is domiciled in the target region, and 
‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and target M&A maturity. We estimate our regressions with fixed 
effect panel specification, where the unique investor name represents the cluster variable in the panel. For our 
main regression specification, where we use the acquirer BHAR returns over the 12-month period post-M&A per-
formance adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index, the underlying deal data sample is 748 deals. To correct for the 
possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of our 
independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have 
a robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each 




Following the methodology of Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), we identify the “bulge 
bracket” banks that are generally acknowledged to have superior deal expertise. Specifically, 
we include a new dummy variable ‘Top_Advis’ which accounts for whether the investment 
bank is bulge bracket or not. The inclusion of this variable in Table 2.4.2.1-A, model 2 does 
not affect the sign or significance of H2. In fact 'Top_Advis' loads with a significant negative 
coefficient. This result is slightly surprising as large investment banks are expected to supply 
clients with regional expertise due to their large scale and global reach. However, our sample 
differs significantly from the reference paper in that we focus only on cross-border transactions 
and often on public-to-private transactions. Our result seems to suggest that although top tier 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Institutional investor expertise 
Knl_II 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 
 8.710 7.670 8.190 6.270 4.420 
KnI_II x Rel_Ma-
turity 
1.066*** 1.047*** 0.920*** 1.037*** 
0.894*** 
 14.130 13.840 12.090 13.720 11.930 
Control variables 
Cult_Dist 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.002** 
 1.030 1.520 1.760 1.380 2.120 
Prct_Held_B 0.022 0.026 0.027 0.013 0.036 
 0.440 0.520 0.530 0.260 0.720 
Deal_Val -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
 -20.520 -26.280 -27.710 -26.770 -22.020 
Hostile -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.080*** -0.085*** -0.084*** 
 -17.260 -16.890 -15.740 -16.590 -16.600 
Ind_Relat. 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 
 5.860 6.350 8.000 5.320 7.410 
All_Cash 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
 46.640 47.510 47.100 47.080 47.600 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 -17.190 -16.020 -17.280 -19.150 -13.150 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 0.020*** 0.008 -0.004 0.019*** -0.002 
 4.600 1.680 -0.720 4.470 -0.410 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.220*** -0.228*** -0.238*** -0.223*** -0.235*** 
 -30.080 -29.930 -31.060 -30.510 -29.830 
TurnovAcq -0.077*** -0.080*** -0.068*** -0.083*** -0.066*** 
 -11.800 -12.340 -10.350 -12.700 -9.920 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-
Tar 
0.022*** 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 
0.025*** 
 7.980 7.050 10.350 8.190 9.000 
Prior_Exp 0.000***    0.000*** 
 17.250    16.740 
Top_Advis  -0.010***   -0.010*** 
  -6.650   -6.460 
Prior_Sub   0.013***  0.007*** 
   6.620  3.570 
Domic_Tar_Reg    0.016*** 0.015*** 
    8.780 8.130 
Rel_Maturity -0.059*** -0.047*** -0.069*** -0.038*** -0.039*** 
 -4.650 -3.660 -5.350 -2.880 -2.960 
Constant 1.096*** 1.095*** 1.111*** 1.100*** 1.096*** 
 257.580 267.340 262.690 270.770 244.560 
Unique institutional 
investors 
4,078 4,078 4,078 4,078 4,078 
Cross-border M&A 
deals 
748 748 748 748 748 
Number of obser-
vations 
75,555 75,555 75,555 75,555 75,555 
Wald Chi2 6887.41 6628.78 6565.32 6507.77 7246.85 
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advisors can add significant deal-specific expertise, they are less likely to add value in terms 
of regional specific expertise. 
We identify those deals for which internal expertise on the target region's M&A environment 
may already exist, by accounting for the cases in which the acquirer already has a foreign 
subsidiary in the target region at the time of the deal announcement. This new variable, 
‘Prior_Sub’, loads with a significant positive coefficient (Table 2.4.2.1-A, model 3); however, 
its inclusion does not affect the sign or significance of H2, suggesting that any internal exper-
tise gained from having a foreign subsidiary does not negate the role of institutional investors. 
In addition, we use a dummy variable ‘Domic_Tar_Reg’ to control for the possibility that the 
regional expertise of the institutional investor does not solely stem from it being domiciled in 
the target region – as opposed to being an investor in the target region which is our main proxy 
for expertise. The results show that this additional control variable loads with a significant 
positive coefficient but, as in all the cases described above, it does not affect the sign or sig-
nificance of H2. We also report the results of adding all of the above variables that account 
for alternative sources of foreign market expertise jointly in Table 2.4.2.1-A, model 5. The 
inclusion of these new control variables does not negate the positive effect of the institutional 
investor knowledge of the target region. 
Finally, we consider whether the number of joint ventures or strategic alliances that the ac-
quirer company has already completed in the region of the target, which we label 
‘Prior_JV_or_Alliance’, can have an effect on post-M&A performance. We also interact this 
additional control variable with our variable for divergence between the acquirer and target 
country, 'Rel_Maturity'. The new variable, ‘Prior_JV_or_Alliance’, loads with a small significant 
positive coefficient (Table 2.4.2.1-B, model 1) while the interaction variable, 'Prior_JV_or_Al-
liance x Rel_Maturity', does not load with a significant coefficient (Table 2.4.2.1-B, model 2). 
The sign and significance of H2 remain unaffected (Table 2.4.2.1-B, models 1 and 2). 
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Table 2.4.2.1-B: Analysis of t-1m to t+12m post-M&A performance (Alternative sources of regional ex-
pertise continued) 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months period adjusted by the MSCI World 
Size Index corresponding to each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the 
knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio 
allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register mul-
tiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘Prior_JV_or_Alliance  x 
Rel_Maturity is the natural logarithm of the number of joint ventures or strategic alliances that the acquirer com-
pleted in the target region before the current deal multiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target 
and acquirer countries,  ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural distance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ 
is the percentage of outstanding shares which each institutional investor has in the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A 
deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, ‘Ind_Relat.’ 
equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the 
method of payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, ‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ 
is the ratio of total debt to total assets, ‘LiquidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ 
is the trading volume divided by total outstanding shares three months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-
self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-dealing index values, 
‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and target M&A maturity, and ‘Prior_JV_or_Alliance’ the natural 
 (1) (2) 
Institutional investor expertise 
Knl_II 0.010** 0.010** 
 2.360 2.380 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity 0.678*** 0.696*** 
 7.040 7.200 
Prior_JV_or_Alliance  x Rel_Maturity  -0.007 
  -1.120 
Control variables 
Cult_Dist -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 -8.810 -8.530 
Prct_Held_B -0.236*** -0.236*** 
 -2.610 -2.610 
Deal_Val -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 -24.660 -24.000 
Hostile -0.028*** -0.029*** 
 -3.410 -3.470 
Ind_Relat. 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 19.310 19.320 
All_Cash 0.059*** 0.059*** 
 32.860 32.860 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 -69.170 -69.270 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 -0.014** -0.012* 
 -2.070 -1.650 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.296*** -0.294*** 
 -29.300 -27.630 
TurnovAcq -0.088*** -0.089*** 
 -9.200 -9.140 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.079*** 0.078*** 
 21.060 21.060 
Rel_Maturity 0.079*** 0.083*** 
 4.830 4.790 
Prior_JV_or_Alliance 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 91.180 90.360 
Constant 1.442*** 1.440*** 
 126.860 123.260 
Unique institutional investors 4,078 4,078 
Cross-border M&A deals 748 748 
Number of observations 75,555 75,555 
Wald Chi2 30581.50 32166.97 
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logarithm of the number of joint ventures or strategic alliances that the acquirer completed in the target region 
before the current deal. We estimate our regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where the unique investor 
name represents the cluster variable in the panel. For our main regression specification, where we use the acquirer 
BHAR returns over the 12-month period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index, the un-
derlying deal data sample is 748 deals. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the 
basis of a random sample or that the distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are not 
independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have a robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) 
and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectivel 
2.4.2.2. Alternative measures of the discrepancy in M&A environments 
It is possible that there are other, more adequate measures of the discrepancy between the 
target and acquirer's M&A environments. We use the geographic distance between the target 
and acquirer countries as an alternative measure of market discrepancy. We test to see if this 
new variable 'Geog_Dist' can replace 'Rel_Maturity' as the explanatory variable for coefficient 
H2 (Table 2.4.2.2-A, model 1). While the new variable loaded by itself with significant negative 
coefficient, the interaction coefficient H2 , 'Knl_II x Geog_Dist', was not significant. In Table 
2.4.2.2-A, model 2, we allowed both 'Rel_Maturity' and 'Geog_Dist' to interact with 'Knl_II' and 
found, as hypothesized, that only 'Rel_Maturity' interacted with 'Knl_II' is significant. In an un-
tabulated analysis, we also tested market discrepancy using a different proxy, a dummy vari-
able which is equal to one when the target and acquirer are domiciled in different geographical 
regions, with the sign and significance of our main variable of interest, H2 , remaining unaf-
fected. These results present additional evidence in favour of our original premise that the role 
of institutional investors as information providers is not simply explained by geographic dis-
tance but instead by differences in the maturity of markets. We expected this result as while, 
for example, Singapore is a long geographic distance from the US, the relative maturity of their 
M&A markets are quite similar and we would not expect the potential information provision of 
institutional investors to be of as much value as when the difference between the relative 
maturities of the countries is greater. That is, it is not geographic distance that matters but 
‘distance’ in relative maturities. 
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Table 2.4.2.2-A: Analysis of t-1m to t+12m post-M&A performance (Alternative measures of the dis-
crepancy in M&A environments) 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months period adjusted by the MSCI World 
Size Index corresponding to each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the 
knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio 
allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register mul-
tiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘KnI_II x Geog_Dist’ is 
knowledge-intensive institutional investors multiplied by the natural logarithm of the geographic distance between 
the acquirer and target regions, ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural distance between the acquirer and target countries, 
‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares which each institutional investor has in the acquirer, 
‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 
otherwise, ‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in the same industry and 0 otherwise, 
‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the method of payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, ‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book 
ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of total debt to total assets, ‘LiquidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by total outstanding shares three months before 
the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the acquirer and target countries’ 
anti-self-dealing index values, ‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and target M&A maturity, and 
‘Geog_Dist’ is the natural logarithm of the geographic distance between the acquirer and target regions. We esti-
mate our regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where the unique investor name represents the cluster 
variable in the panel. For our main regression specification, where we use the acquirer BHAR returns over the 12-
month period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index, the underlying deal data sample is 
 (1) (2) 
Institutional investor expertise 
Knl_II 0.018 0.004 
 0.730 0.180 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity  0.356*** 
  3.730 
KnI_II x Geog_Dist -0.003 -0.001 
 -0.850 -0.420 
Control variables   
Cult_Dist 0.000 -0.001 
 0.330 -1.200 
Prct_Held_B -0.078 -0.073 
 -0.950 -0.890 
Deal_Val -0.029*** -0.027*** 
 -31.090 -30.010 
Hostile -0.023*** -0.028*** 
 -2.570 -3.100 
Ind_Relat. 0.040*** 0.036*** 
 18.870 17.160 
All_Cash 0.065*** 0.064*** 
 36.210 34.710 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 -72.670 -72.710 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 0.008 0.007 
 1.150 1.040 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.267*** -0.269*** 
 -26.460 -26.390 
TurnovAcq -0.110*** -0.154*** 
 -11.880 -16.080 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.081*** 0.076*** 
 22.670 20.480 
Rel_Maturity  0.025 
  1.490 
Geog_Dist -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 -18.140 -18.030 
Constant 1.486*** 1.491*** 
 96.930 96.980 
Unique institutional investors 4,078 4,078 
Cross-border M&A deals 748 748 
Number of observations 75,555 75,555 
Wald Chi2 10757.89 11330.51 
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748 deals. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or 
that the distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.), all models have a robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-
stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
2.4.2.3. Alternative measures of M&A success 
We use a range of different performance measures, including regional and size BHAR bench-
marks run over medium-term (t-1m to t+12m) and long-term (t-1m to t+36m) event windows. The sign 
and significance of H2 remain unchanged (Table 2.4.2.3-A, models 1 through 4). In addition, 
as an alternative measure of success we also collect data on the value of impairments in any 
of the five years following completion of the deal. With this new dependent variable, Table 
2.4.2.3-B, model 1 reports that the significance of H2 remains unchanged, with a negative 
sign, since more subsequent impairments are associated with less success. We also measure 
performance by considering the likelihood of deal completion after controlling for whether the 
deal is a tender offer ‘Tender Offer’, whether there is a competing bid, ‘Competing Bid’, and 
whether there is a target firm termination fee clause, ‘Target Term Fee’. Again, the sign and 
significance of H2 remain unchanged (Table 2.4.2.3-B, model 2). Note that we use a larger 
deal data sample for this model, which includes the terminated deals in the same time period. 
 
Table 2.4.2.3-A: Analysis of t-1m to t+12m and t-1m to t+36m post-M&A performance (Alternative 
measures of M&A success) 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months and -1 to +36 months period 
adjusted by the MSCI Regional or Regional & Size indices of the acquirer. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the 
target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ 
is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share 
register multiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘Cult_Dist’ is the 
cultural distance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares 
which each institutional investor has in the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US 
$, ‘Hostile’ equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, ‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer 
operate in the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the method of payment is all cash and 0 
otherwise, ‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of total debt to total assets, 
‘LiquidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by total 
outstanding shares three months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference 
between the acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-dealing index values, and ‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference be-
tween acquirer and target M&A maturity. We estimate our regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where 
the unique investor name represents the cluster variable in the panel. For our main regression specification, where 
we use the acquirer BHAR returns over the 12-month period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI World 
Size Index, the underlying deal data sample is 748 deals. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not 
estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of our independent variables and regression 
residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have a robust estimate of variance following 
Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate 






gional Index,  t-
1m to t+12m 
(2) MSCI Re-
gional & Size In-
dex,  t-1m to t+12m 
(3) MSCI 
Regional Index, 
t-1m to t+36m 
(4) MSCI 
Regional & Size 
Index, 
t-1m to t+36m 
Institutional investor expertise 
Knl_II 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.021*** 
 9.040 10.450 7.620 4.370 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity 1.068*** 1.052*** 1.086*** 0.671*** 
 14.050 13.720 9.300 5.950 
Control variables     
Cult_Dist 0.001 0.002*** -0.027*** -0.025*** 
 1.130 2.780 -19.480 -20.800 
Prct_Held_B 0.017 -0.053 0.023 -0.162 
 0.330 -0.980 0.210 -1.490 
Deal_Val -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.035*** -0.027*** 
 -26.450 -27.060 -35.530 -24.420 
Hostile -0.085*** -0.066*** -0.095*** -0.007 
 -16.590 -15.750 -9.680 -0.780 
Ind_Relat. 0.009*** 0.003* 0.113*** 0.092*** 
 6.030 1.700 38.890 31.660 
All_Cash 0.069*** 0.059*** 0.086*** 0.070*** 
 46.930 42.920 37.870 32.040 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 -19.460 -23.540 -25.030 -14.170 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 0.017*** -0.027*** 0.059*** -0.018* 
 3.810 -6.150 5.550 -1.790 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.224*** -0.252*** -0.313*** -0.333*** 
 -30.560 -32.660 -24.960 -25.130 
TurnovAcq -0.081*** -0.069*** -0.240*** -0.250*** 
 -12.470 -10.790 -23.880 -24.080 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.022*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.081*** 
 8.240 13.370 7.350 17.580 
Rel_Maturity -0.060*** -0.056*** 0.206*** 0.093*** 
 -4.680 -4.520 9.630 4.640 
Constant 1.103*** 1.109*** 1.310*** 1.263*** 
 273.880 264.010 162.160 138.130 
Unique institutional investors 4,078 4,038 3,758 3,579 
Cross-border M&A deals 748 706 697 596 
Number of observations 75,555 72,152 64,945 57,404 
Wald Chi2 6460.80 6244.76 9317.86 6225.86 
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Table 2.4.2.3-B: Analysis of t-1m to t+12m post-M&A performance (Alternative measures of M&A suc-
cess continued) 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months period adjusted by the MSCI World 
Size Index corresponding to each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the 
knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio 
allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register mul-
tiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural dis-
tance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares which each 
institutional investor has in the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ 
equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, ‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in 
the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the method of payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, 
‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of total debt to total assets, ‘LiquidAcq’ 
is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by total outstanding 
shares three months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the 
acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-dealing index values, ‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and 
 
(1) Dependent variable: 
impairment of goodwill 
(2) Dependent variable: 
likelihood of deal completion 
Institutional investor expertise   
Knl_II -75.545*** 0.352*** 
 -12.090 10.680 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity -871.225*** 3.427*** 
 -5.880 4.280 
Control variables   
Cult_Dist 34.201*** 0.025*** 
 26.230 4.060 
Prct_Held_B -41.567 1.686** 
 -0.760 2.210 
Deal_Val -28.679*** -0.130*** 
 -38.310 -25.870 
Hostile 98.691*** Omitted 
 39.050  
Ind_Relat. -5.487** 0.471*** 
 -2.200 25.090 
All_Cash 60.640*** -0.088*** 
 29.460 -5.630 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 -0.263*** 0.020*** 
 -26.130 16.890 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 83.798*** -1.345*** 
 12.070 -33.520 
LiquidAcq Y-1 232.189*** -1.385*** 
 31.470 -22.570 
TurnovAcq -22.800*** 0.181*** 
 -4.400 3.670 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 77.533*** -0.936*** 
 42.830 -37.300 
Rel_Maturity -759.877*** -0.268** 
 -18.750 -2.000 
Tender_Offer  -0.068*** 
  -4.290 
Competing_Bidder  -0.265*** 
  -11.480 
Target_Term_Fee  -0.008 
  -0.410 
Constant 94.262*** 2.769*** 
 27.170 68.460 
Unique institutional investors 3,154 4,832 
Cross-border M&A deals 174 797 
Number of observations 43,256 81,315 
Wald Chi2 4952.87 4867.45 
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target M&A maturity, ‘Tender_Offer’ equals 1 if the deal is classified as a ‘tender offer’ by the SDC Platinum Data-
base and 0 otherwise, ‘Competing_Bidder’ equals 1 if there are any competing bidders and 0 otherwise, and ‘Tar-
get_Term_Fee’ equals 1 if there is a target company termination fee clause in the deal agreement document and 
0 otherwise. We estimate our regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where the unique investor name 
represents the cluster variable in the panel. For our main regression specification, where we use the acquirer BHAR 
returns over the 12-month period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index, the underlying 
deal data sample is 748 deals. For Table 2.4.3-B, the underlying deal data sample for Model 1 is 177 and for Model 
2 it is 797. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or 
that the distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.), all models have robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats 
are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
2.4.2.4. Deal level, serial acquirers and primary index-listing sensitivity 
analysis 
In order to see whether the positive effect of institutional investor expertise applies to compa-
nies listed on non-primary exchange indices, we re-estimate our original regressions with a 
larger sample of all public acquirers. The results reported in Table 2.4.2.4-A, model 1 demon-
strate that the sign and significance of H2 remain unchanged.19 It should be noted that in 
Table 2.4.2.4-A, we re-estimate the original regressions with the larger sample by including all 
the additional controls simultaneously in the regression (Table 2.4.2.4-A, model 2). The sign 
and significance of H2 remain unchanged. To control for the possibility that some acquirers 
may complete more than one M&A deal within the same BHAR event window, we re-estimate 
model 2 in Table 2.4.2.4-A by using a sample of non-serial acquirers only. Adding this re-
striction considerably reduces the sample size however the sign and significance of H2 re-
main unchanged. 
As our primary concern is the knowledge of specific institutional investors (who may be present 
on multiple deals), our main unit of analysis is each institutional investor’s portfolio holding in 
the target region. As already stated, we control for clusters of investor name as each investor 
could be on several acquirer’s share registers. However, there is a second potential cluster 
effect, namely that of each deal. As we cannot test for the deal-level cluster effect in the current 
model we replicate the analysis on a deal level, with the results reported in Table 2.4.2.4-B. 
Our original results on the sign and significance of H2  remain unchanged. We perform this 
analysis using the original controls (Table 2.4.2.4-B, model 1) and also including the additional 
controls (Table 2.4.2.4-B, model 2). We control for the potential noise in the data caused by 
follow-on acquisition effect our BHAR event window by performing the regressions excluding 
any deal which is performed by a ‘serial acquirer’ – here defined as one which completes 
multiple deals within a time window of three years in model 3.20  
                                                 
19 We note that there are two additional control variables included in Tables Table 2.4.2.4-A and Table 2.4.2.4-B, 
namely, ‘Any_II_Leave’ (which measures the number of institutional investors that sell their holdings in the acquirer 
company within six months of a deal announcement) and ‘Acquisitive_CrossBorder_Mean’ (which accounts for the 
acquirers that perform a number of international deals which is greater than the average number of international 
deals completed by all firms within the last year and zero otherwise). These additional controls were inspired by 
comments received at conference presentations. 
20 We note that the sign and significance of the coefficient βH2 remains but the magnitude of the coefficient in-
creases dramatically. While this agrees with our hypothesis, we suggest the exercise of caution here as removing 
serial acquirers has taken our sample size down to just 91 deals.  
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Table 2.4.2.4-A: Analysis of t-1m to t+12m post-M&A performance (Deal level, serial acquirers and 
primary index-listing sensitivity analysis) 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months period adjusted by the MSCI World 
Size Index corresponding to each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is knowledge-intensive institutional investors, ‘KnI_II’ 
is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share 
register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional 
investors on the acquirer share register multiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer 
countries, ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural distance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the per-
centage of outstanding shares which each institutional investor has in the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal 
value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, ‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 
1 when the target and acquirer operate in the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the method 
of payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, ‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the 
ratio of total debt to total assets, ‘LiquidAcq’ is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is 
the trading volume divided by total outstanding shares three months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-
self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-dealing index values, 
‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and target M&A maturity, ‘Domic_Tar_Reg’ equals 1 when the 
institutional investor on the acquirer’s share register is domiciled in the target region, ‘Prior_Exp’ equals 1 when 
the acquirer completed an earlier deal in the target region, ‘Top_Advis’ equals 1 when the acquirer is advised by a 
global investment bank, ‘Prior_Sub’ equals 1 when the acquirer has a subsidiary in the target region, ‘Any_II_Leave’ 
is the number of institutional investors that dispose of their holdings in the acquirer company within six months of 
the M&A deal announcement, ‘Geog_Dist’ is the natural logarithm of the geographic distance between the acquirer 
and target regions, ‘KnI_II x Geog_Dist’ is knowledge-intensive institutional investors multiplied by the natural log-
arithm of the geographic distance between the acquirer and target regions, ‘Prior_JV_or_Alliance’ is the natural 
logarithm of the number of joint ventures or strategic alliances that the acquirer completed in the target region 
before the current deal, ‘KnI_II x Prior_JV_or_Alliance’ is knowledge-intensive institutional investors multiplied by 
the natural logarithm of the number of joint ventures or strategic alliances that the acquirer completed in the target 
region before the current deal, ‘Acquisitive_CrossBorder_Mean’ equals 1 when the acquirer has completed a num-
ber of international deals which is greater than the average number of international deals completed by all firms 
within the last year and 0 otherwise. We estimate our regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where the 
unique investor name represents the cluster variable in the panel. For our main regression specification, where we 
use the acquirer BHAR returns over the 12-month period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI World Size 
Index, the underlying deal data sample is 748 deals. For Table 2.4.2.4-B, the underlying deal data sample for Model 
1 and 2 is 2,065 and for Model 3 it is 531. Note that the number of additional new unique institutional investors for 
the large sample is small in relation to how many new deals are added to the sample. All added deals refer to deals 
completed by acquirers which are not part of the constitute of the primary index. When one looks at all the extra 
deals completed by smaller acquirers or acquirers listed on the secondary exchanges, the number of new unique 
institutional investors that are now present, but were not present on deals only on the primary index-listed acquirers’ 
share register is small. This is not surprising as few institutional investors specialize only in smaller companies or 
companies listed on the secondary exchanges. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated 
on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are 
not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have a robust estimate of variance following Huber 
(1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statis-
tical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 






(1) Large sample, original 
model,  Institutional Inves-
tor level 
(2) Large sample all con-
trols,  Institutional Investor 
level 
(3)  Large sample all con-
trols excl. serial acquirers,  
Institutional Investor level 
Institutional investor expertise    
Knl_II 0.006* -0.001 0.001 
 1.650 -0.250 0.140 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity 0.434*** 0.529*** 2.042*** 
 8.260 4.520 9.320 
Control variables    
Cult_Dist 0.000 -0.016*** 0.025*** 
 0.160 -15.430 11.930 
Prct_Held_B -0.088 -0.208*** -0.255*** 
 -1.510 -3.530 -3.120 
Deal_Val -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.010*** 
 -16.870 -4.010 -6.070 
Hostile -0.072*** -0.005 0.044*** 
 -14.260 -1.350 4.020 
Ind_Relat. 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.053*** 
 14.730 12.870 9.770 
All_Cash 0.031*** 0.014*** 0.032*** 
 17.360 6.260 6.230 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 10.000 -3.180 -1.020 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 -0.122*** -0.042*** -0.215*** 
 -16.510 -3.490 -10.710 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.204*** -0.214*** -0.029 
 -25.800 -17.650 -1.240 
TurnovAcq -0.139*** -0.016 -0.056*** 
 -18.260 -1.480 -2.980 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.053*** -0.020*** 0.039*** 
 16.190 -4.560 4.980 
Rel_Maturity -0.230*** 0.889*** -0.315*** 
 -14.680 11.620 -3.090 
Domic_Tar_Reg  0.006** 0.029*** 
  2.020 4.740 
Top_Advis  -0.026*** 0.028*** 
  -8.880 5.160 
Prior_Sub  -0.045*** 0.049*** 
  -11.590 7.170 
Prior_Exp  0.000*** 0.003*** 
  -3.040 20.010 
Prior_JV_or_Alliance  0.016*** -0.022*** 
  9.980 -5.050 
Prior_JV_or_Alliance x  Rel_Ma-
turity 
 -0.046*** 0.118*** 
  -3.030 3.220 
Any_II_Leave  -0.026*** -0.032*** 
  -5.890 -4.700 
Geog_Dist  0.004** 0.019*** 
  2.540 6.380 
KnI_II x Geog_Dist  -0.070*** 0.081*** 
  -6.610 4.860 
Acquisitive_CrossBorder_Mean  -0.016*** Omitted 
  -4.680  
Constant 1.134*** 1.125*** 0.824*** 
 226.840 83.010 28.070 
Unique institutional investors 4,085 4,085 2,541 
Cross-border M&A deals 2,065 2,065 531 
Number of observations 123,585 123,585 24,693 
Wald Chi2 1690 2702 2401.21 
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Table 2.4.2.4-B: Analysis of t-1m to t+12m post-M&A performance (Deal level, serial acquirers and 
primary index-listing sensitivity analysis continued 
The dependent variable is the acquirer BHAR returns over the -1 to +12 months period adjusted by the MSCI World 
Size Index corresponding to each acquirer company. ‘KnI_II’ is the portfolio allocation in the target region of the 
knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register, ‘KnI_II x Rel_Maturity’ is the portfolio 
allocation in the target region of the knowledge-intensive institutional investors on the acquirer share register mul-
tiplied by the difference in M&A maturity between the target and acquirer countries, ‘Cult_Dist’ is the cultural dis-
tance between the acquirer and target countries, ‘Prct_Held_B’ is the percentage of outstanding shares which each 
institutional investor has in the acquirer, ‘Deal_Val’ is the M&A deal value measured in millions of US $, ‘Hostile’ 
equals 1 when the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise, ‘Ind_Relat.’ equals 1 when the target and acquirer operate in 
the same industry and 0 otherwise, ‘All_Cash’ equals 1 when the method of payment is all cash and 0 otherwise, 
‘MV_BVAcq’ is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, ‘TD_TAAcq’ is the ratio of total debt to total assets, ‘LiquidAcq’ 
is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, ‘TurnovAcq’ is the trading volume divided by total outstanding 
shares three months before the announcement of the deal, ‘Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar’ is the difference between the 
acquirer and target countries’ anti-self-dealing index values, ‘Rel_Maturity’ is the difference between acquirer and 
target M&A maturity, ‘Domic_Tar_Reg’ equals 1 when the institutional investor on the acquirer’s share register is 
domiciled in the target region, ‘Prior_Exp’ equals 1 when the acquirer completed an earlier deal in the target region, 
‘Top_Advis’ equals 1 when the acquirer is advised by a global Investment Bank, ‘Prior_Sub’ equals 1 when the 
acquirer has a subsidiary in the target region, ‘Any_II_Leave’ is the number of institutional investors that dispose 
of their holdings in the acquirer company within six months of the M&A deal announcement, ‘Geog_Dist’ is the 
natural logarithm of the geographic distance between the acquirer and target regions, ‘KnI_II x Geog_Dist’ is 
knowledge-intensive institutional investors multiplied by the natural logarithm of the geographic distance between 
the acquirer and target regions, ‘Prior_JV_or_Alliance’ is the natural logarithm of the number of joint ventures or 
strategic alliances that the acquirer completed in the target region before the current deal, ‘KnI_II x Prior_JV_or_Al-
liance’ is knowledge-intensive institutional investors multiplied by the natural logarithm of the number of joint ven-
tures or strategic alliances that the acquirer completed in the target region before the current deal, ‘Acquisi-
tive_CrossBorder_Mean’ equals 1 when the acquirer has completed a number of international deals which is 
greater than the average number of international deals completed by all firms within the last year and 0 otherwise. 
We estimate our regressions with fixed effect panel specification, where the unique investor name represents the 
cluster variable in the panel. For our main regression specification, where we use the acquirer BHAR returns over 
the 12-month period post-M&A performance adjusted by the MSCI World Size Index, the underlying deal data 
sample is 748 deals. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random 
sample or that the distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have a robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 
1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively 
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(1) Original sample, 
original model, deal 
level 
(2) Original sample, 
all controls, deal 
level 
(3) Original sample, 
all controls, excl. se-
rial acquirers, deal 
level 
Institutional investor expertise 
Knl_II 0.046** 0.116** 0.083 
 2.140 2.250 0.810 
KnI_II x Rel_Maturity 0.289** 1.983*** 4.519*** 
 2.390 3.680 3.980 
Control variables        
Cult_Dist -0.009 -0.030* 0.016 
 -0.780 -1.950 0.550 
Deal_Val -0.007 0.009 0.004 
 -0.760 0.660 0.120 
Hostile 0.136 -0.010 -0.001 
 0.820 -0.130 -0.010 
Ind_Relat. 0.061** 0.015 -0.024 
 2.270 0.390 -0.280 
All_Cash 0.038 0.011 -0.036 
 1.450 0.300 -0.420 
MV_BVAcq Y-1 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 -3.070 -3.880 -2.250 
TD_TAAcq Y-1 0.060 0.169 0.110 
 0.740 1.240 0.360 
LiquidAcq Y-1 -0.236* -0.036 0.309 
 -1.830 -0.210 0.950 
TurnovAcq -0.030 0.080 0.087 
 -0.190 0.320 0.180 
Anti-self-dealingAcq-Tar 0.057 0.011 0.027 
 1.220 0.200 0.230 
Rel_Maturity -0.583* -0.342 -0.402 
 -1.850 -0.910 -0.520 
Any_II_Leave -0.055* -0.120*** -0.096 
 -1.930 -2.930 -1.150 
Top_Advis  -0.022 -0.004 
  -0.550 -0.050 
Prior_Sub  0.005 0.072 
  0.110 0.640 
Prior_Exp  0.000 0.004 
  -0.440 1.640 
Prior_JV_or_Alliance  -0.013 -0.088* 
  -0.640 -1.860 
Prior_JV_or_Alliance x  Rel_Maturity  0.048 -1.041* 
  0.300 -1.870 
Geog_Dist  0.030* 0.063* 
  1.770 1.840 
KnI_II x Geog_Dist  0.000*** 0.000*** 
  -3.170 -2.760 
Acquisitive_CrossBorder_Mean  -0.027 Omitted 
  -0.720  
Constant 1.124*** 0.789*** 0.437 
 14.880 4.510 1.180 
Number of observations / Cross-bor-
der M&A deals 
748 748 91 
R2 0.0465 0.1425 0.3068 
173 
 
2.5.  Conclusion 
Traditional research on information flows in financial markets concentrates on flows from firms 
to investors. However, motivated by the earlier theoretical work of Dye and Sridhar (2002), we 
investigate whether there may be value in information which flows in the opposite direction, 
i.e. from investors to firms. Keeping within the spirit of the Dye and Sridhar model, we look at 
cross-border M&A deals with potentially widely distributed information and attempt to identify 
settings in which the management of firms could learn from investors which have experience 
and expertise in the target region. We propose here that such expertise held by investors is 
likely to benefit the management of a potential acquirer most when the target country is sig-
nificantly less developed in terms of M&A maturity compared to the acquirer country, i.e. when 
the divergence of the two markets is large and hence the extent of information asymmetry is 
greater. Thus, we conclude that going naked (without informed investor support) into foreign 
deals in complex (diverse maturity), cross-regional settings may be dangerous for the bottom 
line.
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3. Acquisitions, SEOs, Divestitures and IPO Performance 
 
Naaguesh Appadu, Anna Faelten, Mario Levis 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, when Ritter (1991) first documented the aftermarket underperformance of 
IPOs, a considerable amount of empirical research across many countries21 has corroborated his 
findings and highlighted some significant differences in performance across different types of IPOs.22 
Post-event market underperformance, however, is not a unique feature of IPOs. A number of studies, 
for example, report that firms with seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) underperform in comparison to 
similar non-issuing firms in the three-year period following the issue (Loughran and Ritter (1995), 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) and Iqbal, Espenlaub and Strong (2006)). Furthermore, despite 
the positive initial returns for firms announcing acquisitions, there is considerable evidence suggest-
ing negative post-event performance at least for stock-financed acquisitions (Loughran and Vijh 
(1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Wiggenhorn, Gleason and Madura (2007)). 
Raising additional equity capital and acquisitions are quite common among recently listed firms. 
Survey evidence of US and European CFOs, on the motivation of IPOs, (Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
and Bancel and Mittoo (2009)) and the actual record of corporate activity of recent IPOs (Hovakimian 
and Hutton 2010b) suggest that such activities are an integral part of future strategy for growth. 
Divestitures are also widely used by firms in general as part of an overall strategic plan and are often 
related to recent acquisitions. In contrast to SEOs and acquisitions, however, they tend to be value 
enhancing (Dranikoff, Koller and Schneider  (2002), Hollowell (2009) and Lee and Madhavan 
(2010)). Given the similarities in the post-event performance patterns of IPOs and acquisitions, Brau, 
Couch and Sutton (2012) argue that acquisitions by recently listed firms may be account for the 
aftermarket underperformance of IPOs. A similar type of argument could apply for SEOs as well.  
In spite of the considerable evidence on the extent of individual corporate activity, in terms of acqui-
sitions, seasoned equity offering and divestitures, by recently listed firms, there is still relatively lim-
ited empirical evidence on the implications of the range of such activities subsequent performance.23 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the pattern of these three types of follow-on corporate 
activities during the 3-year period since flotation and their implications on the long-run aftermarket 
performance of recent IPOs. 
                                                 
21.See, for example, Levis (1993) for the UK and Chan, Wang and Wei (2004) for China. 
22. Newly listed firms, for example, with certain characteristics in terms of size (Ritter (2011)), underwriters’ or venture 
capital sponsors’ reputation (Chan, Cooney, Kim and Singh (2008) and Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis and Sigh (2011)), pri-
vatizations (Choi, Lee and Megginson  (2010), and PE backing (Brav and Gompers (1997), Cao and Lerner (2009), and 
Levis (2011)) show positive aftermarket performance. 
23. In a recent paper, Brau Couch and Sutton (2012) examine the long term performance of IPO companies involved in 
subsequent acquisitions, while Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2011) investigate the implications of different issuing activi-
ties on long term performance. 
 
175 
In this chapter, we test and find support for strong linkages in the type, timing and pattern underpin-
ning the different kinds of post-IPO corporate event; furthermore, we also show that such character-
istics of corporate events have a defining effect on the aftermarket performance of IPO companies.  
Recent IPO firms involved in a series of acquisitions and/or seasoned equity offerings perform rela-
tively better in comparison to others who remain either totally inactive or just have a single, probably 
opportunistic, event without a coherent plan for future growth. This could also be the result of an 
inherent sample bias as firms that realize their set objectives of a recent completed corporate trans-
action are unlikely to return for more at least in the immediate future. In this sense, the superior 
performance of the firms displaying a pattern of continued corporate activity is to be expected.  By 
showing that the aftermarket performance of IPO companies relates both to the pattern and under-
lying motivation of their follow-on transactions, we highlight an additional important dimension of the 
long-standing debate of IPO firms’ aftermarket performance. More specifically, we argue that a public 
listing on its own is not necessarily the determining factor of aftermarket performance; instead, the 
newly listed firms’ competitive position and management’s ability to utilize their public status to pur-
sue growth opportunities have a defining impact on future performance.  
We start our analysis by providing a detailed account of the types of corporate event undertaken by 
IPO firms within the first three years of their listing. We find that a total of 82% of the IPO companies 
in our sample were involved in at least one of the three types of corporate event, while half of them 
had at least one acquisition or SEO. Overall, acquisitions, either in cash, stock or both, were by far 
the most popular type of corporate event, accounting for 54% of all of the events in the sample. 
In the second part of the paper, we examine the underlying characteristics of each of the three types 
of corporate event. We find that the IPO firms mostly involved in acquisitions are larger and more 
profitable, with a strong market debut and good recent stock performance at least for stock financed 
transactions. SEOs also come early after the IPO at times of positive market sentiment following a 
recent run of good stock performance, but on average are the less profitable IPO firms that raise 
additional equity capital. Divestitures, on the other hand, come later and involve considerably larger 
firms in the Main market and low cash balances. We also find that the underlying motivation for the 
same type of transaction may change over time. An acquisition, SEO, or a divestiture, for example, 
is sometimes driven by pure demand for capital while at other times occur predominantly due to 
market timing considerations. 
Second, we investigate the aftermarket performance of IPO companies on the basis of the type and 
pattern of their follow-on corporate activities, in terms of acquisitions, SEOs, and divestitures. We 
find strong evidence that IPO firms that engage in a number of SEOs and acquisitions during the 
three-year post-IPO period perform significantly better than, their inactive counterparts. Although a 
casual comparison of our results with the evidence of previous studies may indicate noticeable in-
consistencies, these are due to differences in the sample characteristics and the methodological 
approach between this and other studies. More specifically, instead of examining a specific type of 
corporate event in isolation, we take a rounded view of a firm’s follow-on corporate event activities 
and their implications to performance. Our rationale for this integrated approach reflects our under-
lying view that a series of follow-on corporate activities is a better indicator of a firm’s planned strat-
egy for growth. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that explicitly recognizes and traces the activity 
and patterns of three of the most common types of event during a three-year period in the aftermar-
ket. By examining the underlying company characteristics, patterns and motivation behind each of 
the three types of event over different time periods after the IPO, we show that the drivers behind 
them differ not only across the three events but for each specific event over different time periods. 
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More generally, we also contribute to the literature by showing that the average aftermarket under-
performance of IPO companies conceals a wide range of diverse performances that relate to the 
timing and type of their follow-on decisions during the first 3 years after flotation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a review of the related literature. 
Section 3.3 describes the data and methodology and section 3.4 (parts A, B and C), provides a 
detailed mapping of the type and sequence of the three corporate events during the three-year period 
following the IPO. Section 3.5 examines the underlying characteristics of acquisitions, SEOs and 
divestitures and Section 3.6 reports on IPO companies’ aftermarket performance according to differ-
ent types of corporate activity. Finally, section 3.7 we summarize the results and highlight the key 
conclusions and potential implications of our study. 
3.2. Related Literature 
The popularity of follow-on corporate by newly listed firms is consistent with the view that an IPO is 
the first step towards a long-term plan for growth. An IPO, for example, offers the opportunity to raise 
the cash or use the publicly traded stock for future acquisitions (Mikkelson, Partch and Shah, (1997) 
and Brau, Francis, and Kohers, (2003)) and reduce information asymmetry (Eckbo, Gianmarino and 
Heinkel, (2011)). The survey of chief financial officers by Brau and Fawcett (2006) provides consid-
erable support for the latter position. Capital infusion and alleviation of information uncertainty, how-
ever, are not the only links between an IPO and a merger. A public listing may also facilitate a sub-
sequent stock merger by reducing valuation uncertainty and leading to more efficient, acquisition 
strategies (Hsieh, Lyandres and Zhdanov, (2011)).  
Recent empirical evidence by Hovakimian and Hutton (2010a) and Celikyurt, Sevilir and Shivdasani 
(2010), provides even further support for the importance of acquisitions for newly listed firms. They 
show that the future growth of IPO firms is mainly through acquisitions rather than capital expenditure 
or R&D; IPO firms are also more prolific acquirers in comparison to their more mature counterparts 
within their industry (Maksimovic, Phillips and Yang, (2010)).  
Acquisitions may also stimulate demand for additional capital leading to further capital raising 
rounds. Welch (1989), for example, finds significantly higher levels of secondary issue offerings 
among recently floated firms than one would expect among a random sample of firms. The surge in 
post-IPO acquisitions, however, may also lead to divestitures as certain parts of the acquired assets, 
which do not fit into the newly developed entity, may be disposed of to improve profitability. Divesti-
tures, of course, could also be related to market feedback and the enhanced liquidity enjoyed by the 
public listing.   
The poor aftermarket performance of acquisitions and seasoned equity offerings is often attributed 
to the market misevaluation hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Baker, Stein, and Wurgler 
(2003)), which leads to opportunistic behavior and the tendency of managers to exploit their infor-
mational advantage by timing their financing and investment decisions to take advantage of overval-
ued stock prices.24 A number of studies provide evidence that is broadly consistent with the market 
timing of IPOs and SEOs (Loughran and Ritter (1995), Levis (1995), Jiang (2008) and Kim and 
                                                 
24.Schultz (2003) shows that underperformance by firms following equity offerings is very likely to be observed ex-post in 
an efficient market and can be explained by a ‘pseudo’ market timing hypothesis. Thus, more firms may issue equity at 
higher stock prices even when the market is efficient and there is no timing ability.  
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Weisbach (2008)), acquisitions (Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswana-
than (2005) and even divestitures (Brauer and Stussi (2010)).  
Financing and investment decisions may also be motivated by feedback received from the market 
that helps to pursue expected growth opportunities.  Jegadeesh, Weinsten, and Welch (1993), for 
example, show that IPOs followed by high returns are associated with a higher probability of follow-
on SEOs within three years of the IPO. More recently, Hovakimian and Hutton (2010b) also report 
that firms with high post-equity-issue returns are more likely to return to the market for additional 
rounds of equity financing. They argue that these results are consistent with the market feedback 
hypothesis in that high post-issue returns encourage managers to return to the market for additional 
funding. It is important to note, however, that such a pattern of follow-on equity issues may also be 
the direct outcome of strategic (demand for capital) rather than opportunistic (overvaluation) trans-
actions.  
Lowry and Schwert (2002) highlight an additional dimension of the market feedback hypothesis by 
reporting that IPO volume and average initial returns are highly autocorrelated, i.e. companies tend 
to go public following periods of high initial returns. Both the cycles of initial returns and the lead-lag 
relationship between initial returns and IPO volume are predominantly driven by information learned 
during the registration period. More positive information results in higher initial returns and more 
companies filing IPOs soon thereafter. Recent increases in the price of acquiring firms as a result of 
either positive market feedback or overvaluation is likely to affect stock but not cash-based acquisi-
tions (King, Slotegraaf and Kesner (2008). 
Finally, it is also interesting to note that all three types of corporate event (IPOs, acquisitions and 
SEOs)  are not only moving in cycles of their own but, given that the underlying drivers of individual 
corporate events are broadly similar, there is a significant overlap among them. Lowry (2003), for 
example, finds that IPO volume fluctuates substantially over time and relates to firms’ demands for 
capital and investor sentiment; Howe and Zhang (2010) show a similar pattern for SEOs. Further-
more, Colak and Tekatli (2010) find that a common factor related to the business cycle can explain 
a significant proportion of individual corporate events.  Moreover, Rau and Stouraitis (2011) find that 
such corporate event waves are closely linked and even follow certain patterns. For example, SEOs 
precede IPOs, which are followed by stock-financed merger waves followed in turn by stock repur-
chase activity. The speed and sequence of corporate event waves may have important implications 
for the timing of financing and investment decisions. More specifically, a recently floated firm that 
timed its listing at a ‘window of opportunity’ for IPOs is likely to be involved soon afterwards in some 
type of acquisition if the IPO and M&A waves overlap. In such cases, acquisitions by IPO firms are 
likely to take place within a short time period after flotation. 
It is important to note two recent papers that focus explicitly on the long-run performance for firms 
with follow-on corporate events. Brau, Couch and Sutton (2012) find that IPO companies that acquire 
within a year of going public significantly underperform in the three years following flotation; on the 
other hand, non-acquiring IPO firms or those that wait for more than a year after the IPO to become 
acquirers do not significantly underperform over the same time period. Their paper, however, differs 
from ours not only on its focus on acquisitions only, but more importantly on its implicit assumption 
that acquisitions are the only type of follow-on corporate transactions made by recently listed firms. 
Furthermore, they do not distinguish between cash and stock acquisitions, a feature that is usually 
178 
associated with differences in performance (Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Carrow, Heron and Sax-
ton (2004)). In contrast Bessler and Zimmermann (2011), using a pan-European IPO sample,25 show 
positive aftermarket long-run performance for acquiring IPO firms. Their study, however, also ignores 
any other type of corporate activities that the recent IPOs may have been involved after the listing. 
Billett, Flannery and Gartfinkel (2011) also provide a wider perspective on subsequent corporate 
activities by examining the implications of a variety of follow-on security issuances on long-run per-
formance. Their results suggest that negative post-issuance returns are related to the number of the 
different types of security issued; in the case of IPOs, they find that firms that go through a series of 
post-IPO financing rounds, in the form of bank loans, follow-on SEOs, public debt issues, or private 
placements of equity significantly underperform. Their evidence implies that undertaking such activ-
ities without a strong strategic objective leads to disappointing performance.  
3.3. Data and methodology 
This study is based on a sample of 1,504 non-financial IPOs listed on the two London markets, the 
Official List (often referred to as the Main Market) (276 IPOs) and the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) (1,228 IPOs) during the period from January 1995 to March 2008. The basic sample of IPOs 
originates from London Stock Exchange statistics and covers industry classification, market capital-
ization, amount raised, and issue price. The data on the follow-on acquisitions (cash and stock), 
SEOs, and divestitures within the three years after flotation are from Bloomberg and cover the period 
January 1995 to December 2010. We analyze the entire universe of all completed acquisition and 
SEO transactions with a stated deal value amount.26 The financial accounts, stock price returns and 
macroeconomic data is from Datastream. 
Long-term aftermarket performance estimates are based on buy-and-hold abnormal returns 




































where: rit and rbt are the raw returns on IPO i and the selected benchmark b at event month t. 
We estimate BHARs using the FTSE All-Share Index for all IPOs listed on the Main market and the 
Small Cap index for IPOs listed on AIM. Given the concentration of certain industries in our IPO 
sample we also estimate industry-adjusted BHARs are based on the ten broad FTSE sector indices. 
The null hypothesis that the mean BHARs are equal to zero is tested using the skewness-adjusted 
t-statistic with bootstrapped p-values as suggested by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and adapted by 
Jelic, Saadouni and Wright (2005). 
                                                 
25 Their sample includes IPOs from UK, France, Germany and Italy. The UK component, however, is rather limited as it 
includes only 644 IPOs involved in 400 acquisitions. Our UK sample in this paper during the shorter period (1996-208) 
includes 1,493 IPOs and 1, acquisitions.  
26.  The number of divestitures is not included in the restriction due to unavailability. 
27. When a firm in a portfolio is delisted from the database, the portfolio return for the next month is an equally-weighted 
average of the remaining firms in the portfolio. Thus, the proceeds of the delisted firm are equally allocated among the 
surviving members of the portfolio in each subsequent month.  
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We also assess aftermarket performance using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model with 
equal- and value-weighted returns as follows: 
   𝑅𝑝𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡  (2) 
The three factors are (Rmt – Rft), the excess return on the value weighted market portfolio, (SMB) the 
return on a portfolio formed by subtracting the on a large from the return on a small firm portfolio. 
High minus low (HML) is the return on UK-listed high book-to-market return minus the return of the 
low book-to-market portfolio and Rf is the 90-day UK Treasury bill rate.  The 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 portfolios 
were constructed using a two-by-three groupings rebalanced every six months throughout the sam-
ple period.  
3.4. Descriptive statistics of IPOs and follow-on corporate events 
3.4.1. Annual Distribution of IPOs and Corporate Events 
Table 3.4.1-A provides details of the annual distribution of the sample of 1,504 IPOs during the period 
January 1995 to March 2008 and their follow-on corporate activities in terms of acquisitions, SEOs, 
and divestitures. It shows significant variations in both the volume of IPOs and follow-on events 
during the sample period. The first wave of IPOs ended in the middle of 2000 with the burst of the 
technology bubble; the market started growing again in 2004 with 218 issues that year and continued 
for three years until mid-2007, with the peak year being 2005 with 270 issues.28 In sharp contrast to 
the strong and almost immediate involvement of a large number of recently listed IPO firms in a 
frantic spree of acquisitions during 1999-2001, the 2004-2006 cohort was relatively modest and it 
took almost two years for follow-on acquisitions to peak again. This new wave of IPOs was also 
different from 1999-2000 as it was followed by strong SEO activity (333 issues) in the subsequent 
two years. On the other hand, the volume of divestitures appears relatively stable during the entire 
sample period.29 The differences in the patterns of the follow-on events between the two waves re-
flect, to a certain extent, the type and characteristics of the two IPO groups and the corresponding 
market sentiment at the time. The 1999-2000 wave of IPOs, for example, was dominated by small 
technology firms listing on AIM, raising modest amounts of capital at relatively high valuations; in 
contrast, the 2004-2006 cycle was considerably more diverse in terms of industry distribution and 
market size. Both cycles of IPO, acquisition and SEO activity coincided, however, with corresponding 
strong market performances.   
The 1,504 IPO firms in our sample were involved in 2,938 corporate events during the three-year 
period after flotation, resulting in an average of 1.9 events per IPO firm. Consistent with the literature 
on the importance of acquisitions as one of the key objectives for an IPO, more than 50% of the 
follow-on corporate events (1,587) were acquisitions. In contrast, however, with the CFOs’ view that 
IPOs provide ‘currency’ for acquisitions, unreported results show that pure cash transactions ac-
                                                 
28. Although the overwhelming majority of the IPO firms during this period (79.7%) were listed on the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM), they accounted for only 15.2% of the total amount raised. In other words, the average (median) amount 
raised by an IPO on the MAIN market is £233m (£81m) in comparison to an equivalent £11m (£5m) on AIM. 
29.As the data on divestiture transactions is limited, Table 1 only shows values for IPOs, acquisitions, and SEOs. 
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counted for 41% of all acquisitions while pure stock acquisitions accounted for only 14%; the ‘cur-
rency’ argument, however, receives considerable support from the 708 acquisitions (45% of the total) 
that were completed by a combination of cash and stock. 
Table 3.4.1-A: Annual Distribution of IPOs, Acquisitions, SEOs, and Divestitures 
The total sample of 1,504 IPOs during the period 1995-2008 raised a total of £77.2 billion and involved in 1,587 
acquisitions worth £38.1 billion, 915 SEOs raising 20.1 billion, and 436 divestitures.  In total, the sample of IPO 
firms was involved in 2,938 corporate events in the three-year period after flotation, worth £58.3 billion, exclud-
ing the value of divestitures. 
 
















1995 11 53       - - 
1996 82 419 1 127 9 244 0  10 371 
1997 53 273 2 1 12 92 1  15 93 
1998 71 7,119 47 485 25 220 5  77 705 
1999 77 10,951 98 668 32 270 21  151 939 
2000 201 9,276 189 3,090 59 
2,07
2 
20  268 5,162 
2001 78 4,891 170 1,503 35 957 53  258 2,460 
2002 54 3,984 118 852 48 935 41  207 1,787 
2003 50 2,586 61 3,536 31 
1,43
7 
33  125 4,973 
2004 214 4,375 81 1,073 25 805 20  126 1,878 
2005 261 8,471 168 3,126 68 
1,93
2 
39  275 5,058 
2006 200 13,534 234 7,604 167 
3,40
9 
43  444 11,013 
2007 144 11,096 273 5,043 225 
4,23
5 
69  567 9,278 
2008 8 170 108 2,556 108 
1,89
8 
57  273 4,454 
2009   22 6,696 47 
1,06
6 
23  92 7,762 
2010   14 1,787 22 524 9  45 2,312 
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2011   1  2 23 2  5 23 
All 1,504 77,197 1,587 38,146 915 
20,1
20 
436  2,938 58,266 
* Data for the value of divestitures is not available. 
 
Table 3.4.1-B provides summary statistics of the number of corporate events for each of the three 
years following an IPO. It is immediately apparent that each of the three types of corporate event 
follows a distinct timing pattern. In sharp contrast to divestitures, for example - almost half of which 
occur during the third year after flotation - 45% of the total number of acquisitions completed within 
the first 12 months and then gradually decline during the second (32%) and third years (23%). This 
pattern of activity is consistent with the notion that firms are indeed using public listing as part of a 
strategic move for growth through acquisitions. On the other hand, the broadly even distribution of 
SEOs across the three years suggests that firms raise additional equity at regular intervals in order 
to fund ongoing operations and possibly cash acquisitions. 
Table 3.4.1-B: Annual Number of Events Announced by IPO Firms in the Three Years after Flotation 
The total sample of 1,504 IPO firms during the period 1995-2008 was involved in 2,938 corporate events during 
the first 3 years since flotation. Acquisitions account for 54% of the total number of events (2,938) during 1995-
2011, while SEOs and divestitures account 31% and 15% respectively. The majority acquisitions (45) occur 
within the first year of listing, while a larger number of divestitures (45%) take place in the third year since 
going public. SEOs are distributed evenly across the 3 years. 
 
 
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 TOTAL 
Acquisitions     
Number 715 503 369 1,587 
% of total by year (45%) (32%) (23%) (100%) 
% of total by type (67%) (49%) (43%) (54%) 
     
SEOs     
Number 274 346 295 915 
% of total by year (30%) (38%) (32%) (100%) 
% of total by type (26%) (34%) (34%) (31%) 
     
Divestitures     
Number 71 168 197 436 
% of total by year (16%) (39%) (45%) (100%) 
% of total by type (7%) (17%) (23%) (15%) 
     
All     
182 
Number 1,060 1,017 861 2,938 
% of total by year (36%) (35%) (29%) (100%) 
% of total by type (100%) (100) (100) (100%) 
 
3.4.2. Volume, Pattern and Timing of Follow-on Corporate Events  
 
Table 3.4.2-A provides details on the pattern and timing of corporate events by IPO firms during the 
three-year period following flotation. First, it is worth noting that out of total of 1,504 IPOs, only 1,277 
were still listed at the beginning of the third year; a sizable proportion (15%) of the original sample 
were delisted either voluntarily, i.e. as a result of transfer to the Main market, a merger, going private 
again or bankruptcy. More specifically, the table shows the number and proportion of IPO firms that 
were involved in each of the three types of corporate events during the first six months and at one, 
two, and three years after flotation. The percentage estimates are based on the number of live IPO 
firms at the end of each of the four periods. For example, 625 IPO firms, or 49% of those still alive 
at the end of the three-year period, were not involved in any acquisitions. On the other hand, 652 
(51% of the surviving IPO firms) made at least one acquisition within the three-year period, while 
124 (10% of the surviving) made at least four. 
Acquisitions clearly emerge as the most popular type of activity, particularly within 12 months of 
flotation; a total of 28% and 41% of the IPO companies in the sample had at least one such event 
within first 12 and 24 months, respectively, and by the end of the third year, more than half (51%) 
had concluded one such transaction. However, although the pattern of post-IPO acquisition activity 
in the UK is broadly comparable to the US, the average number of takeovers per IPO is still lower. 
Celikyurt, Sevilir and Shivdasani (2010), for example, report that 54.7% of IPO firms in the US con-
duct at least one acquisition within the first year and 71.5% within three years. Moreover, while they 
find that the average number of acquisitions during the first IPO year is 0.65, increasing to 3.35 by 
the end of the third year, the equivalent average level of acquisition activity in UK is 0.48 for the first 
year, increasing to 1.04 by the third year. Their sample, however, includes only 1,295 IPOs with total 
proceeds equal to or greater than $100 million. Hovakimian and Hutton (2010a), on the other hand, 
using a larger sample of 5,771 IPOs that includes smaller companies and a longer time period, find 
that only 19% and 36% of the IPO firms in their sample completed at least one acquisition by the 
first and third years of their IPO, respectively. This is a level of activity considerably lower than the 
equivalent 28% and 51% rates levels of activity we report for UK.  They also find that the average 
number of acquisition per IPO is just 0.74, considerably lower than in UK.  
SEOs start relatively slowly, with only 17% having an additional equity issue in the first 12 months, 
but their frequency grows rapidly during the second and third years. In fact, by the end of the third 
year, 50% of the surviving IPO firms had raised additional equity through at least one SEO, a pro-
portion almost identical to those involved in a least one acquisition; a further 17% and 4% of the 
surviving IPOs had 2 or 3 SEOs respectively by the third year of listing.  Overall, however, the aver-
age number of SEOs from our original sample of IPOs is only 0.6 in comparison to 1.04 acquisitions 
per IPO. The pattern of SEO activity in our sample is consistent with Hovakimian and Hutton (2010b), 
who use a broader sample of equity issues not related to IPOs only, finding that 50% of the issues 
are by firms that issue only once, 26% by those issuing twice and 13% three times. The slow start 
and subsequent gradual increase in the number of SEOs could be related to the emerging need for 
funds for further acquisitions and capital expenditure but could also be related to recent price move-
ments. The table also shows that a remarkable 77% of the surviving sample IPO companies did not 
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complete a single divestiture during the three-year period. Only 4% made a divestiture within the first 
year of listing but, although their popularity increased gradually over time, only 23% of the IPO firms 
still alive at the beginning of the third year were involved in at least one such event by the end of the 
three-year period. Finally, it is worth noting that the overall volume of acquisitions and SEOs in our 
sample of IPOs is very similar to the equivalent level of activity across Europe (Vismara, Paleari and 
Ritter 2012). 
Table 3.4.2-A: Summary Statistics of Corporate Events Following an IPO 
The sample of 1,504 IPOs, during the period 1995-2008 were, involved in different types of corporate events 
in the three years following flotation. An event can be an acquisition, an SEO or a divestiture during the first 
six, 12, 24 and 36 months.  A total of 227 IPOs, 15% of the initial sample,  were delisted by the end of the 
three-year period since flotation, and about 50% of initial sample of IPOs by the end of the 3-year period were 
not involved in any acquisitions or SEOs; a large proportion of the IPOs (77%) were not involved in any divest-
itures. Overall, during the 3-year period in the aftermarket only 17% were not involved in any type of corporate 
event, while a small minority of 10%, 1% and 2% were involved in more than 4 acquisitions, SEOs and divest-
itures respectively. 
 
  Months 0-6 Years 0-1 Years 0-2 Years 0-3 
  No % No % No % No % 
Total no. of IPOs 1504        
End of Period: IPOs 1495 99% 1475 98% 1388 92% 1277 85% 
Delisted IPO firms 9 1% 29 2% 116 8% 227 15% 
 
IPO firms making 
no: 
Acquisitions 1253 84% 1069 73% 824 59% 625 49% 
SEOs 1378 92% 1225 83% 887 64% 632 50% 
Divestitures 1465 98% 1450 98% 1225 88% 977 77% 
Events at all 1162 78% 889 60% 484 35% 213 17% 
 
IPO firms making at 
least one: 
Acquisition 242 16% 406 28% 564 41% 652 51% 
SEO 117 8% 250 17% 501 36% 645 50% 
Divestiture 30 2% 58 4% 163 12% 280 22% 
 
IPO firms making at 
least two: 
Acquisitions 69 5% 155 11% 267 19% 344 27% 
SEOs 5 0% 23 2% 106 8% 215 17% 
Divestitures 2 0% 10 1% 42 3% 80 6% 
 
IPO firms making at 
least three: 
Acquisitions 24 2% 73 5% 143 10% 204 16% 
SEOs 0 0% 1 0% 11 1% 48 4% 
Divestitures 0 0% 3 0% 15 1% 38 3% 
 
IPO firms making at 
least four: 
Acquisitions 9 1% 34 2% 85 6% 124 10% 
SEOs 0 0% 0 0% 2 0% 7 1% 
184 
Divestitures 0 0% 0 0% 8 1% 19 1% 
 
Table 3.4.2-B, in the broad shape of a decision tree, offers a different perspective on post-IPO cor-
porate activity by tracing the pattern of the first three post-IPO corporate events.  For each step, 
there are five options: acquisition, divestiture, SEO, no event, or delisting.  The first event for 500 
(33%) of the total 1,504 IPO firms in the initial sample was an acquisition, 29% an SEO, and 9% a 
divestiture. At the same time, 87 firms (5%) were delisted before they had undertaken any corporate 
activity, while almost a quarter (353 firms or 24%) of the whole sample was not involved in any 
corporate activity during the first three years of public life. 
The table also shows that 46% of firms (230) with an acquisition as their first event followed it up 
with a second acquisition, while 52% (122) even made a third acquisition during the three-year period 
following flotation. At the same time, 19% of the IPO firms starting with an acquisition as their first 
corporate event followed it up with an SEO and then either switched to yet another acquisition (36%), 
opted for a divestiture (4%), or proceeded with another SEO (16%). We also observe a broadly 
similar interchanging pattern for IPO firms starting with an SEO or a divestiture as their first event. 
For example, 435 of IPO firms (29% of the total), raised additional equity as their first corporate 
event; 25% of these followed it up with a second fundraising round and 19% even had a third one. 
At the same time, a sizable proportion (23%) probably used at least some of the proceeds of their 
first SEO for an acquisition as their second event.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that the type of the first corporate event sets the pattern for the follow-
on activities. For example, more than half of the IPO firms starting with an acquisition are involved 
in more acquisitions as their second and third events. Moreover, 54% of IPO firms starting with a 
divestiture are also more likely to be involved in two more such transactions later on.  A broadly 
similar, but with less pronounced pattern, is also observed for SEOs. Such repetitive patterns of the 
same type of event may be related to positive market feedback and subsequent positive perfor-
mance, as reported for SEOs by Hovakimian and Hutton (2010b), or may be part of a predefined 
strategic plan for growth. We explore the potential implications of such patterns of serial behavior on 
long-term performance in Section V. Finally, it is worth noting that a total of 28 firms – 7.2% of the 
surviving firms - were delisted after completing three events.   
Table 3.4.2-B: Patterns of Post-IPO Corporate Event Activity 
This table illustrates the pattern of corporate events for the 1,504 newly listed firms. After listing, there are five 
possible options: acquisition, SEO, divestiture, no event, or delisting. Delisting incorporates bankruptcy, delist-
ing and takeover. Each option is available three consecutive times, Event 1, Event 2, and Event 3. The table 
therefore becomes a decision tree illustration in that each event step (1-3) shows the number of firms following 
a given path of the five options available. The numbers in brackets corresponds to the number of firms following 











Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
   
  Acquisition (122; 52%)  
 Acquisition (230; 46%) SEO (28; 12%)  
       Divestiture (21; 10%)  
  No event (55; 24%)   Delist (4; 2%) 
   
  Acquisition (35: 36%) 
Acquisition (500; 
33%) 
SEO (95; 19%) SEO (15; 16%) 
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  Divestiture (4; 4%) 
  No event (37; 40%)   Delist (4; 4%) 
   
  Acquisition (8; 20%)   
 Divestiture (27; 16%) SEO (3; 13%) 
  Divestiture (5; 16%) 
 
No event (121; 24%)   Delist (27; 
5%) 
No event (8; 32%)   Delist (3; 13%) 
   
  Acquisition (36; 34%) 
 Acquisition (106; 24%) SEO (24; 23%) 
        Divestiture (5; 5%) 
  No event (34; 32%)   Delist 7; 6%) 
   
  Acquisition (18; 16%) 
SEO (435; 29%) SEO (111; 25%) SEO (21; 19%) 
            Divestiture (6; 5%) 
  No event (62; 56%)   Delist (4; 4%) 
   
  Acquisition (4; 11%) 
 Divestiture (34; 8%) SEO (5; 15%) 
  Divestiture (9; 26%) 
 
No event (160; 37%)   Delist (28; 
6%)   
No Event (12; 37%)   Delist (4; 
11%) 
   
  Acquisition (6; 38%) 
 Acquisition (16; 12%) SEO (3; 18%) 
  Divestiture (1; 6%) 
  No event (6; 38%)   Delist (0; 0%) 
   
  Acquisition (0; 0%) 
Divestiture (129; 9%) SEO (29; 22%) SEO (4; 14%) 
  Divestiture (7; 24%) 
  No event (17; 59%)   Delist (1; 3%) 
   
  Acquisition (0; 0%) 
 Divestiture (25; 20%)  SEO (0; 0%) 
No event (353; 24%)  Divestiture (13; 54%) 
Delist (87; 5%) 
No event (45; 36%)   Delist (14; 
10%) 
No event (11; 42%)   Delist (1; 4%) 
 
3.5. The Likelihood of an Acquisition, SEO or Divestiture 
In this section we investigate the firm and market characteristics related to each of the three types 
of corporate events. Table 3.5-A presents summary statistics on the size and key operating charac-
teristics for our sample of IPOs, in both the Main and AIM markets, by the type of their first corporate 
event and for the group of IPO firms without any corporate activity during the three years after flota-
tion. More specifically, it reports the median values for underpricing, market value, and equity pro-
ceeds as well as a number of key performance indicators. In general, we find no fundamental differ-
ences in the characteristics of the IPO firms involved in different types of corporate event; this applies 
to firms in both the Main and AIM markets, in spite of the obvious differences in the absolute values 
of their size-related characteristics. There are, however, some subtle differences between corporate-
event active and inactive IPO firms. The latter group, for example, consists of relatively larger firms 
in terms of assets and sales, which are more profitable, at least in the Main market, both in absolute 
and relative terms, and operating in more mature industries as indicated by their assets’ tangibility. 
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On the other hand, recently listed firms involved in acquisitions and SEOs are relatively smaller in 
terms of sales and somewhat less profitable.  
Table 3.5-A: Operational characteristics for the IPO Firms at the Time of Listing 
The table reports key operational characteristics for the sample of 1,504 IPOs, in the Main and AIM, during 
the period 1995-2007 according to the type of their first corporate event since flotation. The source of data 
for all balance items are the IPO prospectuses and are based on the last published accounts before going 
public. The number of observations varies across items depending on data availability. 
 
 Acquisitions SEOs Divestitures No Event 
 Cash Stock Hybrid    
 Main AIM Main AIM Main AIM Main AIM Main AIM Main AIM 
Underpricing                     
     Median 8% 10% 10% 9% 8% 10% 8% 8% 8.3% 7.7% 9% 7.3% 
     No. Obs. 80 256 18 129 59 274 89 489 55 184 54 355 
MV at offer(£m)             
     Median 430 20 535 13 204 16 490 19 674 22 157 17 
     No. Obs. 98 268 22 149 68 291 114 531 82 198 67 373 
 IPO Proceeds(£m)             
     Median 94 5 67 3 64 4 115 4 188 6 54 5 
     No. Obs. 98 268 21 149 67 290 112 530 81 198 67 373 
Total Assets(£m)             
     Median 104 10 48 5 63 7 147 7 266 9 59 6 
     No. Obs. 88 266 21 146 65 286 107 521 68 190 64 357 
Sales(£m)             
     Median 104 10 48 5 63 7 147 7 266 9 59 6 
     No. Obs. 88 266 21 146 65 286 107 521 68 190 64 357 
EBITDA(£m)             
     Median 12 0.6 2 -0.1 5 0.1 19 -0.3 27 -0.2 4 0.04 
     No. Obs. 88 231 19 128 62 249 104 464 165 169 63 309 
IPO Proceeds / TA             
     Median 63% 56% 
104
% 
67% 86% 54% 63% 71% 49% 57% 82% 77% 
     No. Obs. 85 263 15 139 63 274 102 495 66 181 60 340 
Sales/TA             
     Median 94% 68% 70% 18% 47% 60% 71% 18% 67% 18% 68% 38% 
     No. Obs. 82 219 19 119 59 232 99 448 66 164 54 284 
Leverage (TD/TA)             
     Median 15% 7% 14% 18% 5% 6% 14% 3% 15% 3% 13% 3% 
     No. Obs. 87 232 20 123 63 249 106 456 65 166 62 296 
Cash /TA             
     Median 15% 19% 55% 28% 26% 22% 18% 33% 12% 22% 18% 28% 
     No. Obs. 84 219 18 119 61 238 103 437 63 163 61 271 
Tangibility /TA             
     Median 18% 8% 7% 7% 8% 6% 19% 7% 18% 7.5% 26% 8% 
     No. Obs. 85 217 19 112 54 234 104 421 64 159 61 269 
EBITDA to Sales             
     Median 16% 7% 8.2% 
-
8.3% 




     No. Obs. 88 209 19 128 62 235 100 346 63 132 62 265 
EBITDA/TA             
     Median 15% 7% 
-
1.3% 
-9% 12% 1.4% -8% -7% 11% -4% 13% 1% 
     No. Obs. 88 231 22 149 62 249 104 463 65 169 63 308 
 
 
We use logit panel regressions to assess separately the likelihood of an acquisition – financed either 
by cash, stock or mixed – SEO, and divestiture as a function of company-specific characteristics and 
market conditions. In the logit regression (2) below, the dependent variable is set to one when there 
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is an event during each of the six-month interval within the three years since going public or 0 oth-
erwise. Thus, the same IPO firm may be included in any of the six logit regressions if it was involved 
in different types of event during that period.  
Ait  =  ai +β1Timing + β2IPOProceeds + β3EquityProceeds(-6M) + β4Profitability(-1Y) + 
β5Leverage(-1Y) + β6Tangibility(-1Y) + β7Return(-3M) + β8MarketSentiment(-3M) 
+Β9GDPGrowth(-6M) + β10FDR + β11 PreviousEvent(-1) + β12Market + β13Sales(-1Y) 
+ ειt                                     (2)   
The independent variables relate to the three hypotheses while company characteristics are used 
as control variables. According to the financing hypothesis, the probability of acquisition increases 
with the availability of IPO proceeds (money raised at flotation scaled to total assets), the proceeds 
of previous equity issues (equity raised scaled to total assets), profitability (EBITDA scaled to total 
assets), leverage (total debt scaled to total assets) and asset tangibility (property plant and equip-
ment scaled to total assets). On the other hand, the probability of acquisition declines with the time 
period lapsed since the IPO (the number of six-month intervals since the IPO).  
The market timing hypothesis posits that the likelihood of stock acquisitions increases with recent 
stock price performance, market sentiment (the average discount of investment trusts over a three-
month period before the event) and general economic conditions (GDP growth over the previous six 
months). First day returns (underpricing) could also be an important determinant of acquisition ac-
tivity, either as an indicator of market feedback or as another proxy for market misevaluation. We 
also include a dummy variable to control for the occurrence of a previous similar event as a proxy of 
reduced adverse selection costs and an indication of an established strategic plan for future growth; 
our set of control variables also includes the listing market (Main or AIM) and a log of sales as a 
proxy for size.  
Table 3.5-B reports the logit regressions for each of the three main corporate events and separate 
results for acquisitions according to the method of payment, i.e. cash, stock, and hybrid. It is worth 
noting that the market timing and feedback hypotheses are to a certain extent relevant for all three 
types of events while the financing hypothesis relates to acquisitions and SEOs only. More specifi-
cally, we find a negative and significant coefficient for timing across all types of acquisitions and 
SEOs, suggesting that an early engagement in such transactions is indicative of a pre-planned strat-
egy for future growth. Divestitures, on the other hand, take place later in public life suggesting that 
such events are in response to firm performance and market conditions rather than part of a prede-
fined plan. In contrast to Hovakimian and Hutton (2010a) and Celikyurt, Sevilir and Shivdasani (2010), 
who report a positive and significant coefficient for cash acquisitions, we find positive but not signif-
icant coefficients suggesting that IPO proceeds are not the dominant source of funds for acquisitions. 
Instead, our evidence demonstrates strong support for the financing hypothesis in terms of the pos-
itive and significant coefficient of the additional equity proceeds for cash and hybrid acquisitions; 
thus, recent IPO firms use their public status to raise additional equity capital (SEOs) to fund cash 
and mixed acquisitions. Stock acquisitions of course also use their public listing to generate currency 
for acquisitions, as  suggested by Brau and Fawcett (2006)’s CFOs’ survey. The positive and signif-
icant profitability coefficient for cash acquisitions suggests that internally generated funds are an-
other important source of finance for cash and hybrid acquisitions. On the other hand, the corre-
sponding negative coefficient for SEOs and divestitures indicate that such corporate events are more 
likely to be motivated by the need for some type corporate restructuring to address their poor profit-
ability at that point in time. Klein and Rosenfeld (2010), for example, find that poor performance and 
underinvestment in subsidiaries are the key motivations for spin-offs and the subsequent improve-
ment in the parents’ performance. 
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There is also considerable evidence in support of both the market timing and market feedback hy-
potheses across all three types of corporate event. In contrast to Hovakimian and Hutton (2010a), 
we find that only stock acquisitions are affected by market timing exactly as predicted by the market 
timing hypothesis. The probability of stock acquisitions and SEOs, for example, is significantly higher 
for issuers with strong recent price performance and in the case of stock and hybrid acquisitions for 
IPO companies with a particularly successful market debut in terms of first day performance. Ce-
likyurt, Sevilir and Shivdasani (2010) also report that firms with higher first day returns conduct more 
stock-financed acquisitions in the years following an IPO. Further support for the importance of mar-
ket timing in post-IPO corporate activity is offered by the positive and significant coefficients of mar-
ket sentiment, as measured by the average investment trusts’ discount for cash acquisitions, SEOs 
and even divestitures. An additional perspective on the strategic motivation behind acquisitions and 
SEOs is offered by their respective positive and negative coefficients for GDP growth.  They indicate 
that acquisitions are a direct response to an expanding economy while SEOs are more likely to be 
launched in response to capital requirements, either for acquisitions or capital expenditure, at times 
of sluggish economic growth. 
Consistent with the pattern of follow-on events shown in Table 3.4.2-B, the logit results also point to 
a strong serial pattern of follow-on corporate events by companies which have carried out recent 
IPOs. The positive and significant coefficients of a recent acquisition, SEO or divestiture suggest a 
recurring pattern in such transactions that are likely to be indicative of a long-term plan for future 
growth; such a pattern also provides further support to the market feedback hypothesis through 
closer monitoring and reductions in potential information asymmetries. Intintoli, Jategaonkar and 
Kahle (2011) find that firms that issue SEOs within the first year of their IPO are able to offer shares 
at a smaller discount as institutional demand is significantly higher for follow-on SEOs. . 
Table 3.5-B: The Likelihood of an Acquisition, SEO, or Divestiture 
The Table reports estimates from logit panel regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of ‘1’ if there is an event during the six months period and ‘0’ otherwise. Timing is the 
number of six-month time intervals since the IPO. IPO Proceeds is the money raised scaled to total assets. 
Equity proceeds is the primary equity capital (SEO) raised in the six-month period scaled to total assets. Prof-
itability is EBITDA scaled to total assets of the latest available in the calendar year six months prior (LACY-
6M). Sales is the logarithm of revenues (LACY-6M). Leverage is the total debt scaled to total assets (LACY-
6M). Tangibility is property plant and equipment scaled to total assets (LACY-6M). Return is the three-month 
share price return prior to the six-month period. Underpricing is the difference between the offer price and the 
first day of trading, scaled by the offer price. Previous Event is a dummy equal to ‘1’ if a similar event has taken 
place in the six months prior and ‘0’ otherwise. The proxy for Market Sentiment is the average three-month 
investment trust discount prior to the six-month period. GDP Growth is the quarterly UK GDP growth in the 
quarter prior to the six-month period. The dummy variable for Market Listing takes the value of ‘1’ if listed on 
the Main market and ‘0’ otherwise. Positive coefficients imply that increases in the variable are associated with 
higher probability of an event. The statistics reported in brackets are the Z statistics. The Pseudo-R2 is the log-
likelihood of the maximum likelihood minus the log-likelihood when only the constant is included.  ***, **, and 
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Equity Proceeds 0.332 
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189 
Sales 0.031 
     (3.71)*** 
0.047 
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0.099 0.092 0.034 0.126 0.025 0.072 
Observations 
7059 7059 7059 7059 7059 7059 
 
 
Finally, in line with Hovakimian and Hutton (2010a), we find that the likelihood of cash acquisitions 
increases with size as larger firms have better access to both debt and equity markets due to their 
greater transparency and lower risk.  Larger firms are also more likely to hold more extensive cash 
reserves and are in a better position to fund their acquisitions by cash; stock acquisitions, on the 
other hand, are not affected by size. Rather surprisingly, we find that leverage is only related to 
divestitures but not to the decision to pursue acquisition or SEOs; divestitures are also more likely 
among firms listed on the Main market.  
We also investigate the likelihood of each of the events occurring in each of the three post-IPO years 
separately. Further unreported results suggest that the positive and significant coefficient of under-
pricing for stock and hybrid acquisitions is entirely due to the acquisitions which take place in the first 
12 months post-IPO; such corporate events in the second and third years are not related to first-day 
performance.  Also, the positive coefficient of market growth, found in the overall three-year results, 
is predominantly driven by the acquisitions which take place in the second year only. Otherwise, the 
annual logit regressions show remarkable persistence for all types of corporate event for each of the 
three years following an IPO.  
3.6. Aftermarket Performance 
To assess the potential relationship between follow-on corporate activities and the long-term perfor-
mance of IPO firms, we estimate BHARs for the sample as a whole, by the market of listing (Main 
vs. AIM) and a number of strategies reflecting the volume of corporate events of any type during the 
three-year period after flotation. Table 3.6-A reports BHARs for the whole sample of IPO companies 
from January 1995 to March 2008 calculated until the earlier of either the IPO’s third anniversary or 
the delisting date; the latest date for returns was April 2011. We report results for the first six months 
and then at 12-month intervals, excluding first-day returns, using two alternative benchmarks: 1) the 
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FTSE All-Share Index and 2) the ten FTSE sector indices. The number of IPOs included in the cal-
culation of BHARs declines with the month of seasoning. Panel A reports equal- and value-weighted 
BHARs for all IPOs, while Panels B and C show separate results for the Main and AIM markets, 
respectively. We also report performance results for all IPO firms and three alternative strategies 
reflecting their follow-on corporate activities, i.e. no events, at least one event, and at least two events 
during the three-year period after the listing; event(s) refers to a single or a combination of any of 
the three types of corporate activity examined in this paper. 
The results for the entire sample of IPOs in Table 3.6-A (Panels A and B) are broadly consistent with 
the pattern of previous US and UK studies. The equally-weighted 36-month BHARs, both FTA- and 
industry-adjusted, are negative and statistically significant, confirming once again the long estab-
lished pattern of long-term average underperformance, while the equivalent positive but non-signifi-
cant value-weighted returns suggest that firm size plays some role in long-run performance. Follow-
on corporate activity, however, emerges as the decisive discriminating factor for long-term perfor-
mance. The average equally-weighted 36-month return for all IPOs without any follow-on activity 
drops to -33.80% in comparison the average of -12.80%; on the other hand, the equivalent FTA-
adjusted returns for IPO companies with at least one or two corporate events are not statistically 
significant from zero. A broadly similar pattern is also evident for value-weighted FTA- and industry-
adjusted returns. 
Panels B and C provide further detail on the issues of firm size and listing market by examining the 
36-month performance of IPOs on the Main (Panel B) and AIM (Panel C) markets separately. While, 
for example, the average equally- and value-weighted 36-month BHARs for firms on the Main market 
are not statistically different from zero, IPO firms on AIM significantly underperform both the relevant 
market and industry benchmarks by 16.47% and 34.72% respectively during the same time window; 
the value-weighted returns are also very similar. At the same time, however, it is worth noting some 
of the performance differences across firms depending on the basis of their follow-on corporate ac-
tivities. We find, for example, that the industry-adjusted BHARs for IPO companies with one or two 
follow-on events on the Main market are positive and significant. Moreover, in contrast to the nega-
tive and significant equal and value BHARs for IPO firms without any follow-on events on AIM, the 
equivalent performance of active firms (two or more events) is not statistically different from zero. 
Table 3.6-A: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns by Volume of Activity 
The total sample of 1,504 IPOs during the period 1995-2008 were involved in a total of 2,938 corporate during 
the first 36 months of going public; this include 1,587 acquisitions, 915 SEOs and 436 divestitures. For each 
IPO, the buy-and-hold returns are calculated by compounding daily returns up to the month of the IPO and 
from the on compounding monthly returns for 36 months. Buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) in panel A include 
IPOs both in the Main and AIM markets and are calculated using the FTSE-All Share index for IPO firms in the 
Main market and the FTSE Small-Cap index for their AIM counterparts; Industry adjusted BHARs are  based 
on the FTSE 10 Group Industry Classification indices.. Panels B and C show the equivalent BHARs for IPOs 
in the Main and AIM markets respectively. Each of the three panels shows BHARs for all IPOs in the respective 
market(s) and separate estimates according to the number of corporate events for each IPO during the 3 years 
in the aftermarket; a corporate even could be either an acquisition, an SEO or a divestiture. ***, **, and * 
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Panel C: AIM 
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In Panels A and B of Table 3.6-B, we present the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model results 
based on monthly returns. The intercept of the time series regressions provides an estimate of the 
risk-adjusted performance of each of the three groups of IPO companies according to their follow-
on corporate activity. Their positive and significant values for both equally- and value-weighted re-
turns suggest that IPO firms with two follow-on events generate an average market-adjusted return 
of about 9% per annum. 
Table 3.6-B: Fama and French Three-Factor Regressions on Calendar-Time Monthly Portfolio Returns 
The total sample of 1,504 IPOs during the period  January 1995 to March 2008 were involved in 2,938 corporate during 
the first 36 months of going public; this include 1,587 acquisitions, 915 SEOs and 436 divestitures. RMF is the market 
return on the FT All-Share Index minus the risk-free rate that is the UK one month Treasury bill rate. SMB is the difference 
each month between the return of small and big firms. HML is the difference each month between the return on a portfolio 
of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks.  The White heteroskedasticity 
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193 
SMB 0.961 
     (3.71)*** 
1.150 












     (-4.02)*** 
Adjusted R2 




































0.093 0.091 0.072 0.507 
 
 
Finally, to provide some further insights into the nature and drivers of aftermarket performance and 
their interaction with the pattern of follow-on corporate activity during the three years after flotation, 
Table 3.6-C reports multivariate regression results using the 36-month equally weighted buy-and-
hold returns as the dependent variable. We relate aftermarket performance to a set of company-
specific characteristics, such as market capitalization at the time of the offer, profitability in terms of 
EBITDA to total assets, and first-day returns.  We also control for market sentiment, proxied by the 
discount on investment trusts, and the pattern of corporate event activity in terms of the timing, vol-
ume and composition of the follow-on acquisitions, SEOs and divestitures. More specifically, we 
differentiate between single events of any type and multiple events of the same type over the three-
year time period and separate acquisitions according to their means of payment, i.e. cash, stock, or 
hybrids. 
Table 3.6-C examines the relation between company specific characteristics and 36-month perfor-
mance using the logarithm of wealth relatives. As expected, in model (1), we find a positive and 
significant relation between both market capitalization and profitability with long-term aftermarket 
performance, which is consistent with a number of other studies suggesting that the long-term un-
derperformance of IPO firms is predominantly due to small and immature firms that are probably too 
eager for a public listing. It is also worth noting that underperformance is a generic feature of smaller 
IPO companies rather than those just listed on AIM. We also observe a negative and significant 
coefficient between market sentiment, in terms of investment trust discount, and 36-month perfor-
mance; in other words, IPO firms floated in periods of positive market conditions clearly disappoint 
in the long term.  Finally, the negative and significant coefficient for the no-event dummy suggests 
that IPO companies without any follow-on activities in terms of acquisitions, SEOs and divestitures 
underperform their active counterparts by the end of the three-year period. 
Model (2) focuses on performance implications of early corporate activity. Consistent with the results 
of Brau, Couch and Sutton (2012), we find that IPO firms with at least one acquisition, of any type, 
within the first six months of listing perform significantly worse than average. On the other hand, in 
contrast to Levis (1995) and Jiang (2008), we find that there is a positive and significant relation 
between an SEO in the first six months of listing and long-run performance. At the same time, given 
the relatively limited divestiture activity at the early stages of public listing, it is not surprising that this 
type of activity is not related to long-term performance. Our results in model (3), however, suggest 
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that the underperformance of IPO firms with early acquisitions is more likely to be related to the 
timing rather than the nature of such acquisitions. The negative but not significant coefficient for IPO 
firms with at least two acquisitions of any type during the three-year period indicates that the long-
term performance of acquiring firms is not significantly worse than the average IPO. The coefficient 
for SEOs, however remains positive and significant, confirming that IPO firms with at least two SEOs, 
with or without any other type of corporate event, perform better than their less active - in terms of 
raising equity capital - counterparts.  
It is worth noting that in Table 3.4.2-B we show that a considerable number of recent IPO firms 
involved in an SEO as their first event are very likely to follow it up with an acquisition. In other words, 
a sizable proportion of the IPO firms raising additional equity capital are using at least part of the 
proceeds to pursue future cash acquisitions. Thus, the positive and significant coefficient for the “at 
least two SEOs” dummy  during the 3-year period is likely to  reflect the combined implications of 
SEOs and acquisitions on long-run performance. In some further unreported results, we also exam-
ine the performance of IPO firms involved in transactions of the same type only, but we find no 
evidence of a relationship between such ‘clean’ patterns of activity and 36-month performance. In 
the case of divestitures, there is very little difference between the performance of combined and 
clean transactions as the divesting IPO firms in our sample are less likely to be engaged in other 
types of corporate event during the three-year period.  
Table 3.6-C: Multivariate Cross-Sectinal Regressions for 36-month Aftermarket Performance 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 36-month wealth relative using the FTSE All-Share index as the 
market benchmark.  The independent variables are the logarithm of Market Capitalization at the time of the IPO, 
EBITDA/TA is EBITDA scaled by total assets at the time of the IPO, the proxy for Market Sentiment is the average three-
month investment trust discount at the time of the IPO. We use a dummy equal to 1 and 0 otherwise to capture the different 
types of corporate events during the first year and within three years of the public listing. The White heteroskedasticity 
robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and *   indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (4) (3) 
Market Value     0.054** 
(2.43) 




    0.045** 
(1.92) 
EBITDA/TA       0.917*** 
(7.04) 








     -6.476*** 
(-5.80) 




     -6.850*** 
(6.16) 
No corporate events within 3 years     -0.158** 
(-1.96) 
   
At least one acquisition within the first six  
months 
 
       -0.291*** 
(-2.61) 
  
At least one SEO within the first six months    0.193* 
(1.89) 
  






At least two Acquisitions within three years   -0.078 
(-0.85) 
 












At least two divestitures within three years   0.099 
(0.55) 
 
At least two cash acquisitions within three 
years 
    0.255* 
(1.78) 
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At least two stock acquisitions within three 
years 
       -0.543** 
(-1.98) 
At least two hybrid acquisitions within three 
years 
   -0.042 
(-0.37) 
At least two SEOs within three years          0.353*** 
(3.20) 
At least two divestitures within three years    0.103 
(0.58) 
 






        -1.607*** 
(-12.65) 
R2 adjusted 














Our evidence so far appears inconsistent with a number of previous studies that report poor long-
term performance for acquiring companies in general and recent IPO firms involved in subsequent 
acquisitions in particular. To shed some further light on this issue model (4) replicates the analysis 
of model (3) but separates acquisitions by method of payment, i.e. cash, stock, or hybrid. The results 
are quite revealing; while, for example, the coefficients for cash and hybrid acquisitions are non-
significant, the coefficient for stock acquisitions is negative and significant suggesting that IPO firms 
that completed at least two such acquisitions, even if these were combined at some point with an 
SEO and/or divestiture, perform worse than other IPO companies. Thus, the apparent discrepancy 
of our results in model (3) with the evidence of Brau, Couch and Sutton (2012) for the US is likely to 
be related to the mix of cash and stock acquisitions in our respective samples. Our sample is broadly 
balanced between the two types of acquisition and thus the combined acquisitions dummy is not 
significant, whilst the negative relationship between performance and acquisitions in their  sample is 
likely the result of a higher proportion of stock-based acquisitions in their sample. The method of 
payment may also account for the positive performance of European IPOs with subsequent acquisi-
tions reported by Bessler and Zimmermann (2011). 
Finally, it is important to note that our results are not directly comparable with any of the studies that 
focus on a single corporate event, i.e. acquisitions or seasoned equity offerings. Our evidence sug-
gests that it is the overall pattern and timing of the three types of corporate event that relate to 
aftermarket performance than any single type of event on its own. Such a pattern of follow-on cor-
porate events provides a more representative view of a firm’s ability to pursue successfully its long-
term strategic plan for future growth. 
3.7. Conclusions 
Using a sample of 1,504 IPOs listed in UK during the period January 1995 to March 2008, we track 
their follow-on corporate activities during the first 3 years of going public in terms of acquisitions, 
seasoned equity offerings and divestitures. We find that IPO firms become actively involved in a 
spree of acquisitions, funded either by cash, stock, or both, soon after their public listing and remain 
active over the whole three-year period in the aftermarket. In fact, about a quarter of the IPO com-
panies made at least two acquisitions and one in ten managed at least four such events during the 
same period; we also observe a broadly similar pattern for raising additional capital through SEOs. 
In contrast, the IPO firms’ divestiture activity is mainly concentrated during the end of the three-year 
post-listing period. Moreover, the first type of corporate event often sets the pattern of the activities 
to follow. We also show that only 17% of the IPOs that survived the three-year period were not 
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involved in any corporate activity after their public listing. The range and intensity of follow-on cor-
porate events across a wide range of recent IPO firms provides strong support for the view that going 
public is part of a long-term strategy for growth through access to capital markets.  
Our evidence suggests that all three types of corporate event are, to a certain extent, motivated by 
broadly similar considerations that relate to direct and indirect capital needs, recent price perfor-
mance, market conditions, and the feedback received by key market participants.  Cash acquisitions, 
for example, are likely to come early, funded by additional equity capital proceeds, and involve larger 
and more profitable firms. Stock acquisitions and SEOs, on the other hand, are linked to less profit-
able firms, strong market sentiment, significant underpricing at the time of flotation or recent rises in 
stock prices. Divestitures are also more likely among less profitable but larger firms following recent 
price declines.  
We also provide evidence that the pattern and timing of subsequent corporate activity is related to 
IPO companies’ long-term aftermarket performance. Firms with two or more corporate events during 
the first 3 years of going public outperform their passive counterparts by the end of the end of the 
three-year period after flotation. Such differences in performance, however, are not only linked to 
the type and intensity of post-IPO activity but to the timing and motivation of such corporate events 
as well.  
In other words, our evidence suggests that the long established pattern of aftermarket underperfor-
mance is not necessarily an inherent feature of newly listed firms. Like in the case of any other 
publicly listed firm, their performance is related to their ability to pursue their strategic objectives for 
long-term growth; the implementation of this process is likely to include a combination of corporate 
events like acquisitions, SEOs and divestitures. Other recently listed firms, without a sustainable 
long-term choose to remain wholly inactive or bring to an abrupt end any further plans for corporate 
activity when their first attempt proves unsuccessful. We believe that this is a fruitful dimension for 
further research towards understanding the critical linkages between corporate activities and long-
term performance of newly listed firms.  
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4. Reverse Takeovers: Are they a Viable Alternative to 
IPOs? 
 
Naaguesh Appadu1 Anna Faelten1 and Mario Levis1 
Abstract  
We examine the aftermarket performance and survival rates of firms going public through a reverse takeover 
(RTO) and compare them to the performance of a matched sample of IPOs on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) during the period 1995-2012. We find that RTOs are not fundamentally different from their IPO peers. 
Given that the UK regulatory framework treats RTOs in the same way as IPOs, our results are consistent with 
the view that lowering information asymmetry, providing additional protection to investors and thereby reducing 
mispricing, leads to the elevation of RTOs as a viable alternative to IPOs. 
 
4.1. Introduction  
Reverse Takeovers (RTOs), or Reverse Mergers (RMs) as they are usually known in the US, offer 
an alternative to the traditional IPO route for going public. They refer to a transaction in which a 
private firm takes control of a public one and becomes listed as a result of the takeover or merger, 
thereby bypassing the usual IPO process. A large number of firms in the US, Canada, Australia, the 
UK and others have in recent years chosen the RTO method for their public listing, such as the 
NYSE, Burger King, Fastjet, West African Minerals and Berkeley Group. The popularity of this 
method relates to the widely held, but sometimes mistaken, perception that under certain circum-
stances it is a more effective mechanism than IPOs in terms of lower cost and speed of completion.  
Despite the potential benefits in terms of speed and cost, RTOs have attracted considerable adverse 
publicity and regulatory attention. Bumi in the UK, Sino-Forest in Canada and the large number of 
Chinese RMs listed in the US between 2001 and 2010,1 are typical examples of such controversies. 
This has led to intense debate and scrutiny by investors and regulators as a large number of these 
cases ended in high profile class actions. The SEC has issued a number of warnings cautioning 
investors about the potential risks associated with RMs related to the accuracy of RMs’ public filings, 
accounting irregularities and stock price manipulation (MacFadyen, 2011 and Aydogdu et al., 2007). 
The US’s concerns about RTOs, however, go beyond issues related to foreign listings. They are also 
linked to the widespread occurrence of significant underperformance of the listed entities in the years 
following completion and the entities’ low survival rates (Gleason et al., 2005 and Adjei et al., 2008).  
The purpose of this paper is to assess the potential implications of the regulatory regime on the 
performance of UK RTOs. As the regulatory frameworks for RTOs and IPOs are broadly similar in 
the UK, we posit that aftermarket performance, survival rates and the follow-on activities of the two 
groups should also be very similar. More specifically, we argue that some of the key elements of the 
UK regulatory framework - such as the precise definition of an RTO in terms of asset class tests 
together with the requirement of publication of a full prospectus, the required shareholder approval 
and the potential to raise equity capital at the time of listing - have a number of important implications 
for the motivation, survival and long-term performance of the listed company.  
Firstly, the key characteristics of the UK regulatory framework support transparency and encourage 
a wider spectrum of companies with different characteristics and motivations to use this route for 
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going public. Secondly, the requirement of a full prospectus and shareholder approval reduces in-
formation asymmetry, provides additional protection to investors and enables the companies in-
volved to describe fully the purpose of their listing and their future plans for growth. Thirdly, the 
opportunity to raise equity capital at the time of listing and the involvement of underwriters and insti-
tutional investors also promotes valuation transparency and shareholder protection. 
Given the similarities of the regulatory regimes in UK for the two types of listing, we argue that the 
choice between an IPO and an RTO depends, in addition to operational characteristics such as the 
size and profitability of the private entity, on the underlying motivation for going public. For example, 
the transparency of the regulatory framework and the potential for raising additional equity capital at 
the time of listing provides an opportunity for a private firm to go public through an RTO and accom-
plish a genuine synergetic merger at the same time. On this basis, we expect the two types of listing 
to have broadly similar aftermarket performances, survival rates and levels of follow-on corporate 
activity to facilitate growth, i.e. raising additional equity capital and involvement in takeovers.   
Using a sample of 243 RTOs during the period 1995-2012, matched in terms of size, industry, listing 
and timing with an equivalent IPO sample, we find strong evidence in support of the contention that 
the regulatory framework has widespread implications for the motivation and performance of RTOs. 
Under the broad RTO classification, we find three types of transactions driven by entirely different 
considerations. They range from takeovers of Mature Shells1 or Special Purpose Acquisition Com-
panies (SPACs)1 to Synergy RTOs that involve the merger of a private entity with a going-concern 
public company in similar types of business that offers viable synergy potential. We also find that 
while in the US the majority of RMs involve shell companies used by private firms as a route for 
obtaining a public listing, the majority of UK RTOs involve firms seeking potential synergy gains. In 
addition, most UK RTOs also raise money at the time of going public and are actively involved after 
the listing in follow-on corporate activities, such as acquisitions and seasoned equity offerings. Fi-
nally, the RTOs’ aftermarket performance and their survival rates are broadly similar to their matched 
IPOs.  
Our paper makes three distinct contributions to the RTO literature. First, under the broad definition 
of an RTO, we find three types transactions: takeovers of mature public shells aiming for a fast public 
listing, mergers with similar public firms with potential operational synergy gains and takeovers of 
private firms by SPACs looking for suitable investment targets. Second, we find that survival rates, 
and the pattern of follow-on corporate activities (seasoned equity offerings and takeovers) are not 
fundamentally different to their IPO counterparts. Third, the differences in performance across the 
three types of RTOs suggest that the overall underperformance of RTOs documented in previous 
studies may be related to the relatively large number of SPACs and Mature shells included in their 
samples.  
Our evidence suggests that the disclosure and transparency of the regulatory framework is en-
hanced by the lowering of information asymmetry, thereby providing additional protection to inves-
tors and reducing the potential for mispricing, leading to the elevation of RTOs as a viable alternative 
to IPOs. In that sense, our study contributes to the ongoing debate on how best to regulate RTOs 
and the capital raising activities of small firms in general. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides a review of the literature 
on RTOs (RMs); Section 4.3 describes the data and the methodology used in this study; Section 4.4 
shows descriptive statistics of RTOs and IPOs and explores the characteristics of the three distinct 
types of RTO;  Section 4.5 presents an analysis of the choice between RTOs and IPOs; Sections 
4.6 and 4.7 show the follow-on activities and aftermarket performance of RTOs and IPOs in our 
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sample, while Section 4.8 concludes the paper; finally, Appendix describes the regulatory framework 
for RTOs in the UK and highlights the key differences with the equivalent regime in the US. 
4.2. .    Related Literature    
The literature on RTOs covers a wide range of issues related to the potential implications of the 
regulatory framework on the choice of method for going public, the motivation and characteristics of 
firms choosing this route for a public listing, timing, aftermarket performance and survival, and the 
speed and cost of such transactions.  
4.2.1. Regulation 
The nature and strictness of securities regulation has always been a policy tool for safeguarding 
investors’ interests by reducing information asymmetry, providing the information required to assess 
the riskiness of the firm, obtaining fair value for the investment and promoting stock market devel-
opment (La Porta et al., 2006). Stronger securities regulations are often in response to financial 
crises, surfacing scandals, corporate governance issues and financial innovations (Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher, 2014). The optimal level of strictness for small firms, start-ups and, more recently, 
crowdfunding in need of equity capital, however, remains a matter of ongoing debate. Libertarians 
argue that a framework free from restrictive procedures and long processes facilitates the funding of 
small to medium size companies and promotes growth. On the other hand, traditional regulators, in 
pursuit of safeguarding unsophisticated investors from fraud and speculative activities, remain cau-
tious.  
Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2014), for example, show that in the context of crowdfunding, strong 
investor protection may harm small firms and thus entrepreneurial activities. In the case of RTOs, 
Carpentier et al. (2006) find that their lighter oversight in comparison to IPOs in Canada leads to 
worse performance, both terms of earnings and stock returns. In short, regulators face the challenge 
of trying to strike a balance between tailoring securities law to match the financial needs of small 
firms and, at the same time, protecting investors to a reasonable extent. 
The regulatory framework may also have implications for the type of firms choosing the RTO route 
for going public and their motivation for doing so. The overwhelming majority of the academic evi-
dence, however, focuses on RTOs in general without explicitly considering the potential differences 
in their characteristics and motivation for going public, and the implications for the future activities 
and performance of these newly listed firms. Gleason et al. (2006), for example, using a relatively 
small sample of 121 RTOs in the US during the period 1987-2001, find that about 27% of participat-
ing public and private firms operate in the same industry, while 31% and 41% come from related and 
different industry sectors, respectively. Such proximity in industry suggests that expected potential 
synergies are an important consideration for using the RTO process to go public. Furthermore, while 
it is widely recognised that RTOs often involve some sort of a shell public company, the fact that 
such transactions differ both in motivation and the type of the public entity involved is often over-
looked.   
Carpentier et al. (2012) examine the implications of market regulation on RTOs from the perspectives 
of investors, managers and regulators. The analysis is based on a direct comparison between IPOs 
and RTOs in Canada, where the latter enjoy relatively easy access to the market and new listings 
are divided almost equally between the two groups. They find that IPOs in Canada perform better 
than RMs, both in terms of earnings and stock returns. Their results are consistent with the view that 
a commitment to a stricter regulatory framework lowers information asymmetry and reduces mispric-
ing. Further evidence on the implications of the regulatory framework is provided by Ignatyeva et al. 
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(2012). They argue that European SPACs are more flexible and able to complete their acquisitions 
more quickly due to less restrictive regulation by European stock exchanges. Furthermore, the over-
all average performance of European SPACs is relatively better in comparison to their US counter-
parts in spite of their negative returns. In fact, smaller European SPACs perform better than the 
larger ones and even earn a positive return twelve months after the decision date. 
The regulatory framework may also have an impact on the cost and speed of completing an RTO 
and the characteristics and motivation of firms opting for this method of listing. The empirical evi-
dence, however, is not always consistent with this view. In the US, for example, while it is assumed 
that such transactions can be completed within 60 days at a cost considerably lower than the aver-
age of 7% of capital raised for IPOs, the actual costs may depend on the agreed percentage of 
stocks retained by the original shareholders in the new company (Makamson, 2010). Moreover, as 
RTO transactions involve shell promoters who charge fees in terms of a certain percentage of own-
ership interest in the newly created entity, the total cost of the transaction is not necessarily lower if 
full account is taken of such fees. Along the same lines, the speed advantages are also not always 
apparent. Although in the US, an RTO can be completed within four months, the actual completion 
rates vary depending on the complexity of the deal and market conditions.  
In one of the very few non-US studies, Brown et al. (2013) also provide valuable additional insights 
into the characteristics and motivation of RTOs, or ‘backdoor listings’ (BDLs) as they are sometimes 
referred to, by using a sample from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), where the regulatory 
framework related to such transactions is considerably different to that in the US. Although in Aus-
tralia there is no formal regulation on RTOs, the ASX may impose readmission requirements as 
though the company were applying for a new listing. ASX also differs from the US in disclosure 
requirements by way of prospectus, while concurrent capital raising is found in the majority of cases. 
Thus, RTOs in Australia are closer substitutes for IPOs than in the US. Nevertheless, the authors 
find that RTOs in Australia tend be at an earlier stage of development, less profitable, raise less 
capital and take longer to complete than their matched IPO counterparts. 
4.2.2. The RTO vs IPO choice 
In order to assess the key determinants in the choice between an RTO and an IPO, Gleason et al. 
(2006) use the proxy statements from managers to shareholders describing these transactions. They 
report that the most commonly cited reasons for such transactions are the solid financial position of 
the private firm and the growth prospects of moving into complementary lines of business. They also 
report that at the time of going public, firms using RTOs tend to be smaller, less profitable and more 
leveraged than their IPO counterparts in terms of comparable size and industry. Also, in line with 
self-underwritten IPOs, they exhibit greater likelihood of financial distress and higher leverage in 
comparison to the matched IPO sample. Floros and Shastri (2009), in a comparison of RTOs with 
penny stock IPOs, also find that RTOs tend to be smaller and have lower profitability and lower 
liquidity. More importantly, they also show that private firms often opt for RTOs because they plan to 
conduct strategic acquisitions using the publicly traded stock as the mode of payment. Arellano-
Ostoa and Sandro (2002) also report that, in contrast to the high quality firms that go public through 
an IPO, reverse takeovers are populated by smaller and largely unknown firms. 
Interestingly, a broadly similar pattern is reported by Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008) on the choice 
between an IPO and a sell-out (the acquisition of a company by a public entity). Their evidence 
suggests that firms which go public through the latter route tend be lower growth firms with lower 
valuation ratios at an earlier stage of development. In this sense, sell outs are associated with more 
information asymmetry, broadly similar to that of their RTO counterparts.  
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4.2.3. Timing 
The choice between an IPO and RTO also depends on timing considerations. In contrast to IPOs, 
which are more likely to occur under ‘hot’ market and industry conditions, Brau et al. (2003) and 
Semenenko (2011) show that private firms use distressed public firms as vehicles to go public when 
market conditions are unfavourable. On the other hand, private firms take control of public firms in 
good financial health during favourable market conditions. Post-takeover financial performance is 
very likely to be related to such changing patterns of activity. Furthermore, they also report that most 
of the private firms which are linked with mergers are small, uncapitalised and have a low probability 
of survival. On the other hand, private firms merging with companies which qualify as going concerns 
are similar to those engaging in ordinary merger deals.  
Derrien and Kecskes (2007) report similar timing patterns for Introductions on the LSE. They find 
that, in cold markets, firms substitute Introductions for IPOs and that such offerings occur at the 
beginning of IPO waves. They also argue that firms use this two-stage strategy to time the market 
twice: first when listing and again when issuing equity. As exactly the same type of flexibility is also 
available to RTOs, this is an important additional strategic benefit in relation to IPOs.  
4.2.4. Cost Advantage and Aftermarket Performance 
Motivated by the recent debate on Chinese Reverse Mergers (CRMs) in the US, Jindra et al. (2012) 
examine the cost and characteristics of CRMs in comparison to Chinese firms which had ordinary 
cross-IPO listings on US exchanges.  During the period 2000-2010, the number of CRMs (100) was 
almost the same as that of Chinese IPOs (111). They argue that if one of the key motivations for a 
CRM is lower up-front costs than an IPO, it is reasonable that the companies involved would be 
smaller and less profitable than those listed through an IPO. Indeed, they find that CRMs are sub-
stantially smaller in terms of assets, have higher leverage and a lower analyst and institutional fol-
lowing. Moreover, CRMs have significantly underperformed in comparison to Chinese IPOs. The 
cost advantage of CRMs almost disappears when account is taken of the litigation costs as a result 
of the increased probability of class action and the associated costs. Lee et al. (2012), however, find 
that CRMs are generally healthier and perform better than both their US RM counterparts and a 
group of publicly traded firms matched by industry, size and date. Gleason et al. (2006) report that 
RTOs, in general, outperform their matched traditional IPOs in the short term and tend to exhibit 
comparable performance in the three years following their public listing. Semenenko (2011) attrib-
utes the apparent underperformance of RTOs in comparison to IPOs to their initial overvaluation. 
4.2.5. Survival and Follow-on Activities 
Adjei et al. (2008) shed further light on another dimension of the motivation behind RTOs and their 
performance by comparing the survival of RTO companies with IPO companies. In contrast to com-
mon belief, they report that only 1.4% of the RTO sample do not meet the initial listing requirements 
for any of the exchange standards. Thus, inability to comply with the standards is not the key moti-
vation for choosing this route for their public listing. Nevertheless, 42.7% of RTOs were delisted by 
the third year after listing, in contrast to 27% of their IPO counterparts. Such a high rate of failure 
may be due to information asymmetries as a result of limited disclosure at the time of listing and 
limited underwriter support. It is also consistent, however, with the view that an RTO is the preferred 
route for lower quality firms. Furthermore, Jampal et al. (2012) argue that in addition to financial 
performance, the survival of RMs also relates to the terms of governance characteristics of the new 
firm. They show that survival rates increase for firms with new Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) 
as well as a concave relationship between average board tenure and the probability of RM survival. 
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On the other hand, Banerjee et al. (2013) find that the survival of RTOs is related to operating per-
formance and not to the method of listing.  
Gleason et al. (2006) also find that upon announcement, there are significant increases in the price 
of the public firms.  Such gains, however, are not sustainable in the long term and there is little 
improvement in operational and profitability measures over the subsequent two-year period.  Fur-
thermore, more than 50% of the sample does not survive the first two years after the completion of 
the RTO. It is interesting also to note that they find marked differences in both the industrial compo-
sition of their initial sample of RTOs and in the RTO companies’ survival. More specifically, their 
analysis of the surviving entities suggests that 52% are involved in the same industry, 33% operate 
in complementary areas and about 15% move into different fields altogether. Such differences may 
be indicative of different motivations in the initial RTO transaction and a possible link between moti-
vation and aftermarket performance. Appadu et al. (2013) examine the type and pattern of follow-on 
activities such as acquisitions, SEOs and divestitures of IPOs during the three-year period after going 
public. Their evidence suggests that such corporate activities are directly related to the aftermarket 
performance of IPOs. On this basis, it is reasonable to assume that such activities may also provide 
another important dimension to the post-listing performance of RTOs. 
4.3. Sample and Methodology 
The extant literature on RTOs is largely based on US RTO samples from SDC, supplemented by 
relevant SEC filings (10-K, 10-Q and 8-K). The sample size is rather small (a maximum of 314 ob-
servations for the period 1996-2008 (Semenenko, 2011)) in comparison to those for IPOs. 
Our basic RTO sample comes from LSE statistics for the period 1 January 1995 to 30 June 2012. 
On the LSE list of new issues and IPO summaries, such transactions are classified by the issue 
types ‘placing and re-admission’, ‘introduction re-admission’, ‘offer for subscription re-admission’ and 
‘placing and public offer re-admission’. We compare the primary LSE sample with both the SDC and 
Zephyr databases and, on the basis of the individual readmission prospectuses,1 exclude any RTOs, 
which do not meet the LSE definition of an RTO clearly or do not involve a private company.  
The final sample consists of 243 RTOs and 1,643 IPOs for the sample period. Our data collection 
included a download of the amount of money raised at announcement and pre-announcement finan-
cials for the public and private firms from the LSE, SDC and Zephyr. The numbers were verified by 
a manual process of cross-checking the data with that available in the readmission prospectuses of 
individual RTOs. For comparative purposes, we also matched a sample of ordinary IPOs during the 
same time period as the RTO sample. For each of the 243 RTOs in this sample, we found a corre-
sponding new issue from the list of 1,643 IPOs by identifying the date and market of listing (Main vs. 
AIM), industry classification and asset size, for which we used the assets of the private entity of the 
RTO, i.e. the firm that was looking to go public.1  For the purpose of this study, we also collected 
data for follow-on activities (M&A and SEOs) for three years post the effective date of both the RTOs 
and IPOs. The M&A and SEO data were downloaded from Bloomberg. 
4.3.1. Descriptive statistics of RTOs and IPOs 
Table 4.3.1-A shows the annual distribution of the sample of 243 RTOs and 1,643 IPOs, which were 
listed on the two LSE markets during the period January 1995 to June 2012. The number of com-
pleted RTOs accounts for 13% of the total number of listings. It is interesting to note the subtle 
differences in the annual distribution of issues between the two groups. While, for example, the 
number of IPOs dropped significantly during the dot.com bubble in 2000-01, the flow of RTOs was 
not affected; however, the number of RTO transactions increased in line with IPOs during the 2004-
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06 recovery of IPO activity. Furthermore, during the recent crisis, when the number of IPOs dropped 
by 97% during 2007-09, the decline of RTOs was relatively modest. More specifically, for the first 
time ever, in 2009 the number of listed RTOs (eight) was twice the number of their IPO (four) coun-
terparts. Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that for companies, which meet the regulatory 
requirements necessary to carry out an IPO but do not need to raise money at the same time, going 
public reduces information asymmetry and makes it relatively easier for them to get a public listing 
during adverse market conditions.  Floros and Sapp (2011) show that in the US, the number of RMs 
in each of the years during the 2001-08 period was greater than the number of traditional IPOs. 
They argue that this increase relates not only to the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley in July 2002 but 
also to the obligation on shell companies to make regular filings, making them more transparent to 
private acquirers and helping them  
Table 4.3.1-A: Annual distribution of IPO and RTO activity during the period 1995-2012 
 
The table shows the annual distribution of IPO and RTO transactions. The data on IPOs is from the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) statistics website while the RTO data is sourced from the LSE, Bureau 
van Dijk and SDC Platinum, and has been subsequently cross-referenced with the company prospectuses 
produced for the purpose of the listing. Panel A compares the annual distribution of IPO and RTO activity, 
including the total money raised ($m) from both types of public listing. Panel B compares the annual 






























1995 4 4 0 0 0 11 53 
1996 2 2 0 0 0 82 419 
1997 7 4 3 43 25 53 273 
1998 11 5 6 55 46 71 7,119 
1999 9 4 5 56 20 77 10,951 
2000 13 5 8 62 58 201 9,276 
2001 13 2 11 85 290 78 4,892 
2002 17 8 9 53 45 54 3,983 
2003 8 5 3 38 21 50 2,586 
2004 23 4 19 83 246 214 4,375 
2005 43 18 25 58 309 261 8,471 
2006 41 14 27 66 182 200 13,534 
2007 14 4 10 71 92 144 11,096 
2008 13 4 9 69 61 30 3,227 
2009 8 4 4 50 85 4 414 
2010 10 3 7 70 23 49 8,879 
2011 5 2 3 60 13 46 5,780 
2012 2 2 0 0 0 18 374 
ALL 243 94 149 61 1,515 1,643 95,700 
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to improve their negative image somewhat. In fact the increasing number of RTOs in the US and 
UK, although for different reasons, may account, to a certain extent for the drop of IPOs raised by 
Gao, Ritter and Zhu (2013) and Ritter, Signori and Vismara (2013). 
The table also shows that, in sharp contrast to the US where RMs usually do not raise money at the 
time of the listing (Gleason et al., 2005 and 2006), 61% of the total sample of UK RTOs raised 
money at the time of going public. The average amount raised by RTOs is relatively small – £10.1m 
– in comparison to the £58.2m raised by the average IPO during the same time period. These large 
differences are, however, mainly driven by a small number of very large IPOs; the median amount 
raised by IPOs is just £7.2m in comparison to £3.5m for the equivalent RTO. It is also worth noting 
that the overwhelming majority (85%) of RTOs were listed on AIM, while the equivalent proportion 
of ordinary IPOs during the same period was below 70%. 
4.3.2. Types of RTOs  
A preliminary review, of the public entities which are involved in RTOs, indicates significant differ-
ences in the type of private and public firms participating in such transactions. Following a detailed 
assessment of the background, financials and motivation for the acquisition from the individual re-
admission prospectuses, we identified three distinct types of RTOs: Mature Shells, SPACs and Syn-
ergy RTOs. 
Our first type of RTO is the ‘Mature Shell’ type.  This is a publicly listed entity, which has been listed 
for more than a year by the time of the RTO but is not operating. It is most likely to be a business, 
which ran into financial difficulties but remained listed as a cash shell. It could also be a firm selling 
its operations and assets following bankruptcy. This group of RTOs is similar to a large number of 
the shells involved in US RMs.  
Our second type of RTOs involves the takeover of a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC), 
a newly listed firm with the sole intent of merging with unidentified single or multiple private or public 
firms within the first 12-18 months of going public.1  At the time of the RTO, the public entity may 
have cash assets only and no sources of revenue and is, in that sense, another type of shell, some-
times described as a naked shell. 
The third type is the ‘Synergy RTO’, which is a publicly listed entity that is fully operational and which 
has been listed for more than a year before an RTO is announced. We call this a Synergy RTO as it 
involves a genuine takeover of a (public) firm, which is in the same type of business as the private 
acquirer with the intention of building a new, larger public company that will benefit from the syner-
gies between the two parties. This type of RTO is clearly different from Mature Shells, where the 
targeted shell is only intended as a vehicle for capital growth, rather than any synergy acquisition 
objectives. 
Table 4.3.2-A shows a breakdown of our RTO sample according to the three distinct types of RTOs. 
In stark contrast to the previous literature in this field, which focuses mainly on the US where RTOs 
tend to involve a public shell company, Synergy RTOs emerge as the most common type in UK with 
more than 50% of the sample falling into this category, followed by SPACs (31%) and Mature Shells 
(17%). Furthermore, the annual breakdown shows a relatively low level of activity in the boom period 
(2004-07) for Mature Shell RTOs but a significantly higher level of SPAC and Synergy RTO activity 
during this period. This relatively higher level of SPAC activity suggests that such listings may be 
taking advantage of favourable market conditions rather than pure business considerations. The 
annual number of Mature Shells, on the other hand, is relatively stable over the same sample period; 
this reflects the nature of such transactions as they are more a corporate ‘rescue’ type of activity and 
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happen as the opportunity arises to ‘save’ a struggling entity by combining it with another which 
needs cash. Interestingly, the highest relative activity of this type was in 2012. 
 
 
In an unreported table, we find further evidence of the differences between IPOs and RTOs as a 
whole and their three distinct groups, showing details of their money raising activity at the time of 
going public. In contrast to the US, raising money is an important component of such transactions: 
61% of all RTOs in the UK raise equity at the time of going public.1 The amount raised by the median 
RTO is £3.46m, which is about half that raised by the equivalent IPO (£6.51m) but broadly consistent 
with their respective total assets and market values. On the other hand, the average amount raised 
 
 
Table 4.3.2-A: Annual distribution of RTO activity: Mature Shells, SPACs and Synergy RTOs during the 
period 1995-2012 
 












1995 0 0 0 0 4 100 
1996 0 0 0 0 2 100 
1997 1 14 1 14 5 71 
1998 3 27 0 0 8 73 
1999 2 22 3 33 4 44 
2000 4 31 3 23 6 46 
2001 2 15 3 23 8 62 
2002 3 18 5 29 9 53 
2003 1 13 2 25 5 63 
2004 5 22 5 22 13 57 
2005 7 16 17 40 19 44 
2006 3 7 20 49 18 44 
2007 2 14 6 43 6 43 
2008 3 23 3 23 7 54 
2009 3 38 3 38 2 25 
2010 1 10 3 30 6 60 
2011 1 20 1 20 3 60 
2012 1 50 1 50 0 0 
ALL 42 17 76 31 125 52 
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by RTOs as a proportion of market value (41.5%) is higher than the equivalent 30.6% for IPOs. This 
is predominantly due to Synergy RTOs, which raise an amount equal to 57.8% of the market value, 
clearly indicating that those companies that go public with a public entity in the same type of business 
do raise money (57.8%) with the clear intention of future expansion. On the other hand, mature RTOs 
raise a relatively small amount of money (a median of £1.58m), both in absolute terms and in relation 
to their market value (15.8%). Not surprisingly, SPACs raise relatively modest amounts of money at 
the time of transaction, probably relying on the significant cash reserves of their public partners for 
future growth. In fact the amount raised by RTOs (23.2%) is almost the same as IPOs (24.16%) only 
Mature Shells raised less than IPOs. 
4.4. The Choice between RTO and IPO  
Given the unique nature of each of the three identified groups of RTOs we expect some distinct 
differences in the operational characteristics both among the three RTO groups, and between the 
RTOs as a whole and their matched sample of IPOs.  More specifically we observe the following key 
differences: 
 RTOs in general are smaller, less profitable and more leveraged than their equivalent 
IPO counterparts. This is in line with the US evidence (Floros and Sapp, 2011) and 
simply reflects the earlier stage of development of RTOs in comparison to IPOs. A 
possible exception to this well pattern, are the private entities of synergy RTOs that are 
usually well established firms seeking growth through a merger with a public entity of 
similar nature 
 The publicly listed entity in an RTO is also generally smaller than an IPO, in terms of 
assets and revenue, and unprofitable but with high levels of cash on the balance sheet 
in comparison to its private counterpart 
 Given the nature of the public entities of mature shells they are likely to be smaller and 
less profitable in comparison to the other types of RTOs 
 As RTOs do not have to raise funds at the time of listing they are more likely to proceed 
with a public listing even in unfavourable market conditions 
 Because the key purpose of a SPAC is to complete an acquisition within a defined 
period since the listing, it is reasonable to expect that they maintain high levels of cash 
Finally it is worth noting that in sharp contrast to the US, where listing fees for RMs are lower than 
for IPOs, the UK practise is rather different. The requirements of the UK regulatory framework have 
a direct impact on the fees involved to complete the listing. Such additional costs relate to the raising 
of equity at the time of the RTO and associated underwriting costs, the preparation and issuance of 
a full prospectus and readmission fees to the stock exchange.  
Although precise data of such costs is not available, our investigation based on the information in-
cluded in the readmission prospectuses1  and other relevant market sources suggests that the aver-
age fees for RTOs, both in AIM and Main markets are not significantly different from their IPO coun-
terparts. 
4.4.1. Descriptive statistics   
Table 4.4.1-A, panel A reports descriptive statistics for the medians of total assets, revenue, profita-
bility, cash holdings, total debt and a number of related performance indicators for the whole sample 
of public and private RTO firms, for each of the three groups separately and for the matching sample 
of IPOs. 
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In line with our expectations, the typical private RTO entity in the UK is indeed generally smaller, 
with lower turnover and higher levels of debt and cash in comparison to their IPO counterparts.  
Furthermore, the publicly listed entity in an RTO is smaller in size in terms of assets and revenue, 
and unprofitable but with high levels of cash on the balance sheet in comparison to its private coun-
terpart. This is particularly true for Mature Shell public entities.  On the other hand, the public and 
private entities of Synergy RTOs are more similar to IPOs than the SPAC and Mature Shell pairs. 
Our evidence is broadly consistent with the US evidence which shows that larger firms are in general 
more likely to go public through an IPO rather than staying private (Chemmanur et al., 2010) or 
selling out to a public company (Brau et al., 2003).  
The assets for the median private firms in the Synergy RTOs group are £5.64m in comparison to 
£2.65m and £1.26m for the equivalent Mature Shell and SPAC RTO group firms, respectively. Syn-
ergy RTOs also involve larger public companies in terms of sales operating at a profit in the last year 
before takeover, in contrast to their Mature Shell and SPAC counterparts. It is also interesting to note 
that in terms of assets, sales and profitability, the profiles of private firms involved in Synergy RTOs 
are broadly similar to our matched IPO sample during the same period, suggesting that, while for 
such companies a direct IPO could have been a feasible alternative, they opted for an RTO instead 
on the basis of the speed and potential cost advantages of going public and completing an acquisi-
tion at the same time. In this respect, our results in relation to the Synergy RTOs are consistent with 
Adjei (2008), who finds that only 1.4% of US RTOs do not meet the listing requirements.  
Table 4.4.1-B provides further evidence of the differences between IPOs and RTOs as a whole and 
their three distinct groups, showing details of their money raising activity at the time of going public. 
In contrast to the US, raising money is an important component of such transactions: 61% of all 
RTOs in the UK raise equity at the time of going public.1 The amount raised by the median RTO is 
£3.46m, which is about half that raised by the equivalent IPO (£6.51m) but broadly consistent with 
their respective total assets and market values. On the other hand, the average amount raised by 
RTOs as a proportion of market value (41.5%) is higher than the equivalent 30.6% for IPOs. This is 
predominantly due to Synergy RTOs, which raise an amount equal to 57.8% of the market value, 
clearly indicating that those companies that go public with a public entity in the same type of business 
do raise money (57.8%) with the clear intention of future expansion. On the other hand, mature RTOs 
raise a relatively small amount of money (a median of £1.58m), both in absolute terms and in relation 
to their market value (15.8%). Not surprisingly, SPACs raise relatively modest amounts of money at 
the time of transaction, probably relying on the significant cash reserves of their public partners for 
future growth. Moreover,  the amount raised by RTOs (23.2%) is almost the same as IPOs (24.16%). 
In fact only Mature Shells raised less than IPOs. 
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Table 4.4.1-A: Descriptive statistics for public and private RTO entities at the time of public listing 
 











This table shows key financial characteristics for the public and private entities in the whole sample of RTOs 
and matched IPOs. The RTO entities have been matched – in terms of the approximate date of listing, industry 
classification and assets size (using the private entity’s assets) – with an IPO counterpart. The table also shows 
each of the three groups separately. The median values of Total Assets, Sales, EBITDA and Cash for each of 
the groups are in £m. The data is from the accounts of the individual entities at the time of listing or the last 
published accounts prior to the public listing as reported in the prospectuses of individual transactions. Panel 
A shows descriptive statistics for all of the RTOs in our sample and Panel B reports descriptive statistics related 
to the actual amount raised at the time of the public listing.  The RTO statistics only relate to the issues which 
actually raised money at this point in time. Table 2 also shows the median test between RTO and the three 
components (Mature Shells, SPACs and Synergy RTOs) and the Matched IPO sample where *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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107.7
8 




239 237 41 42 74 73 124 122 228 




239 240 41 42 75 74 123 124 230 
EBITDA/total 
assets (%) 




238 237 41 42 74 73 123 122 224 














236 238 41 42 74 72 121 124 222 














187 215 31 35 56 68 100 112 233 
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Number of issuers 
raising money 
 
149 28 50 72 243 
% of issuers raising 
money Mean 61.2 66.7 66.7 56.7 100 
Amount raised  (£m) Mean 10.12 4.69 9.77 12.47 21.15.81 
 Median 3.46 1.58 2.75 4.40 6.51 
Market value (£m) Mean 45.30 22.84 23.48 63.52 96.65 
 Median 14.72 13.06 15.73 16.07 23.5828 
Amount raised/mar-
ket value (%) 
Mean 41.5 20.1 25.1 57.8 30.62 
 Median 23.2 15.8 24.3 25.9         24.16 
 
4.5. Logit analysis: RTO vs IPOs 
To assess the likelihood of a private firm going public through an RTO instead of the traditional IPO 
route and how the types of RTO differ from each other in a multivariate framework, we use a logit 
regression model based on company characteristics and market conditions.  
Equation 1 presents the logit regression where the dependent variable is set to 1 when there is an 
RTO and 0 for a firm in the IPO matching sample.  
Ait  =  ai + β1(SIZE) + β2(LIQ) + β3(LEV)+ β4(PROF) + β5(ATO) +  β6(-3RET) + Β7(CONS)+ 
Β8(TECH) (1) 
On the basis of previous RTO literature and the nature of such transactions, we expect that firms 
using this route to go public are smaller, at an earlier stage of development with lower profitability 
and possibly limited balance sheet liquidity.  There is also evidence to suggest that they cluster in 
certain industries and, under such circumstances, are more likely to find it harder to attract the wide-
spread institutional interest necessary to enable them to complete a successful IPO. This is particu-
larly the case during periods of favourable market conditions when a number of more attractive firms 
are preparing for an IPO. We proxy the size of the private firm with the logarithm of Total Assets 
(Assets), Balance Sheet Liquidity by the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets (Cash/As-
sets), Leverage with the ratio of total debt to total assets, Profitability with the ratio of EBITDA to total 
assets and Efficiency with sales to total assets.1 We use the FTSE All-Share Index during the three 
months before the RTO/IPO as an indicator of market conditions and two dummy variables which 
take the value of 1 for both Consumer Services and Technology firms and 0 otherwise1. 
We use a similar binomial logit model to assess the choice between each of the three types of RTO 
(Mature, SPAC and Synergy) against the other two based on the characteristics of both the private 
and public entities in an RTO transaction. In this case, the dependent variable is set to 1 for one of 
the three RTO groups and 0 for the other two. Thus, we run three separate regressions for each 
group as the dependent variable using the characteristics of both the public and private entities in-
volved in the RTO transaction. We expect the public entities of Mature Shells and SPACs to hold 
proportionally higher levels of cash on their balance sheets, have lower asset turnover and be 
smaller in size than their Synergy counterparts.  
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Table 4.5-A, Column 1 shows the results of the logit for the choice between an IPO and an RTO. 
The dependent variable is set to 0 for IPOs and 1 for RTOs. Consistent with the univariate descriptive 
statistics, the negative and significant coefficients for the assets and cash/assets of the private enti-
ties confirm that private entities in RTOs are in general smaller and hold a lower proportion of cash 
to total assets in comparison to their IPO counterparts. Although this is entirely consistent with the 
US evidence, it is important to note that in unreported results of the same binomial model of IPOs vs 
the private entities of each of the three RTO groups separately, we find that such differences are in 
fact entirely due to SPACs and Mature RTOs. Synergy RTOs are similar in size and more profitable 
than their IPO counterparts. The negative and significant coefficient for the three-month market re-
turn is also consistent with the notion that RTOs time their listings during difficult market conditions.  
To access the potential differences among the public companies involved in each of the three iden-
tified types of RTOs, Columns 2-4 report results for the differences between the three RTO groups 
on the basis of the characteristics of public and private entities separately. In Model 2 (private and 
public), the dependent variable is set to 1 when there is a Mature RTO and 0 otherwise, in Model 3 
(private and public) the dependent is 1 for a SPAC and 0 otherwise, while in Model 4 (private and 
public) the dependent is 1 for Synergy and 0 otherwise. The results highlight some of the significant 
differences between the three groups of RTOs. First, Column 2 (public) shows that the public entities 
of the Mature Shells are smaller and less profitable in comparison to their SPAC and Synergy coun-
terparts. Second, the negative and significant coefficient for asset turnover and the positive coeffi-
cient for cash liquidity in Column 3 (public) confirm that the SPACs’ public entities maintain high 
levels of cash as they are searching for suitable takeover targets. Third, the positive and significant 
coefficients for the assets in Column 4 (private and public) suggest that both the private and public 
entities of Synergy RTOs are larger than their Mature and SPAC counterparts; at the same time, the 
public entities of Synergy RTOs carry a higher level of debt in comparison to the other two groups 
while their private counterparts are more profitable in spite of their lower asset turnover.  Fourth, the 
apparent tendency of RTOs in general to time their listing during unfavourable conditions is driven 
entirely by Mature Shells. There is no evidence to suggest timing considerations for SPACs or Syn-
ergy RTOs. It is also interesting to note that the overall popularity of the Consumer Services sector 
among RTOs is predominantly due to Mature Shells, while it is less prevalent among SPAC and 
Synergy RTOs. Overall, our evidence suggests that the choice of RTO type is predominantly driven 
by the characteristics of the public rather than private entities involved in such transactions. 
Table 4.5-A: The choice between RTO and matched IPO and between the three different types of RTO 
 
The table reports the results from a logit regression for the choice between IPO and RTO and the choice of 
RTO type, based on a set of private (prv) and public (pbl) entity characteristics and market conditions. Two 
industry dummies are included, Consumer Services and Technology, as they represent a significant propor-
tion of our sample: 24% and 13% respectively. The dependent variable in Column 1 is set to 1 for RTOs 
and 0 for IPOs. In Columns 2-4 the dependent variable is set to 1 for the specific RTO group and 0 for the 
other two. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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386 211 211 211 211 211 211 
 
To test the robustness of the binomial model for differences among the three RTO groups, we also 
applied a multinomial logit model where the dependent variable is set to 1 for Synergy, 2 for Mature 
and 3 for SPAC RTOs. We use the same variables as in the binomial model for both the private and 
public entities in an RTO. The results obtained, but not tabulated, are broadly similar with the con-
clusions drawn from the binomial model. 
4.6. Post-Listing Survival and Follow-on Corporate Activities 
The marked differences in the operational characteristics between RTOs and IPOs and the three 
types of RTO are likely to have direct implications on their survival, follow-on activities and aftermar-
ket performance after public listing. It can be argued, for example, that the smaller size and lower 
profitability of RTOs are indicators of poor quality, which effectively rules out a conventional IPO 
listing and, consequently, results in lower survival rates.  
Table 4.6-A reports the survival rate of RTOs during the first 6, 12, 24 and 36 months of going public 
as a the result of a takeover, bankruptcy or voluntary delisting.  These are reported for RTOs as a 
whole and for each of the three groups separately, and for comparative purposes we also show the 
equivalent delisting rates for our matched sample of IPOs. The results show that while the survival 
rate of RTO firms is very similar to that of IPO firms within the first year of going public, both for the 
group as a whole and for the three separate types, the pattern changes gradually over time. By the 
end of the 36-month period, the survival rate of RTOs is 80% in comparison to 90% rate for IPOs.  
It is also worth noting that although the UK RTO survival rate is lower than that of IPOs, it is never-
theless markedly higher than the US rate. Gleason et al. (2005), for example, report that only 46% 
of the companies in their RM sample survived longer than two years in comparison to a robust 93% 
for IPOs. Broadly similar results are reported by Adjei et al. (2008) and Jambal et al. (2012). This 
suggests that the tighter UK regulatory frame 
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Table 4.6-A: Survival rates for IPO and RTOs 
work, in terms of shareholder approval and raising money, enhances transparency and improves the 
quality of such transactions. Interestingly, in Panel B, in which the takeover reason for delisting is 
removed, the difference in survival rates between IPOs and RTOs is reduced to just 4%.  
There also are some differences in the survival rates over the three-year period following an RTO 
between the three groups. While, for example, only 75% of SPACs survive the three years, the 
equivalent proportions for Synergy RTOs and Mature Shells are 85% and 77%, respectively. Such 
differences, however, appear to be predominantly due to delistings related to takeovers. Excluding 
them, the results in Panel B suggest broadly similar survival rates for all three types of RTO.  
Table 4.6-B explores another important dimension to the potential differences in the underlying mo-
tivation for going between IPOs and RTOs, by tracking their follow-on corporate activities, in terms 
of acquisitions and raising additional equity capital, during the three-year period following their public 
 
This table reports the results of a survival analysis of IPOs and RTOs as whole and by RTO type. For each 
time period (6, 12, 24 and 36 months after listing), we show the percentage of firms which survived. Note 
that the full sample size will decrease as the length of time increases (n=243 will decrease with time t) as 
some of the firms in our sample were listed during the last three years, hence their survival rate is still to be 
determined. Panel B shows the same analysis as Panel A, but excludes firms which delisted because they 
were targets in a takeover. 
 









RTO RTO RTO RTO 
Panel A:  Percentage of firms surviving voluntary delisting, bankruptcy or takeover during the period  




242 239 42 75 122 




238 235 40 74 121 




227 213 37 63 113 




203 182 30 53 99 
Panel B:  Percentage of firms surviving voluntary delisting or bankruptcy, excluding takeovers, during the pe-
riod 




242 240 42 76 122 




238 236 40 75 121 




228 221 39 66 116 




206 198 34 61 103 
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listing.  The table shows the number and percentage of corporate events as a proportion of the total 
number IPOs and RTOs in the sample 6, 12, 24 and 36 months after going public.  
Values higher than 100% indicate that some of the IPOs/RTOs are involved in several follow-on 
activities. During the first six months of listing, the 243 IPOs in the sample were involved in 77 ac-
quisitions; on the other hand, the 243 RTOs were involved in only 25 acquisitions. RTOs, however, 
become more active in acquisitions at a later stage of their public life; in fact, by the end of the third 
year of listing, the remaining 228 RTOs were involved in 252 acquisitions in contrast to only 223 by 
IPOs. This is mainly driven by a substantial number of acquisitions made by Mature and Synergy 
RTOs. A broadly similar pattern of increasing corporate activity across all three groups of RTOs is 
observed for SEO activity as well.  
Table 4.6-B: Follow-on activity 
 
This table shows the analysis of follow-on activity of IPO- and RTO-matched firms, per RTO type. In Panel A, 
for each time period (6 months and 1, 2 and 3 years after listing), we show the number of follow-on events 
(acquisitions or SEOs) as a proportion of the number of firms. Note that the full sample of firms will decrease 
as the length of time increases as some of the firms in our sample were listed during the three years before 
the data collection cut-off date. Panel B shows the same analysis as Panel A but takes instead the number of 
firms with at least one corporate event, i.e. those which were active during the given time period, as a proportion 















6-month acquisition rate % 32 10 7 18 6 
 No. Events  78 25 3 14 8 
1st year acquisition rate % 50 31 24 41 27 
 No. Events  122 75 10 31 34 
2nd year acquisition rate % 86 73 98 66 70 
 No. Events  210 174 40 49 85 
3rd year acquisition rate % 107 111 149 99 106 
 No. Events  261 252 58 70 124 
6-month SEO rate % 12 10 5 11 11 
 No. Events  29 24 2 8 14 
1st year SEO rate % 23 24 17 21 28 
 No. Events  56 58 7 16 35 
2nd year SEO rate % 47 53 49 58 52 
 No. Events  113 126 20 43 63 
3rd year SEO rate % 64 70 72 76 67 
 No. Events  155 160 28 54 78 
6-month event rate % 44 20 12 29 18 
 No. Events  107 49 5 22 22 
1st year event rate % 73 55 41 63 55 
 No Events  178 133 17 47 69 
2nd year event rate % 133 127 146 124 121 
 No. Events  323 300 60 92 148 
3rd year event rate % 171 181 221 175 173 
 No. Events  416 412 86       124 202 
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In spite of the apparent similarities in the overall volume of corporate activity between IPOs and 
RTOs during the three-year period following public listing, it could still be argued that the drivers of 
such activities differ between the two groups. While for an IPO, for example, raising additional equity 
capital may be considered the customary path for future growth, the inherent diversity of RTOs may 
necessitate a more direct approach, depending on performance and underlying fundamentals. 
RTOs, for example, planning for future growth through acquisitions, may raise additional equity at 
the time of their RTO while the actual execution of their strategy may depend on subsequent perfor-
mance.  
In Table 4.6-C, we assess the potential differences in follow-on activities in terms of acquisitions and 
SEOs between IPOs and RTOs during the three years after flotation controlling for the market of 
listing (Main or AIM), whether the IPO/RTO raised capital at the time of listing, the abnormal perfor-
mance (total return) at the end of the 36-month period after flotation and industry dummies for Con-
sumer Services and Technology. Column 1 shows the regression results for all of the follow-on ac-
tivities while Column 2 shows the results for acquisitions and SEOs separately.  
As the IPO/RTO variable in Column 1 takes the value 0 for IPOs and 1 for RTOs, the positive coef-
ficient suggests that RTOs are in fact marginally more active in terms of acquisitions and SEOs in 
comparison to their IPO counterparts, and are spread across both markets. Looking separately at 
acquisitions and SEOs, the significant coefficients for IPOs/RTOs clearly suggest that RTOs are 
equally active as IPOs in each of these two types of corporate activities. Acquisitions are more likely 
to take place in the Main market, while SEOs are more popular in AIM. Not surprisingly, raising equity 
capital is a reliable predictor of further corporate activity for both RTOs and IPOs, and the rather 
strong aftermarket performance is also heavily related to corporate activity in terms of both acquisi-
tions and SEOs.  
From the above results, the weight of evidence in terms of survival rates and the volume of follow-
on corporate activity and its pattern suggests that UK RTOs, in sharp contrast to their US counter-
parts, are not fundamentally different in these respects from IPOs.  
Table 4.6-C: Follow-on corporate activity 
The dependent variable in Column 1 is the total number of acquisitions and SEOs during the three-year 
period after public listing, while the dependent variables in Columns 2 and 3 cover each of the two types 
of activity separately. The IPO/RTO variable takes the value of 1 for RTOs and 0 for Matched IPOs. The 
dummy for Main/AIM is equal to 1 for issues listed on the Main market and 0 for AIM. Raise capital takes 
the value of 1 for issues which raised capital at the time of listing and 0 otherwise. BHAR36 is the buy-
and-hold abnormal return for an issue relative to the FTSE All-Share Index or the FTSE SmallCap Index 
as the market benchmark. Two industry dummies have been included as they represent a significant 
proportion of the sample: Consumer Services is the most common industry classification, accounting for 
24% of the total population of RTOs and Technology accounts for 13%. *, ** and *** indicate significance 









    
IPO/RTO 0.360* 0.173 0.187* 
 (1.54) (0.88) (1.69) 
Main/AIM 0.801** 0.874*** -0.072 
 (2.44) (3.16) (-0.47) 
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Raise capital 0.796*** 0.518** 0.278** 
 (2.68) (2.06) (1.99) 
BHAR36 0.678*** 0.504*** 0.173*** 
 (4.84) (4.27) (2.63) 
Technology -0.309*** 0.048* -0.356** 
 (-1.01) (0.18) (-2.49) 
Consumer Services 0.537** 0.599*** -0.061 
 (2.20) (2.90) (-0.53) 
Constant 0.856*** 0.390 0.466*** 
 (2.50) (1.35) (2.89) 
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.075 0.024 
    
No. Observations  469 469 469 
 
4.7. Aftermarket Performance 
Long-term aftermarket performance estimates are based on BHARs for each RTO. These are com-




































where rit and rbt are the raw returns on RTO i and the selected benchmark b at event month t. 
The sample covers the period from January 1995 to June 2009 and the BHARs are calculated for 
each new issue until the earlier of either their third anniversary or delisting date. We report results 
for the first 6, 12, 24 and 36 months, excluding first-day returns, using two alternative benchmarks: 
the FTSE All-Share Index for issues listed on the Main market and the FTSE Small- Cap Index for 
those on AIM. The null hypothesis that the mean BHARs are equal to zero is tested using the skew-
ness-adjusted t-statistic with bootstrapped p-values, as suggested by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) 
and adapted by Jelic, Saadouni and Wright (2005). Note, the number of issues included in the cal-
culation of BHARs declines with the month of seasoning.  
Table 4.7-A reports four panels. Table 4.7-A (Panel A) reports 36-month equal and value-weighted 
BHARs for the samples of RTOs and IPOs in both the Main and AIM markets while panel B and C 
shows separate results for all  IPOs and RTOs listed in each of the two markets respectively. 
Finally Panel D shows the equivalent returns for each of the three RTO groups, i.e. SPACs, Mature 
Shells and Synergy RTOs, separately.  
Consistent with the RM evidence for the US (Carpentier, 2012 and Semenenko, 2011), our equiva-
lent UK RTO sample as a whole also underperforms the relevant benchmarks during the three-year 
period, at least in value-weighted terms. We find negative and statistically significant value-weighted 
BHARs throughout the 36-month period after the public listing of the RTO, starting from -7.80% in 
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month 6, gradually declining to -30.64% by month 36. The equivalent 36-month value-weighted 
BHAR for IPOs is -4.99% but not statistically significant. It is interesting to note the striking difference 
in the pattern of market value-weighted BHARs between IPOs and RTOs. Consistent with previous 
studies, (Levis, 2011) the 36-month value-weighted BHARs for our sample of IPOs are generally 
higher than their equally-weighted BHAR counterparts (-4.99 vs. -34.34%***) suggesting that larger 
IPOs perform relatively better on average than their smaller counterparts. Table 4.7 (panel B) pro-
vides further support for the differences in performance by size by showing separate results for the 
IPO in each of the two markets, i.e. Main and AIM.  IPOs in the main market perform consistently 
better than their AIM counterparts. While the 36-month returns of AIM IPOs are consistently negative 
for both the equally weighted average and the value weighted average, their Main counterparts are 
positive and statistically significant for the value weighted only 
Table 4.7-A: Aftermarket Performance: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
This table reports 36 months Buy-and - hold (BHAR) returns for our sample of RTOs and matched IPOs. 
The BHAR are adjusted to the FTSE All-Share Index (Main IPO or RTO) or the FTSE SmallCap Index 
(AIM IPO or RTO). EW is the equally-weighted portfolio and VW is the value-weighted portfolio. Observa-
tions is the number of companies in the portfolio at each time period (months 6, 12, 24 and 36 after listing).  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Panel A shows the 36 BHARs for the 
RTO and matched IPO samples in both the Main and AIM markets. Panel B and C report the BHARs for 
all IPOs and RTOs listed in each of the two markets respectively. And panel D reports performance for 
each of the three RTO types separately.  
 
Panel A: RTOs and matched IPO sample  
 Matched IPOs RTOs 

















-7.35%** -12.25%** -17.14%* -13.15% 
T-test -0.73 -2.18 -2.10 -3.83 -2.14 -2.19 -1.83 -0.84 












233 228 210 186 237 232 212 180 
 
Panel B: Matched IPO Main and AIM 
 Matched MAIN IPOs Matched AIM IPOs  





Month 6 Month 12 Month 24 Month 36 




T-test 0.28 -0.03 1.73* 1.44 -0.76 -2.15 -4.36 -5.16 














21 21 19 16 212 207 191 170 
 
Table 4.7-A (panel C)  provides further support for the size differences in the performance of RTOs 
by showing the separate buy and hold results for the RTOs listed in Main and AIM markets. Con-
sistent with our previous results, this section demonstrates that the overall negative performance of 
RTOs is predominantly due to such issues listed in the AIM market. At the same, although the BHAR 
is negative and statistically significant for RTOs listed on AIM, the results for value weighted is similar 
for RTOs listed on Main market but not statistically significant. At the same time equal weighted 
BHARs for RTOs both in Main and AIM markets perform better that their value weighted counter-
parts.1  
Panel C: Matched RTO Main and AIM  
       RTO  MAIN RTO AIM 







Month 6 Month 12 Month 24 Month 36 





T-test -0.05 0.70 0.78 1.31 -2.25 -2.87 -2.07 -1.17 















31 30 28 26 206 202 184 154 
 
Finally Table 4.7-A (Panel D) reports equivalent performance estimates for Mature Shells, SPACs 
and Synergy RTOs separately. By the end of the 36-month period, SPACs and Mature Shells un-
derperform their relative benchmarks in value-weighted terms by 63.77% and 32.59%, respectively; 
the equivalent BHAR for Synergy RTOs is also negative at -23.58%, but not statistically significant. 
Such differences are consistent with the nature and motivation of the tree RTO groups. 
 
 
Panel D: Three RTO groups 























































































































41 40 37 30 74 72 63 52 122 120 112 98 
 
To provide some further insights into the nature and drivers of the differences in the aftermarket 
between the three RTO groups, Table 4.7-B reports multivariate regression results using 36-month 
equally-weighted buy-and-hold returns as the dependent variable. We control for company size at 
the time of the listing by using the listing market, i.e. Main or AIM, and industry by using dummies 
for Technology and Consumer Services.1 We use return on assets as an indicator of operating per-
formance and the premium/discount on investment trusts during the three-month period before the 
public listing as an indicator of market sentiment. Model 1 shows the regression results for both the 
IPOs and RTOs. The positive and significant coefficient for the IPO/RTO dummy suggests that RTOs 
perform relatively better than their IPO counterparts, although the BHARs for both groups at month 
36 are negative.  Unsurprisingly, we also observe a positive and significant coefficient for return on 
assets across all six models, confirming the strong relationship between market and profitability. It 
is also interesting to note the negative and significant coefficients for market sentiment in Models 1, 
3 and 4 as they are consistent with the view that RTOs offer a relatively easy method of public listing 
during adverse market conditions. 
Finally, in Models 4 to 6 we examine the 36-month aftermarket across the three RTO groups con-
trolling again for the listing market and industry. The negative and significant coefficient for SPACs 
indicates that their performance is worse than the other two groups; on the other hand, Synergy 
RTOs, in spite of their negative BHARs by the end of the 36-month period, still do relatively better 
than the other two groups.  
Table 4.7-B: Multivariate cross-sectional regressions of 36-month aftermarket performance of 
The dependent variable is the equally weighted BHAR for RTOs and Matched IPOs relative to the FTSE 
All-Share Index or the FTSE SmallCap Index as the market benchmark. The independent variables are: a 
dummy variable with the value 1 for RTOs and 0 for IPOs; the LSE listing market equal to 1 for Main and 0 
for AIM; return on assets (EBITDA/assets) at the time of the listing; and industry dummies for Consumer 
Services and Technology (which represent a significant proportion of the sample: 24% and 13% of the total 
population of RTOs respectively); market sentiment is proxied by the premium/discount of investment trusts 

















RTO (1)/IPO (0)   0.119* 
(0.82) 
     
Main (1)/AIM (0)       0.493** 
(2.27) 










Return on assets     0.0051* 
(2.35) 

























































Synergy RTOs      
0.395* 
(1.65) 
Intercept      -0.379* 
(-1.90) 












R2 adjusted 0.026 0.012 0.038 0.067 0.074 0.078 
No. Observations  359 184 177 177 177 177 
4.8. Conclusions 
Despite the potential benefits and recent growth, RTOs have attracted considerable adverse public-
ity and regulatory attention. The similarity of the IPO and RTO regulatory frameworks in the UK in 
terms of transparency, disclosures and shareholder approvals provide a unique opportunity to as-
sess the potential implications of such consistency on the characteristics, motivation, follow-on cor-
porate activity and aftermarket performance of the two groups of listings during their first three years 
of going public. 
Using a sample of 243 Reverse Takeovers (RTOs) and a matched sample of IPOs listed on the 
London Stock Exchange during the period January 1995 to June 2012, we find that under the broad 
RTO definition, there are three groups of firms which differ in terms of the characteristics, maturity 
stage of the public and/or private parties involved and the underlying motivation for going public via 
the RTO route. In contrast to the US experience, we show that the majority of UK RTOs consist of 
firms looking for expansion through a simultaneous synergetic acquisition and a public listing, with 
the remaining reversing into some type of listed shell entity. We also find that, consistent with the 
pattern of IPOs, firms choosing the RTO route to go public are also actively involved in acquisitions, 
SEOs or both soon after their public listing and remain active during the whole three-year period in 
the aftermarket. The survival rate of RTOs (excluding takeovers as a reason for delisting) is only 
marginally lower than IPOs (90%), ranging from 77% to 85%, depending on the type of RTO. Thus, 
the UK evidence suggests that, although an RTO is a quite distinct method of going public and the 
profiles of the companies involved are different from ordinary IPOs in terms of financial characteris-
tics at the time of their public listing, their survival rates and aftermarket performance are very similar.  
In fact, the apparent long-term underperformance in value-weighted terms for the RTO group as a 
whole is predominantly due to a relatively small number of large SPAC RTOs. Our evidence sug-
gests that the transparency and strictness of the regulatory framework make RTOs a viable alterna-
tive for a range of small companies aiming for a public listing. In other words it could be argued that 
the bad reputation of RTOs in US is not necessarily related to the nature of transaction itself but 
more to the opacity and complexity of the RTO process. Moreover, the transparency and strictness 
of the regime also has a direct impact on the motivation for going public.  
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Although our results are consistent with the view that the disclosure and transparency of the regula-
tory framework, by lowering information asymmetry, providing additional protection to investors and 
reducing mispricing, account for at least part of the positive assessment of UK RTOs, it will require 
further research to establish with certainty the exact reasons for the performance differences be-
tween the UK and the US. In that sense, our results come as a timely contribution to on-going dis-
cussions across different countries regarding the regulations governing this type of transaction. 
4.9. Appendix: The RTO regulatory frameworks in the UK and the 
US   
There are a number of important differences between the UK and the US in terms of the regulatory 
requirements related to the definition of an RTO, shareholder approval, required documentation and 
capital raising practices. 
First, according to the UK Listing Authority (UKLA) guidelines, an RTO on the AIM market is defined 
as any acquisition or acquisitions in a 12-month period which exceed 100% in any of the class tests 
for a company listed on AIM; these tests are set in terms of gross assets, profit, turnover and amount 
paid in relation to the target’s market value. Second, in terms of shareholder approval and disclosure 
requirements, RTOs are treated in exactly the same way as IPOs.1  Third, UKLA guidelines require 
that any agreement, which would result in a reverse takeover must be conditional on the consent of 
its shareholders. In the US, shareholder approval depends on the shell company’s status of incor-
poration and listing; many states and stock exchanges require shareholder approval before a com-
pany can issue shares constituting more than 20% of the outstanding shares pre-transaction.1,  
Fourth, UK RTOs often raise capital at the time of such transactions, similar to Australia where the 
raising of capital from RTOs occurs in the large majority of cases (Brown et al., 2012). In the US, on 
the other hand, the concurrent raising of capital happens rarely; some private companies, however, 
may combine a reverse merger with a private investment in a public equity (Asquith and Rock, 2011). 
The new entity may, of course, access capital markets at a later date when the stock has risen and 
the offering becomes less dilutive.  This is broadly similar to the two-stage listing process available 
through Introductions on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In terms of regulatory and institutional 
details, an Introduction is identical to an IPO except that no shares are introduced, hence no money 
is raised. 
Fifth, an RTO company seeking readmission to the LSE needs to comply with exactly the same entry 
requirements as any other company applying for admission for the first time, including the publication 
of a prospectus and full accounting disclosures. The prospectus always refers to such readmissions 
as reverse takeovers if they are classified as such under UKLA guidelines. In such cases, they will 
have to fulfil various class tests as RTOs on the LSE. Applying the same entry requirements as IPOs 
and requiring the publication of a prospectus lowers information asymmetry, reduces mispricing and 
enhances the market’s confidence in the performance of the newly listed firms.  
In the US, since the exchange of shares between the two parties is considered to be an offer of 
securities all that is required is for the shell company to prepare and circulate a private placement 
memorandum describing the terms of the deal as well as some information about themselves.  This 
may be not necessary if the shareholders of the private company qualify as accredited investors.  
Last but not least, while it appears that the majority of US RTOs (RMs) involve shell companies1 
which are in this situation either as a result of termination of their normal operations or because they 
were formed explicitly as a public shell,1 UK RTOs do not necessarily involve strictly defined shell 
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companies either in terms of SPACs or not operating as a result of recent restructuring, but do in-
clude a wider variety of listed entities as bidders.  
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